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GEOGRAPHICAL  SEGMENT  DISCLOSURE  AND  CAPITAL  MARKET 
RISK  ASSESSMENT  OF  MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISES 
ABSTRACT 
This  study  examines  the  geographical  segment  dis- 
closure  practices  of  UK  based  multinationals  in  a 
capital  asset  pricing  framework  during  the  period 
1973-1982.  Thirty  six  companies  were  chosen  from 
"The  Times  1000"  for  the  year  1981-82  which  had  sub- 
stantial  overseas  sales  (at  least  10%  of  consolidated 
sales,  had  year  end  on  31  December,  had  continuous 
listing  on  the  London  stock  exchange  for  the  nine 
year  period,  and  had  either  continuously  disclosed 
geographical  segment  information  in  their  financial 
statements  in  each  of  the  years,  or  had  changed  their 
geographical  segment  disclosure  practices  from  non- 
disclosure  to  disclosure  on  31  December  1977. 
An  intervention  analysis  was  carried  out  to  test  the 
impact  of  intervention  (change  in  disclosure  practice) 
on  the  systematic  risk  profile  of  the  treatment  group 
(twentyone  companies),  as  compared  with  the  control 
group  (fifteen  companies).  Moving  regression  was 
used  to  generate  a  time  series  of  betas,  and  beta  of 
betas  was  used  to  test  the  stability  of  betas  over 
time.  Results  showed  that  geographical  segment  data (iii) 
had  information  content;  that  the  London  stock  market  was 
efficient  in  a  semistrong  sense;  and  that  there  were  overall 
reductions  in  risk  arising  from  geographical  segment  disclosure 
accruing  to  the  treatment  group  companies  as  a  consequence  of 
changing  their  disclosure  practices. 
The  contribution  to  knowledge  from  this  research  lies  in  its 
being  one  of  the  few  market  efficiency  studies  based  on  the 
London  stock  market,  and  the  first  to  test  the  market's 
response  to  geographical  segment  disclosures. 
This  research  also  provides  evidence  relevant  to  the  debate 
on  segmental  disclosure  in  the  United  Kingdom. (iv) 
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2 CHAPTER  13 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0  The  Environment 
It  is  generally  believed  that  data  provided  in  the  financial  statements 
"directly  affect  the  way  in  which  'conflicting  interests  are  resolved" 
(Ijiri,  1967,  p  67).  This  view,  although  popularly  believed  to  be 
true,  may  not  necessarily  be  the  whole  truth.  It  is  also  possible, 
that  there  is  a  flow  of  influence  in  the  oppositedirection  -  the 
pressure  group  theory,  which  believes  that  the  development  of 
financial  reporting  practice  is  affected  by  the  conflicting  interests  of 
various  user  groups  such  as  management,  consumers,  investors,  creditors, 
regulatory  bodies,  and  others  (Aranya,  1979).  Developments  in 
geographical  segmental  disclosure  can  be  seen  in  the  light  of  these 
pressure  groups. 
Although  the  demand  for  segmental  financial  disclosure  has  gathered 
momentum  only  in  the  1970s,  (Skousen,  1970),  this  is  not  an  isolated 
phenomenon.  In  the  19th  century,  joint  stock  companies  evolved  in 
response  to  the  substantial  financing  needs  of  corporations  in  the 
wake  of  the  industrial  revolution,  which  the  pre-19th  century  form 
of  owner-manager  organisations  could  not  satisfy  (Yamey,  1960;  Ma, 
1982).  As  substantial  additional  financings  were  sought,  and  joint 
stock  corporations  were  formed,  demand  for  financial  information 
geared  to  the  needs  of  the  shareholders  also  grew.  The  Joint  Stock 
Corporations  Act  of  1844  in  the  UK  was  probably  the  first  in  the 
world  to  pioneer  such  information  disclosure,  requiring  companies 
to  present  a  'full  and  fair'  balance  sheet  to  shareholders, 
although  it  did  not  specify  the  form  and  contents  or  valuation 
methods  to  be  used  (Edey  and  Panipatki,  1956,  pp  356-357). 4 
As  the  industrial  revolution  became  diffused  from  its  UK  base  in 
the  19th  century.  disclosure  requirements  similar  to  -'those  of  the  UK 
were  pronounced  by  regulatory  authorities  in  other  countries  of 
the  continent  of  Europe  and  North  America  and  subsequently  in  the 
rest  of  the  world  to  protect  the  interests  of  investors  and  others 
from  unscrupulous  acts  by  insiders  such  as  managers  and 
directors.  The  US  Securities  Act  of  1933,  and  Securities  Exchange 
Act  of  1934  are  two  such  initiatives  on  regulating  financial 
reporting  by  corporations  to  protect  the  interests  of  investors 
and  other  user  groups  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1929  crash,  and 
pressures  from  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange.  An  overview  of  the 
chronological  development  of  company  financial  reporting  can  be 
found  in  Zeff  (1979)  in  the  US  context,  and  in  Nobes  and  Parker 
(1979)  in  the  UK  context. 
As  the  industrial  revolution  matured,  and  technology  became 
more  sophisticated,  businesses  expanded  to  reap  the  benefits  of  a 
larger  scale  of  operation,  and  smaller  organisations  merged  with 
'larger  ones.  As  the  merger  movement  gathered  momentum  in  the 
second  half  of  the  20th  century,  business  activities  became 
increasingly  diversified  (Steiner,  -1975)  and  expanded  across 
national  frontiers,  even  ignoring  product-market  logic,  in  the 
form  of  conglomerates  (Mueller,  1980).  Just  as  the  industrial 
revolution  resulted  in  general  financial  disclosure  being  demanded, 
reflecting  the  change  from  owner  management  in  the  pre-19th  century 
to  joint  stock  corporations,  so  did  the  development  of  business 
combinations  and  diversification  in  the  1960s  and  after  give  rise  to 
a  demand  for  segmental  disclosure  as  mergers  and  diversifications 
resulted  in  less  and  less  meaningful  information  being  available 
to  investors  and  other  user  groups  (Ronen,  1982). 5 
In  the  United  States  of  America  the  Subcommittee  on  Antitrust  and 
Monopoly  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  began  hearings 
on  the  economic  concentration  in  American  Industry  in  September 
1964.  Various  pressure  groups  represented  by  users  such  as 
accountants  and  financial  analysts  gave  evidence  to  the  Subcommittee 
on  Antitrust  and  Monopoly  demanding  more  meaningful  segmental 
disclosure  which  culminated  in  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 
(SEC)  requiring  disclosure  by  diversified  companies  of  the  results 
of  operations  by  line  of  business  in  1969,  and  subsequently  the 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB)  publishing  Financial 
Accounting  Standard  (FAS)  No.  14  on  segment  reporting  in  1976. 
Developments  surrounding  the  segment  reporting  issue  in  the  USA 
have  been  chronicled  by  Skousen  (1970). 
Segment  reporting  as  required  by  the  SEC  or  the  FASB  is 
mainly  of  the  line  of  business  variety.  While  this  is  a 
legitimate  area  of  disclosure,  as  business  organisations  have 
become  more  and  more  transnational,  a  further  development  in 
information  required  for  users  is  data  on  geographical  performance. 
While  there  is  some  evidence  of  debate  in  the  international  capital 
markets  literature  on  the  benefits  of  geographical  diversification 
(Grubel,  1968;  Levy  and  Sarnat,  1970;  Agmon,  1973),  there  has  been 
very  little  research  on  geographical  diversification  in  the  context 
of  financial  reporting.  Yet,  "Segmentation  on  a  geographical  basis 
is  not  an  alternative  to  segmentation  on  the  basis  of  line  of 
business  activity.  It  is  distinctly  and  significantly  different, 
as  foreign  countries  often  exhibit  different  risk  and  return 
profiles...  "  (Gray,  1981,  p  39). 6 
This  is  the  environment  of  geographical  segmental  disclosure. 
There  has  been  no  accounting  standard  or  exposure  draft  on 
segmental  disclosure  in  the  United  Kingdom,  although  the 
Accounting  Standards  (Steering)  Committee  in  Corporate  Report 
(1975,  paras  6.49-6.51)  has  found  segmental  disclosure  to  be  a 
plausible  mode  of  financial  reporting.  The  UK  Companies  Act  1981 
and  the  London  Stock  Exchange  Listing  Agreement  (1979)  also  require 
geographical  segmental  disclosure,  although  such  requirements  are 
not  very  rigorous  largely  due.  to  practical  difficulties  of  segment 
identification,  materiality  and  meaningfulness. 
Apart  from  the  UK  and  the  USA,  various  international  bodies  also 
have  made  pronouncements  regarding  segmental  disclosure,  including 
geographical  disclosure.  A  comparative  analysis  of  segmental 
disclosure  requirements  by  various  national  and  international 
bodies  appears  in  chapter  III  (section  3.2)  following. 
1.1  The  Disclosure  Issue 
The  disclosure  issue  in  the  context  of  this  research  is  the  issue  of 
information  disclosure.  Information  is  not  synonymous  with  data. 
While  data  are  simply  facts  which  are  obtained  through  empirical 
observation,  and  knowledge  a  group  of  law  like  generalisations  relating 
data  to  the  environment,  information  is  the  resulting  co-ordination 
of  data  with  knowledge  when  data  are  screened,  edited  and  evaluated 
for  use  by  a  specific  user  in  a  given  situation  (Caspari,  1968). 
Thus,  any  system  of  financial  disclosure  need  be  user  oriented, 
taking  cognizance  of  user  needs  and  user  environment  (AAA,  1977). 7 
Information,  once  public,  has  public  goods  characteristics 
(Demski,  1974).  In  a  multiperson  setting  user  needs  and  user 
environments  can  be  various.  In  such  diverse  setting,  if  Pareto 
optimality  is  unattainable,  then  second  best  (Prest  and  Turvey,  1965) 
will  have  to  do,  where  a  disclosure  system  should  be  such  that 
given  the  social  and  institutional  constraints,  the  system  should 
be  acceptable  by  the  majority. 
There  are  costs  as  well  as  benefits  of  disclosure.  Information 
has  to  be  produced  as  well  as  disseminated.  It  can  be  argued  that 
disclosure  decisions  are  best  left  to  the  market  mechanism.  In 
an  efficient  market,  all  information  would  be  impounded  in  stock 
prices.  This  may  be  true  of  public  information,  but  market  efficiency 
in  the  strong  form  sense,  reflecting  private  information  is  far 
from  proved  (Dyckman,  Downes  and  Magee,  1975;  Jensen,  1978).  It 
can  be  argued  that  "self  interest"  or  "capture"  theory  would  operate 
in  any  system  of  voluntary  disclosure  where  companies  would  produce 
and  disclose  information  only  up  to  the  point  where  the  benefits 
from  disclosure  in  the  form  of  lower  cost  of  financing  and  obtaining 
credit  are  not  negated  by  costs  of  information  production, 
dissemination  and  competitive  disadvantages  (Mautz  and  May,  1978). 
It  can  also  be  argued  that  left  to  the  free  market,  a  disclosure 
system  might  not  work  in  the  best  interests  of  the  society.  Good 
news  are  likely  to  be  disclosed  while  bad  news  might  be  suppressed 
(Horowitz  and  Kolodny,  1980),  resulting  in  moral  hazard  problems 
(Arrow,  1971). B 
If  voluntary  disclosure  is  inadequate,  mandatory  disclosure  might 
be  an  alternative.  Yet,  mandatory  disclosure  could  result  in 
information  overload  (section  2.221)  from  the  user  viewpoint, 
additional  costs  of  information  production  and  competitive 
disadvantages  from  the  producers'  viewpoint,  and  costs  of 
bureaucracy  from  the  societal  viewpoint.  To  recommend  mandatory 
disclosure  practice,  it  will  have  to  be  shown  that  the  realised 
inadequacies  of  market  outcomes  are  greater  than  potential 
inadequacies  of  non-market  efforts  to  ameliorate  them  (Wolf,  1979). 
The  disclosure  issue  is  thus  an  issue  of  social  choice;  of 
striking  the  right  balance  between 
. 
mandatory  and  voluntary 
disclosure  systems  taking  into  account  the  multi-person  nature 
of  information  and  non-transitivity  of  individual  and  social 
choices  (Arrow,  1951). 
1.2  Geographical  Disclosure  and  Risk 
The  geographical  segmental  disclosure  problem  is  distinctly  different 
from  line  of  business  disclosure  problem  because  foreign  countries 
often  exhibit  different  risk-return  profiles  due  to  varying  histories 
of  economic  development,  cultural  differences,  and  differing  host 
government  ambitions  and  requirements  (Kobrin  et  al,  1980). 
Disclosure  of  geographical  prospects  by  multinationals  can  help 
investors  in  the  assessment  of  risk  return  prospects  of  multinationals 
since  finer  information  can  result  in  a  better  understanding  of  the 
aggregate  (Marschak  and  Radner,  1972). 
In  an  efficient  market,  finer  geographical  information  is  likely  to 
be  reflected  in  the  stock  prices  resulting  in  better  investment  or 
divestment  decisions  by  individuals,  In  a  two  parameter  mean-variance 
efficient  portfolio  when  all  firm  related  unsystematic  risk  can  be 9 
diversified  away  (Sharpe,  1964)  all  that  mattersis  systematic 
risk.  If  finer  information  about  geographical  prospects  affects 
the  volatility  of  stock  prices,  then  it  may  be  worthwhile 
investigating  if  such  information  will  also  affect  the  systematic 
risk  of  conglomerates.  International  capital  market  literature 
(Lessard,  1974)  posits  that  a  multinational  company's  risk  can  be 
decomposed  into  industry,  country  and  world  factors.  If  the  country 
factor  is  a  significant  influence,  then  it  is  possible  that 
geographical  segment  disclosure  resulting  in  finer  information 
about  country  prospects  will  also 
iffect 
a  multinational's  risk. 
1.3  The  Objective  of  this  study 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  association  between 
multinationals'  systematic  risk  and  their  geographical  segment 
disclosure  practice.  This  association  will  be  examined  by  testing 
two  hypotheses:  - 
1  If  geographical  segment  data  have  information  content,  then 
there  will  be  an  association  between  geographical  segment 
disclosure  and  multinationals'  beta  without  prejudice  as  to  the 
direction  in  which  the  betas  might  move.  If  this  association  is 
supported,  then  it  will  substantiate  the  notion  of  market  efficiency 
in  a  semi-strong  sense  so  far  as  geographical  segment  information 
is  concerned,  and  provide  evidence  in  support  of  the  international 
market  model  which  suggests  that  multinationals'  beta  can  be 
decomposed  into  world,  country  and  industry  factors.  This  is  the 
main  hypothesis  of  this  thesis. 10 
2  If  finer  information  in  the  form  of  geographical  segment 
data  reduces  overall  uncertainty  about  the  company's  prospects, 
then  such  reduced  uncertainty  may  result  in  a  reduction  in  the 
total  variability  of  the  company's  stock  prices.  To  the  extent 
that  total  variability  of  the  company's  stock  prices  includes 
systematic  risk,  it  is  possible  that  on  average  there  will  be 
an  association  between  geographical  segment  disclosure  and 
reduced  systematic  risk.  If  this  second  hypothesis  is  supported, 
it  will  give  weight  to  earlier  research  by  Choi  (1973  b), 
Dhaliwal  (1978)  and  others  who  have  found  evidence  that 
improved  disclosure  can  result  in  a  lower  cost  of  equity  capital. 
The  two  above  hypotheses  will  be  tested  in  the  context  of  UK  based 
multinationals  during  the  period  1973-1982. 
1.4  Limitations 
The  objective  of  this  study  as  outlined  earlier  (section  1.2)  is  of 
necessity  limited.  The  limitations  are  as  follows:  - 
(i)  This  research  will  concentrate  on  geographical  segment 
disclosure.  By  concentrating  on  geographical  disclosure,  it 
will  naturally  not  emphasise  other  forms  of  disclosure  such 
as  line  of  business.  The  reason  for  concentrating  on 
geographical  disclosure  is  that  while  line  of  business 
disclosure  has  been  extensively  investigated  by  earlier 
researchers  (eg  Kinney,  1971;  Collins,  1976a)  in  the 
USA,  there  have  been  very  little  published  research 
investigating  geographical  segmental  disclosure. 11 
(ii)  It  will  examine  a  UK database  rather  than  US  or  other  database, 
primarily  because  research  in  the  area  of  segmental  disclosure 
on  UK  database  have  been  very  few  (Emmanuel  and  Pick,  1980  being 
the  exception). 
It  will  examine  disclosure  benefits  only,  and  exclude  costs  from 
the  scope  of  the  investigation,  to  keep  the  research  in  manageable 
size. 
(iv)  It  will  concentrate  on  one  user  group  only,  the  investors  and 
not  investigate  disclosure  benefits  to  other  user  groups  such 
as  employees,  trade  unions,  consumers  etc  because  of  the 
difficulties  in  obtaining  meaningful  data  for  user  groups  other 
than  investors. 
ýv)  Even  within  the  context  of  benefits  to  investors  it  will 
only  investigate  the  association  between  risk  and 
geographical  segment  disclosure  ignoring  other  benefits 
such  as  improved  forecasting  ability  of  segmental 
information. 
1.5  Database  and  Methodology 
Database  and  methodology  of  this  research  are  explained  in  chapter  VII, 
and  an  overview  is  also  given  in  appendix  VII(E). 12 
Database  and  methodology  of  this  research  will  be  geared  to  the 
achievement  of  the  limited  objective  outlined  in  sections  1.3  and 
1.4  above.  Since  the  proposed  area  of  investigation  is  the  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  practice  of  UK  based  multinationals,  the 
companies  to  be  chosen  must  be  of  UK  origin,  substantially  large,  with  a 
significant  amount  of  foreign  sales,  and  have  a  common  year  end  to 
minimise  the  impact  of  seasonal  fluctuations  in  their  fortunes  and 
consequently  on  their  stock  prices. 
As  the  companies'  systematic  risk  profiles  are  to  be  examined,  the 
time  series  to  be  chosen  must  be  one  with  a  reasonable  length,  five 
to  ten  years,  for  which  continuous  stock  prices  will  be  available. 
The  index  to  be  chosen  as  a  market  proxy  must  similarly 
be  continuous.  Stock  prices  for  the  companies'  will  have  to  be 
adjusted  for  capitalisation  issues  and  dividends. 
Since  geographical  segment  disclosure  practices  are  to  be  investigated, 
the  companies  chosen  will  have  to  be  grouped  into  treatment  and  control 
groups,  and  risk  characteristics  of  the  treatment  group  will  have  to 
be  compared  with  that  of  the  control  group.  To  be  able  to  compare  this 
risk  profile  difference  between  the  two  groups  effectively,  an 
intervention  point  will  have  to  be  chosen  at  which  the  treatment  group 
will  have  changed  its  segmental  disclosure  practices.  There  will  have 
to  be  enough  observations  on  either  side  of  the  intervention  point  to 
enable  a  meaningful  time  series  measurement. 
Underlying  characteristics  of  the  data  will  have  to  be  examined  to 
establish  appropriate  methods  for  testing.  For  instance  if  the 
underlying  data  are  serially  correlated  or  unstable,  intervention 
analysis  might  be  used  instead  of  cumulative  average  residual  method. 13 
Appropriate  statistical  tests  and  significance  level  will  have  to 
be  chosen  to  be  able  to  draw  meaningful  conclusions.  Finally,  to 
improve  external  validity  of  the  conclusions  which  may  be  drawn, 
confounding  variables.  will  have  to  be.  identified,  and  their  influences 
on  the  results  tested. 
1.6  Expected  Contribution  to  Knowledge 
Expected  contribution  to  knowledge  stemming  from  this  research  are 
as  follows:  - 
(i)  Since  disclosure  benefit  studies  until  now  have  primarily  been 
conducted  on  US  data,  this  research  will  contribute  to  the  fund  - 
of  knowledge  by  extending  disclosure  benefit  studies  to  UK  based 
companies  of  which  there  has  been  only  one  (Emmanuel  and  Pick, 
1980). 
(ii)  It  will  probably  be  the  first  ever  study  on  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  benefits  in  the  UK  context,  since  Emmanuel  and  Pick's 
research  only  investigated  the  forecasting  ability  of  industry 
segmental  data. 
(iii)  By  testing  market  reaction  to  segmental  geographical  information 
in  the  London  Stock  Market,  it  will  provide  evidence  of  market 
efficiency  or  otherwise  of  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  in  a  semi- 
strong  sense. 
T..  k. 14 
(i  Q)  By  testing  for  country  influence,  as  one  of  the  components  of 
disaggregated  beta,  it  will  provide  evidence  in  favour  or  other- 
wise  of  one  of  the  possible  'k'  factors  in  the  Arbitage  Pricing 
Model  of  Capital  Asset  Pricing. 
(v)  It  will  test  the  applicability  of  the  cumulative  average 
residuals  in  capital  market  studies  by  examining  the 
underlying  characteristics  of  the  datapoints  in  the  timeseries, 
and  possibly  showing  the  applicability  of  intervention 
analysis. 
(vi)  It  will  contribute  to  the  dormant  issue  of  segmental  disclosure 
in  financial  reporting  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  Accounting 
Standards  committee  did  examine  this  issue  in  the  Corporate 
Report  (1975)  but  very  little  has  been  done  about  it 
since  then. 
1.7  An  Overview 
Earlier  sections  of  this  chapter  have  introduced  the  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  issue  in  the  UK  context,  explained  research 
objectives  and  limitations,  described  possible  approaches  in  database 
and  methodology,  and  stated  the  possible  contributions  to  knowledge 
stemming  from  this  research.  In  this  section,  an  overview  will  be 
provided  showing'how  the  objective  of  this  research  is  likely  to  be 
achieved. 15 
Chapter  II  will  set  the  scene  by  explaining  the  theoretical  background 
of  information  disclosure  following  which  segmental  disclosure  issues 
will  be  analysed  in  chapter  III.  Since  this  research  is  about 
information  disclosure  in  the  context  of  the  capital  market,  chapter  IV 
will  provide  a  background  of  information  processing  efficiency  of  the 
stock  market,  and  chapter  V  will  examine  the  risk  assessment  aspects. 
Prior  research  in  the  area  of  segmental  disclosure  in  general,  and 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  in  particular  will  be  analysed  in 
chapter  VI,  setting  the  scene  for  empirical  analysis.  Hypotheses, 
database  and  experimental  design  of  the  empirical  aspects  of  this 
research  will  be  explained  in  chapter  VII,  and  the  results  will  be 
analysed  and  interpreted  in  chapter  VIII. 
Chapter  IX  will  explore  the  implications  of  this  research  for  market 
efficiency,  for  risk  measurement,  and  for  disclosure  policy  formulation. 
Chapter  X  will  contain  a  summary  of  what  has  been  achieved  in  this 
research,  and  what  has  not,  and  point  to  some  areas  of  future  research. 
A  bibliography  of  all  references  cited  in  this  research  will  be 
provided  in  chapter  XI. 
First,  the  theory  of  information  disclosure,  of  which  geographical 
segment  disclosure  is  a  subset,  will  be  examined. 16 
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2.0  Introduction 
This  research  is  about  segmental  disclosure  and  multi- 
nationals'  risk  assessment.  Thus,  there  are  two  import- 
ant  strands  in  this  research:  (i)  financial  reporting 
aspects  and  (ii)  risk  profile  aspects.  This  chapter 
will  be  concerned  with  the  financial  reporting  aspects. 
In  particular  the  theoretical  foundation  of  disclosure, 
of  which  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  a  subset, 
will  be  the  main  concern  of  this  chapter. 
Since  disclosure  is  about  information,  this  chapter  will 
discuss  both  disclosure  and  information  in  a  general 
sense.  First,  the  normative  nature  of  disclosure  will 
be  discussed  and  the  nature  of  user  needs  and  user  en- 
vironment  will  be  explored.  Such  user  needs  and  user 
environment  concepts  will  be  utilized  in  establishing  a 
disclosure  framework. 
Information  concepts  will  then  be  defined,  and  the 
quantitative  and  qualitative  aspects  of  information  will 
be  explored.  Distinctions  will  be  made  between  the 
physical  approaches  to  information  theory  and  the  psycho- 
logical  approaches.  Finally,  special  problems  of  inform- 
ation  disclosure  in  a  multiperson  setting  will  be  analysed. 23 
2.1  Disclosure 
The  central  purpose  of  financial  reporting  is  the  dis- 
closure  of  economic  data  about  reporting  entities. 
It...  at  a  very  general  level,  accounting  writers 
appear  to  agree  that  the  central  purpose  of 
financial  accounting  is  the  systematic  provision 
of  economic  data  about  reporting  entities  ...  " 
(AA-A,  1977,  P"1) 
In  this  systematic  provision  of  economic  data  about 
reporting  entities,  a  distinction  is  sometimes  made 
between  'decision  based  systems'  and  'accountability 
based  systems.  '  A  system  that  is  decision  based  is 
centered  on  the  decision  maker,  namely  the  user  of 
information.  A  system  that  is  accountability  based, 
on  the  other  hand,  focuses  on  the  relationship  between 
the  producer  of  the  information  and  the  user  of  the 
information.  (Ijiri,  1983). 
Irrespective  of  which  framework  one  uses,  "users"  play 
a  key  role  in  establishing  financial  reporting  objectives. 
It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  a  large  number  of  criteria 
as  being  relevant  in  the  evaluation  of  financial  reporting 
systems.  AAA  (1977,  pp.  16-17)  lists  reliability, 
relevance  for  decision  making,  timeliness,  comparability, 
predictive  ability  and  optimal  quantity  and  cost  as 
being  some  of  these  criteria.  It  is  possible  that  there 
are  others.  But  all  these  criteria  are  just  subsets  of 
one  overall  criterion  -  "usefulness.  "  (Peasnell,  1973). 24 
If  usefulness  is  the  overall  criterion,  then  user  needs 
should  be  paramount  in  designing  and  evaluating  financial 
reporting  systems.  Appropriate  disclosure  of  financial 
data  and  relevant  information  to  the  users  is  thus  a  key 
issue  in  financial  reporting.  An  understanding  of  user 
characteristics,  and  the  environment  in  which  users 
operate  would  thus  be  a  prerequisite  in  the  formulation 
of  an  appropriate  disclosure  policy  in  financial  reporting. 
2.11  User  needs 
The  set  (or  sets)  of  users  of  financial  accounting  re- 
ports  need  to  be  specified  before  a  reporting  system 
appropriate  for  such  users  can  be  designed  and  evaluated. 
In  more  recent  years  users  have  been  seen  not  as  a 
homogeneous  group  such  as  shareholders,  but  as  consisting 
of  divergent  interest  groups  such  as  creditors,  employees, 
regulatory  authorities,  the  general  public,  consumers, 
and  many  others  in  addition  to  shareholders. 
(Demski,  1974;  Corporate  Report,  1975;  A.  AA,  1977)- 
Even  when  the  population  of  users  is  specified,  a  number 
of  questions  remain  about  the  behaviour  of  users  needs 
which  require  clarification.  Some  of  these  questions 
are: 
1.  To  what  extent  do  beliefs  and  preferences  vary 
across  users? 
2.  Do  differences  in  user  beliefs  and  preferences 
affect  (i)  the  demand  for,  and  (ii)  use  of 
accounting  reports? 25 
ý.  Are  users  influenced  by  tformt  as  well  as  by 
'content'  of  accounting  reports? 
ý+.  When  faced  with  multiple  sources  of  data,  how  do 
users  combine  the  various  data  into  a  composite 
assessment? 
5.  Do  answers  to  any  of  the  above  questions  change 
when  one  looks  at  users  in  the  aggregate  rather 
than  individually? 
(A,  1977). 
These  are  important  questions,  and  in  many  cases  there 
are  interdependencies.  Moreover  user  needs  are  not 
independent  of  user  environment.  The  environment  in 
which  the  user  operates  may  change  his  perception  of 
needs  for  financial  reports. 
2.12  User  Environment 
User  specification  and  user  needs  are  important  in 
establishing  an  appropriate  disclosure  framework. 
Equally  important  is  an  understanding  of  the  environment 
in  which  the  user  is  likely  to  operate.  (AA.  A,  1977)" 
Some  of  the  important  environmental  issues  relevant  in 
the  setting  up  of  a  disclosure  framework  are: 
1.  When  competing  sources  of  information  exist  who 
should  produce  the  information?  Cost  considerations 
in  such  cases  will  have  to  be  weighed  against  the 
efficiency  of  such  information  with  regard  to  both 
form  and  content. 26 
2.  Information  'efficiency'  of  the  market  is  another 
important  environmental  issue.  To  what  extent  are 
securities  markets  'efficient'  in  reflecting  avail- 
able  information?  If  there  are  market  failures, 
is  intervention  necessarily  desirable? 
3.  Externalities  may  exist  among  users.  Disclosure  of 
segmental  results  by  line  of  business  or  by 
territories,  for  instance,  may  reduce  the  entity's 
competitive  strength  if  potential  or  existing  com- 
petitors  are  able  to  use  such  information  to  the 
detriment  of  the  discloser. 
ý+.  Externalities  among  producers  of  information  can 
also  be  an  important  consideration.  Information 
disclosed  by  one  source  may  affect  disclosure  by 
another. 
These  are  some  of  the  environmental  issues  in  a  dis- 
closure  context.  It  is  possible  newer  environmental 
issues  will  emerge  over  time  as  the  institutional  structure 
of  society  changes.  Simultaneous  consideration  of  user 
needs  and  user  environment  enhances  the  possibility  of 
the  formulation  of  a  plausible  disclosure  framework. 
2.13  A  Disclosure  Framework 
A  plausible  disclosure  framework  should  take  into  account 
both  user  needs  and  user  environment.  Users  are  the 
beneficiaries  of  disclosure.  Therefore,  if  users  are 
identified  as  investors,  then  the  pertinent  information 
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to  disclose  will  be  the  risk-return  profile  of  the 
entity.  If  users  are  identified  as  employees  of  the 
organization,  then  potential  continuity  of  employment 
will  probably  be  the  main  concern. 
Since  beliefs  and  preferences  of  user  groups  vary  in  a 
multi-group  situation,  disclosure  emphasis  may  have  to 
be  different  even  in  disclosing  the  same  information  in 
different  environmental  context.  'Sophisticated' 
users  such  as  financial  analysts  may  not  be  particularly 
concerned  with  'form'  as  they  can  extract  'contents' 
easily,  while  unsophisticated  users  may  be  greatly  in- 
fluenced  by  'form'  of  disclosure. 
Even  the  same  user  may  have  multiple  objectives,  and  the 
same  information  may  have  to  be  disclosed  in  different 
settings.  There  may  be  potential  conflict  here  since 
the  meaning  of  the  data  may  change  depending  on  the 
context  in  which  such  data  is  disclosed. 
Finally,  any  individual  user  is  also  a  member  of  a  group. 
An  item  disclosed  may  have  different  consequences  in  an 
individual  setting  from  those  in  an  aggregate  setting. 
Taking  segmental  disclosure  as  a  specific  issue,  some  of 
the  pertinent  questions  may  be  formulated  as  follows: 
1.  Is  there  a  need  for  segmental  disclosure,  from  the 
individual  point  of  view  and  the  societal  viewpoint? 
2.  Who  would  be  the  likely  users  of  such  information, 
and  to  what  end? 28 
3.  What  are  the  likely  benefits  from  such  disclosure? 
4.  What  are  the  likely  costs,  and  who  should  bear  such 
costs? 
5.  Should  all  entities  be  asked  to  disclose  segmental 
information,  or  only  those  with  'substantial' 
business  identified  by  turnover,  trading  profits, 
or  capital  employed? 
6.  Are  there  incentives  for  voluntary  disclosure,  or 
should  such  segmental  disclosure  be  mandatory? 
7.  If  segmental  disclosure  is  warranted,  how  should 
segments  be  identified?  Should  segments  be 
identified  by  line  of  business,  by  territories,  or 
something  else? 
g.  If  segments  are  identified  by  territories,  how 
should  such  territories  be  identified?  Is  it  by 
continent,  by  countries,  or  simply  by  home  and 
export? 
9.  What  should  be  the  contents  of  such  segmental 
geographical  disclosure?  Should  it  be  sales, 
profits,  capital.  employedp  or  some  others,  or 
some  combination  thereof. 
These  are  just  some  of  the  questions.  Answers  to  each 
one  of  these  can  be  many.  Possible  answers  to  these 
questions  need  careful  consideration  before  a  plausible 
disclosure  framework  can  be  established. 29 
Financial  reporting  is  about  disclosure  of  economic  data 
about  reporting  entities.  To  be  meaningful  such  dis- 
closure  has  to  be  of  value  to  users.  In  a  multi- 
person  setting  user  objectives  and  abilities  differ. 
Therefore,  to  maintain  usefulness,  disclosure  methods 
and  forms  must  vary  depending  on  user  need  and  user 
environment.  Environmental  considerations  include 
externalities  among  users,  among  producers,  and  between 
producers  and  users.  Disclosure  ramifications  thus 
overflow  into  the  areas  of  interrelationships  between 
groups  and  within  groups.  An  understanding  of  in- 
formation  theory  can  enhance  one's  understanding  of 
these  interrelationships. 30 
1 
2.2  Information 
In  a  user  oriented  framework  of  accounting,  the 
purpose  of  financial  reporting  is  the  dis- 
closure  of  financial  and  related  information  to 
users  such  as  investors,  creditors  and  others. 
Since  disclosure  is  disclosure  of  information, 
an  understanding  of  information  theory  concepts 
will  be  beneficial  in  understanding  the  nature 
of  information  disclosure*-- 
_ 
Before  the  ramifications  of  information  theory 
can  be  explored,  some  of  the  definitions  related 
to  information  concept  need  to  be  clarified.  In  the 
information  theory  literature  a  distinction  is 
made  between  (i)  data  (ii)  knowledge  and  (iii 
information.  Caspari  (1968,  p.  8)  for  instance 
has  distinguished  these  three  concepts  as  follows-: 
Data  are  simply  facts,  which  are  obtained  through 
empirical  observations.  Knowledge  is  a  group  of 
law-like  generalisations  which  relate  data  to 
their  environment;  information  is  the  resultant 
coordination  of  data  with  knowledge  when  data 
are  screened,  edited  and  evaluated  for  use  by  a 
specific  user  in  a  given  situation.  Thus  knowledge 
is  the  means  by  which  data  become  useful  to 
the  user;  knowledge  may  become  information  when 
it  is  used  in  making  a  decision. 31 
The  definition  of  information  as  given  above  is 
the  one  accepted  in  the  social  sciences.  How- 
ever,  early  developments  in  information  theory 
which  were  in  the  physical  sciences  (mainly  in 
telecommunication)  had  no  such  user  orientation. 
Information  in  telecommunications  was  devoid  of 
'meaning'.  According  to  Shannon  and  Weaver 
(1949)  "information  must  not  be  confused  with 
meaning"  (p.  8).  Information  system  in  tele- 
communications  context  consisted  of  five  com- 
ponents:  source,  transmitter,  channel,  receiver 
and  destination.  The  system  was  an  objective 
physical  system,  sender  oriented  and  mechanical. 
Developments  of  information  theory  in  the  social 
sciences  have  been  mainly  in  psychology  where 
the  physical  signal  transference  concepts  have 
been  merged  with  perceptional  aspects  of  human 
beings  resulting  in  Human  Information  Processing 
(HIP)  theory  which  has  taken  into  account  the 
receivers'  objectives  (Brunswik,  1952;  Miller,  1960). 
More  recently  -the  ramifications  of  inform- 
ation  concepts  have  been  extended  to  the 
societal  context  (Demski,  197!  ),  and  in  the 
context  of  organizational  environment  (Feldman 
and  March,  1981). 
In  the  sections  following  information  theory 32 
will  be  explored  both  in  a  quantitative  sense  as 
well  as  in  a  qualitative  sense  in  a  single  person 
setting;  subsequently  information  choice  in  a 
multiperson  setting  will  be  analysed. 
2.21  Amount  of  Information  (The  Bayesian  Approach 
Information  theory  as  developed  by  Shannon  (1949) 
in  telecommunications  was  primarily  directed  at 
measuring  the  amount  of  information  contained  in 
a  message.  The  objective  of  such  an  approach 
to  quantification  can  be  grouped  into  three 
categories: 
(i)  to  provide  analytical  means  for  measuring 
the  capability  of  transmission  channels  in 
order  to  determine  the  optimal  size; 
(ii)  to  minimize  the  undesirable  effect  of  "noise"; 
and 
(iii)  to  determine  the  amount  of  redundancy  in  a 
message  in  order  to  economise  on  its  size. 
The  information  theory  approach  to  quantification 
is  based  upon  the  premise  that,  for  any  problem, 
there  are  a  certain  number  of  possible  answers 
to  which  probabilities  may  be  attached. 
When  information  about  the  problem  is  received, 
the  original  probabilities  undergo  a  trans- 
formation.  Some  answers  may  no  longer  exist 
as  a  possibility  and  their  probabilities  become 33 
zero,  while  the  probabilities  of  other  answers 
may  increase,  decrease  or  remain  unchanged. 
Information  is  defined  in  this  context  as  a 
function  of  the  two  sets  of  probabilities:  the 
one  before  the  reception  of  the  message  and  the 
other  after  it.  Thus,  knowledge  of  the  changes 
in  the  probabilities  permits  measurement  of  the 
amount  of  information  contained  in  the  message 
that  induced  these  changes. 
2.211  Uncertainty  Reduction 
Information  is  related  to  the  decrease  in  the 
amount  of  doubt  concerning  the  occurrence  of  an 
event.  Therefore,  the  amount  of  information  is 
a  function  of  the  unexpectedness  of  an  event. 
Learning  the  occurrence  of  an  unexpected  event 
is  worth  far  more  than  if  it  is  expected.  The 
greater  the  expectation  or  probability  associated 
with  the  occurrence  of  an  event,  the  smaller  is 
the  amount  of  information  contained  in  a  report 
of  its  occurrence. 
A  prior  estimate  of  the  amount  of  information 
expected  from  a  message  labelled  "entropy"  is 
the  summation  of  the  probability  of  each  possible 
event  times  the  amount  of  information  associated 
with  its  occurrence.  The  minimum  condition 
under  which  information  can  be  transmitted  is 34 
that  in  which  a  choice  or  selection  must  be  made 
between  two  alternatives.  The  maximum  un- 
certainty  will  exist  when  the  two  alternatives 
have  the  same  probability  of  occurrence,  as  in 
the  toss  of  a  coin.  By  definition,  wherever 
a  choice  is  made  between  two  alternatives  which  on 
an  a  priori  basis  are  equally  likely,  it  is 
specified  that  the  choice  has  transmitted  one 
unit  of  information.  This  unit  is  called  the 
"bit"  -a  contraction  of  the  words  "binary 
digit".  One  unit  of  information  is  necessary 
to  make  a  binary  decision.  Thus,  if  there  are 
8  possibilities  and  each  one  is  equally  likely 
to  be  selected,  and  only  one  of  these  8  is 
chosen,  the  amount  of  information  transmitted  is 
3  bits:  23  =  8. 
Blackwell  and  Girschik  (1951+)  formalised  this 
uncertainty  reduction  aspect  of  information  by 
emphasising  the  receiver  of  the  information, 
and  used  Bayesian  Decision  Theory.  The  result 
of  Blackwell's  theorum  most  frequently  used  in 
accounting  literature  states: 
Given  two  (noiseless)  systems,  Y  and  'Y', 
Y  will  be  at  least  as  valuable  as  IYI 
for  every  probability  density,  and  for 
every  payoff  function,  if  and  only  if 
Y  is  at  least  as  fine  as  'Y'. 
(Marschak 
and  Radner,  1972,  pp.  64-66) 35 
The  mathematical  relationship  between  uncertainty 
and  probability  is  given  by  the  logarithm  of  one 
divided  by  the  probability  of  selecting  a  given 
element  from  the  set  of  elements. 
Symbolically,  if  we  define  - 
H=  degree  of  uncertainty,  and 
p=  probability,  then 
H=  log  (l/p) 
=-  log  p. 
In  the  two  limiting  cases  - 
if  p=1,  then  H=0 
if  p=0,  then  H=  oC 
In  most  choice  situations,  however,  we  have  - 
0<p  <I 
oc)H  >0 
If  the  possible  number  of  equiprobable  events  is 
reduced  in  the  process  of  choice  from  the  in- 
itial  probability  po  to  pl  after  information 
signals  are  received,  the  degree  of  reduced  un- 
certainty  which  is  also  known  as  the  quantity  of 
information  (H)  is  measured  in  bits  (binary 
units,  for  example  yes  and  no  answers)  by  the 
following  expressions 
H=  1og2  Po  -  logt  P1 
=  logt  (p0  /  P1)  bits 36 
Feltham  (1972,  p.  9)  has  defined  information 
as 
"the  meaning  derived  from  data,  provided 
the  knowledge  of  the  person  receiving 
those  data  is  changed  ...  data  are 
information  if  their  receipt  results 
in  change  in  the  receiver's  probability 
distribution". 
To  derive  "meaning"  it  is  important  to  consider 
the  role  of  a  priori  knowledge.  Gorelik  (1975) 
has  mapped  the  relationship  between  a  priori 
knowledge,  and  the  quantity  of  semantic  in- 
formation  from  a  message  as  follows: 
(Figure  2.1) 37 
A  Priori  Knowledge  and  Amount  of  Information 
(I) 
Amount 
of 
Inform- 
ation 
(I)  max. 
a  priori  knowledge  (S) 
9 
min.  =  Minimum  amount  of  a  priori  knowledge 
necessary  for  the  receiver  to  begin 
to  understand  a  given  message. 
9  opt.  =  The  optimal  amount  of  a  priori  know- 
ledge  enabling  the  receiver  to 
extract  all  the  information  from  a 
given  message. 
8  max.  =  The  amount  of  a  priori  knowledge  with 
which  the  receiver  will  extract 
nothing  new  for  himself  from  a  given 
message. 
(Gorelik,  1975,  pp.  120-121) 
Figure  2.1 
.d  min.  I  or  up  to.  .d 
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Figure  2.1  shows  that  at  a  certain  level  of  a 
priori  knowledge  maximum  amount  of  information  is 
obtained; 
8 
optimum  is  this  level.  If  a  priori 
knowledge  is  very  little  or  non  existent,  very 
little  or  no  information  is  obtained  from  the  data 
because  the  receiver  is  not  able  to  relate  the 
data  to  any  decision  setting.  At  the  other  end  of 
the  scale  if  a  vast  amount  of  relevant  a  priori 
knowledge  is  already  in  the  possession  of  the 
receiver,  the  data  has  no  surprise  value,  hence 
no  information  is  obtained  from  the  data. 
2.22  Value  of  Information 
In  a  user  oriented  discipline  such  as  accounting, 
knowing  the  amount  of  information  is  not  enough, 
it  is  important  to  be  able  to  establish  of  what 
value  the  information  is  to  the  user. 
Value  is  that  quality  of  anything  which  makes  it 
desirable.  Marschak  and  Radner  (1972,  p"85)  helve 
defined  value  of  information  as  follows: 
"Value  of  information  is  that  cost  which 
equate  the  maximum  net  expected  utility 
for  the  given  information  structure  to  the 
maximum  net  expected  utility  obtained  with 
no  information.  " 39 
It  is  implied  in  the  definition  of  value  of 
information  that  the  value  of  information- 
generally  arises  from  an  interaction  between: 
(i)  information,  (ii)  receiver  of  the 
information  and  (iii)  the  receiver's  goals  or 
needs.  In  this  context  information  has 
value  only  as  long  as  it  facilitates  the 
achievement  of  some  goals,  or  satisfies  some 
need  of  a  given  receiver.  Further,  value  of 
information  results  from  an  interaction  of 
objective  factor  (information)  and  subjective 
factor  (user).  Moreover,  value  of  inform- 
ation  can  be  related  to  the  concept  of  variety 
or  distinctness.  Value  can  be  related  to  a 
choice  of  a  rare,  and  therefore,  valuable 
element  from  some  set  of  elements. 
Relevance,  accuracy,  timeliness  and  other 
factors  can  also  enhance  value  of  information 
by  making  it  more  useful.  (AAA.  1977,  p.  16). 
In  general,  to  be  of  value,  information  must 
cause  a  better  decision  to  be  made  than 
would  be  made  without  the  aid  of  that  inform- 
ation.  The  monetary  value  of  information  is 
the  additional  profit  which  may  be  obtained, 
or  loss  which  may  be  avoided,  through  the  use 
of  the  information. 40 
2.221  Information  Overload 
Implicit  in  the  value  of  information  discussed 
above  is  the  perception  of  usefulness  of  in- 
formation  by  the  user  for  decision  making 
purposes.  This  perception  of  usefulness 
depends  on  judgmental  capability  of  the 
receiver  of  the  information. 
The  decision  maker's  judgmental  capability  is 
affected  by  information  overload.  The 
phenomenon  of  information  overload  has  been 
discussed  both  in  accounting  and  in  the 
psychology  literature.  (Bedford,  1973; 
Bedford  and  Baldouni,  1962;  Miller,  1960; 
Revsine,  1970;  and  Schroder,  Driver  and 
Streufert,  1967). 
As  the  complexity  of  information  available  to 
a  decision  maker  increases,  the  individual's 
conceptual  processing  level  becomes  more  and 
more  abstract,  i.  e.  he  perceives  more  and  more 
dimensions  to  the  decision  and  integrates  the 
data  using  relatively  sophisticated  analytical 
techniques.  At  some  point,  however,  the 
information  to  be  processed  becomes  so  complex 
that  the  decision  maker  reverts  to  a  more 
concrete  level  of  processing  the  data.  He 
does  this  because  he  is  no  longer  able  to 41 
mentally  manipulate  all  the  data  which  is  now 
available. 
Revsine  (1970)  introduced  this  model  of  Human 
Information  Processing  in  accounting  liter- 
ature  following  Schroder,  Driver  and  Streufert 
(1967)  who  developed  this  theory  of  individuals 
and  groups  functioning  in  complex  social 
situations  in  the  field  of  psychology. 
Schroder,  Driver  and  Streufert  (SDS)  developed 
and  empirically  tested  this  human  information 
processing  (HIP)  model  which  establishes  a 
curvilinear  relationship  between  the  level  of 
information  processing  and  environmental  com- 
plexity  as  shown  in  Figure  2.2. 
Disregarding  individual  differences,  inform- 
ation  processing  by  "people  in  general" 
reaches  a  maximum  level  of  structural  com- 
plexity  at  some  optimal  level  of  environmental 
complexity  (point  X  in  Figure  2.2).  Increasing 
or  decreasing  environmental  complexity  (points 
Y  and  Z)  from  the  optimal  point  (X)  lowers  the 
conceptual  level  from  A  to  B. 
According  to  SDS  environmental  complexity  is 
composed  of  two  distinct  sets  of  properties. 
The  primary  property  set  includes  information 42 
load,  information  diversity  and  the  rate  of 
information  change.  The  secondary  property 
set  is  comprised  of  two  motivational  elements  - 
noxity,  the  severity  of  adverse  consequences 
of  behaviour;  and  eucity,  the  reward  or 
promise  given  by  an  environment. 
The  General  Relationship  Between  Environmental 
Complexity  and  Behavioural  Complexity 
High 
(Abstract) 
Level  of 
Information 
Processing 
(Concrete)  II 
Low 
Low  YXZ  High 
Environmental  Complexity 
(Schroder,  Driver  and  Streufert,  1967,  p.  37) 
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Environmental  Complexity  Vs  Information  Processing 
(For  Different  Levels  of  Personalities) 
Abstract 
Inform- 
E  Curve 
ation  A 
Processing 
Level 
FI 
Curve 
G 
Concrete 
Low  CD  High 
Environmental  Complexity 
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Figure  2.3  extends  the  theoretical  relationships 
shown  in  Figure  2.2  to  the  question  whether  the 
"peak"  of  the  curve  is  the  same  for  all  in- 
dividuals.  If  innately  abstract  decision 
makers  have  a  higher  peak,  for  example,  then  the 
notion  of  an  optimal  level  of  environmental 
complexity  for  corporate  disclosure  is  probably 
naive  (Revsine,  1973).  This  also  means  that 
the  probability  is  low  of  designing  a  corporate 
disclosure  system  that  fits  the  conceptual  pro- 
cessing  level  needs  of  all  individuals. 
Individual  differences  in  the  level  of  inform- 
ation  processing  ability  may  be  expressed  as  a 
family  of  U  curves  as  shown  in  Figure  2.3. 
According  to  SDS  (p.  39),  individual  differences 
in  conceptual  level  (in  one  stimulus  area) 
measured  around  the  mid  or  optimal  point  on  the 
scale  of  environmental  complexity  will  pro- 
gressively  decrease  as  the  environment  becomes 
more  extreme  in  either  direction. 
Curve  A  in  Figure  2.3  represents  innately 
abstract  decision  makers,  while  curve  B  represents 
decision  makers  whose  information  processing 
ability  is  innately  concrete.  Maximum 
differences  between  behavioural  complexity  for 
any  two  curves  expressing  information  processing 45 
ability  occurs  at  the  optimal  level  for  the  more 
abstract  group.  The  distance  E-G  in  Figure  2.3 
is  larger  than  the  distance  E-F. 
Information  overload  is  thus  a  function  of 
environmental  complexity  and  the  decision  makers' 
ability  to  process  such  complex  information  for 
decision  making.  Because  individual  inform- 
ation  processing  abilities  differ  his  judgmental 
response  to  environmental  conditions  will  also 
differ  as  a  consequence.  Brunswik's  Lens  model 
has  taken  this  response  accuracy  of  subjects 
(decision  makers)  and  produced  an  integrative 
human  information  processing  theory. 
2.222  The  Lens  Model  (The  Regression  Approach) 
The  concept  of  value  of  information  brings  in 
the  psychological  aspects  of  the  information 
problem  into  focus.  The 
-engineering.  approach  to 
information  (Shannon 
and  Weaver,  19+9)  is 
essentially  one  of  a  theory  of  coding  and  trans- 
mission  alone,  concentrating  on  the  sender. 
Statistical  decision  theory  and  reduction  of 
uncertainty  approaches  (Blackwell  and  Girschik, 
1954)  concentrated  on  the  receiver  alone  leaving 
out  the  communication  component  which  links  the 
receiver  and  the  sender.  Marschak  (1968)  has 
shown  this  partial  nature  of  information  theory 46 
as  adapted  by  engineers  and  statisticians. 
Psychologists  provided  the  missing  link. 
While  engineers  and  statisticians  looked  at  the 
quantity  of  information,  psychologists 
(Brunswik,  1952,1955,1956;  Schroder,  Driver 
and  Streufert,  1967)  concentrated  on  the  quality 
of  information. 
The  Simple  Lens  Model 
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Brunswik  (1952)  proposed  the  Lens  Model  in  which 
the  relationship  between  the  environment  (states 
of  the  world),  the  information  set,  and  subject 
response  were  analysed  to  establish  response 
accuracy  via  cue  usage  and  predictive  significance. 
The  basic  framework  of  the  lens  model  is  shown  in 
Figure  2.4.  Figure  2.4a  shows  a  detailed  class- 
ification  of  information  processing  variables 
(Libby  and  Lewis,  1982,  p.  233)"  Brunswik  portrays 
the  decision  maker  as  (i)  being  separated  from  the 
event  of  interest  by  time  or  space,  (ii)  faced 
with  multiple  overlapping  cues  which  are  imperfect 
predictors  of  the  environment,  and  (iii)  probabil- 
istically  combining  these  cues  to  form  a  judgment. 
In  effect,  the  environment  is  observed  through  a 
"lens"  of  imperfect  cues.  The  focus  is  on  judg- 
mental  achievement.  The  model  suggests  that 
judgmental  achievement  will  be  a  function  of  both 
the  environment  and  the  decision  maker  (the 
subject).  This  dual  effect  implies  that  a 
complete  understanding  of  decision  making  requires 
that  the  decision  maker  and  the  environment  be 
studied  jointly.  The  interaction  between  the 
individual  and  the  environment  is  described  by  a 
number  of  relationships,  including  those  among 
the  cues,  those  between  the  cues  and  the  criterion 
event,  between  the  cues  and  the  judge's  (subject's 49 
response,  and  those  between  the  criterion  event 
and  the  judge's  response. 
Brunswik's  lens  model  developed  out  of  his 
philosophy  of  "probabilistic  functionalism" 
which  led  him  to  the  study  of  an  organism's 
success  and  failures  in  an  uncertain  world 
(Slovic  and  Lichtenstein,  1971,  p.  655)" 
Brunswik  developed  the  lens  model  to  represent 
the  probabilistic  interrelations  between 
organismic  and  environmental  components  of  the 
judgment  situation.  Dudycha  and  Naylor  (1966) 
has  detailed  some  important  relationships  in  the 
lens  model  in  terms  of  multiple  regression 
statistics. 
(Figure  2.5). 
The  variables  X1  X2  ...  Xk  are  cues  or  information 
sources  that  define  each  stimulus  object.  The 
cue  dimensions  must  be  quantifiable 
(if  only  to 
the  extent  of  a  yes-no  coding).  Each  cue 
dimension  has  a  specific  degree  of  relevance  to  the 
true  state  of  the  world.  This  true  state,  also 
called  the  criterion  value,  is  designated  as  Ye 
For  example,  the  cues  to  be  a  set  of  financial 
ratios  and  the  criterion  value  could  be  the 
existence  of  future  bankruptcy;  similarly  cues 
could  be  a  set  of  segmental  disclosure  practice, 
and  the  criterion  value  a  certain  level  of  system- 
atic  risk.  The  relevance  of  the  J  th  information 50 
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source  in  the  environment  is  indicated  by  the 
correlation,  rye  across  stimuli  between  cue 
X.  and  criterion  value  Y 
je 
This  value,  rje  is  called  the  ecological 
validity  of  the  j  th  cue.  The  interrcorr- 
elations  between  cues  are  given  by  the  rid 
values. 
The  ecological  validity  of  a  cue  is  a  uni- 
variate  measure  and  corresponds  to  Beaver's 
(1968)  univariate  predictive  ability  measure. 
To  determine  the  multivariate  relationship 
between  all  the  cues  and  the  criterion  event  a 
linear  regression  model  is  formed: 
k 
Ye  =  bieXi 
i-1 
The  multiple  correlation  coefficient 
Re  r  Ye  Ye  indicates  the  degree  to  which  the 
weighted  combination  of  cues  serve  to  predict 
the  state  of  Y  This  measure  is  called  the 
e 
environmental  predictability. 
The  RHS  of  the  model  represents  the  decision 
maker  system.  The  decision  maker's  reliance  on 
individual  cues  is  measured  by  the  univariate 
correlation  between  the  cue  (Xi)  and  the  subject 
response  (Ys)  and  is  called  the  utilization 52 
coefficient  (res).  If  a  cue  is  not  selected 
or'ignored,  it  is  given  a  zero  weight.  The 
subject's  decision  making  strategy  or  policy 
is  given  by  the  linear  regression  model 
Ys  =  b.  X. 
is  i 
i"I 
The  multiple  correlation  coefficient  R=r 
sY  Ss 
indicates  how  well  the  decision  maker's 
judgments  can  be  predicted  by  a  linear  com- 
bination  of  cue  values.  This  is  also  known 
as  the  subject's  response  linearity.  The 
importance  of  each  of  the  cues  in  the  environ- 
ment  and  for  the  subject  is  measured  by  the 
value  of  the  coefficients  b1e9  and  bis. 
Two  important  summary  measures  in  the  lens 
model  are: 
(i)  the  achievement  index: 
r=rYY 
aes 
and  (ii)  the  matching  index: 
G=rYY 
es 
Matching  index  represents  the  accuracy  of  cue 
utilization,  while  the  achievement  index  is  an 
expost  measure  of  judgment  accuracy. 
Libby  (1981)  has  shown  that  these  two  summary 
measures  are  related  as  follows: 
ra  G  Re  Rs 53 
Achievement  Matchin  nvironmental  Response 
...  ,  xi  index  index  redictabilit  linearity 
This  shows  that  achievement  index,  the  expost 
measure  of  judgment  accuracy  (ra),  is  a  function 
of: 
1.  the  matching  index,  (G),  measuring  the 
accuracy  of  cue  weighting  or  utilization 
2.  predictability  of  the-environment,  or  pre- 
dictive  ability  of  the  information,  (Re),  and 
3.  predictability  of  the  individual,  his  response 
linearity  or  consistency  (R5).. 
2'.  23  Bayesian  Vs  Regression  Approaches 
The  Lens  approach  as  described  in  the  previous 
section  is  primarily  descriptive  whereas  the 
Bayesian  approach  as  described  in  section  2.21  is 
primarily  normative.  Models  which  guide  account- 
ing  and  research  can  rarely  ignore  either  of  these 
two  dimensions.  Normative  models  which  lack  some 
descriptive  validity  imply  little  for  system 
design  issue.  Also,  descriptive  models  which 
rely  on  principles  that  are  not  logically  derived 
from  goal  premises  are  unlikely  to  remain  in  use 
(Mock  and  Vasarhelyi,  1978,  p.  415).  In  order  to 
be  able  to  appreciate  the  contribution  made  by  the 
Bayesian  (information  economics)  approach  and  the 
Lens  model  (the  regression  approach)  to  the 54 
understanding  of  the  information  processing 
problem,  a  comparative  analysis  will  be  attempted. 
Comparative  analyses  of  Bayesian  and  regression 
approaches  have  been  made  in  the  past  by  Slovic 
and  Lichenstein  (1971)  and  Mock  and  Vasarhelyi 
(1978).  Following  Brunswik  (1952)  a  wide  variety 
of  mathematical  models  have  been  developed  to 
capture  judgmental  policies  in  the  Lens  model. 
The  most  prominent  of  these  models  is  the  linear 
regression  model  used  in  Figure  2.5,  developed  by 
Hoffman  (1960).  Subsequently  the  linear  discriminant 
function  has  been  used  by  Rodwan  and  Hake  (1964) 
in  cue  weighting  process,  and  non  linear  form- 
ulations  such  as  curvilinear  and  exponential 
models  have  also  been  attempted  (Slovic  and 
Lichenstein,  1971,  p.  659)" 
While  the  Bayesian  approach  concentrates  on  the 
major  elements  of  information  and  decision  process, 
the  Lens  model  emphasises  human  information  pro- 
cessing  elements.  Since  it  is  primarily  a 
descriptive  model,  the  lens  model  may  be  deemed 
to  be  more  representative  of  empirical  information 
processing  systems.  Its  strength  lies  in  its 
inclusion  of  both  information  processing  rules 
and  relevant  behavioural  variables  (such  as 
overload  constraints)  into  the  framework. 55 
However,  failure  to  explicitly  consider  decision 
models  and  user  objectives  is  a  drawback  of  the 
Lens  model. 
The  modern  impetus  for  what  is  called  the  Bayesian 
paradigm  can  be  traced  to  von  Neuman  and 
Morgenstern  (1947)  who  revived  interest  in 
maximization  of  expected  utility  as  a  core 
principle  of  rational  decision  making  and  to 
Savage  (1954)  who  fused  the  concepts  of  personal 
probability  and  utility  into  a  theory  of  decision 
making  under  uncertainty  conditions.  The  Bayesian 
approach  is  thus  embedded  within  the  framework  of 
decision  theory.  Its  basic  principles  are  that 
opinions  should  be  expressed  in  terms  of  subjective 
or  personal  probabilities,  and  that  optimal  revision 
of  such  opinions,  in  the  light  of  relevant  new 
information  should  be  made  via  Bayes'  theorem. 
Because  of  its  concern  with  decision  making,  the 
output  of  Bayesian  analysis  is  not  a  single  pre- 
diction  (a  point  estimate),  but  rather  a  dis- 
tribution  of  probabilities  over  a  set  of  hypo- 
thesized  states  of  the  world.  These  probabilities 
can  then  be  used,  in  combination  with  information 
about  payoffs  associated  with  various  decision 
possibilities  and  states  of  the  world  to  implement 
any  of  a  number  of  decision  rules,  including  the 
maximization  of  expected  utility. 56 
Bayes'  theorem  is  thus  an  exante  normative  form- 
ulation.  It  specifies  certain  internally  con- 
sistent  relationships  among  probabilistic 
opinions  and  serves  to  prescribe,  in  this  sense, 
how  decision  makers  should  behave.  One  major 
weakness  of  this  approach  to  information  pro- 
cessing  is  the  absence  of  explicit  consideration 
of  human  information  processing,  behavioural 
variables  and  behavioural  relationships. 
Slovic  and  Lichenstein  (1971,  pp.  671-674)  have 
analysed  the  major  differences  between  regression 
approach  and  the  Bayesian  approach  in  information 
processing  under  three  categories: 
(i)  input 
(ii)  the  subject's  response  and  (iii)  subjective 
composition  rules  as  follows: 
Correlation  approach  Bayesian  approach 
1.  Input 
a.  The  correlation 
paradigm  typically 
involves  dimensions 
of  quantitative 
information. 
Data  presented  within  the 
Bayesian  studies,  by  con- 
trast  are  often  discrete 
or  qualitative  items. 
b.  Lens  model  research 
on  uses  items 
that  are  often  corn 
elated  in  a  fashion 
representative  of 
the  real  world. 
Bayes'  theorem,  in  its 
analytically  convenient 
forms  requires  conditionally 
independent  data. 57 
2.  The  Subject's  response 
Correlational  approaches 
usually  deal  with  a 
single  valued  predictiol 
(point 
estimate)  about 
some  conceptually  con- 
tinuous  hypothesis. 
3.  Subjective  composition 
rules 
a.  The  simple  additive 
model  plays  a  key 
role  in  correlation 
studies. 
b.  Correlational  studie 
rely  on  global 
measures  which 
reflect  importance 
across  an  entire 
dimension  or  data 
source  such  as 
correlations  (ris)  o 
regression  weights 
(bis' 
c.  Most  correlational 
research  deals  with 
the  static  aspect  of 
information  process- 
ing. 
Bayesians  would  say 
that  there  is  a 
probability  distribution 
over  this  continuous 
distribution  and  that 
the  subject's  single 
judgment  must  represent 
the  output  of  some 
implied  decision  pro- 
cess  in  which  some 
implied  decision  rule 
is  applied. 
Bayes'  theorem  is 
multiplicative  in  form. 
Bayesians  are  usually 
interested  in  the  sub- 
jective  impact  of  each 
datum,  as  measured  by 
its  subjective  likeli- 
hood  ratio.  In  the 
Bayesian  approach  the 
source  or  dimensionality 
of  the  datum  is 
irrelevant, 
Bayesian  paradigm  looks 
at  fixed  hypotheses  and 
examines  the  manner  in 
which  the  subjective 
probabilities  of  these 
hypotheses  are  revised  in 
the  light  of  new 
information. 58 
In  spite  of  apparent  differences  between  the 
Bayesian  and  regression  approaches,  there  are 
points  of  isomorphism.  Each  paradigm  is 
based  on  a  theoretical  model  of  the  composition 
rules  whereby  informational  input  is  integrated 
into  a  judgmental  response.  The  relationship 
between  the  decision  maker  and  his  environment 
is  the  concern  of  both  approaches.  Both  models 
compare  what  the  decision  maker  is  doing  with 
what  he  should  be  doing.  Yet  both  are  in- 
complete.  Both  are  concerned  with  the  decision 
maker  as  an  individual,  not  as  members  of  groups, 
in  an  organizational  context,  or  in  a  multi- 
person  setting. 
2.24  Information  in  a  Multiperson  Setting 
Value  of  information  in  a  multiperson  setting  can 
be  different  from  that  in  a  single  person  context. 
Demski  (1974,1980),  Beaver  and  Demski  (1974), 
and  Beaver  (1981)  have  analysed  the  problem  of 
information  processing  in  a  multiperson  setting 
following  Arrow  (1951)  in  a  social  choice  frame- 
work.  The  fundamental  problem  for  information 
analysis  in  a  multiperson  framework  is  that 
utility  functions  of  individuals  can  not  be 
added  to  establish  a  group  utility  function  in  a 
social  choice  setting. 59 
In  a  single  person  setting,  costless  additional 
information  can  do  no  harm.  It  is  at  least  as 
good  as  less. 
Because  of  the  personal  and  subjective  nature 
of  value  of  information,  where  individual 
objectives  can  be  divergent,  value  of  information 
is  unlikely  to  be  congruent  across  individuals. 
This  can  lead  to  a  heterogenity  of  demand  for 
financial  information  across  investors,  for 
instance.  Thus  in  a  multiperson  setting,  a  key 
feature  of  information  is  that  economic  consequences 
of  the  information  system  may  affect 
constitutents  in  different  ways. 
Information  choice  in  a  collective  setting  can 
violate  Pareto  optimality  principle,  resulting 
in  Arrow's  impossibility  theorem  in  a  purist 
world.  Possible  resolutions  of  such  impossib- 
ility  dilemma  in  a  pragmatic  sense  have  been  put 
forward  by'Cushing  (1977)  and  Bromwich  (1980). 
A  further  extension  of  information  processing  in 
a  multiperson  context  is  information  analysis  in 
an  organizational  context  (Feldman  and  March, 
1981).  The  classical  representation  of  organ- 
izational  choice  is  a  simple  extension  of  decision 
theory  versions  of  individual  choice  (Luce  and 
Raiffa,  1957).  The  value  of  information  in  a 
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simple  classical  world  depends  in  a  well-defined 
manner  on  the  information's  relevance  to  the 
decision  to  be  made  and  on  its  precision,  cost 
and  reliability.  The  underlying  assumptions  of 
information  choice  in  such  a  classical  world 
include  expectations  of  the  following  type: 
Relevant  information  will  be  gathered  and 
analysed  prior  to  decision  making;  inform- 
ation  gathered  will  be  used  in  making  that 
decision;  available  information  will  be 
examined  before  more  information  is  sought; 
needs  for  more  information  will  be  deter- 
mined  prior  to  seeking  more  information; 
and  information  that  is  irrelevant  to  a 
decision  will  not  be  gathered. 
(Feldman  and  March,  1981,  p.  172). 
Such  apparent  rationality  in  information  gather- 
ing  and  utilization  does  not  hold  in  an  organ- 
izational  context.  Overproduction  of  information 
in  an  organizational  context  can  result  due  to 
(i)  information  incentives,  (ii)  surveillance 
reasons  (iii)  strategic  nature  of  information, 
and  (iv)  symbolic  nature  of  information  it,  dself. 
(i)  Information  incentives:  Organizations 
provide  incentives  for  gathering  more  information 
than  is  optimal  due  to  a  systematic  bias  in 61 
estimating  costs  and  benefits  of  information. 
Such  bias  can  be  caused  due  to  the  fact  that 
often  information-gathering  functions  are 
separated  from  information-using  functions 
where  the  users  accept  the  responsibility  for 
the  utilization  of  information  while  delegating 
the  responsibility  for  its  availability. 
Moreover,  in  an  uncertain  world  post  hoc  account- 
ability  is  often  required  of  decision  makers  and 
organizations.  Individuals  and  organizations 
gather  information-in  anticipation  of  such 
requirements  although  in  effect  such  information 
may  not  be  used. 
(ii)  Surveillance  reasons:  Instead  of  seeing 
organizations  as  seeking  information  in  order  to 
choose  between  alternatives,  it  is  possible  to 
see  organizations  as  scanning  the  environment 
for  surprises,  or  for  assurance  that  there  are 
none.  Such  analysis  is  an  exploratory  approach 
to  data  analysis,  and  is  in  contrast  to  the 
decision  theory  model  of  information  analysis 
which  is  of  hypothesis  testing  type.  Such 
systems  for  surveillance  are  justified  in  terms 
of  expected  decisions  and  environments  to  be 
faced,  where  the  information  gathering  process 
is  long  while  decision  times  are  short. 62 
(iii)  Strategic  nature  of  informations  In  an 
organizational  setting  information  can  command 
power.  In  the  context  of  conflict  of  interests 
information  is  gathered  with  consciousness  of 
potential  decision  consequences  (Feldman  and 
March,  1971,  p.  176).  Agency  theory  analysis 
(Jensen 
and  Meckling,  1976;  Fama,  1980),  and 
analysis  of  information  uncertainty  (Hirsh- 
leifer  and  Riley,  1979),  can  be  conceived  of  as 
attempts  at  the  resolution  of  such  power 
conflict. 
(iv)  Information  as  symbols  Organizational 
decisions  allocate  scarce  resources  and  are 
thereby  of  considerable  social  and  individual 
importance.  But  decision  making  in  organiza- 
tions  is  more  important  than  the  outcomes  it 
produces.  It  is  an  arena  for  exercising  social 
values,  for  displaying  authority,  and  for 
exhibiting  proper  behaviour  and  attitudes  with 
respect  to  a  central  ideological  construct  of 
the  concept  of  intelligent  choice.  Bureau- 
cratic  organizations  are  edifices  built  on 
ideas  of  rationality.  The  cornerstones  of 
rationality  are  values  regarding  decision  making 
(Weber,  1947). 63 
"The  gathering  of  information  provides  a 
ritualistic  assurance  that  appropriate 
attitudes  about  decision  making  exist. 
Within  such  a  scenario  of  performance, 
information  is  not  simply  a  basis  for 
action,  it  is  a  representation  of  com- 
petence  and  a  reaffirmation  of  social 
virtue" 
Feldman  and  March,  1981,  p.  177) 
Symbols  of  competence  are  simultaneously  symbols 
of  social  efficiency.  Because  the  acts  of 
seeking  and  using  information  in  decisions  have 
more  symbolic  value  to  the  actors  and  to  the 
society,  individuals  and  organizations  will 
consistently  gather  more  information  than  can  be 
justified  in  conventional  decision  theory  terms. 
2.3  Summary 
Chapter  II  has  been  concerned  with  the  theory  of 
information  disclosure.  First  user  needs  and 
user  environments  have  been  explored  following 
which  various  ramifications  of  information  theory 
have  been  discussed.  Information  has  been 
distinguished  from  data  and  knowledge  to  establish 
a  meaningful  definition  of  information.  Develop- 
ment  of  information  theory  has  been  traced  and 
the  similarities  and  differences  between 64 
information  economics  and  psychological 
approaches  have  been  analysed.  The  important 
Brunswikian  Lens  model  has  been  discussed  in 
particular  and  its  importance  in  information 
processing  has  been  shown.  All  this  has  been 
done  in  a  single  person  context.  In  the 
concluding  section  the  multiperson  nature  of 
financial  information  has  been  recognized,  and 
the  difficulties  of  information  processing  in  a 
rnultiperson  context  have  been  analysed  both  in 
a  social  choice  context  as  well  as  in  an 
organizational  context. 
Having  thus  explained  the  theory  of  information 
disclosure  in  general,  the  scene  has  been  set  for 
exploring  the  issues  in  segmental  disclosure  in 
particular.  Chapter  III  which  follows  will  be 
concerned  with  segmental  disclosure  issues. 65 
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Segmental  Disclosure  Issues 
3.0  Introduction 
In  the  previous  chapter  information  theory  concepts  have  been  discussed 
in  general  in  the  context  of  financial  reporting.  Chapter  III  will  be 
concerned  with  one  specific  aspect  of  information  disclosure  - 
Segmental  Disclosure  Issues.  This  chapter  is  organized  as  follows  : 
First  segmental  disclosure  in  an  environmental  setting  will  be  mapped, 
showing  how  the  need  for  segmental  disclosure  has  arisen  in  the  wake  of 
changes  in  economic  environment  in  recent  years  -  the  merger  and  take- 
over  scene  will  be  analysed,  and  their  impact  on  segmental  disclosure 
issues  will  be  explored. 
Second,  following  these  changes  in  the  economic  environment  what  societal 
response  there  has  been  will  be  discussed  under  the  heading  of 
Segmental  Disclosure  Requirements.  This  section  will  discuss  the  various 
segmental  disclosure  requirements  imposed  by  national  and  international 
regulatory  authorities  such  as  governmental  and  standard  setting 
authorities,  and  the  rationale  behind  such  requirements. 
The  extent  to  which  such  segmental  disclosure  requirements  have  benefitted 
various  sections  in  the  society  and  the  society  as  a  whole  will  be 
explored  in  the  next  section:  Segmental  Disclosure  Criteria.  Three 
specific  criteria  will  be 
.  examined:  predictive  ability,  decision 
usefulness,  and  social  welfare  maximization,  as  being  representative 
of  the  whole  spectrum. 
Finally,  Segmental  Geographical  Disclosure,  which  is  of  special  interest 
in  this  research  will  be  discussed  under  a  separate  heading  drawing 
together  various  segmental  geographical  disclosure  issues. 73 
First,  the  segmental  disclosure  environment. 
3.1  Segmental  Disclosure  Environment 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  general  trend,  especially  by  large 
companies,  towards  diversification  in  terms  of  both  business  activity  and 
geographical  location  (Steiner,  1975;  Dubin,  1976;  Mueller,  1980). 
In  the  postwar  period,  the  first  increases  in  merger  activity  on  a 
sizeable  scale  took  place  in  the  1950s  in  UK  and  the  USA.  As  the  merger 
movement  gained  momentum,  a  typical  quoted  company  in  the  UK  in  the  mid- 
sixties  had  a  one  in  three  chance  of  dying  through  merger.  In  the  USA, 
at  the  height  of  the  merger  wave,  during  1966-68,462  large  manufacturing 
and  mining  companies  were  acquired  accounting  for  10  per  cent  of  total 
assets  of  all  large  companies  (assets  larger  than  US  $10  million)  as 
they  existed  in  1964  (Hughes  and  Singh,  1980,  p  6). 
The  motives  for  companies  thus  spreading  their  activities  across  products 
and  markets  as  well  as  across  national  boundaries  include  alleged  risk 
reduction  benefits  such  as  stability  of  earnings  and  sales  (Dunning, 
1974;  Rugman,  1976). 
A  further  trend  within  this  merger  movement  has  been  a  movement  towards 
conglomerate  merger  away  from  product-market  emphasis  to  conglomerate 
merger  (table  3-1). 74 
Distribution  of 
Type  and  Period 
Assets  Acquired  in  Large* 
(percentages)  in  the  USA 
Mergers  by 
1948-51  1960-63  1969  1971 
Horizontal/Vertical  62  37  27  24 
Product-market  exten  sion  38  46  35  32 
Conglomerate  merger  0  17  38  44 
100  100  100  100 
*  Individual  company  assets  total  $10  million  at  least. 
Source:  Steiner,  1975,  p  24 
Table  3.1 
Conglomerate  mergers  are  nonsynergistic  (Ronen,  1982).  Such  mergers 
do  not  necessarily  have  any  product-market  logic.  The  rationale  in 
conglomerate  merger  would  appear  to  be  increase  in  size  and  increased 
return  on  capital  employed  in  the  short  run  (Drucker,  1964).  There  is 
no  clearly  accepted  definition  of  a  conglomerate  firm.  Steiner  (1975, 
p  18)  has  attempted  to  define  a  conglomerate  firm  in  terms  of  the  absence 
of  a  well  defined  interconnection  among  the  products  or  services  it 
provides  that  could  be  used  to  predict  which  products  or  services  it 
might  add  to  its  line. 
Mergers  result  in  loss  of  information  in  that  data  about  individual 
segments  that  were  previously  available  to  the  users  because  the 
segments  were  separate  legal  entities  would  be  provided  only  in  the 
aggregate  as  they  relate  to  the  new  entity  afteF  the  merger.  User 
groups  affected  by  such  loss  of  information  due  to  mergers  can  be  varied. 
The  Corporate  Report  (1975)  has  defined  the  groups  of  users  who  have  a 75 
right  to  information  about  the  corporate  entity  as  follows  : 
(i)  the  equity  investor  group,  (ii)  the  loan  creditor 
group,  (iii)  the  employee  group,  (iv)  the  analyst- 
advisor  group,  (v)  the  business  contact  group,  (vi)  the 
government,  and  (vii)  the  public. 
The  above  list  may  not  be  exhaustive,  but  in  essence  it  emphasises  the 
nature  of  diversity  of  the  user  groups  and  their  objectives. 
Users,  such  as  those  identified  above,  would  find  it  difficult  to  analyse 
the  prospects  of  the  corporation  unless  decomposed  data  about  the 
corporation's  operations  are  made  available.  This  is  so  because 
customers  may  want  to  be  able  to  obtain  continuity  of  supply,  suppliers 
would  want  to  be  assured  of  payment  for  goods  and  supplies,  investors 
would  like  to  know  the  degree  of  safety  of  their  investments  in  the 
company  and  the  higher  return  prospects.  Similar  arguments  can  be 
advanced  for  each  potential  or  existing  user  group.  In  sum,  segmental 
information  would  make  it  possible  to  make  better  decisions  so  far  as 
users  of  company  information  are  concerned.  Although  it  is  possible 
that  detailed  information  about  the  segments  would  be  provided  after 
the  merger,  such  voluntary  disclosure  can  be  constrained  by  private 
gains  to  the  company,  its  managers  and  the  stockholders.  A  consequence 
of  the  realisation  of  such  potential  losses  to  the  community  has  been 
the  enactment  of  segmental  disclosure  requirements  by  various  national 
and  international  bodies  the  more  important  of  which  are  described  in 
the  following  section. 
3.2  Segmental  Disclosure  Requirements 
One  of  the  earliest  segmental  disclosure  requirement  in  the  western 
world  is  in  the  Swedish  Stock  Corporations  Act  of  1944  which  required 
the  disclosure  of  information  about  the  profitability  of  various 76 
operations  carried  out  by  diversified  companies  registered  in  Sweden 
(Walker,  1968).  This  has  subsequently  been  amended  in  1975. 
Currently,  the  most  comprehensive  set  of  segmental  disclosure  requirement 
exists  in  the  USA  where  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB) 
in  1976  published  FAS  14  which  specified  financial  reporting  requirements 
for  segments  of  a  business  enterprise.  The  FASB  states  the  purpose  of 
FAS  14  being 
"to  assist  financial  statement  users  in  analysing  and  understanding 
the  enterprise's  financial  statements  by  permitting  better 
assessment  of  enterprise's  past  performance  and  future  prospects" 
(Para  5). 
FAS  14  requires  that  the  financial  statements  of  a  business  enterprise 
include  information  about  the  enterprise's  operations  in  different 
industries,  its  foreign  operations  and  export  sales,  and  its  major 
customers,  in  the  form  of  a  disaggregation  of  the  consolidated  financial 
information.  For  industry  segments  (line  of  business)  it  requires 
revenue,  operating  profit  or  loss,  and  identifiable  assets,  if  any  of  the 
above  three  items  represents  more  than  10%  of  consolidated  total  for  the 
enterprise  as  a  whole. 
This  10°%  rule  is  also  applicable  to  foreign  operations  and  export  sales 
in  that  if  the  revenue  generated  from,  or  identifiable  assets  employed 
in  foreign  operations  are  10%  or  more  of  the  consolidated  total,  then 
revenue,  operating  profit  or  loss,  and  identifiable  assets  appropriate 
to  those  foreign  operations  will  have  to  be  disclosed. 
The  FASB  recognizes  the  difficulties  that  management  may  face  in  identify- 
ing  segments  due  to  interdependencies  that  may  exist  between  segments,  and 77 
due  to  diversities  of  operations  in  product  lines  as  well  as  in  various 
geographical  locations. 
A  great  deal  of  discretion  is  therefore  given  to  the  management  in 
defining  identifiable  segments.  FAS  14,  pars  34,  states  : 
"Each  enterprise  shall  group  its  foreign  operations  on  the 
basis  of  the  differences  that  are  most  important  in  its 
particular  circumstances.  Factors  to  be  considered  include 
-proximity,  economic  affinity,  similarities  in  business 
environment,  and  the  nature,  scale,  and  degree  of  interrelationship 
of  the  enterprise's  operations  in  the  various  countries.  " 
The  FASB  statement  No  14  is  the  culmination  of  various  underlying  forces 
converging  on  the  US  scene.  Starting  in  the  mid  1960s,  in  the  wake  of 
the  merger  boom,  a  number  of  professional  organisations,  including  the 
Financial  Analysts'  Federation,  Financial  Executives'  Research 
Foundation,  and  the  National  Association  of  Accountants  sponsored  research 
studies  to  assess  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of  disclosing  inform- 
ation  for  line  of  business  (LOB)  segments  in  external  reports.  In 
1969,  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  issued  requirements 
for  reporting  LOB  in  registration  statements,  which  were  subsequently 
extended  in  1970  to  annual  reports  filed  with  the  SEC  on  form  10-K. 
In  1973  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  (NYSE)  issued  a  recommendation  urging 
that  LOB  information  of  the  type  10-K  be  included  in  annual  reports  to 
security  holders.  Since  the  NYSE  is  the  largest  stock  exchange  in  the 
world,  the  SEC  followed  the  NYSE  recommendations  and  extended  the 
requirements  for  filing  LOB  reports  in  the  annual  reports  to  security 
holders  of  all  companies  filing  with  the  SEC.  In  1974,  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  (FTC)  initiated  an  annual  LOB  reporting  programme  to 
enable  it  to  publish  aggregate  data  on  corporations  engaged  in  trade  and 78 
commerce  in  the  USA.  Finally  in  1976,  the  FAS  14  was  recommended. 
A  chronicle  of  events  surrounding  the  segment  reporting  issue  in  the 
early  years  appears  in  Skousen  (1970). 
In  the  United  Kingdom  segmental  disclosure  requirements  are  contained  in 
the  Companies  Acts  and  in  the  London  Stock  Exchange  Listing  Agreement 
(1979).  Segmental  disclosure  requirements  in  the  UK  are  similar  though 
less  comprehensive  as  those-of  the  USA.  Unlike  the  USA,  there  are 
no  requirements  in  the  UK  to  disclose  identifiable  assets,  for  instance 
for  each  segment.  The  UK  Companies  Act  1967,  S16(1)  requires  the 
directors'  report  to  contain  a  statement  of  principal  activities  of  the 
company  and  its  subsidiaries  in  the  course  of  the  financial  year  and 
any  significant  changes  in  that  year;  S17  requires  the  disclosure 
of  turnover  and  profits.  The  Companies  Act  1981  is  more 
comprehensive  and  brings  the  UK  situation  in  line  with  the  European 
Economic  Community's  (EEC)  fourth  directive  (1978)  on  harmonisation. 
The  1981  Act,  schedule  I,  part  III,  section  55,  states  : 
"(1)  If  in  the  course  of  the  financial  year  the  company  has 
carried  on  business  of  two  or  more  classes  that,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  directors,  differ  substantially  from  each  other,  there 
shall  be  stated  in  respect  of  each  class  (describing  it)  - 
(a)  the  amount  of  the  turnover  attributable  to  that  class;  and 
(b)  the  amount  of  the  profit  or  loss  of  the  company  before  taxation 
which  is  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors  attributable  to  that 
class. 
(2)  If  in  the  course  of  the  financial  year  the  company  has  supplied 
markets  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors,  differ  substantially 
from  each  other,  the  amount  of  turnover  attributable  to  each  such 
markets  shall  also  be  stated.  ....  "market"  means  a  market 
delimited  by  geographical  bounds 
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(5)  Where  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors  the  disclosure  of  any 
information  required  by  this  paragraph  would  be  seriously  prejudicial 
to  the  interests  of  the  company,  that  information  need  not  be 
disclosed,  but  the  fact  that  such  information  has  not  been  disclosed 
must  be  stated.  " 
The  London  Stock  Exchange  Listing  Agreement  (1979),  concentrates  on 
geographical  analysis  and  leaves  out  line  of  business  disclosure 
altogether.  The  Listing  Agreement,  para  10(c)  requires  the  provision 
of  h  statement  showing  geographical  analysis  of  turnover  and 
contribution  for  certain  companies  as  follows  : 
"A  broad  geographical  analysis  by  turnover  by  way  of  figures  or 
percentages,  not  necessarily  given  country  by  country,  will  be 
acceptable.  No  geographical  analysis  of  turnover  is  required 
unless  'overseas  operations'  (outside  the  Republic  of  Ireland  and 
United  Kingdom)  comprise  more  than  10%  of  the  turnover.  Where 
analysis  is  required,  the  analysis  should  be  by  continent  but  if 
50  of  the  total  'overseas  operations'  relates  to  one  continent, 
a  further  analysis,  for  example  by  country  within  that  continent, 
will  be  required. 
In  respect  of  trading  results  an  appropriate  statement  should  be 
included  where,  for  a  proper  appraisal  of  the  business  of  the 
company  (or  group),  shareholders  should  be  aware  of  significant 
contributions  derived  from  activities  carried  out  in  any  one 
country  ...  " 
The  Accounting  Standards  (Steering)  Committee  in  the  Corporate  Report 
(1975)  also  favoured  segmental  disclosure  by  geographical  area  rather 
than  by  line  of  business  because  it  is  "less  difficult  to  implement". 80 
Thus  flexibility  and  practicality  have  been  the  overriding  consideration 
in  UK  requirements.  Management  has  been  given  the  discretion  to  decide 
what  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the  users,  when  to  disclose,  and  in 
many  instances,  how  much  to  disclose. 
Apart  from  the  UK  and  the  USA,  similar  segmental  disclosure  requirements 
exist  in  many  industrial  countries  such  as  Canada,  countries  in  the  EEC, 
the  Scandanavian  countries,  Australia  and  others.  But  the  requirements 
have  not  been  uniform,  although  the  harmonisation  programme  in  the  EEC 
countries  is  a  step  in  this  direction. 
The  International  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (IASC)  has  attempted 
harmonization  of  segmental  disclosure  practices  across  its  member 
countries,  and  produced  IAS  14  in  1981.  Its  basis  has  been  the 
US  and  UK  segmental  disclosure  requirements  although  it  has  been 
influenced  apparently  by  third  world  memberships  in  asking  for  segmental 
profits,  assets  employed,  and  bases  for  intersegment  transfer  prices. 
IAS  14,  para  22,  requires  : 
"For  each  reported  industry  and  geographical  segment,  the  following 
financial  information  should  be  disclosed  - 
(a)  sales  or  other  operating  revenues,  distinguishing  between 
revenue  derived  from  outside  the  enterprise  and  revenue 
derived  from  other  segments, 
(b)  segment  results, 
(c)  segment  assets  employed,  expressed  either  in  money  amounts  or 
as  percentages  of  the  consolidated  totals,  and 
(d)  the  basis  of  inter-segment  pricing.  " 
In  addition  para  24  of  IAS  14  requires  that  changes  in  identification  of 
segments  and  changes  in  accounting  practices  used  in  reporting  information 81 
which  have  a  material  effect  on  the  segment  information  should  be 
disclosed. 
Whereas  the  UK  and  US  requirements  were  mainly  for  the  benefit  of  users 
within  the  country,  the  IAS  requirements  were  tailored  more  for  the 
requirements  of  the  transnationals  and  their  interfaces  with  the  host 
countries.  The  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  in  1979  produced  a  guideline  for  multinationals  which  has  also 
been  aimed  at  segmental  disclosure  requirements  for  multinationals  with 
the  special  emphasis  of  fostering  transnational  investment.  The  emphasis 
in  the  OECD  guidelines  has  been  on  consolidation  methods  and  inter 
unit  transfer  pricing  which  are  sensitive  issues  to  the  host  countries' 
government  and  public.  It  makes  special  mention  of  'respect  for 
national  laws  and  tax  bases'  which  may  affect  capital  movement  across 
countries  and  affect  national  economic  development  in  host  countries. 
Like  the  OECD,  the  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council's  Commission 
on  Transnational  Corporations(UNCTC)  (1977)  has  been  concerned  with  the 
relations  between  the  multinationals  and  the  host  countries.  However, 
with  the  UN  the  emphasis  has  been  different.  The  UNCTC  proposals  have 
been  greatly  influenced  by-  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  developing 
countries'  governments  (Gray,  Shaw  and  McSweeney,  1981). 
Figure  3.1  is  a  summary  of  some  of  the  major  segmental  disclosure 
requirements  mentioned  here. 
Disclosure  requirements  and  recommendations  explored  above  show  the 
distinct  influence  of  user  groups  and  the  cultural  environments.  UK  and 
US  disclosure  requirements  are  primarily  for  the  consumption  for  the 
users  within  the  country,  while  international  disclosure  requirements 82 
are  for  fostering  better  relations  between  countries  where  in  many  cases 
the  objectives  and  cultural  environments  are  very  different.  While  line  of 
business  disclosure  might  have  been  enough  in  the  absence  of  conglomerate 
mergers,  in  the  wake  of  conglomerate  mergers,  mergers  across  national 
boundaries  and  e)pansion  in  third  world  countries,  multinationals  are 
increasingly  required  to  disclose  not  only  sales  and  profits,  but  also 
the  accounting  policies  and  currency  translation  methods  which  affect 
the  bases  determining  such  sales  and  profits.  In  many  cases  multi- 
nationals  may  have  two  audiences:  one  in  the  home  country  and  one  abroad. 
The  requirements  for  the  two  groups  may  be  different. 
Such  detailed  requirements  for  segmental  disclosure  by  conglomerate 
multinationals  bring  in  the  problems  of  relevance  and  meaningfulness, 
especially  when  the  business  is  an  integrated  one,  when  there  are 
possible  competitive  disadvantages  to  disclosure,  and  when  such 
disclosure  requires  a  great  deal  of  investment  of  time  and  money  in  the 
production  and  dissemination  of  information.  These  are  issues  concerning 
the  costs  and  benefits  of  disclosure  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next 
section. 83 
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3.3  Segmental  Disclosure  Criteria 
Segmental  disclosure  entails  the  disclosure  of  disaggregated  information 
about  the  entity  over  and  above  aggregate  information  about  the  entity. 
Since  disclosure  of  additional  information  is  involved,  it  will  be 
appropriate  to  examine  segmental  disclosure  arguments  in  the  light  of 
disclosure  arguments  in  general.  Although  there  is  no  agreement  in  the 
literature  on  a  comprehensive  set  of  disclosure  criteria  the  following 
three  are  usually  accepted  as  being  comprehensive  enough  : 
A  The  Predictive  Ability  criterion  (Beaver,  Kennelly  and 
Voss,  1968); 
B  The  Decision  Usefulness  criterion  (Anton,  1964;  AAA, 
1977); 
C  The  Social  Welfare  Maximization  criterion  (Hirshleifer, 
1971;  Demski,  1974;  Hakansson,  1977;  Ross,  1979). 
Though  identified  as  separate,  these  three  criteria  are  interdependent. 
Decision  usefulness  may  result  in  increased  social  welfare  by  increasing 
the  utility  of  users  of  information.  Similarly  predictive  value  may 
be  one  of  the  criteria  of  decision  usefulness  (figure  3.2). 
predictive  decision 
ability  usefulnes 
social 
welfare 
maximization 
Interdependence  of  Disclosure  Criteria 
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Disclosure  of  segmental  information  should  satisfy  at  least  one  of  the 
three  above  criteria. 
3.31  Predictive  ability  criterion 
Segmentation  implies  disaggregation  or  decomposition.  Following 
Blackwell  and  Girshick's  (1954)  theorem  of  'fineness  of  information' 
structure,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  disaggregation  of  a  complex 
information  signal  can  enhance  understanding  and  hence  improve 
prediction  of  future  values  of  the  information  series. 
Aggregating  data  results  in  loss  of  information  which  could  be  used  to 
discover  economic  hypotheses,  to  improve  the  precision  of  estimation, 
to  test  existing  hypotheses  and  to  measure  effects  which  are  being 
clouded  by  aggregation  (Orcutt,  Watts  and  Edwards,  1968). 
One  measure  of  information  loss  as  a  result  of  aggregation  is  entropy 
(Lev,  1969;  Theil,  1972).  Entropy  is  the  e>pected  information  content 
in  a  message.  Based  on  the  entropy  criterion,  the  loss  of  information 
due  to  aggregation  is  measured  by  the  difference  between  the  entropies 
of  disaggregated  (H)  and  the  aggregated  (H')  set  of  items  : 
H-H'  PH 
ss 
where  Ps  is  the  combined  share  of  the  two  items  aggregated  (S)  and  Hs  is 
the  entropy  of  the  pair.  In  this  measurement  of  loss  of  information 
due  to  aggregation  there  are  two  important  considerations  : 
(i)  information  loss  increases  as  the  size  of  the  combined  item 
becomes  larger  relative  to  a  related  total;  and 
(ii)  the  loss  increases  as  the  two  items  to  be  combined  become 
more  equal  to  each  other. 
Thus,  the  relative  sizes  of  the  items  within  the  aggregated  pair  as  well 
as  between  the  pair  and  a  related  total  are  reflected  in  the  aggregation 86 
decision.  Therefore,  the  stability  over  time  of  the  relative  sizes  of 
aggregated  items  may  have  a  significant  effect  on  the  information  loss. 
The  reluctance  to  aggregate  unstable  decompositions  is  not  merely 
intuitive.  On  the  average,  prediction  of  a  variable  whose  time  series 
is  very  volatile  is  more  difficult  (ie,  subject  to  more  error)  than  that 
of  a  stable  variable.  Thus,  if  we  accept  the  notion  that  the  main 
objective  of  financial  statements  is  to  provide  information  for 
prediction  purposes,  we  would  supply  more  detailed  (disaggregated) 
information  about  unstable  variables.  Porcano  (1976)  has  similarly 
concluded  that  if  the  segments  are  in  similar  industries,  then 
apparently  segment  data  will  contain  less  information  than  would  be  the 
case  if  the  segments  were  in  dissimilar  industries. 
However,  it  is  not  correct  to  suggest  that  disaggregation  will  always 
improve  predictive  ability.  Barnea  and  Lakonishok  (1980,  p  26)  have 
suggested  that  whether  disaggregation  will  produce  more  accurate  forecasts 
depends  on  three  factors  : 
(1)  The  relative  quality  of  forecasting  techniques  applied  to 
the  aggregated  data  as  measured  by  Theil's  (1966)  U2  statistic 
which  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  forecasts' 
error  (Q  to  the  variance  of  the  underlying  forecasted  2) 
variable  (Q  2  ). 
2 
Qj 
(2)  The  magnitude  of  the  correlation  between  the  variables  used  in 
forecasting;  and 
(3)  The  magnitude  of  the  correlation  between  the  forecasting  errors. 87 
In  simpler  terms,  whether  disaggregation  results  in  improved  predictive 
ability  depends  upon  (i)  the  forecasting  technique  applied,  and  (ii)  the 
structure  of  the  data  used  in  forecasting. 
Further,  in  a  social  science  setting,  there  is  an  additional  factor  - 
the  decision  maker's  data  handling  ability  (Revsine,  1970)  which  has  been 
ignored  in  the  information  theory  approach.  to  disaggregation  as  developed 
in  the  physical  sciences. 
The  entropy  approach  to  disaggregation  in  financial  statement  analysis  has 
been  criticised  by  Abdel-Khalik  (1974)  on  the  following  grounds  : 
(1)  It  takes  the  point  of  view  of  the  suppliers  of  data,  and 
ignores  that  of  users. 
(2)  It  may  measure  the  amount  of  decomposition  in  financial 
statements,  but  not  the  amount  of  information,  and 
(3)  It  is  improper  to  equate  proportions  in  any  classification 
with  a  probability  distribution. 
These  shortcomings  of  the  entropy  approach  to  disaggregation  reflects  the 
restricted  nature  of  the  definition  of  information  in  information  theory. 
Specifically,  since  information  is  defined  in  terms  of  probability  only, 
the  subjective  meaning  of  a  message  to  receiver  is  ignored  in  the  i 
measurement  of  the  information  content.  This  view  implies  that  the 
accountant  cannot  optimally  decide  about  the  aggregation  unless  he  has 
perfect  knowledge  of  both  the  users'  decision  models  and  their  utility 
(preference)  functions.  Such  knowledge  would  be  necessary  for  the 
accountant  to  minimise  the  users'  expected  loss  from  using  aggregated 
rather  than  the  individual  data.  When  individuals  differ  in  the 
ranking  of  several  alternatives  (ie,  they  have  different  preference 
functions)  there  usually  exists  no  "social  ranking"  which  simultaneously 
satisfies  the  individual  preferences. 88 
The  entropy  measure  of  information  in  disaggregation  is  appropriate  in 
closed  physical  systems  which  are  not  decision  model  oriented.  Accounting 
being  an  open  system,  the  underlying  aggregation  or  disaggregation 
decision  is  dictated  by  contentions,  and  principles  of  decision 
usefulness  (Lev,  1970;  Bernhardt  and  Copeland,  1970;  Abdel-Khalik,  1974). 
3.32  Decision  Usefulness  Criterion 
Entropy  measures  of  segmental  information  disclosure  have  been  found 
inadequate  due  to  lack  of  decision  orientation  in  the  previous  section. 
Anton  (1964,  p.  2)  has  suggested  that  one  of  the  important  requirements 
of  an  accounting  system  is  that  it  "should  be  integrated  with  the 
planning  and  control  system"  relevant  to  the  users.  Lev  (1973)  has 
argued  in  favour  of  segmental  disclosure  by  stating  that  business 
organisations  are  homeostatic  in  that  they  seek  to  maintain  equilibrium 
relationships.  Any  structural  changes,  planned  or  unplanned,  are  of 
interest  to  the  financial  analyst  for  identifying  changes  in  management 
strategy  or  signalling  an  ability  by  management  to  maintain  a  desired 
structure. 
Decision  usefulness  of  segmental  data  has  been  analysed  in  several 
research  studies.  Such  studies  include  opinion  surveys  (Bradish,  1965; 
Mautz,  1968;  Backer  and  McFarland,  1968);  field  experiments  (Stallman,  1969); 
and  earnings  predictability  and  stock  price  volatility  studies  (Kinney, 
1971,1972;  Kochanek,  1974;  Collins,  1975;  Horowitz  and  Kolodny,  1977; 
Collins  and  Simonds,  1979;  and  Ecmnanuel  and  Pick,  1980).  A  comprehensive 
analysis  of  such  studies  appears  in  chapter  VI.  Almost  all  of  these 
studies  have  found  disclosure  of  segmental  information  beneficial  in  a 
decision  making  context. 
Benefits  of  segmental  disclosure  in  a  decision  making  context  can  be 89 
grouped  into  micro  and  mäcro  contexts.  In  a  micro  or  individual  decision 
context  it  can  be  envisaged  that  customers,  suppliers,  equity  investors, 
lenders,  employees,  and  management  will  all  find  disclosure  of  segmental 
information  beneficial. 
Agency  cost  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976)  supports  the  idea  that 
an  increase  in  financial  disclosure  results  in  a  reduction  in  the  firm's 
equity  cost  of  capital.  If  investors  find  it  worthwhile  to  obtain 
detailed  information  regarding  the  firm,  then  the  price  they  are  willing 
to  pay  for  the  firm's  stock  will  be  inversely  related  to  the  cost  of 
obtaining  that  information.  In  other  words,  the  cost  of  obtaining 
financial  information  will  be  borne  by  the  firm  directly,  or  it  will  be 
imposed  upon  the  firm  via  the  stock  price  setting  mechanism.  If  it  is 
assumed  that  firms  can  provide  information  regarding  their  operation  at 
smaller  cost  than  external  parties,  then  firms  which  anticipate  seeking 
external  financing  would  increase  the  extent  of  their  disclosure  because 
the  resulting  decrease  in  the  cost  of  capital  would  benefit  current 
shareholders  in  two  ways  : 
(i)  the  market  value  of  their  holdings  would  increase;  and 
(ii)  they  would  be  able  to  obtain  the  desired  amount  of  new 
financing  at  the  least  sacrifice. 
Similar  arguments  about  reduction  in  the  firm's  equity  cost  of  capital 
in  the  event  of  detailed  disclosure  have  been  advanced  by  Singhvi  (1967), 
Choi  (1973b),  and  Kochanek  (1974).  A  slightly  different  view  of  the 
impact  of  segmental  disclosure  on  the  firm's  equity  cost  of  capital  has 
been  put  forward  by  Ronen  (1982).  Ronen  argues  that  disclosure  of  segment 
information  will  usually  induce  a  revision  of  investors'  expectation 
regarding  future  earnings.  But  this  revision  of  expectations  effect 
cats  be  either  favourable  or  unfavourable  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
induced  changes  in  stock  prices.  The  sign  and  magnitude  of  the  revision 90 
of  expectations  effect  will  depend  on  the  structure  of  the  segments' 
information  -  that  is  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  segments' 
reported  numbers  with  reported  numbers  by  other  firms  in  the  market  and 
the  values  of  those  firms.  It  is  intuitively  possible  to  expect  the 
revision  of  expectations  effect  to  be  more  pronounced  (positive  or 
negative)  the  less  positively  intercorrelated  the  segments'  reported 
earnings  streams. 
Apart  from  the  impact  of  disclosure  on  equity  cost  of  capital  which  can 
be  beneficial  to  the  company  in  timing  new  financing  decisions,  equity 
holders  will  be  better  able  to  assess  the  prospects  of  their  investments  in 
the  company,  lenders  will  be  able  to  assess  bankruptcy  risks  better  as 
a  consequence  of  detailed  product  market  prospects  being  available,  trade 
unions  and  employees  can  judge  more  accurately  the  possibility  of  continuity 
of  employment,  customers  will  be  able  to  assess  the  possibility  of 
continuity  of  supplies,  and  suppliers  assured  of  the  continuity  of  business. 
Similarly  analyst-advisor  groups  will  be  able  to  generate  more  meaningful 
assessments  of  the  company's  prospects  for  dissemination  to  other  user  groups, 
and  the  stewardship  function  over  management  will  be  better  exercised 
as  management  will  be  exposed  to  detailed  examination  of  their 
performance  by  investors  and  other  interest  groups. 
In  a  macro  sense  "business  can  initiate  activities  and  expand  in  new 
directions  with  less  risk,  and,  therefore,  at  lower  cost  than  might 
otherwise  be  possible;  rate  of  return  on  investments  will  tend  to  be 
higher  because  fewer  false  starts  or  errors  of  total  ignorance  are 
likely"  (Rappaport  and  Lerner,  1972,  p  7).  More  disclosure  in  a  macro 
setting  may  lead  to  more  investor  confidence  resulting  in  greater  capital 
formation;  governmental  decisions  will  be  based  on  sounder  bases  for 
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anti  trust  and  monopoly  legislations  will  be  enacted  in  a  framework  of 
fuller  information,  and  forecasting  the  growth  of  different  sectors  of 
the  economy  may  be  better  achieved. 
Government  decisions  about  balance  of  payments,  foreign  exchange 
management,  inward  investment  policy,  repatriation  of  dividend  and 
capital,  pollution,  discriminatory  practices  and  social  responsibility  of 
management,  and  many  others  can  be  taken  in  a  more  informed  environment. 
That  segmental  disclosure  will  have  advantages  is  not  in  dispute.  Yet  it  is 
not  necessarily  true  that  "the  more  information  is  available  to  the  market 
participants,  the  better  the  allocation  of  resources  in  the  economy" 
(May  and  Sundem,  1973),  if  costs  of  disclosure,  direct  and  indirect  are 
taken  into  account.  Disclosure  is  not  a  free  good  (Benston,  1969). 
At  the  strategic  level,  the  relative  desirability  of  different  levels  of 
disclosure  is  unclear;  it  is  premature,  and  potentially  incorrect  to 
conclude  that  more  disclosure  is  preferable  to  less  (Beaver,  1974). 
Segmental  disclosure  may  lead  to  competitive  disadvantages;  additional 
disclsoure  could,  in  principle  act  as  a  deterrent  to  informational  and 
innovational  activities  that  would  benefit  the  productive  sector  (Mautz 
and  May,  1978);  costs  of  producing  and  disseminating  information  could 
exceed  benefits  (Phillips  and  Zecher,  1981);  beyond  a  certain  limit 
additional  disclosure  may  lead  to  information  overload  (Revsine,  1970) 
and  dysfunctional  behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  managers  of  the  firm 
(Feldman  and  March,  1981). 
Segmental  disclosure  can  destroy  or  threaten  a  competitive  advantage. 
Competition  encourages  efficiency,  innovation,  and  risk  taking,  thus 
contributing  to  wealth  creation  and  economic  welfare.  Competitive 
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as  (ii)  extent  of  disclosure.  The  extent  of  competitive  disadvantage 
will  depend  on  the  number  and  variety  of  interests  finding  the  information 
useful  and  the  degree  to  which  disclosure  relates  to  some  measures  of 
success  in  markets,  products  or  customers.  Apart  from  competitive 
disadvantage  to  the  company  which  is  easily  recognizable,  it  is 
conceivable  that  segmental  disclosure's  competitive  disadvantage  can 
extend  to  disadvantage  between  suppliers,  employees,  investors, 
creditors,  and  probably  others. 
At  the  tactical  or  operational  level  there  are  problems  of  meaningfulness 
and  materiality.  Problems  of  meaningfulness  emerge  in  the  form  of 
segment  identification  in  general  and  cost  allocation  and  transfer 
pricing  problems  in  particular  when  segmental  profits  are  required  to 
be  disclosed  (Mautz,  1968;  Emmanuel  and  Gray,  1977b  and  1978). 
Segment  identification  in  a  conglomerate  can  be  subjective.  In  general 
there  are  no  natural  classes  of  business  activity.  The  question  of 
whether  two  or  more  classes  of  business  differ  substantially  from  one 
another  can  be  entirely  contingent  on  the  circumstances  of  the  firm 
and  the  choice  of  their  managers  (Walker,  1968,  p  29).  Such  managerial 
choice  can  be  a  function  of  the  need  for  decision  decomposition  in  an 
organisation  (Demski  and  Feltham,  1976). 
Depending  on  the  need  for  decision  decomposition  segments  could  be 
identified  along  one  or  more  of  the  following  lines  :  (Gray  1981) 
(i)  line  of  business,  (ii)  legal  entities,  (iii)  organisational 
divisions,  (iv)  markets,  (v)  industry  groups  or  (vi)  geographical 
divisions. 
In  segments  so  identified,  decision  decomposition  needs  can  arise  in  two 
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(1)  When  the  decision  maker  has  a  number  of  activities  to  select, 
and  for  whatever  reason,  separately  selects  subsets  of  these 
activities  instead  of  selecting  them  simultaneously.  One 
common  example  is  the  use  of  separate  inventory  models  for  each 
type  of  material  handled  by  a  purchasing  department. 
(2)  When  the  decision  maker  divides  his  operations  into  a  number 
of  departments  and  then  delegates  authority,  over  some  elements 
of  the  organizational  operations  to  different  managers.  Cost 
allocations  are  used  in  such  circumstances  to  construct  depart- 
mental  performance  measures  that  the  decision  maker  then  uses 
to  influence  the  action  selected  by  his  managers. 
Arrow  (1964(a),  p  398)  refers  to  this  as  organisational  control 
and  points  out  that  it  divides  itself  naturally  into  two  parts: 
the  choice  of  operating  rules  instructing  members  of  the 
organisation  how  to  act;  and  the  choice  of  enforcement  rules 
to  persuade  or  compel  them  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
operating  rules. 
To  facilitate  this  organisational  control  and  motivation  of  managers 
transfer  prices  are  used.  Transfer  prices  are  monetary  values  which 
attach  to  the  movement  of  goods  or  services  between  segments  of  the  same 
company.  They  may  be  valued  by  any  number  of  methods  which  may  differ 
between  segments  of  companies  or  even  change  from  one  period  to  another. 
Such  methods  include:  standard  costs,  marginal  costs,  cost  plus, 
external  selling  price,  or  any  combination  of  these. 
The  particular  method  employed  would  depend  upon  : 
(i)  the  organisational  context:  management  objective,  technology, 
organisational  structure  etc;  (ii)  management  information  and 
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minimization  of  tax  burden  for  the  corporation  as  a  whole. 
(Goetz,  1967;  ICMA,  1981;  Kaplan,  1982) 
To  achieve  this  intersegment  transfer  pricing  objective  cost  allocations 
are  necessary  in  many  situations.  Several  accounting  mechanisms  can  be 
grouped  under  the  general  title  of  joint  cost  allocation.  Shorter 
reporting  periods  or  finer  classification  of  reports  generate  a  higher 
proportion  of  joint  costs. 
The  allocating  mechanism  over  time  or  across  segments  (in  many,  cases)  is 
arbitrary.  Professional  standards  allow  deferral  of  some  costs  to 
future  periods  (for  example  product  costs  through  inventory  valuation, 
and  equipment  costs  through  depreciation),  while  other  costs  might  be 
treated  as  current  expenditure  in  the  period  in  which  they  occur  (for 
example,  advertising,  and  research  and  development  expenditures). 
Similarly  allocation  by  segments  is  often  based  on  arbitrary  procedures. 
In  spite  of  such  arbitrariness  in  allocation  over  time  or  over  segments, 
cost  allocations  can  serve  as  useful  proxy  variables  for  certain 
difficult  to  observe  costs.  They  are  desirable  mechanisms  for  motivating 
and  controlling  managers  under  conditions  of  decentralised  decision 
making  (Zimmerman,  1979,  p  519).  But  they  do  not  necessarily  give  a 
true  picture  of  the  profitability  of  the  division  or  segment.  Since 
cost  allocations  do  not  help  derive  meaningful  profits,  it  is 
illegitimate  to  use  arbitrary  allocations  in  calculations  of  the  profits 
for  business  segments.  One  can  only  ascertain  the  gross  contributions 
of  such  segments  to  indirect  costs  and  corporate  net  income  (Walker, 
1968,  p  37). 
Problems  of  segment  identification  and  materiality,  and  consequent 
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mentioned  above  are  byproducts  of  the  differences  between  internal 
(management)  accounting  objectives  and  the  objectives  of  external 
reporting.  Internal  accounting  principles  are  those  which  work  for 
that  particular  company.  There  is  no  need  for  them  ever  to  have  been 
accepted  by  anyone  else,  nor  need  they  be  consistent  company-wide,  nor 
from  period  to  period.  Quite  another  set  of  standards  applies  to 
financial  reports  issued  by  a  company  for  use  by  outsiders. 
Publicly  reported  data  are  erected  to  meet  certain  established  standards 
of  propriety,  homogeneity  in  nature  and  presentation,  consistency  over 
time  and  with  the  reports  of  other  companies.  In  contrast,  data  provided  for 
internal  purposes  may  have  any  one  of  a  number  of  uses  in  the  area  of 
motivation  and  control  (Mautz,  1968). 
Difficulties  of  segment  identification  and  consequent  problems  cost 
allocation  and  transfer  pricing  issues  are  well  recognised  by  standard 
setting  bodies.  For  instance  the  FASB  states  : 
"Information  prepared  in  conformity  with  those  standards  may  be 
of  limited  usefulness  for  comparing  an  industry  segment  of  one 
enterprise  with  a  similar  industry  segment  of  another  enterprise. 
Inter-industry  comparison  of  industry  segments  would  require  a 
fairly  detailed  prescription  of  the  line  or  bases  of  disaggregation 
to  be  followed  by  all  enterprises,  as  well  as  specification  of  the 
bases  of  accounting  for  inter-segment  transfers  and  methods  of 
allocating  costs  common  to  two  or  more  segments.  "  (FAS  14,  para  76.  ) 
Because  of  these  difficulties  in  segment  identification,  segment 
materiality,  inter-segment  transfer  pricing  and  cost  allocation,  there 
is  need  for  flexibility  in  segment  reporting.  Yet,  too  much  flexibility 
and  managerial  discretion  can  negate  many  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of 96 
segment  reporting  since  managerial  discretion  can  induce  arbitrary 
allocations  to  suit  company  and  management  objectives  at  the  expense  of 
user  objectives. 
How  much  managerial  discretion  is  then  desirable  in  segment  reporting? 
If  managers  are  likely  to  maximize  their  personal  objectives  at  the 
expense  of  user  objectives,  should  segmental  disclosure  be  mandatory? 
Are  there  sufficient  incentives  to  adequate  voluntary  segmental 
disclosure?  If  such  incentives  are  inadequate,  what  are  the  costs  and 
benefits  of  mandatory  disclosure?  Answers,  if  any,  to  such  questions 
are  in  the  domain  of  social  welfare  maximization  criterion  of  segmental 
disclosure. 
3.33  Social  Welfare  Maximization  Criterion 
Social  welfare  maximization  in  the  context  of  segmental  disclosure  issues 
encompass  macro  questions  which  affect  resources  allocation  in  a  societal 
sense.  The  issues  here  are  : 
(1)  Assuming  segmental  disclosure  is  desirable,  are  there  adequate 
incentives  for  voluntary  disclosure? 
(2)  In  the  absence  of  adequate  voluntary  disclosure  should 
mandatory  disclosure  be  advocated? 
(3)  What  are  the  costs  and  benefits  of  mandatory  disclosure? 
In  a  survey  of  reporting  practices  of  300  large  companies  in  the  United 
Kingdom  for  the  year  1981-82,  the  ICAEW  (1982)  reported  that  76%  disclosed 
some  form  of  geographical  area  based  information,  and  72%  disclosed  line 
of  business  data.  But  how  meaningful  is  this  information,  given  that 
in  the  United  Kingdom  the  Companies  Act  1981,  and  the  Stock  Exchange 
Listing  Agreement  give  a  large  amount  of  discretion  to  management  in  the 
identification  of  segments,  and  the  extent  of  reporting?  Are,  companies 97 
disclosing  only  those  information  that  suits  them  best,  manipulating 
them  to  pass  on  the  information  they  like  to,  and  leaving  out  bits  that 
they  do  not  want  to  disclose?  In  the  absence  of  any  possibilities  of 
audit  of  segmental  data,  there  is  no  way  of  verifying  the  meaningfulness 
of  segmental  disclosure.  Mautz  and  May  (1978),  Ronen  and  Livnat  (1981) 
and  Ronen  (1982)  have  analysed  the  extent  and  incentives  for  voluntary 
disclosure  of  segment  information.  Some  of  the  arguments  advanced  by 
them  will  be  discussed  here. 
The  attitude  of  a  company's  management  towards  segmental  disclosure  may 
change  over  time  as  circumstances  change.  It  can  be  argued  that 
originally  a  company's  management  would  be  opposed  to  segmental 
disclosure  because  of  one  or  more  of  the  following  reasons  : 
(i)  possible  competitive  disadvantage  if  meaningful  information  is 
disclosed;  (ii)  possible  misinterpretation  by  users  who  are 
unfamiliar  with  the  company's  operations;  and  (iii)  because  of 
jointness  of  many  activities  in  the  organization  management  might 
argue  that  they  should  be  judged  on  the  overall  results  of  the 
organisation  than  on  individual  segment  results. 
However,  as  the  company  becomes  more  and  more  diversified  and  needs  more 
access  to  the  capital  market,  it  may  find  that  financial  analysts  who 
could  not  understand  what  a  conglomerate  stood  for  would  lose  interest 
in  the  company  with  the  possible  consequence  that  the  company's  stocks 
would  not  be  in  as  much  demand  as  would  have  been  the  case,  the  investing 
public  would  lose  interest  in  the  company's  shares,  and,  the-  price  .  earnings 
multiple  would  fall.  In  such  a  case  the  company  would  favour  some  form 
of  voluntary  disclosure  of  more  information.  But  the  attitude  of  the 
management  towards  segmental  disclosure  would  be  inhibited  by  self 
interest.  Mautz  and  May  in  a  survey  of  management  attitude  towards 
segmental  disclosure  summarises  management  attitude  as  follows  : 
"Disclose  anything  necessary  to  compete  for  capital  and  credit  as 98 
long  as  disclosure  does  not  result  in  competitive  disadvantage  to 
the  company. 
Disclose  anything  necessary  to  inform  shareholders  and  creditors 
of  the  company's  success  and  financial  condition  that  does  not  result 
in  competitive  disadvantage  to  the  company. 
Disclose  nothing  more  unless  demonstrable  benefits  to  the  company 
from  disclosure  exceed  the  costs,  both  direct  and  indirect.  " 
(Mautz  and  May,  1978,  pp  283-284.  ) 
Self  interest  thus  dominates  the  disclosure  philosophy  of  the  management 
of  a  company.  Agency  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976)  and  incentive 
signalling  analysis  (Ronen  and  Livnat,  1981)  also  supports  this  self 
interest  view  of  segmental  disclosure.  In  some  cases  managers  of  the 
conglomerate  entities  would  continue  to  provide  information  on  the 
merged  segments;  but  their  decision  to  disclose  such  information 
voluntarily  would  be  induced  by  the  effected  impact  of  the  disclosure 
on  the  wealth  of  the  conglomerate  entity  stockholders  and,  thus,  indirectly 
on  the  welfare  of  the  managers  (Ronen,  1982,  p  42). 
If  voluntary  disclosure  is  induced  by  self  interest  only,  then  it  is 
conceivable  there  are  circumstances  in  which  information  will  not  be 
disclosed  if  the  private  costs  to  the  company  concerned  is  greater  than 
the  public  benefit  to  the  society  as  a  whole.  Research  studies  and 
opinion  surveys  such  as  Mautz  (1968),  Kinney  (1971),  Collins  and  Simonds 
(1979),  Emmanuel  and  Pick  (1980)  and  others  described  in  chapter  VI 
have  found  segmental  disclosure  beneficial  to  investors  and  other  users. 
The  fact  that  such  studies  have  found  segmental  disclosure  beneficial  to 
users  suggests  that  some  socially  valuable  segment  information  was 
suppressed  as  the  result  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  prior  to  the 99 
mandatory  requirements  to  disclose  such  information  in  the  USA.  Even 
when  mandatory  disclosure  is  in  force,  some  information  would  still  be 
lost  since  the  requirements  do  not  cause  the  reproduction  of  all  pre- 
merger  information. 
It  would  appear  therefore  that  mandatory  disclosure  would  be  socially 
beneficial  in  some  cases.  Yet  there  are  problems  with  mandatory 
disclosure.  Mandatory  disclosure  inevitably  involves  allocation  of 
costs  resulting  -in  moral  hazard  problems.  Moral  hazard  would  arise  in 
that  managements  of  firms  that  did  not  choose  voluntarily  to  disclose 
segmental  information  may,  in  the  event  of  mandatory  disclosure  select 
the  mechanism  that  is  likely  to  produce  the  most  favourable  effect  on 
stock  prices. 
Further,  there  would  be  cost  of  enacting  and  enforcing  regulations. 
Last,  but  not  least,  mandatory  disclosure  may  result  in  information  being 
produced  by  inefficient  producers,  as  Gonedes,  Dopuch  and  Penman 
suggested  : 
"Disclosure  laws  may  induce  a  suboptimal  allocation  of  resources 
because  they  may  lead  to  the  production  of  information  that  would 
not  be  produced  by  the  coalitions  operating  on  personal  account; 
or  they  may  induce  a  suboptimal  result  because  they  do  not  lead  to 
production  by  the  most  efficient  producer.  " 
(Gonedes,  Dopuch  and  Penman,  1976,  p  99) 
Disclosure  is  not  a  free  good  to  the  society.  Costs  associated  with 
disclosure  may  be  borne  by  the  disclosing  company  while  the  benefits  may 
be  reaped  by  those  who  do  not  pay  for  the  disclosure  costs.  In 
consideration  of  social  benefits  to  many  user  groups  mandatory  disclosure 
may  be  advocated,  but  such  mandatory  disclosure  can  result  in  direct 
costs  such  as  costs  of  information  production  and  dissemination, 100 
costs  of  regulation,  as  well  as  indirect  costs  such  as  dysfunctional 
managerial  behaviour  and  moral  hazard.  Difficulties  in  segment 
identification  and  cost  allocation  necessitates  that  managerial  discretion 
be  given  to  the  disclosing  company,  yet  at  the  same  time  the  existence 
of  such  discretion  can  negate  many  of  the  potential  arguments  in  favour 
of  segmental  disclosure.  There  is  thus  no  clear  choice  in  segmental 
disclosure  as  yet. 
Segmental  disclosure  issues  are  multidimensional  and  dynamic.  The 
purpose  of  this  current  research  is  to  contribute  to  this  debate  by 
providing  incremental  knowledge  about  geographical  segmental  disclosure 
in  a  capital  market  context. 
3.4  Segmental  Geographical  Disclosure 
Many  of  the  issues  in  segmental  disclosure  discussed  in  earlier  sections 
in  this  chapter,  such  as  segment  identification,  materiality,  managerial 
discretion,  are  common  to  line  of  business  disclosure  as  well  as 
geographical  disclosure.  Yet  there  are  distinct  differences. 
Geographical  segmental  disclosure  has  become  an  issue  especially  in  the 
context  of  expansion  and  diversification  across  national  frontiers. 
Foreign  countries  often  exhibit  different  risk  and  return  profiles  due 
to  their  history  of  economic  development,  cultural  differences  (Jaggi, 
1975),  legal  environment,  interest  rate  differentials,  currency  movement 
restrictions,  and  differing  host  government  ambitions  and  requirements 
(Steiner,  1975;  Mueller,  1980). 
In  an  empirical  study  of  US  multinationals  across  the  world,  Kobrin  (1980) 
found  political  stability,  foreign  investment  climate,  and  profit 
remittances  and  exchange  control  as  the  three  most.  important  aspects 
of  the  overseas  environment  in  identifying  risk,  while  labour  strikes, 101 
expropriation  and  administrative  procedures  ranked  rather  low  as  risk 
factors  in  the  opinion  of  the  respondents  who  were  managers  of  multi- 
national  firms. 
But  more  importantly,  Kobrin  found  that  there  was  a  lack  of  any  systematic 
risk  assessment  in  the  strategic  sense  by  the  multinationals  so  far  as 
overseas  businesses  were  concerned.  Risk  assessments  reported  were 
primarily  reactive,  bottom  up,  subjective  and  often  ethnocentric. 
The  existence  of  such  a  situation  is  less  than  optimal  in  that  decisions 
to  withdraw  or  eland  investments  are  being  made  without  due  regard  to 
consequences.  A  lack  of  a  rational  system  in  risk  assessment  across 
geographical  frontiers  by  multinational  conglomerates  ignores  the  notion 
that  risk  assessment  is  a  continuous  process  in  which  the  discontinuities 
in  the  form  of  political  upheaval  or  similar  occurrences  are  only 
manifestations  of  an  accumulation  of  underlying  incremental  changes  in 
the  socio-economic  structure.  The  nature,  form,  and  intensity  of  such 
changes  in  distant  foreign  markets  make  issues  in  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  distinctly  different  from  issues  in  line  of  business 
disclosure,  although  complementary. 
Because  of  cultural,  economic  and  political  differences  the  tax 
environment  and  legal  requirements  can  also  be  different  in  foreign 
territories.  Conglomerates  operating  in  different  countries  are  expected 
to  follow  the  legal  and  cultural  differences  in  each  of  these  countries 
(OECD,  1976,1979).  Yet  when  the  legal  and  tax  environments  in  these 
countries  differ  from  each  other,  conflicting  situations  can,  and  often 
do  arise  when  intersegment  transfer  bases  and  accounting  policies  are 
required  to  be  disclosed. 
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In  circumstances  where  the  legal  and  tax  environments  differ  between 
countries  in  which  multinational  operations  are  based  promoting  better 
understanding  of  multinationals'  operations  by  host  governments  can  be 
a  difficult  task.  Geographical  segmental  disclosure,  in  spite  of  the 
difficulties  in  producing  meaningful  data,  will  help  promote  such 
understanding  by  giving  an  appreciation  of  the  multinational  conglomerate's 
corporate  strategy. 
Another  moot  point  in  geographical  segmental  disclosure  is  the  role  of 
managerial  discretion.  In  the  US  the  FASB  in.  discussing  information-about 
foreign  operations  and  export  sales  states  : 
"...  the  distinction  between  domestic  and  foreign  operations  was 
very  difficult  to  make  ... 
The  Board's  intention  had  been  to  allow 
judgment 
...  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  foreign  operations  are 
conducted  made  it  impossible  to  define  appropriate  geographic 
areas  for  all  enterprises.  Therefore  only  general  guidelines  for 
that  determination  are  set  forth 
... 
For  those  enterprises  conducting 
foreign  operations  in  two  or  more  geographic  areas,  the  Board 
considered  several  methods  of  associating  foreign  revenue,  a  measure 
of  profitability,  and  identifiable  assets  with  a  particular 
geographic  area.  These  methods  include  location  of  accounting 
records,  the  location  of  the  assets,  the  location  of  the  risks 
associated  with  the  assets  and  liabilities,  and  the  location  of  the 
customers.  However  the  Board  concluded  that  none  of  those  methods 
would  necessarily  correlate  the  profitability  and  identifiable 
assets  of  a  geographic  area  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  Board's 
objectives  ...  " 
(FAS  14,  paras  83-85) 
Similarly,  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
'".  * 
"...  markets  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors,  do  not  differ 
substantially  from  each  other  shall  be  treated  as  one  market" 
(Companies  Act,  1981,  section  55(4)(b)); 103 
and 
"No  geographical  analysis  of  turnover  is  required  unless  "overseas" 
operations"  comprise  more  than  10%  of  the  turnover.  Where  analysis 
is  required,  the  analysis  should  be  by  continent  but  if  50%  of  the 
total  "overseas  operations"  relates  to  one  continent,  a  further 
analysis,  for  example  by  country  within  that  continent  will  be 
required.  " 
(Stock  Exchange  Listing  Agreement,  1979,  para  10(c)). 
Such  disclosure  guidelines  as  "allow  judgment",  "opinion  of  the  directors", 
and  "analysis  should  be  by  continent"  are  very  general  in  nature  and  give 
management  a  wide  latitude  in  what  to  disclose.  Emmanuel  and  Gray 
(1978b)  have  suggested  that  such  discretion  should  be  curtailed  by  linking 
segment  identification  with  the  organisation  structure  of  the  entity. 
But  they  also  state 
"The  materiality  concept  is  ...  linked  to  managerial  perceptions 
and  not  user  perceptions,  largely  on  the  grounds  that  management 
are  better  placed  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  business.  "  (p  177) 
The  issue  of  managerial  discretion  in  segmental  disclosure  is  thus  far 
from  being  resolved. 
In  sum,  geographical  segmental  disclosure  issues  are  different  from  LOB 
disclosure  issues  though  complementary.  The  special  features  of 
geographical  segmental  disclosure  issues  are  related  to  the  risk  assessment 
angle  where  conglomerates  have  to  satisfy  conflicting  disclosure 
requirements  between  home  base  and  foreign  bases,  and  between  foreign 
bases.  The  role  of  managerial  discretion  in  segment  identification  in 
geographical  disclosure  is  similar  in  nature  to  that  of  LOB  disclosure, 
though  the  political  flavour  in  -geographical  disclosure  makes  it 
somewhat  distinct. 104 
3.5  Summary 
Chapter  III  has  been  concerned  with  segmental  disclosure  issues. 
First,  the  environmental  setting  in  which  segmental  disclosure  has  become 
an  issue  has  been  explored;  the  merger  boom  and  conglomerate  form  of 
business  organisation  in  which  segmental  disclosure  has  become  an  issue 
has  been  examined  in  a  historical  setting. 
Various  institutional  requirements  for  segmental  disclosure  have 
been  described  and  analysed  with  special  reference  to  USA,  UK,  and 
international  standard  setting  bodies. 
The  costs  and  benefits  of  segmental  disclosure  have  been  examined,  and 
difficulties  such  as  segment  identification,  materiality,  cost  allocation 
and  transfer  pricing  methods  have  been  given  special  attention.  Assuming 
segmental  disclosure  is  to  be  pursued,  the  specific  type  of  disclosure  - 
mandatory  or  voluntary,  have  been  investigated  and  incentives  and 
difficulties  in  segmental  disclosure  have  been  explored. 
The  nature  and  problems  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure  have  been  analy- 
sed  and  the  possible  costs  and  benefits  of  geographical  disclosure  have 
been  explored  and  contrasted  with  the  line  of  business  form  of  segmental 
disclosure. 
Having  thus  explored  the  issues  of  segmental  disclosure  with  special 
reference  to  segmental  geographical  disclosure,  the 
.  scene  is  now  set  for  a 
study  of  capital  market  reaction  to  segmental  disclosure.  To  be  able  to  do 
this,  first,  the  nature  of  information  disclosure  in  capital  markets 
will  be  analysed  in  chapter  IV,  following  which  chapter  V  will  concentrate 
on  the  risk  assessment  aspects  of  segmental  disclosure. 105 
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CHAPTER  IV 
INFORMATION  DISCLOSURE  IN  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
4.0  Introduction 
Segmental  disclosure  is  about  the  disclosure  of  finer  information 
about  the  corporate  entity.  One  of  the  major  users  of  segmental 
corporate  information  are  investors  (Corporate  Report,  1975). 
Investors  are  interested  in  wealth  maximization  (Fisher,  1930; 
Hirshleifer,  1970).  Given  the  existence  of  a  capital  market,  such 
wealth  maximization  can  be  achieved  through  the  stock  price  mechanism. 
The  extent  to  which  segmental  disclosure  affects  capital  market 
participants  depends  upon  how  quickly  the  capital  market  reacts  to 
such  new  information.  This  is  what  is  known  as  the  notion  of 
market  efficiency  (Fama,  1970b). 
Apart  from  the  speed  with  which  the  new  information  is  impounded  in 
the  stock  prices,  there  is  a  further  question  as  to  the  effect  of 
such  impounding  of  new  information  on  the  stock  prices  (Stiglitz,  1981). 
There  are  thus  two  strands  in  market  efficiency:  - 
(i)  The  speed  with  which  the  new  information  is  impounded  in  the 
stock  prices;  and 
(ii)  The  extent  to  which  such  impounding  relates  to  the  notion  of 
allocational  efficiency. 
In  this  chapter  these  two  aspects  of  market  efficiency  will  be 
analysed  such  that  a  scene  can  be  set  for  examining  the  impact  of 
segemental  geographical  disclosure  in  the  context  of  capital  market 
theories  in  chapter  V. 115 
Under  the  heading  of  the  speed  of  the  impounding  process  various 
market  efficiency  tests  -  weak,  semi-strong  and  strong,  as  well  as 
the  concept  of  the  fair  game  will  be  analysed.  The  extent  to  which 
such  impounding  relates  to  allocational  efficiency  will  be  examined 
in  the  next  section  in  which  the  relationship  of  market  efficiency 
with  perfect  markets,  markets  for  information  and  pareto  optimality 
will  be  discussed. 
4.1  Theory  of  Efficient  Markets 
Finance  literature  during  the  sixties  and  seventies  have  been  full 
of  capital  market  efficiency  tests  (Dyckman,  Downes  and  Magee,  1975). 
These  tests  have  been  categorised  into  weak,  semi-strong  and  strong 
forms  (Fama,  1970b).  A  weak  form  efficiency  refers  to  the  market 
reflecting  all  past  prices,  a  semi-strong  form  reflects  all  published 
information  about  the  shares,  while  the  strong  form  efficiency 
supposedly  reflects  all  "knowable"  information  in  the  market  prices. 
The  weak  form  efficiency  is  easily  proved,  the  strong  form  is 
impossible  to  prove,  while  semi-strong  form  efficiency  is  the  one 
around  which  most  of  the  controversy  hovers.  Jensen  summarises  the 
controversy  as  follows:  - 
"For  all  practical  purposes,  all  relevant  tests  of  market  efficiency 
is  of  semi-strong  form,  since  strong  form  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis 
(EMH)  is  an  extreme  form  which  few  people  have  ever  treated  as  anything 
other  than  a  logical  completion  of  the  set  of  possible  hypotheses" 
(Jensen,  1978,  p  97). 
4.11  Weak  Form  Tests  of  Market  Efficiency 
Market  efficiency  tests  are  tests  of  information  processing  efficiency 
of  the  market.  Weak  form  tests  are  tests  of  efficiency  of  information 116 
sets  which  are  purely  historical  prices. 
Weak  form  tests  of  market  efficiency  have  developed  from  purely 
observational  studies  of  stock  prices  behaviour.  One  of  the  earliest 
studies  of  stock  prices  behaviour  was  undertaken  by  Bachalier  (1900) 
who  set  out  for  the  first  time  a  mathematical  theory  of  speculative 
prices  based  on  the  proposition  that  share  prices  should  have 
independent  increments,  which  is  to  mean  that  today's  price  change 
should  be  independent  of  yesterday's.  This  theory  was  tested 
successfully  against  the  French  Government  bond  market  over  the 
period  1894-98. 
Nothing  much  happened  in  testing  the  behaviour  of  stock  prices  in 
the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  until  Osborne  (1959)  found 
that  security  prices  behaved  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  known  to 
physicists  as  Brownian  motion.  Brownian  motion  was  discovered  by 
Robert  Brown,  a  botanist,  in  1827.  Robert  Brown,  a  Scotsman,  born 
in  Montrose,  Scotland,  in  1773,  did  not  have  the  slightest  interest 
in  speculative  behaviour  of  stock  prices,  but  his  accidental  discovery 
has  had  great  influence  on  the  literature  of  stock  prices  movement. 
Brown  had  accepted  a  commission  in  1801  to  go  to  the  northern  coasts 
of  Australia  (or  New  Holland  as  it  was  then  called)  to  investigate 
plant  life.  During  his  investigations  he  discovered  what  is  now 
known  as  Brownian  motion  (Gillespie,  1970).  Brownian  motion 
describes  the  movement  of  particles  in  solution,  where  movements  of 
different  magnitudes  may  occur  at  any  time,  independent  of  any  prior 
movements.  So  defined,  Brownian  motion  is  a  particular  type  of 
random  walk. 117 
4.111  Random  Walk 
Studies  of  weak  form  efficiency  have  evolved  from,  and  in  many  cases 
were  actually  tests  of  random  walk  model.  The  random  walk  model  tests 
the  statistical  independence  and  randomness  regarding  the  movements 
of  security  prices.  The  motivation  in  such  tests  is  that  if  the  prices 
series  behave  randomly  then  no  one  can  make  excess  returns  consistently. 
Random  walk  tests  are  tests  in  the  time  domain  as  distinct  from  tests 
in  the  frequency  domain.  Time  domain  tests  of  a  time  series  require 
an  understanding  of  the  underlying  processes  that  generate  the  security 
returns  (or  prices). 
N 
The  general  form  of  a  time  series  Yt  can  be  expressed  as:  - 
Yt  =d+b  Yt_l  +U 
ie,  the  value  of  any  variable  at  time  t  can  be  expressed  in  terms 
of  the  value  of  the  variable  at  the  previous  time  period,  t-1,  where 
d  is  the  intercept,  b  is  the  regression  coefficient,  and  Ut  is  the 
unexplained  random  element.  Further  assumptions  in  the  model  are 
that  the  unexplained  random  element  or  error  terms,  Ut  have  the 
following  properties:  - 
(i)  E(Ut)  =  0;  ie  the  expected  value  of  the  error  terms  is  zero. 
(ii)  E(Ut)  <a  ;  ie  error  terms  have  finite  variances;  and 
(iii)  Cov(Ut,  Ut_j)  =  0;  j0; 
ie  the  error  terms  are  serially  uncorrelated. 
When  b=1  and  d=0,  the  time  series  is  a  strict  martingale  or 
random  walk. 118 
Appendix  IV(A)  summarises  the  ter  inology  of  time  series  and 
stationarity. 
Testing  weak  form  market  efficiency  in  the  time  domain  requires  a 
distinction  between  a  particular  observed  time  series,  called  a 
realisation  and  the  process  that  is  presumed  to  have  generated  the 
realisation.  Just  as  in  regular  statistics  we  try  to  make  inferences 
from  a  sample  to  a  population,  in  time  series  analysis  we  try  to  make 
inferences  from  a  realisation  to  the  process  that  generated  it. 
In  this  transition  from  a  realisation  to  the  process  we  make  certain 
assumptions  about  stationarity  of  the  time  series.  There  are  two 
important  stationarity  conditions:  our  first  condition  of  stationarity 
is  that  the  underlying  process  is  stable  in  some  statistical  sense 
for  example,  normally  distributed.  The  second  condition  is  that 
observations  in  the  series  are  serially  independent.  Gottman  has 
formalised  the  two  conditions  as  follows:  - 
"Condition  1:  A  stationary  process  is  characterised  in  part  by  the 
fact  that  its  (finite)  mean  and  (finite)  variance  do 
not  change  with  historical  time. 
Condition  2:  A  stationary  process  is  characterised  in  part  by  the 
fact  that  the  covariance  between  two  random  variables 
at  t  and  t+k  is  a  function  only  of  their  relative 
lag,  k,  not  of  the  starting  point,  t.  In  other  words, 
the  covariance  of  this  process  is  independent  of 
historical  time"  (Gottman,  1981,  pp  61-62). 119 
The  random  walk  model  applied  to  the  testing  of  capital  market 
efficiency  has  the  following  conditions,  which  are  seen  as  sufficient 
conditions  for  capital  market  efficiency:  - 
1  No  transaction  costs. 
2  Information  is  costless. 
3  Homogeneous  expectations  of  investors  based  on  current  information. 
Given  these  three  above  assumptions,  the  random  walk  model  says  that 
the  current  price  of  security  "fully  reflects"  available  information. 
This  statement  has  two  implications:  - 
(a)  successive  price  changes  (or  more  usually,  successive  one  period 
returns)  are  identically  distributed;  and 
(b)  successive  price  changes  (or  returns)  are  independent. 
Formally  stated  the  random  walk  model  could  be  seen  as:  - 
f  (rj' 
t+l/Ot)  =f  (rj, 
t+l 
) 
ie  (i)  the  probability  density  function,  f,  of  price  changes  is  the 
same  for  all  t,  and 
(ii)the  conditional  and  marginal  probability  distribution  of  an 
independent  random  variable,  given  0,  the  information  set, 
are  identical. 
If  the  underlying  probability  distribution  of  the  price  series  is 
assumed  to  be  normal,  then  parametric  tests  are  valid,  and  serial 
correlation  tests  are  appropriate.  If  the  underlying  probability 
distribution  of  the  price  series  is  not  the  same  for  all  t,  then 
parametric  tests  of  serial  correlation  type  are  not  appropriate,  in 
which  case  we  may  need  to  use  non-parametric  tests. 120 
4.112  Serial  Correlation 
Serial  correlation  technique  provides  a  measure  of  the  relationship 
between  the  value  of  a  random  variable  at  time  t,  and  its  value  r 
periods  earlier.  The  serial  correlation  for  lag  r  is  given  by 
Cov  (Pt'  Pt-r)  Var  Pt 
where  Pt  is  the  change  in  the  price  of  a  given  security  from  the  end 
of  day  t-1  to  the  end  of  day  t. 
The  existence  of  a  statistically  significant  amount  of  serial 
correlation  negates  the  notion  of  market  efficiency.  Kendall  (1953) 
has  done  extensive  serial  correlation  tests  for  British  Industrial 
share  prices,  in  spot  prices  for  cotton  in  New  York,  wheat  in  Chicago, 
and  concluded  in  favour  of  weak  form  of  market  efficiency.  Kendall 
was  unable  to  discover  any  underlying  trends  and  so  could  not  derive 
any  meaningful  process  which  would  help  forecast  future  prices. 
Price  movements  appeared  to  be  independent. 
Brealey  (1970)  examined  the  Financial  Times  actuaries  all-shares  index 
over  the  period  1962-68  using  a  lag  of  one  day,  and  observed  low 
positive  correlation. 
Dryden  (1970b)  found  inconclusive  results  when  using  serial  correlation 
tests  to  a  small  sample  (fifteen  companies)  on  the  London  Stock  market 
during  1963-64  and  1966-67. 
Serial  correlation  tests  used  in  the  context  of  examining  short  term 
stationarity  of  stock  prices  have  two  possible  limitations.  (i)  Assurp  tior 
of  normal  distribution  and  (ii)  the  magnitude  of  lag.  Firstly,  an  under- 
lying  normal  distribution  is  assumed  in  the  prices  series. 121 
Fama  (1965a)  disputes  the  normal  distribution  assumption  after  testing 
the  first  differences  in  the  prices  of  blue  chip  stocks  on  the  New 
York  stock  exchange,  and  concludes  in  favour  of  a  stable  Paretian 
distribution  with  a  characteristic  exponent  of  less  than  2.  A  stable 
Paretian  distribution  is  a  long  tailed  asymmetrical  distribution  in 
which  there  is  evidence  to  believe  that  the  distribution  of  residuals 
has  infinite  variance. 
The  economic  implications  of  the  violation  of  normal  distribution 
assumptions  while  using  serial  correlation  tests  are  as  follows:  - 
In  a  Gaussian  (normal)  market,  if  the  sum  of  a  large  number  of 
price  changes  across  some  long  time  period  turns  out  to  be  very 
large,  chances  are  that  individual  price  changes  during  the  time 
period  is  negligible  when  compared  to  the  total  change.  In  a 
market  that  is  stable  Paretian  with  characteristic  exponent  less 
than  two,  the  size  of  the  total  will  more  than  likely  be  the  result 
of  a  few  very  large  changes  that  took  place  during  much  shorter 
sub-periods.  In  other  words,  whereas  the  path  of  the  price  level 
of  a  given  security  in  a  Gaussian  market  will  be  fairly  continuous, 
in  a  stable  Paretian  market  with  characteristic  exponent  less  than  two 
will  usually  be  discontinuous.  This  discontinuous  nature  of  a  stable 
Paretian  market  has  practical  implication.  The  fact  that  there  are 
a  large  number  of  abrupt  changes  means  that  such  a  market  is  inherently 
more  risky  than  a  Gaussian  market.  Therefore,  when  dealing  with 
stable  Paretian  distribution  the  researcher  should  avoid  the  concept 
of  variance  both  in  his  empirical  work  and  in  any  economic  model  he 
may  construct.  For  example,  from  an  empirical  point  of  view,  when 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  distribution  of  residuals  has 122 
infinite  variance,  it  is  not  very  meaningful  to  use  a  regression 
technique  that  has  as  its  criterion  the  minimization  of  the  sum  of 
squared  residuals  from  the  regression  line,  since  the  expectation 
of  that  sum  will  be  infinite.  In  such  cases  an  alternative  technique, 
absolute  value  regression  could  be  used  which  minimizes  the  sum  of 
absolute  values  of  the  residuals  from  the  regression  line. 
The  second  reservation  in  using  the  serial  correlation  test  to  prove 
weak  form  efficiency  of  the  market  is  about  the  time  lag  between 
successive  prices.  While  serial  correlation  tests  can  explain  short 
term  price  movements,  their  impact  in  explaining  longer  term  movements 
have  not  been  impressive.  Granger  and,  Morgenstern  (1963)  have 
addressed  this  problem  and  applied  spectral  analysis  instead,  to 
explain  comparatively  longer  term  price  movements. 
4.113  Spectral  Analysis 
Weak  form  tests  of  market  efficiency  are  essentially  tests  of  stability 
of  a  series  of  stock  prices.  Such  stationarity  properties  can  be 
investigated  in  two  different  ways:  in  the  time  domain,  and  in  the 
frequency  domain.  Time  domain  path  is  the  most  trodden  one,  which 
investigates  the  serial  correlation  properties  of  successive  price 
changes.  Not  so  frequently  cited,  but  relevant  nevertheless,  is 
spectral  analysis  which  is  in  the  frequency  domain. 
The  basic  assumption  of  this  methodology  is  that  if  the  values  of 
one  variable  are  known  at  time  t=l,  2,3, 
...  n  then  a  number  of 
functions  based  on  this  series  can  be  calculated.  These  can  then  be 123 
used  as  a  basis  for  hypotheses  regarding  the  actual  structure  of  the 
time  series.  Granger  and  Morgenstern  (1963)  have  used  spectral 
analysis  to  study  the  stock  prices  in  the  New  York  stock  exchange. 
Their  findings  have  been  consistent  with  weak  form  market  efficiency, 
and  the  serial  correlation  they  found  was  very  small.  Not  a  great 
deal  of  work  has  been  done  in  the  frequency  domain  since  Granger  and 
Morgenstern,  but  their  work  has  explored  a  new  path,  and  has  alleged 
superiority  over  traditional  serial  correlation  analysis  in  that 
spectral  method  can  explain  not  only  short  term  movements,  but  long 
term  movements  in  stock  prices  as  well.  Granger  and  Morgenstern  have 
justified  their  analysis  as  follows:  - 
.  If  the  random  walk  hypothesis  is  true,  in  which  the  price  at  any 
one  moment  of  time  is  the  same  as  the  price  at  any  previous  moment 
of  time  plus  an  independent  random  variable,  then  it  should  be  "true 
when  the  interval  between  the  moments  is  a  day,  week  or  even  a  month. 
The  spectral  method  indicates  that  whereas  the  random  walk  model 
explains  the  short  term  movements  very  well,  the  very  important  long 
run  movements  are  not  adequately  explained  by  this  model". 
(Granger  and  Morgenstern  1963,  p  25) 
Spectral  analysis  needs  no  assumption  of  normal  distribution  of  the 
underlying  price  series.  Other  approaches  which  obviates  the  necessity 
of  the  normality  assumption  are  information  theory  approach,  runs  test 
and  filter  test. 
4.114  Information  Theory  Tests 
Information  theory  applied  to  stock  prices  examines  the  probability 
of  prices  rising  (falling)  at  any  particular  time  point,  given  that 
it  has  risen  (declined)  at  a  previous  time  point.  In  brief,  this  is 124 
to, 
a  test  of  information  content  in  stock  prices  applying  Bayesian 
probability. 
Fama  has  used  information  theory  approach  to  test  the  independence 
of  successive  stock  price  changes  on  the  New  York  stock  exchange  and 
found  evidence  in  favour  of  weak  form  market  efficiency. 
" 
...  it  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  proportions  of  securities 
advancing  and  declining  today  of  New  York  stock  exchange  do  not 
provide  much  help  in  the  proportions  advancing  and  declining 
tomorrow"  (Fama  1965b,  p  229). 
Although  Fama  has  concluded  in  favour  of  weak  form  of  market 
efficiency,  Theil  and  Leenders  (1965)  using  the  same  methodology 
on  data  from  Amsterdam  stock  exchange  found  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
Dryden  (1968)  applied  information  theory  approach  to  test  short  term 
stationarity  of  share  prices  on  the  London  stock  exchange,  and  found 
evidence  which  does  not  support  the  weak  form  efficiency.  Results 
suggest  that  the  dependence  of  today's  outcomes  on  yesterday's  is 
stronger  in  London  Stock  exchange  than  in  New  York.  This  could  be 
due  to  two  factors:  (i)  New  York  market  is  more  efficient  than 
London,  (ii)  there  are  unresolved  problemsin  techniques  of  forecasting 
using  information  theory,  and  accepting  information  inaccuracy  as 
appropriate  measure  of  forecasting  inaccuracy. 125 
4.115  Filter  Analysis 
Filter  analysis  examines  the  possibility  of  earning  above  average 
returns  using  some  mechanical  trading  rules  of  the  following  type: 
if  the  stock  price  increases  by  x  per  cent,  buy  and  hold  until  the 
price  decreases  by  x  per  cent  from  its  subsequent  high.  If  stock 
prices  move  in  a  trend,  then  this  strategy  will  produce  better  results 
than  simply  buy  and  hold  investment  policy.  If  a  rule  consistently 
holds,  then  price  movements  are  not  random  and  the  security  may  be 
improperly  priced,  and  the  market  may  be  inefficient.  In  the  USA 
filter  analysis  has  been  used  to  test  market  efficiency  by  Alexander 
(1961),  Fama  and  Blume  (1966),  and  Jensen  and  Bennington  (1970)  among 
others.  Dryden  (1970a)  and  (1970b)  have  used  filter  analysis  with 
UK  data.  Results  show  that  filters  may  work  in  the  short  period, 
but  their  usefulness  in  predicting  long  term  price  changes  are  limited. 
Jensen  and  Bennington  have  pointed  out  that  while  it  is  possible  to 
derive  filter  rules  that  appear  to  work  for  a  finite  series  of  truly 
independent  returns,  what  is  needed  to  prove  market  inefficiency  is 
that  a  rule  will  continue  to  work  over  other  series  as  well. 
Simulating  numerous  filter  rules  over  a  very  large  data  base  for 
stocks  has  generally  failed  to  identify  consistently  profitable  trends 
in  prices. 
Filter  rules  are  easy  to  test  as  they  do  not  assume  any  distribution 
of  underlying  prices;  in  other  words  filter  rules  tests  are  non- 
parametric  tests. 126 
4.116  Runs  Analysis 
Another  non-parametric  test  of  weak  form  market  efficiency  is  runs 
analysis.  The  test  methodology  here  is  the  analysis  of  the  duration 
(of  runs)  of  successive  price  increases  and  successive  price  decreases. 
The  results  of  these  for  individual  stocks  and  for  indices  are  then 
compared  against  the  mathematical  expectation  of  runs  in  the  light  of 
probability  theory.  If  any  significant  departure  exists  between  actual 
runs  and  those  expected  then  this  indicates  there  are  patterns  present 
in  the  data  which  could  provide  the  basis  for  profitable  investment 
strategies. 
For  example,  if  a  price  increase  of  any  size  is  designated  by  "+" 
and  a  decrease  in  price  by  any  pattern  might  be  observed  over  time. 
Hypothetical  stock  No  of  runs 
A+++++----  -+++  3 
B+-+-+-+-+-+-+  13 
C--+-+++--  ++--  7 
The  pattern  for  stock  A  reflects  continuing  trends;  if  the  price  of 
the  stock  has  been  increasing  (decreasing)  it  will  continue  to  move 
up  (or  down). 
Stock  B  shows  the  opposite  behaviour;  a  tendency  of  price  reversal 
from  the  preceding  period.  Stock  A  has  very  few  runs,  but  stock  B 
has  many. 
Stock  C  represents  an  unpredictable  sequence,  evidenced  by  a 
number  of  runs  equal  to  the  number  expected  by  chance  in  a  totally 
random  series. 127 
Since  each  observation  is  counted  regardless  of  size,  runs  analysis 
removes  potential  problems  of  non-normality  in  identifying  independence. 
Fama  (1965a)  made  use  of  runs  analysis,  measuring  their  length,  their 
direction  and  the  number  of  reversals  (changes  in  direction),  testing 
for  independence.  The  actual  results  differed  very  little  from  those 
expected  and  thus  upheld  the  weak  form  definition  of  efficient  markets 
theory.  However,  runs  analysis  is  not  a  powerful  test,  and  similar  to 
serial  correlation,  results  have  stronger  statistical  than  economic 
interpretation. 
4.12  Semi-Strong  Form  Tests  of'Market  Efficiency 
While  weak  form  test  of  market  efficiency  is  one  of  trying  to  beat  the 
market  using  price  volume  information  only,  semi-strong  form  test  of 
market  efficiency  includes  all  published  information,  including  those 
in  weak  form.  Hence,  apart  from  price  volume  information,  included 
are  knowledge  of  earnings,  dividends,  public  announcements  by  management 
and  all  other  public  information. 
Tests  of  semi-strong  form  and  strong  form  efficiency  are  difficult  to 
design  because  of  the  variety  and  lack  of  regularity  of  the  information 
involved.  In  general  ,  studies  of  semi-strong  form  efficiency  focus 
on  one  particular  type  of  information,  associating  that  information 
with  stock  price  bahaviour. 
Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  examined  the  impact  of  annual  earnings 
announcements  and  concluded  that  85  to  90  per  cent  of  the  earnings 
information  had  already  been  anticipated  by  the  month  the  announcement 
was  made. 128 
Fama,  Fisher,  Jensen  and  Roll  (FFJR)  (1969)  studied  the  impact  of 
steck  splits,  and  concluded  that  price  behaviour  reflects  the 
anticipated  dividend  increases,  when  stocks  are  split. 
At  an  aggregate  level  Niederhoffer  (1971)  studied  the  reaction  of 
security  prices  to  world  events  which  have  potentially  significant 
consequences  on  the  stock  prices.  Niederhoffer  found  that  stock 
market  reacted  immediately  to  announcements  of  crisis  proportions. 
Although  reaction  was  rapid,  some  short  run  price  dependencies  were 
evident.  However,  as  major  events  occur  over  prolonged  and  irregular 
periods,  it  is  doubtful  that  they  could  be  exploited  profitably 
unless  the  investor  has  advance  private  knowledge  of  these  events. 
Marsh  (1979)  investigated  the  stock  market  efficiency  in  the  context 
of  rights  issues  in  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  Eddy  and  Saunders 
(1980)  investigated  the  relationship  between  new  product  announcements 
and  stock  prices.  Both  found  evidence  in  favour  of  semi-strong  form 
efficiency. 
There  are  many  more  studies  in  the  USA,  UK  and  European  context 
investigating  various  forms  of  public  information  and  their  impact 
on  stock  price  changes.  Overall  the  majority  of  studies  have  concluded 
in  favour  of  market  efficiency  of  a  semi-strong  variety. 
Comprehensive  studies  of  market  efficiency  tests  are  to  be  found  in 
Dyckman,  Downes  and  Magee  (1975),  Richards  (1979)  and  Keane  (1980, 
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4.13  Strong  Form  Market  Efficiency 
Strong  form  market  efficiency  implies  that  all  information  is  fully 
reflected  in  stock  prices  at  all  times.  If  a  market  is  strong  form 
efficient,  no  investor  can  expect  abnormally  high  profit  from  the 
possession  of  inside  information.  Hence  strong  form  efficiency  tests 
can  be  described  as  private  information  studies. 
Insiders  with  access  to  specially  exclusive  information  can  be 
categorised  into  two  groups:  (i)  exchange  specialists  and  senior 
employees  and  (ii)  fund  managers. 
Research  by  Niederhoffer  and  Osborne  (1966)  has  shown  that  exchange 
specialists  use  their  privileged  information  to  obtain  excess  profits. 
Finnerty  (1976)  found  that  corporate  directors  and  managers  have 
inside  information  which  could  have  been  used  to  make  excess  profits. 
In  contrast,  fund  managers  do  not  seem  to  be  able  to  make  excess 
profits.  Studies  of  mutual  fund  returns  have  shown  that  fund  managers 
have  no  special  information  advantage  which  allows  them  to  earn 
consistently  large  returns  for  their  customers  when  management  and 
transaction  costs  are  taken  into  account.  (Treynor,  1965;  Sharpe,  1966; 
Jensen,  1968).  While  weak  form  market  efficiency  is  almost  unanimous, 
and  semi-strong  form  of  efficiency  is  possible  though  difficult  to 
design,  strong  form  efficiency  tests  could  be  seen  as  almost  meaningless 
except  to  logically  complete  the  possible  sets  of  tests.  Information, 
if  it  is  private,  is  not  known.  If  it  is  not  known,  no  amount  of 
testing  can  possibly  prove  it  or  disprove  it. 130 
4.14  Fair  Game  Model 
Tests  of  market  efficiency  were  developed  originally  out  of  curiosity. 
There  were  no  theories  behind  it.  Researchers  were  primarily 
interested  in  finding  out  if  the  market  could  be  outperformed. 
Random  walk  hypothesis  tested  the  underlying  pattern  of  stock  price 
changes,  the  rationale  in  such  an  exercise  being  that  if  any  pattern 
exists,  money  could  be  made.  Assuming  costless  transaction,  costless 
information,  and  agreement  among  investors  random  walk  hypothesis  has 
been  accepted.  But  doubts  remain  if  the  theory  would  hold  in  the 
absence  of  such  unrealistic  assumptions.  Violation  of  one  or  more 
of  the  conditions  are  potential  sources  of  market  inefficiency. 
Further,  there  is  the  question  of  time  horizon  over  which  market 
efficiency  is  to  be  tested.  Serial  correlation  of  a  lag  of  one  day 
may  be  significant  in  a  statistical  sense,  and  random  walk  may  be 
said  to  have  been  proved.  But  what  is  the  economic  significance  of 
such  a  proof,  if  serial  correlation  does  exist  in  tests  with  a  lag 
of  one  week,  or  one  month?  There  can  also  be  no  test  of  strong  form 
except  in  the  very  long  run. 
There  are  also  questions  relating  to  information  sets,  covariance  or 
jointness  of  information,  and  perceptional  problems.  Finally,  speed 
of  adjustment  of  stock  prices  says  nothing  about  the  correctness  of 
the  impounding  process.  Investors  may  in  fact  interpret  the  information 
wrongly. 
Such  questions  relating  to  the  traditional  analysis  of  market  efficiency 
has  led  to  ex  post  rationalisation  in  the  theory  of  rational  behaviour 
and  fair  games  (Samuelson  1965),  Fama  (1970b). 131 
The  Fair  Game  model  is  based  on  the  behaviour  of  average  returns,  xithout 
specifying  the  time  horizon  over  which  such  averages  are  taken,  and 
without  any  assumptions  about  the  distributional  properties  of  the 
price  changes  over  time.  Fair  game  simply  says,  on  average  the  game 
is  fair.  It  simply  states  that  the  conditions  of  Harket  equilibrium  can  be 
stated  in  terms  of  expected  returns.  Fair  games,  thus  described  can 
be  seen  as  the  universal  set,  subsets  of  which  are  various  forms  of 
market  efficiency  tests  of  weak,  semi-strong  and  strong  form.  We 
conclude  in  favour  of  stock  market  efficiency  of  a  "fair"  game  model. 
Appendix  IV(B)  is  a  summary  of  market  efficiency  tests. 
4.2  Market  Efficiency  Revisited 
In  the  previous  sections  the  notion  of  market  efficiency  has  been 
extensively  discussed.  But  the  discussion  so  far  has  been  only  about 
the  degree  of  efficiency  without  exploring  the  nature  of  such 
efficiency.  An  understanding  of  the  nature  of  market  efficiency  will 
be  enhanced  if  it  is  linked  with  the  notion  of  perfect  markets,  markets 
for  information,  and  allocational  efficiency. 
4.21  Perfect  Markets 
The  notion  of  efficient  capital  markets  is  distinctly  different  from 
the  economist's  notion  of  perfect  capital  markets. 132 
The  following  conditions  are  necessary  for  perfect  capital  markets:  - 
1  Markets  are  frictionless,  ie 
(a)  No  transaction  costs 
(b)  No  taxes 
(c)  No  government  regulations,  and 
(d)  All  assets  are  perfectly  divisible  and  marketable. 
2  There  is  perfect  competition  in 
(a)  Product  markets 
(b)  Factor  markets,  and 
(c)  Securities  markets. 
3  Markets  for  information  are  perfect,  ie 
(a)  Information  is  costless,  and 
(b)  It  is  simultaneously  received  by  all  individuals. 
4  All  individuals  always  attempt  to  maximise  the  present  value  of 
their  wealth. 
Capital  market  efficiency  is  much  less  restrictive  than  the  notion  of 
perfect  capital  markets  outlined  above. 
In  an  efficient  capital  market  security  prices  simply  reflect  all 
available  information,  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  information. 
Thus,  if  there  are  transaction  costs  such  as  brokerage  fees  to  pay,  or 
opportunities  of  making  excess  profits  because  of  lack  of  competition, 
such  costs  or  benefits  will  be  reflected  in  the  security  prices.  Since 
prices  will  reflect  all  available  information,  investors  will  receive 
accurate  signals  for  capital  allocation.  Such  capital  allocations  may, 
or  may  not  be  optimal  in  the  societal  context,  but  that  is  beyond  the 
domain  of  capital  market  efficiency. 133 
4.22  Markets  for  Information 
Market  efficiency  is  about  information  processing  efficiency.  The 
theory  of  information  disclosure  has  been  extensively  discussed  in 
chapter  II  in  this  research.  Information,  to  be  of  value  must  contain 
something  new  that  the  receiver  does  not  know,  and  must  be  of  use  in 
a  decision  making  context. 
"Value  of  information  is  that  cost  which  equate  the  maximum 
net  expected  utility  for  the  given  information  structure  to  the 
maximum  net  expected  utility  obtained  with  no  information". 
(section  2.22) 
Thus,  if  a  message  is  not  relevant  to  the  decision  maker,  it  will 
not  be  reflected  in  the  stock  prices.  An  important  aspect  of 
financial  disclosure  is  the  understanding  what  is  relevant  to  the 
decision  maker. 
If  the  information  is  useful  to  the  decision  maker,  then  the  decision 
maker  will  be  willing  to  pay  for  it.  The  amount  that  the  decision 
maker  will  be  willing  to  pay  will  depend  on  the  expected  utility  of 
the  information  to  him.  Therefore,  the  value  of  the  gain  from  the 
information,  net  of  costs,  to  the  user  will  be  zero,  ensuring  that 
the  markets  for  information  is  competitive.  Such  costs  could  include 
brokerage,  taxes  and  costs  of  information  search. 134 
4.23  Allocational  Efficiency 
We  have  seen  that  capital  markets  are  efficient  in  a  "fair  game" 
sense;  we  have  also  seen  that  capital  market  efficiency  is  less 
restrictive  than  perfect  capital  market;  but  what  is  the  relationship 
between  capital  market  efficiency  and  the  economist's  notion  of 
allocational  efficiency?  Stiglitz  has  explored  this  area  extensively. 
The  discussion  that  follows  here  is  after  Stiglitz  (1981). 
Market  efficiency  has  been  defined  by  Fama  as  follows:  - 
"A  market  in  which  prices  fully  reflect  available  information  is 
called  efficient: 
Fama,  (1970b),  p  383 
Similarly,  Jensen  defines  market  efficiency  as:  - 
"A  market  is  efficient  with  respect  to  information  set  0t  if  it  is 
impossible  to  make  economic  profits  by  trading  on  the  basis  of 
information  set  0t". 
Jensen,  (1978),  p  96 
Efficiency  as  defined  above  refers  to  information  efficiency  alone, 
and  ignores  the  two  other  requirements  of  Pareto  optimality  which  are 
exchange  efficiency  and  production  efficiency.  Moreover,  efficiency 
of  the  markets  must  take  into  account  the  costs  associated  with 
(a)  establishing  markets  and  (b)  obtaining  information.  Therefore, 
efficiency  in  the  Fama-Jensen  sense  isneither  necessary  nor  sufficient 
condition  for  Pareto  optimality  of  the  economy. 
iJ  Following  is  a  summary  of  the  argument  discussing  the  relationship 
between  Pareto  optimality  and  market  efficiency:  - 135 
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ECONOMIC  EFFICIENCY 
PARETO  OPTIMALITY 
A  EXCHANGE  EFFICIENCY 
Given  : 
(a)  set  of  assets  or 
securities; 
(b)  information  (beliefs) 
of  the  various 
participants  : 
Market  is  efficient  if 
there  is  no  rearrangement 
of  ownership  claims  possible 
which  would  increase  the 
expected  utility  of  one 
individual  without  decreasing 
that  of  some  other 
C  INFORMATION  EFFICIENCY 
Given  : 
Probability  distributions  of 
various  events  (states) 
Requires  : 
(i)  Markets  must  provide  correct 
incentives  for  gathering  right 
amount  and  kind  of  informaton. 
(ii)  Market  prices  must  reflect 
the  information  available  to 
various  traders. 
(iii)  Firms  must  be  able  to  convey 
efficiently  information 
about  their  prospects  to 
potential  investors. 
B  PRODUCTION  EFFICIENCY 
Given  :  (a)  technology 
(b)  resources  (endowment) 
(c)  information 
the  concern  is  with  the  supply  of  various  assets. 
There  are  three  relevant  questions  here  : 
(i)  If  the  firm  maximized  its  market  value  will  the  resources 
allocation  be  optimal? 
(ii)  Is  there  unanimity  among  shareholders  about  the  value 
maximization  objective?  If  not,  what  can  we  say  about 
the  equilibrium? 
(iii)  Are  there  control  mechanisms  in  existence  to  ensure  that 
managers  pursue  the  policies  which  are  in  the  best  interests 
of  the  shareholders  of  the  firm? 
Economic  efficiency  refers  to  A,  B  and  C;  while  "efficient  markets" 
requires  only  C. 
But  more  to  the  point 
"Were  the  market  to  be  efficient  in  the  sense  of  Fama  and  Jensen, 
investors  would  have  no  incentive  to  gather  information.  The  only 
information  that  would  be  reflected  in  the  market  is  costless 
information.  Thus  a  market  which  was  efficient  in  the  Fama-Jensen 
sense  would  almost  certainly  not  be  Pareto  optimal.  " 
Stiglitz,  (1981)  p  237 136 
4.3  Summary 
Chapter  IV  has  been  concerned  with  information  disclosure  in  capital 
markets.  Segmental  geographical  disclosure  results  in  finer  information 
being  available  to  market  participants.  The  extent  to  which  the 
market  is  able  to  reflect  this  information  in  the  stock  prices  of 
such  disclosing  companies  is  likely  to  affect  the  investment- 
divestment  decisions  of  market  participants. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  examine  this  information  impact  on  stock  prices, 
(i)  the  theory  of  efficient  markets,  and  (ii)  implications  of  the 
efficient  markets  theory  have  been  examined.  The  history  of  efficient 
markets  theory  has  been  traced,  various  forms  of  market  efficiency 
tests  have  been  discussed,  and  it  has  been  concluded  that  the  market 
is  efficient  in  a  semi-strong  form  sense,  of  a  fair  game  variety. 
In  discussing  the  implications  of  market  efficiency,  market  efficiency 
has  been  contrasted  with  the  perfect  market  notion;  the  notion  of 
markets  for  information  has  been  explored,  and  it  has  been  shown  that 
allocational  efficiency  notion  is  distinctly  different  from  the  notion 
of  markets  efficiency. 
Having  thus  explored  the  nature  of  information  impact  on  capital 
markets,  the  scene  is  now  set  for  exploring  the  role  of  information 
in  risk  assessment,  through  its  impact  on  perceived  uncertainty  so 
far  as  the  decision  maker  is  concerned.  This  will  be  done  in  chapter  V. Appendix  IV(A)  137 
TIME  SERIES  AND  STATIONARITY  :  TERMINOLOGY 
ON. 
Yt 
d 
Yt-1 
The  general  form  of  a  time  series  Yt  can  be  expressed  as 
Yt  =d+  bYt_,  +  Ut 
4 
where  E  (Ut)  =0 
E  (Ut)Z<°'G 
Coy  (Ut,  Ut_j)  =  0,  j/0 
When  b=1d=0,  the  series  is  a  strict  martingale  or  Random  Walk. 
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When  b11,  d=0  the  series  is  a  multiplicative  semimartingale. 
...  ý 
Yý 
Yt-1 
When  b=1,  dý0  the  series  is,  an  additive  semimartingale  or  Random 
Walk  with  a  drift. 
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A  Stationary  series  is  one  in  which  Yt 
E(Yt)  E(Ytj_1)  for  all  j 
.  -.. 
Yt-1 
A  Mean  Reverting  series  is  stationary  when  : 
Yt=M+Ut 
where  E(Ut)  =  0,  E(Ut2 
Coy  (U 
t,  U_)  =  0,  jý0 
A  Mean  Reverting  series  is  non-stationary  when  : 
Yt  :  Mt  +  Ut 
where  Mt  is  a  deterministic  function. 
A  Moving  Av,  Process  of  order  q,  Mt(q)  is  defined  as  : 
ý+  r 
Yt  =M+  Ut 
.￿ 
-  a1  ut 
r..  r 
-1 
02  Ut-2  '"" 
6q 
.v 
Ut-q 
if  q  <c-e-  , 
MA(q)  is  stationary. 
An  Auto  Regressive  Process  of  order  p,  AR(p)  is  defined  as  : 
Yt 
_d+ 
(81  Yt-1  +02  Yt-2  +  ... 
8p  Yt-p)  +  Ut 
The  conditions  for  the  stationarity  of  an  AR(p)  process  are  a 
function  of  p. 
In  the  special  case  of  AR(1),  stationarity  requires  01<1. 140 
i' 
Lew  Ln 
J-4  -4 
m 
ýýi 
n 
!v  t"' 
Hn 
C-)  O 
Z 
H  nr 
n  Cl) 
Ire 
W 
TESTING  MARKET  EFFICIENCY  Appendix  IV(B) 
Sufficient  conditions: 
Costless  transactions,  I 
WEAK  FORM  TEST  -  '3)  Costless  information 
Homogeneous  expectations 
Frequency 
Domain 
V 
Information  I 
Theory 
SEMISTRONG  FORM  TEST 
STRONG  FORM  TEST 
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CHAPTER  V 
RISK  ASSESSMENT  IN  CAPITAL'MARKETS 
5.0  Introduction 
The  notion  of  market  efficiency  and  its  implications  have  been 
explored  in  chapter  IV,  with  a  view  to  understanding  the  impact  of 
new  information  in  capital  markets.  Such  new  information  may  alter 
the  perceptions  of  market  participants.  The  extent  to  which  this 
altered  perception  may  affect  the  risk  return  prospects  of  investors, 
especially  in  the  context  of  a  geographically  diversified  investment 
environment  is  the  concern  of  this  chapter. 
In  this  chapter,  first,  the  notion  of  risk  will  be  explained  following 
which  the  two  parameter  portfolio  theory  will  be  described  and  analysed. 
The  development  of  the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  from  the  theory  of 
portfolio  selection  via  the  Market  Model  will  be  traced.  Implications 
of  the  CAPM  will  be  discussed,  its  link  with  the  notion  of  market 
efficiency  will  be  described,  and  various  results  from  empirically 
testing  the  CAPM  will  be  analysed. 
Having  described  and  analysed  the  CAPM,  its  application  in  the  context 
of  segmental  geographical  disclosure  will  be  explored.  In  an  ex  ante 
formulation  forecasting  problems  arise.  Problems  of  forecasting  beta, 
and  beta  stability  in  the  context  of  a  geographically  diversified 
investment  situation  will  be  discussed,  and  various  methods  of  fore- 
casting  beta  will  be  explored.  Various  multifactor  models  will  be 
explored-and  the  International  Market  Model  will  be  analysed,  showing 
its  relevance  in  the  geographical  segment  disclosure  situation. 148 
This  will  then  complete  the  theoretical  framework  in  which  prior 
researches  in  segmental  geographical  disclosure  will  be  cited, 
hypotheses  developed,  and  subsequently  analysed  and  implications 
explored. 
First  the  problem  of  risk  assessment. 
5.1  Risk  Assessment 
Conglomerates  can  be  engaged  in  multiple  product-markets  as  well  as 
across  national  boundaries.  Because  of  the  diverse  nature  of  the 
businesses  of  conglomerates,  and  the  diverse  environmentSthey  face, 
investors  are  unlikely  to  have  complete  information  about  the  future 
prospects  of  conglomerates.  This  gives  rise  to  the  phenomenon  of 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty  exists  when  the  decision  maker  has  to  choose 
among  alternate  courses  of  actions  when  the  consequences  of  his  action 
are  incompletely  known  to  him. 
A  theory  of  choice  is  a  set  of  propositions  about  choice  rules,  rules 
which  indicate  for  each  set  of  available  actions  that  action  which 
will  in  fact  be  taken.  To  formalize  the  theory  of  choice  under 
uncertainty,  it  is  convenient  to  introduce  the  concept  of  the  'state 
of  the  world',  a  description  of  the  world  so  complete  that,  if  true 
and  known,  the  consequences  of  every  action  would  be  known  (Arrow, 
1971,  p  44). 
The  meaning  of  uncertainty  is  that  the  agent  does  not  know-the  state 
of  the  world.  By  definition,  the  consequences  would  be  known  if  both 
the  action  and  the  state  of  the  world  are  known. 149 
Thus,  decision  making  under  uncertainty  may  be  viewed  as  choices 
between  alternative  probability  distributions  of  return,  and  the 
individual  choices  between  them  in  accordance  with  a  consistent  set 
of  preferences.  Von  Neuman  and  Morgenstern  (1947)  have  shown  that 
under  reasonable  assumptions  about  individual  preferences,  the 
individual  chooses  an  alternative  which  maximizes  the  expected 
utility  of  returns,  where  utility  function  is  determined  uniquely, 
up  to  a  positive  linear  transformation,  by  individual  preferences. 
It  has  been  shown  earlier  (section  2.211)  that  finer  information 
may  result  in  a  reduction  of  uncertainty.  An  operational  notion  of 
uncertainty  in  decision  making  is  risk.  "Risk  is  measurable 
uncertainty"  (Knight,  1921,  p  20).  Earlier  notion  of  risk  reduction 
in  business  has  been  throui  the  operation  of  the  law  of  large  numbers 
(Knight,  1921,  p  257:  Fisher,  1930,  pp  408-409).  More  recently, 
Markowitz  (1952)  has  introduced  covariance  as  a  measure  of  risk,  and 
formulated  a  theory  of  portfolio  selection  based  on  two  parameters, 
mean  and  variance. 
Risk  assessment  attempts  have  also  been  made  with  the  use  of  other 
measures  such  as  semi-variance  (Markowitz,  1959),  skewness  and  higher 
moments  (Samuelson,  1970;  Jean,  1971;  Francis,  1975),  but  due  to 
difficulties  in  making  such  measures  operational,  the  two  parameter 
mean-variance  model  remains  the  most  popular  and  practical  measure 
used  in  risk  assessment  in  capital  markets,  and  will  be  used  in  most 
of  the  discussions  in  this  chapter. 150 
5.2  Portfolio  Theory 
Market  efficiency  studies  as  discussed  earlier  in  chapter  IV  had 
nothing  to  say  about  risky  returns.  Although  developments  in  risk 
adjusted  returns  are  attributed  to  Markowitz  (1959),  in  many  ways 
the  pioneering  work  of  Fisher  (1930)  on  the  theory  of  interest  rates 
under  certainty  conditions  made  it  all  possible.  Modern  capital 
market  theory  can  be  said  to  have  started  with  Fisher.  Fisher's 
theory  of  real  rate  of  interest  when  extended  to  conditions  of 
uncertainty  resulted  in  two  approaches:  - 
(i)  Time-State-Preference  due  originally  to  Arrow  (1964b), 
Debreu  (1959),  and  popularised  by  Hirshleifer  (1970);  and 
(ii)  The  mean-variance  model  following  in  the  tradition  of 
Markowitz. 
Although  the  State-Preference  theory  is  perhaps  more  general  than  the 
mean-variance  approach,  its  progress  in  the  real  world  has  been 
rather  limited  because  of  the  difficulty  of  testing  it  empirically. 
The  main  thrust  of  research  in  capital  market  theory  in  recent 
years  has  therefore  been  in  the  Markowitz  tradition. 
Quite  independent  of  the  Random  Walkers,  Markowitz  developed  a  theory 
an 
of  portfolio  selection  ashextension  of  Neuman-Morgenstern's  (1947) 
theory  of  games.  Markowitz's  portfolio  selection  model  was  a  two 
parameter  (mean-variance)  model  for  risk  averse  investors  in  which 
the  objective  is  to  minimise  risk  (variance  of  return)  for  a  given 
return.  In  the  establishment  of  this  "minimum  variance"  portfolio, 
the  role  of  the  individual  security's  variance  of  return  was  not 
significant,  what  was  significant  was  the  covariance  with  each  other 
in  the  build-up  of  the  portfolio. 151 
Portfolio  theory  is  based  on  several  assumptions.  Generally,  these 
assumptions  include:  - 
1  Investors  consider  securities  in  terms  of  risk  and  return  to  the 
exclusion  of  everything  else. 
2  Investors  analyse  securities  by  developing  probability  distributions 
of  rates  and  returns. 
3  Risk  is  defined  as  the  total  variability  of  returns,  ie  the 
probability  distributions  developed  are  symmetric. 
4  Investors  seek  to  gain  the  maximum  return  for  a  given  level  of  risk. 
A  major  problem  in  analysing  risk-return  relationships  is  caused  by  the 
fact  that  the  security  analyst  is  concerned  with  the  future  and 
therefore  has  to  make  projections.  Since  the  analyst  cannot  make  these 
projections  with  certainty,  he  must  form  opinions  about  possible 
returns  and  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  each  return.  From  the 
resulting  distribution,  the  expected  return  of  each  security  and  the 
associated  risk,  as  measured  by  the  variance  or  standard  deviation, 
can  be  -measured.  For  an  independent  investment  risk  is  the  variance 
of  returns.  For  a  portfolio,  on  the  other  hand,  risk  is  not  simply 
a  weighted  average  of  component  security  risk.  Portfolio  risk 
depends  upon  how  individual  security  prices  move  in  relation  to 
each  other.  If  selected  stocks  vary  less  than  perfectly  two  or 
more  stocks  that  are  individually  very  risky  may  be  combined  into 
a  portfolio  that  is  less  risky  than  any  of  its  components.  The 
standard  deviation  for  a  portfolio  therefore  must  include  a  measure 
of  this  inter-relationship,  the  covariance. 152 
Once  risk  and  return  for  all  securities  and  portfolios  have  been 
calculated,  combinations  can  be  selected  for  investment  consideration. 
Being  concerned  with  this  selection  process  Markowitz  theorised  how 
risk  averse  investors  can  analyse  individual  stocks  and  then  select 
the  most  desirable  portfolio  tailored  to  the  individual's  particular 
risk-return  combination  preferences.  After  all  possible  combinations 
of  securities  have  been  identified,  it  is  possible  to  select  portfolios 
which  are  superior  for  their  given  risk  or  return  class.  The  set  of 
these  superior  portfolios  is  commonly  called  the  "efficient  frontier". 
These  portfolios  give-the  maximum  return  for  a  given  level  of  risk  or 
the  minimum  risk  for  a  given  return.  (Figure  5.1) 
In  Figure  5.1  the  curve  XYZ  is  an  efficient  frontier.  All  points  on 
the  curve  are  superior  to  those  inside  it,  for  an  investor  who  is  risk 
averse.  R  is  any  point  inside  the  curve.  R  is  inefficient  because 
there  exists  a  point  X  on  the  frontier  which  commands  the  same  return 
as  R  but  is  less  risky.  Similarly,  there  exists  another  point  Y  which 
commands  a  higher  return  than  R.  but  requires  no  additional  risk. 
Capital  market  theory  is  an  exercise  in  positive  economics.  Assuming 
that  people  act  in  certain  ways,  what  is  -implied  about  prices,  quantities 
held,  etc  in  conditions  of  equilibrium?  Our  concern  is  to  explore  the 
following  two  questions  in  equilibrium  conditions:  - 
1  What  is  the  relationship  between  expected  return  and  risk  for 
portfolios?  The  capital  market  line  explains  this.  (Figure  5.2) 
2  What  is  the  relationship  between  expected  return  and  risk  for 
securities?  The  security  market  line  explains  this.  (Figure  5.3) 153 
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After  the  efficient  set  has  been  identified,  the  problem  arises  as 
to  which  portfolio  along  the  efficient  frontier  should  be  held  by 
the  investor.  In  the  absence  of  a  risk-free  rate  of  return,  the 
answer  depends  on  the  indi.  vidual's  utility  function. 
However,  not  all  investments  are  necessarily  risky.  Investments  exist 
that  have  little  or  no  variability,  and  are,  therefore  almost  riskless. 
Government  securities  are  examples  of  this  type  of  investment.  These 
securities  can  be  introduced  into  the  analysis.  The  return  on  these 
securities,  RF  is  the  risk-free  rate.  A  combination  of  investments 
can  now  be  made  of  the  risk-free  investment  and  some  point  on  the 
efficient  frontier.  Rays  drawn  from  RF  will  have  a  unique  point  of 
tangency  with  the  efficient  frontier.  We  call  this  point  in.  By 
combining  the  riskless  security  and  the  portfolio  that  lies  at  point 
in,  a  new  set  of  portfolios  is  constructed  that  is  superior  to  all 
portfolios  on  the  efficient  frontier  except  for  'm'. 
If  it  is  further  assumed  that  investors  can  borrow  as  well 
as  lend  (invest)  at  the  risk-free  rate,  the  new  frontier  extends  along 
the  ray  to  the  right  of  in.  Those  portfolios  lying  along  the  segment 
from  RF  to  m  contain  positive  amounts  of  m  and  the  risk-free  security; 
those  from  m  outward  are  levered  to  purchase  additional  amounts  of  in. 
Therefore,  a  new  efficient  frontier  appears.  This  new  frontier  is 
called  the  "Capital  Market  Line"  (CML).  (Figure  5.2) 
The  algebraic  expression  for  this  capital  market  line  is:  - 
R 
Rp  =  RF  lmF  aP 
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where  RP  =  expected  return  of  a  given  efficient  portfolio 
RF  =  risk-free  rate 
R=  expected  return  of  the  market  portfolio,  m 
am  =  standard  deviation  of  the  market  portfolio 
up 
_ 
standard  deviation  of  the  efficient  portfolio 
If  investors  have  identical  expectations,  m  is  the  optimal 
portfolio  of  risky  investments  for  all  investors.  Thus,  the  sum  of 
all  holdings  of  m  by  investors  should  be  the  total  market  value  of  all 
securities.  Since  each  investor  would  hold  the  same  proportions  of 
each  stock,  the  percentage  of  each  individual  security  in  m  would  be 
the  total  market  value  of  that  stock  relative  to  the  total  market 
value  of  all  securities. 
The  expected  risk-return  relationship  for  any  security  or  portfolio 
in  market  equilibrium  can  be  determined  similarly  to  the  CML 
relationships.  However,  the  risk  of  individual  securities  and 
inefficient  portfolios  contains  an  unsystematic  factor.  Since 
investors  can  diversify  away  unsystematic  risk  by  selecting  efficient 
portfolios,  there  should  be  no  premium  for  unsystematic  risk.  There- 
fore,  the  appropriate  measure  of  risk  for  these  securities  is  not  the 
security's  total  individual  risk;  rather,  it  is  the  security's  effect 
on  a  portfolio's  risk  as  measured  by  the  covariance  of  the  security 
and  the  market.  The  graph  of  this  relationship  in  conditions  of 
equilibrium  is  called  the  "Security  Market  Line"  (SML),  (Figure  5.3) 156 
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5.3  The  Market  Model 
The  Markowitz  model  described  above  (section  5.2)  requires  extensive 
information  concerning  individual  security  variances  and  covariances. 
Sharpe  (1963)  greatly  simplified  the  Markowitz  model  by  observing 
that  most  securities  covary  with  the  market  in  general.  Thus,  the 
covariance  among  individual  securities  could  be  abandoned  in  favour 
of  a  measure  of  movement  of  securities  with  the  market.  This  measure 
would  indicate  each  security's  sensitivity  relative  to  the  market  and 
could  be  used  in  the  same  manner  as  covariance  to  identify  efficient 
portfolios.  Securities  would  be  related  to  each  other  through  their 
relation  to  the  market  in  general,  and  a  market  index  could  be  used 
as  a  proxy  for  market  performance.  (Figure  5.4  and  Figure  5,5) 157 
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The  market  or  index  portfolio  has  Bm  =  1,  ie, 
Covm 
= 
Q2m 
22 
am  am 
A  formal  statement  of  the  market  model  would  be  as  follows:  - 
R  it  =aj+B.  Rmt  +  ei  it 
1IT 
return  on  intercept  general  residual  with  mean  and 
security  j  market  variance  zero  (varies 
for  period  t  slope  factor  independently  of  Rmt) 
Diagramatically,  one  can  easily  take  a  scatter  of  monthly  returns 
on  any  security  j,  with  corresponding  monthly  returns  on  the  market 
index,  Rm,  and  fit  a  line  through  the  scatter,  freLfhand  or  using  OLS 
(Ordinary  Least  Square);  the  intercept,  the  slope  and  the  residual 
will  emerge  without  any  difficulty.  (Figure  5.5) 
The  market  model  is  thus  a  representation  of  security  returns  in  terms 
of  a  general  market  factor.  The  model  states  that  the  relationship 
between  individual  security's  return  and  that  of  the  return  from  the 
market  as  a  whole  is  linear.  The  model  further  states  that  the 
stochastic  portion  of  a  security's  return  can  be  decomposed  into  two 
elements:  - 
(i)  A  systematic  or  market  related  component  (Bj  Rmt)  reflecting 
the  common  movement  of  single  security's  return  with  the  market 
factor,  and 
(ii)  an  individualistic  component  made  up  of  (ai  +  ejt). 159 
This  market  model  not  only  simplified  computations  of  covariance* 
but  gave  the  theorists  an  understanding  of  the  return 
generating  process  with  which  the  equilibrium  return  for  a  security 
could  be  estimated.  Actual  returns  from  any  security  over  a  period 
could  now  be  compared,  and  observations  be  made  as  to  the  existence 
of  abnormal  returns.  This  would  be  a  more  methodical  test  of  market 
efficiency  because  in  an  efficient  market  it  would  be  impossible  to 
make  excess  returns  consistently. 
5.4  The  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model 
From  the  market  model  we  need  proceed  only  a  small  step  to  arrive  at 
the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (the  CAPM).  The  CAPM  (i)  transfers 
the  ex-post  market  model  concept  to  ex-ante  general  equilibrium 
conditions  and  (ii)  expresses  it  in  terms  of  Rf,  the  risk-free  rate 
of  return. 
Thus  while  the  Market  Model  is:  Ri  =  ai  +  Bj  Rm  +  ej 
the  CAPM  is:  E(RS)=  Rf  +  Bj  EE(Rm) 
-  Rf 
ti 
where  E(RS)  is  the  equilibrium  expected  return  on  any  asset  j 
E(Rm)  is  the  equilibrium  expected  return  on  market  portfolio 
Rf  is  the  rate  of  interest  given,  risk-free 
This  is  given  exogenously,  at  which  the  lending  rate 
equals  the  borrowing  rate. 
B 
CovRi  Rm 
Var  Rm  :.....  ....  ................. 
*  In  order  to  assess  the  variance  of  the  return  on  a  portfolio,  in  the 
Markowitz  system  one  needed  N+(N2  -  N)/2  computations,  which  for 
N=1,000  is  500,500.  Using  the  market  model  of  Sharpe,  this  is 
reduced  to  only  2N  +  1,  which  for  N  1,000  is  only  2,001. 160 
Cov  Rj  Rm  is  the  covariance  between  the  return  on  asset  j  and  the 
market  portfolio. 
Var  Rm  =  variance  of  the  return  on  the  market  portfolio. 
The  ei  of  the  market  model  drops  out  in  the  equilibrium  condition  of 
the  CAPM  since  the  ej  (a  major  component  of  the  unsystematic  risk) 
can  be  diversified  away  in  an  efficient  portfolio.  (Appendix  V(A)  ) 
The  implication  of  this  formulation  is  that  the  appropriate  measure 
of  riskiness  of  an  investment  is  not  the  variance  of  the  return  of  the 
investment,  but  the  investment's  relationship  with  the  market.  This 
is  so  because  the  unsystematic  risk  can  be  diversified  away,  what 
cannot  be  diversified  away  is  the  nature  of  the  investment  itself. 
This  is  Bj.,  the  systematic  risk. 
The  assumptions  of  the  CAPM  are  the  assumptions  of  the  building  blocks 
on  which  it  is  built,  plus  a  few  of  its  own.  These  assumptions  are:  - 
A  Related  to  portfolio  theory: 
1  Investors  are  risk  averse, 
single  period  expected  utility 
maximisers  of  termal  wealth. 
2  Portfolios  are  mean-variance  of  return  efficient. 
3  Assets  are  perfectly  divisible  and  marketable. 
B  Assumptions  of  perfect  market: 
1  Investors  are  price  takers. 
2  There  exists  a  single  price. 
3  No  capital  rationing. 
4  No  taxes,  no  transaction  costs. 161 
C  Assumptions  of  market  efficiency  (information  processing  efficiency): 
Market  prices  adequately  reflect  all  available  information 
without  undue  delay. 
D  Related  to  the  market  model: 
The  return  on  a  security  is  linearly  related  to  some  market 
factor  (the  systematic  risk). 
E  Peculiar  to  the  CAPM  only: 
1  Conditions  of  the  existence  of  an  equilibrium 
a)  investors  have  identical  subjective  estimates  of.  means, 
variances  and  covariances  of  return  on  assets. 
b)  The  quantities  of  all  assets  are  given. 
2  There  exists,  an  exogeneously  given  risk-free  rate,  Rf,  (at 
which  investors  can  invest  or  lend  any  unlimited.  amount). 
5.41  The  Implications  of  the  CAPM 
The  CAPM  as  outlined  in  the  previous  section  explains  asset 
prices.  Asset  risk  premia  depend  not  on  the  total  risk  of  the 
asset  but  rather  on  the  relationship  between  the  asset  and  the 
market  portfolio,  ie  its  Beta,  can  determine  the  premium  for  an 
individual  asset. 
Implications  of  the  asset  pricing  model  are  most  easily  seen 
in  terms  of  excess  returns.  By  subtracting  the  risk-free  rate  from 
all  returns  the  axes  are  made  to  intersect  at  RfRf  instead  of  at  0,0. 
In  this  manner  the  intercept  of  any  security  or  portfolio  characteristic 
line  directly  measures  expected  performance  relative  to  the  market. 
This  technique  was  first  developed  by  Jensen  (1969),  who  labelled  the 
vertical  intercept  as  differential  returns. 162 
In  market  equilibrium  where  all  securities  are  properly  priced,  all 
differential  returns  are  zero.  Undervalued  securities  will  have 
positive  differential  returns  and  overvalued  securities  will  have 
negative  differential  returns. 
While  the  concept  of  differential  returns  is  valid  for  comparisons 
with  the  market,  it  is  not  accurate  in  making  direct  comparisons 
between  two  securities.  One  cannot  say  that  because  security  J's 
differential  return  of  6%  exceeds  security  L's  differential  return 
of  1%,  security  J  represents  a  better  buy.  This  is  because  security 
J  may  have  a  larger  beta  signifying  a  greater  risk.  Only  where  one 
security  has  a  larger  differential  return  and  the  same  or  smaller 
beta  is  it  necessarily  superior. 
The  CAPM  identifies  security  returns  net  of  risk-free  rate  as 
proportional  to  the  expected  net  market  return,  where  beta  serves 
as  the  constant  of  proportionality.  As  a  consequence  of  this 
relationship  all  securities  in  equilibrium  plot  along  a  straight 
line  called  the  security  market  line  introduced  in  section  5.2. 
It  can  be  plotted  by  drawing  a  line  between  the  Rf  at  beta  zero 
and  the  total  market  return  at  beta  of  one.  The  line  is  extended 
to  negative  values  of  beta  to  recognise  that  individual  securities 
can  (but  alas,  seldom  do)  move,  on  average,  contrary  to  other 
investments.  (Figure  5.6) 163 
Further  characteristics  of  the  SML  can  be  shown  by  rearranging  and 
substituting  in  some  of  the  equations  we  already  know:  - 
Rj  =  (Rm  -  Rf)  B 
Ri  =  (Rm  -  Rf)  covim 
a2  m 
Ri  =Rm  -  Rfcovjm 
M 
In  expectation  terms:  - 
E(RS)  = 
E(Rm)  Rf 
covým 
62m 164 
The  first  term  of  the  equation  on  the  RHS,  ie  (Rm  -  Rf)/02m  is  a 
constant  for  all  securities  since  it  contains  only  the  market  and 
risk-free  information.  This  term  is  the  slope  of  the  security  market 
line.  The  second  term,  security  covariance,  (ie  CovJm)  with  the 
market  line  is  an  alternative  measure  of  security  risk.  It  is  simply 
the  security  beta  with  the  constant  removed. 
Undervalued  securities  will  plot  above  the  SML,  and  the  overvalued 
securities  will  plot  beneath  it. 165 
5.42  Empirical  Tests  of  the  CAPM 
The  ultimate  test  of  any  theory  is  how  well  it  fits  the  facts. 
If  the  CAPM  is  valid  then  the  following  should  be  true:  - 
1  Systematic  risk  and  return  should  be  related. 
2  Unsystematic  risk  and  return  should  not  be  related. 
3  The  intercept  term  should  be  at  RF. 
4  Risk  and  return  relationship  should  be  linear. 
5  The  slope  of  the  regression  line  should  be  the  market  risk  premium. 
There  have  been  many  tests  of  the  CAPM,  These  tests  can  be  categorised 
into  three  types:  - 
(i)  Testing  individual  securities,  (Douglas,  1969). 
(ii)  Testing  large  investments  and  mutual  funds,  (Treynor,  1965; 
Sharpe,  1966;  Jensen,  1968;  Douglas,  1969)  and 
(iii)  Testing  selected  portfolios,  (Miller  and  Scholes,  1972; 
Black,  Jensen  and  Scholes,  1972;  Fama  and  MacBeth,  1973; 
Blume  and  Friend,  1973;  and  Blume,  1975). 
Results  of  such  tests  have  been  somewhat  inconclusive.  While  most 
tests  support  the  hypothesis  that: 
1  Returns  increase  with  the  level  of  systematic  risk,  and 
2  The  relationship  between  risk  and  return  is  linear  on  average, 
there  has  been  evidence  doubting  the  validity  of  the  rest  of  the 
relationships  proposed  by  the  theory.  Douglas  (1969)  found  that 
ex-post  realised  returns  were  significantly  positively  correlated 
with  unsystematic  risk  and  not  with  systematic  risk.  Miller  and 
Scholes  (1972)  and  Black,  Jensen  and  Scholes  (1972)  noted  that  the 
intercept  terms  do  not  always  behave  the  way  model  predicts.  For 
middle  of  the  range  risk  the  intercept  term  is  at  RF;  but  with  low 166 
beta  securities  it  is  consistently  at  a  level  higher  than  RF,  and 
with  high  beta  securities  it  is  consistently  at  a  level  lower  than 
RF.  This  gives  rise  to  the  possibility  that  the  true  underlying 
security  market  line  may  in  fact  be  a  curve,  instead  of  being  a 
straight  line.  (Figure  5.7  and  Figure  5.8) 
Figure  5.7 
SML:  Empirical  Slope'and  Intercept 
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RF 
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Figure  5.8 
StIL  :  Possible  Theoretical  Slope  and  Intercept 
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Do  these  anomalies  make  the  CAPM  invalid? 
Since  the  CAPM  is  an  expectations  model  it  can  only  be  tested 
via  an  ex-post  model  such  as  the  market  model.  The  relationship 
between  ex-ante  ex-post  returns  can  be  described  as  follows:  - 
The  CAPM 
E(RS)=RF+[E(Rm)-RJ3 
=  RF  +  ßi  E(Rm)  -  RFßj 
=  RF  -  RFßi  +  ßi  E(Rm) 
=  Rf(1  -  ßi  )+  ßi  E(Rm) 
The  Market  Model 
E(RS)  =  aj  +  bj  E(Rm)  +  E(ej) 
=  ai  +  bi  E  (Rm) 
(since  E(el)  =0  by  definition 
Hence  E(RS)  =  RF(1  -  $j)  +  ßj  E(Rm)  from  CAPM 
and  E(RS)  =  aj  +  bj  E(Rm)  from  Market  Model 
aj  =RF(l-ßj) 
This  is  the  ex-post  -  ex-ante  relationship  of  the  intercept  term. 
Thus,.  if  both  the  market  model  and  the  CAPM  are  valid,  then  the 
intercept  term  ai  of  the  market  model  is  equal  to  R  F(l  -  ßj)  of 
the  CAPM. 
If  there  are  inaccuracies  in  the  market  model  then  any  lack  of 
validity  of  the  CAPM  could  be  due  to  inadequacy  of  the  market 
model.  One  such  major  source  of  error  in  the  market  model  relates 
to  the  independence  of  the  error  terms  of  the  linear  equation. 
King(1966)has  demonstrated  that  these  errors  are  correlated  across 
securities  for  a  given  time  period,  and  that  these  correlations 
can  be  due  to  industry  effects. 168 
Heteroscedasticity  and  Non-trading  cause.  further  problems  in 
empiricaly  testing  the  CAPM. 
If  the  market  model  parameters  are  estimated  from  trade  to  trade 
using  ordinary  least  square  method,  returns  will  be  measured  over 
periods  of  different  length.  If  the  variance  of  the  residuals  is 
approximately  proportional  to  the  length  of  the  period,  a 
heteroscedastic  situation  will  arise.  A  weighting  scheme  such 
as  dividing  the  log  of  returns  by  the  square  root  of  the  time 
period  will  be  an  adequate  amendment  in  such  a  situation. 
When  shares  are  traded  infrequently,  beta  estimates  can  be 
severely  biased  due  to  the  possibility  that  prices  are  recorded 
at  the  end  of  a  time  period  to  represent  a  transaction  which 
occured  earlier  in  the  time  period.  Non-trading  problem  has  been 
discussed  in  the  literature  by  Fisher  (1966)  and  Dimson  (1979). 
Shares  which  suffer  from  non-trading  problem  have  their  covariance 
with  the  market  substantially  underestimated.  Non-trading  is  not 
a  serious  problem  in  the  present  research  since  non-trading  is 
generally  a  problem  associated  with  small  companies,  and  the 
companies  under  current  investigation  are  large  multinationals 
in  an  international  context. 
Another  source  of  misfit  between  the  ex-post  -  ex'-ante  could  be  in 
the  choice  of  a  proxy  for  the  whole  market  in  the  form  of  some  index. 
Finally,  there  are  possible  errors  of  measurement  in  individual  cases. 
However,  Ball  (1978)  has  concluded  that  systematic  experimental  error 
is  unlikely  to  be  a  serious  enough  source  of  misfit;  hence  the  CAPM 
must  be  misspecified.  Figure  5.9  shows  the  possible  ways  of  testing 
CAPM. 169 
Fi  ure5.9 
Empirical  Tests  of  the  CAPM 
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A  detailed  analysis  of  the  possible  econometric  difficulties  involved  in 
the 
estimatingACAPM  relationship  is  provided  by  Miller  and  Scholes  (1972). 
Roll  (1977)  has  expressed  serious  reservations  about  the  CAPM.  His 
major  objections  to  CAPM  lie  on  the  grounds  that  (i)  the  CAPM  is  an 
ex-ante  model  of  expectations,  while  all  tests  of  CAPM  have  been,  and 
can  only  be  of  ex-post  data.  In  effect,  ex-ante  models  are  not 
testable;  and  (ii)  the  proxy  for  the  market  should  include  all  assets. 
A  true  "market  portfolio"  would  include  claims  on  real  estate,  human 
capital,  and  other  non-marketable  assets.  Stocks  traded  on  the  stock 
market,  on  which  all  tests  of  CAPM  have  been  conducted,  form  only  a 
subset  of  the  true  market. 
Ryan  (1982)  has  commented  on  Roll's  objections,  and  observed  that  his 
objections  are  a  "product  of  the  subtle  but  important  differences  in 
the  way  individual  researchers  perceive  the  nature  of  theories  and 
their  empirical  testing  (p  443).  "Of  course,  all  economic  models  use 
proxies  in  one  form  or  another  and,  if  one  insists  on  perfect  data, 
few  theories  could  be  tested"  (Sheffrin,  1983,  p  139).  The  issue  is 
thus  one  of  testability  as  a  criterion  for  scientific  theory 
construction  and  development,  which  being  beyond  the  scope  of  current 
research  will  not  be  pursued  here. 
At  the  practical  level  there  are  several  explanations  possible  as 
to  why  the  statistically  estimated  relation  ex-post  has  a  different 
intercept  and  slope  from  what  the  theory  predicts:  - 171 
Real  world  investors  cannot  go  into  debt  and  borrow  at  risk-free 
rate.  The  higher  rate  paid  by  borrowers  reflect  the  default  risk. 
2  Real  world  investors  seldom  hold  the  market  portfolio,  ie,  because 
of  transaction  costs,  and  continuously  changing  optimum  in  the 
market,  they  diversify  less  than  perfectly,  resulting  in  the 
existence  of  a  residual  element  in  the  unsystematic  risk.  If 
unsystematic  risk  does  have  a  price  in  the  market  we  would  expect 
the  rate  of  return  on  a  zero  beta  risky  security  to  be  higher 
than  the  risk-free  rate. 
On  balance  we  can  conclude  that  the  CAPM  is  a  workable  theory  of 
asset  pricing  in  the  capital  market.  Fama  and  MacBeth  have  concluded 
in  favour  of  the  CAPM  as  follows:  - 
on on  average  there  seems  to  be  a  positive  trade-off 
between  return  and  risk,  with  risk  measured  from  the  portfolio 
viewpoint.  In  addition,  although  there  are  "stochastic  non- 
linearities"  from  period  to  period,  we  cannot  reject  the 
hypothesis  that  on  average  their  effects  are  zero  and 
unpredictably  different  from  zero  from  one  period  to  the  next. 
Thus,  we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  in  making  a  portfolio 
selection,  an  investor  should  assume  that  the  relationship 
between  a  security's  portfolio  risk  and  its  expected  return 
is  linear,  as  implied  by  the  two-parameter  model.  .  ." 
Fama  and  MacBeth,  (1973),  p  633. 172 
5.5  CAPM  and  Geographical  Segment  Disclosure 
Multinationals  are  corporations  which  find  it  advantageous  to  have 
sales,  manufacturing,  marketing  or  financial  activities  located  in 
a  number  of  countries.  Environments  in  such  diverse  locations  can 
be,  and  often  are,  different  between  locations.  If  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  by  multinationals  results  in  finer  information 
being  available  to  market  participants,  and  such  information  results 
in  altered  perceptionsof  risk,  then  it  is  conceivable  that  such 
altered  perceptions  would  be  evident  in  the  reassessment  of  betas  for 
multinationals.  If  the  investor  is  interested  in  reformulating  his 
investment  strategy  in  the  light  of  new  information,  then  he  would 
be  interested  not  only  in  finding  out  what  the  systematic  risk  has 
been  in  the  past,  but  also  in  what  direction  it  is  likely  to  move 
in  the  future. 
Although  the  validity  of  the  CAPM  does  not  depend  upon  the  stability 
of  beta,  a  successful  application  of  the  CAPM  to  determine  the 
required  rate  of  return  does  require  a  reasonably  stable  beta.  If 
beta  is  regarded  as  a  random  variable  then  mean  beta  alone  is  not  a 
good  surrogate  of  systematic  risk.  In  such  cases,  the  problem  becomes 
one  of  predicting  systematic  risk,  and  of  establishing  beta  determinants 
which  can  be  used  in  predicting  future  betas.  Thus  the  application 
of  CAPM  in  segmental  geographical  disclosure  context  requires  an 
understanding  of  : 
(i)  beta  stability,  and 
(ii)  beta  determinants. 173 
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5.51  Beta  Stability 
The  importance  of  testing  for  stationarity  of  systematic  risk  was 
first  recognised  by  Blume  (1971)  who  found  that  over  time  betas 
tend  towards  the  mean  value  of  1.0,  the  market  beta.  Elgers, 
Haltinger  and  Hawthorne  (1979)  have  hypothesised  that  this  regression 
tendency  towards  the  mean  value  is  due  to  'survivorship  bias'. 
Further  characteristics  of  betas  are  that  at  the  individual  level 
beta  is  more  likely  to  be  non-stationary  (Sharpe  and  Cooper21972). 
while  predictive  ability  of  betas  improve,  ie,  betas  become  less 
volatile  over  time  at  the  portfolio  level  (Levy,  1971;  Blume,  1975). 
Furthermore,  Goodring  and  O'Malley  (1977)  have  found  that  betas  are 
sensitive  to  market  phase;  ie,  bull  and  bear  markets.  In  an 
optimistic  bull  market  betas  tend  to  be  higher  than  in  bear  markets. 
These  non-stationary  characteristics  of  betas  have  been  analysed 
by  Klein  and  Bawa  (1977)  under  the  heading  of  'estimation  risk'. 
5.511  Estimation  Risk 
The  CAPM  is  based  on  the  two  parameter  mean-variance  model  of 
portfolio  selection.  In  most  realistic  cases,  the  parameters  that 
completely  characterise  the  return  distribution  of  securities  are 
unknown;  yet  the  traditional  CAPM  assumes  that  investors  know  the 
true  parameters  of  these  return  distributions.  Estimation  risk  is 
this  difference  between  the  true  parameters  and  the  assumed  parameters 
of  the  return  distributions. 174 
When  sample  information  is  insufficient  (ie,  the  number  of  observations 
per  security  is  less  than  the  number  of  securities),  as  is  the  case 
with  the  empirical  analyses  of  Blume  (1970),  Black,  Jensen  and  Scholes 
(1972),  Miller  and  Scholes  (1972),  and  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973), 
estimation  risk  prevails  (Klein  and  Bawa,  1977,  p  90).  In  such  cases, 
assuming  costless  information,  the  number  of  observations  could  be 
increased  by  one  of  two  ways:  - 
(i)  by  extending  the  horizon;  ie,  by  lengthening  the  observation 
period  over  which  past  data  are  collected;  and 
(ii)  by  temporal  disaggregation;  ie,  by  taking  observations  at 
more  frequent  intervals  -  for  example.  weekly  instead  of 
monthly;  or  daily,  instead  of  weekly. 
However,  there  are  problems  with  both  of  these. 
5.512  Horizon  Problem 
The  horizon  problem  in  segmental  geographical  disclosure  context  is  the 
problem  of  deciding  how  long  the  period  of  observation  should  be  over 
which  the  prices  information  should  be  collected  and  analysed  to  be 
able  to  establish  realistic  risk  profiles  of  multinationals, 
If  the  observation  period  is  too  short,  then  there  might  not  be  enough 
observations  for  a  tenable  time  series  as  the  beta  estimates  can  be 
unduly  influenced  by  unrepresentative  random  factors. 
If  the  observation  period  is  too  long,  then  the  assumption  of 
stationary  probability  distributions  becomes  difficult  to  support. 
Too  long  a  period  might  result  in  a  situation  where  many  of  the 
factors  that  might  have  been  relevant  in  the  distant  past  might 
not  be  relevant  any  more  in  the  future  over  the  planning  horizon. 175 
On  a  priori  grounds  it  would  be  anticipated  that  betas  would  not 
be  stationary  over  periods  of  indefinite  length  of  time  due,  for 
example,  to  changes  in  capital  structure  and  asset  composition  of 
the  firm  (Brenner  and  Smidt,  1978). 
The  horizon  decision  is  thus  subjective.  On  balance,  a  ten  year 
horizon  could  be  a  starting  point,  modified  by  industry  characteristics, 
such  as  underlying  technology  which  is  an  important  influence  on  the 
asset  structure  of  the  firm.  In  high  technology  industries  such  as 
electronics  and  opticals  the  horizon  could  be  shorter,  while  in  low 
technology  industries  the  horizon  could  be  longer.  Moreover,  the 
horizon  decision  is  influenced  by  whether  one  is  considering  portfolio 
beta  or  individual  firm  beta.  In  a  portfolio  context,  where  there 
might  be  a  mixture  of  high  and  low  technology  industries,  the  impact 
of  horizon  decision  is  likely  to  be  less  pronounced  than  would  be  the 
case  if  firm  level  beta  is  being  considered. 
5.513  Temporal  Disaggregation 
Increasing  the  frequency  of  observations  within  the  horizon  is  one 
of  the  ways  of  increasing  the  sample  size  (section  5.511).  However, 
such  disaggregation  of  the  time  interval  can  have  significant  influence 
on  beta  stability.  A  security's  beta  may  vary  very  substantially 
depending  upon  whether  it  is  estimated  on  the  basis  of  daily,  weekly 
or  monthly  observations.  Hawawini  (1983)  reported  that  Eastman  Kodak 
had  a  beta  of  1.25  based  on  daily  returns,  but  a  beta  of  only  0.93 
based  on  monthly  returns  for  the  four  year  period  January  1970  to 
December  1973. 176 
Opinions  vary  among  researchers  as  to  what  is  the  optimum  interval 
over  which  prices  data  should  be  collected.  Cheng  and  Deets  (1973) 
suggest  that  intervals  should  be  as  short  as  possible,  while  Bear 
and  Gehr  (1975)  are  of  the  opinion  that  longer  intervals  between 
observations  is  preferable. 
An  important  factor  in  deciding  an  optimal  degree  of  temporal 
disaggregation  is  serial  correlation  (Hawawini  and  Vora,  1980).  If 
one  assumes  that  returns  are  serially  uncorrelated  over  time,  then 
this  assumption  becomes  unrealistic  with  finer  partitions  of  the 
observation  period;  if  one  assumes  that  returns  are  serially 
correlated,  then  again  one  introduces  additional  unknown  parameters 
and  thereby  increases  the  'estimation  uncertainty'  (Klein  and  Bawa, 
1977,  pp  90-91). 
The  intervaling  period  and  size  as  measured  by  market  capitalisation 
are  also  related  (Cohen,  Hawawini,  Maier,  Schwartz  and  Whitcomb,  1983). 
In  general,  betas  of  securities  with  a  smaller  market  value  than  the 
average  of  all  securities  outstanding  (the  market)  will  decrease  as 
the  return  interval  is  shortened,  whereas  betas  of  securities  with 
a  large  market  value  relative  to  the  market  will  increase.  This 
suggests  that  betas  measured  over  return  intervals  of  arbitrary 
length  will  tend  to  be  biased.  Hawawini  (1983)  suggests  that  this 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  securities'  daily  prices  do  not  move  in 
unison;  some  stocks  may  lag  behind  the  general  market  movement,  others 
may  lead  it.  Fundamental  cause  of  this  intertemporal  cross  correlations 
is  the  friction  in  the  trading  process,  which  delays  the  response  of 
securities'  prices  to  new  information. 177 
On  balance  monthly  returns  seem  to  be  desirable.  The  thin  trading 
effect,  (effect  of  non-trading)  can  be  reduced,  if  not  totally 
eliminated  if  one  measures  returns  over  intervals  longer  than  a  week, 
say  a  month  (Hawawini,  Michel  and  Viallet,  1983). 
5.52  Beta  Determinants 
Problems  in  beta  stability  have.  been  discussed  in  section  5.51  above. 
There  still  remains  the  question  of  how  to  predict  beta  over  the 
planning  horizon  for  a  geographically  diversified  firm.  As  in  any 
model  building  situation,  there  are  two  approaches  to  modelling 
systematic  risk:  (i)  the  statistical  or  stochastic  process  approach; 
and  (ii)  the  economic  or  causal  variable  approach. 
Stochastic  process  approaches  are  based  on  the  time  series  properties 
of  numbers,  and  are  not  concerned  with  what  causes  the  numbers  to  be 
what  they  are.  Various  approaches  to  stochastic  modelling  of  time 
series  of  betas  are  given  in  Figure  5.10.  Schaefer,  Brealey,  Hodges 
and  Thomas  (1975),  have  tested  these  stochastic  modelling  approaches 
and  concluded  in  favour  of  a  return  to  normality  model  for  forecasting 
systematic  risk. 
Like  all  statistical  approaches,  the  stochastic  process  approach  to 
beta  determination  is  limited  because  it  looks  at  the  symptoms  and  not 
the  underlying  causes,  To  be  able  to  predict  systematic  risk  for 
multinationals  over  the  planning  horizon,  it  is  important  to  understand 
(i)  the  existing  state  of  the  underlying  forces;  and  (ii)  how  these 
underlying  forces  are  likely  to  behave  under  alternative  economic 
environments. 178 
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Figure  5.10 
Alternative  Models  for  Predicting  Systematic  Risk 
Forecasting  Beta 
Stochastic  Economic  or  Causal  1  Beaver,  Kettler  &  Scholes(1970 
Process  Approach  Variable  Approach  2  Rosenberg  &  McKibben(1973) 
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where, 
(1)  at  is  a  zero  mean  serially  un- 
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variance  aU 
(2)  A  is  assumed  to  be  between  zero  and 
unity. 
Cross-sectional  variance  of  betas  is 
constant  over  time.  There  is  a 
tendency  for  betas  to  regress  toward 
the  mean  level  of  the  process, 
-  Rosenberg  and  McKibben(1973) 
Random  Walk  Model 
Bt+l  0  Bt  +  Ut 
where, 
Ut  is  a  zero  mean, 
serially  uncorrelated 
random  variable  with 
variance  Qu 
One  implication  of  this  model 
is  that  cross-sectional 
variance  of  the  betas 
increases  over  time. 
-  Kantor.  (1971) 179 
The  instrumental  variable  approach  is  an  attempt  at  modelling  these 
underlying  forces. 
5.521  Instrumental'Variables 
A  pioneering  attempt  at  modelling  systematic  risk  based  on  instrumental 
variables  was  made  by  Beaver,  Kettler,  and  Scholes  (1970)  who  used 
accounting  variables  as  surrogates  for  underlying  economic  variables 
of  the  firm  and  tested  the  relationship  between  systematic  risk  and 
some  of  the  important  accounting  measures,  such  as  net  income,  dividend, 
leverage,  liquidity  and  assets.  They  suggested,  and  found  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  hypothesis  that  accounting  risk  measures  are  predictive 
of  future  market  risk  levels.  Similiarly,  Rosenberg  and  McKibben  (1973) 
used  a  descriptor  type  model  where  beta  factors  are  assumed  to  be 
linear  function  of  a  number  of  descriptors,  or  explanatory  variables 
which  included  accounting  based  variables. 
Predictive  ability  of  individual  accounting  variables  as  proxy  for 
structural  changes  in  the  firm's  investment  and  financing  policy  over 
time  have  been  tested  by  others.  For  example,  Hamada  (1969,1972) 
tested  capital  structure  as  an  instrumental  variable;  operating 
leverage  as  an  instrumental  variable  has  been  tested  by  Lev  (1974b) 
and  Percival  (1974);  Rubinstein  (1973)  and  Bildersee  (1975)  have  tested 
the  relevance  of  line  of  business  activity  information;  Brenner  and 
Smidt  (1978)  have  tested  the  association  between  asset  characteristics 
of  firms  and  beta  changes.  All  these  tests  support  the  hypothesis  that 
there  are  significant  relationships  between  some  accounting  variables 
and  systematic  risk. 
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The  instrumental  Tariable  approach  to  forecasting  beta  is  preferable  to 
stochastic  modelling  approaches  because  policy  decision  of  firms 
which  can  affect  betas  (Foster,  1980b),  are  easier  to  incorporate  in 
an  instrumental  variable  approach.  If  the  firm's  future  beta  is  a 
function  of  the  firm's  future  cash  flows,  then  policy  decisions  by 
management  about  investment  and  financing  decisions  affecting  future 
cash  flows,  will  affect  the  firm  betas. 
Collins,  Rozeff  and  Dhaliwal  (1981)  have  linked  a  firm's  policy 
decision  with  estimation  risk.  Over  time  estimation  risk  will 
increase  if  investors  become  less  certain  about  the  firm's  future 
cash  flows  because  of  increased  uncertainty  about,  for  example, 
investments  being  undertaken  by  the  firm.  If  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  gives  insights  into  the  firm's  investment  and  financing 
policies,  estimation  risk  will  be  lower,  thus  affecting  betas. 
In  addition  to  investment-financing  policies,  firm's  accounting 
policies  have  been  suggested  as  additional  beta  determinants. 
Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1979)  have  suggested  that  lobbying  behaviour 
related  to  disclosure  is  conditioned  by  size  of  firms;  Hagerman 
and  Zmiewski  (1979)  found  evidence  in  favour  of  a  positive  relation- 
ship  between  accounting  policy  choice  and  a  number  of  economic  variables 
such  as  size,  risk,  and  capital  intensity.  This  relationship  between 
accounting  policy  choice  and  firm  beta  seems  rather  indirect,  if 
not  tenuous.  Any  change  in  beta  due  to  lobbying  behaviour  if  any, 
is  likely  to  be  shortlived,  and  similar  in  nature  to  management 
attempts  to  smooth  firms'  income  over  time  (Sunder,  1973;  1975). 
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In  summary,  firm  level  variables  such  as  assets,  profits  and 
leverage  can  give  insights  into  the  firm's  beta.  Management 
policy  regarding  investment-financing  decisions  can  affect  the 
future  values  of  assets,  profits  and  leverage  -  the  firm  level 
beta  determinants.  If  segmental  geographical  disclosure  gives 
information  about  the  existing  state  of  the  firm  level  beta 
determinants  and  management  policies  affecting  their  future 
values,  such  disclosure  will  affect  firm  betas. 
Non-firm  level  environmental  variables  can  also  affect  betas  (Chen,  1982) 
"Generally  speaking,  random  betas,  if  properly  estimated  can 
be  expressed  as  a  function  of  factors  unique  to  the  company 
and  variables  associated  with  the  economy.  The  former  may 
include  the  traditional  variables  such  as  the  changes  in  assets, 
the  change  in  dividends,  and  financial  leverage.  The  latter 
needs  more  investigation. 
.  ." 
(Chen,  1982,  p  65) 
Multifactor  models,  Arbitrage  Pricing  model  and  International  Market 
model  are  attempts  at  modelling  these  non-firm  level  variables  as 
beta  determinants. 
5.522  Multifactor  Models 
One  of  the  earliest  extensions  of  the  Sharpe  model  of  capital  asset 
pricing  was  by  Black  (1972)  who  investigated  the  market  equilibrium 
under  the  assumption  that  there  is  no  riskiess  asset,  hence  no 
riskless  borrowing  or  lending  opportunities.  He  demonstrated  that, 
if  there  are  no  restrictions  on  short  selling,  then  in  equilibrium, 
the  portfolio  of  all  investors  will  consist  of  a  linear  combination 
of  the  market  portfolio  and  a  second  portfolio  which,  although  risky, 
has  zero  co-variance  with  the  market  portfolio. 182 
Merton  (1973)  introduced  a  three-factor  model  in  the  context  of  a 
continuous  time  intertemporal  model  of  asset  pricing.  The  three 
portfolios  are:  - 
(i)  the  riskless  asset;  (ii)  the  market  portfolio  M;  and  (iii)  a 
portfolio  or  asset  N  which  is  perfectly  negatively  correlated  with 
changes  in  the  riskiess  asset  rate. 
Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  have  found  that  a  four-factor  random 
coefficient  model  would  fit  the  empirical  data  better  than  the  two 
factor  model  of  Black,  or  a  three  factor  model  of  Merton.  An 
extension  of  this  multifactor  model  approach  is  the  'k'  factor 
model  of  Arbitrage  Pricing. 
5.523  The  Arbitrage  Pricing  Model 
Formulated  by  Ross  (1976),  the  Arbitrage  Pricing  Theory  (APT)  offers 
a  testable  alternative  to  the  CAPM.  The  CAPM  predicts  that  security 
rates  of  return  will  be  linearly  related  to  a  single  common  factor  - 
the  rate  of  return  on  the  market  portfolio,  The  APT  is  based  on 
similar  intuition,  but  is  much  more  general.  It  assumes  that  the 
rate  of  return  on  any  security  is  a  linear  function  of  k  factors  as 
shown  below:  - 
f-  .y  ti 
_  Ri  =  E(Ri)  +  bi1F1 
+  .,.  +  bikFk  +  ei 
ti 
where  Ri  =  the  random  rate  of  return  on  the  ith  asset 
E(Ri)  =  the  expected  rate  of  return  on  the  ith  asset 
bik  =  the  sensitivity  of  the  ith  asset§  return  to  the  kth  factor 
Fk  =  the  mean  zero  kth  factor  common  to  the  returns  of  all  asset! 
ei  =  the  random  zero  mean  noise  term  for  the  ith  asset 183 
The  CAPM  is  viewed  as  a  special  case  for  APT  when  the  market  rate  of 
return  is  assumed  to  be  the  single  relevant  factor. 
The  arbitrage  pricing  theory  is  based  on  the  idea  that  in  competitive 
markets  arbitrage  will  assure  that  riskless  assets  provide  the  same 
expected  return.  The  market  equilibrium  mechanism  is  driven  by 
individuals  eliminating  arbitrage  profits  across  multiple  factors. 
This  may  be  true,  yet  only  of  limited  value  in  that  it  does  not  tell 
us  what  these  'k'  factors  are,  nor  does  it  tell  us  what  makes  these 
factors  economically  or  behaviourally  relevant. 
A  more  specific  multifactor  model  in  the  context  of  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  is  the  International  Market  Model. 
5.524  The-International  Market  Model 
The  Arbitrage  Pricing  Model  described  above  can  be  seen  to  be  extended 
in  the  area  of  asset  pricing  in  an  international  situation.  The  APT 
is  part  of  a  general  trend.  King  (1966)  has  emphasised  industry 
factor;  Beaver,  Kettler  and  Scholes  (1970)  pioneered  the  instrumental 
variable  approach;  Black  (1972)  suggested  two  factors;  Merton  (1973) 
three  factors;  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  four  factors;  Ross  (1976) 
'k'  factors.  Following  the  same  principle,  in  the  international 
capital  market  context  there  has  been  the  development  of  country 
factors,  and  world  factors  (Lessard,  1973,1974). 
In-the  presence  of  barriers  to  portfolio  capital  flows,  multinational 
firms  (MNCs)  have  an  advantage  relative  to  single  country  firms  because 
of  their  ability  to  diversify  internationally.  This  financial 
advantage,  the  result  of  financial  market  imperfections,  compliments 184 
the  advantages  MNCs  derive  from  imperfections  in  real  goods  and 
factor  markets  and  represents  an  additional  motive  for  international 
expansion.  The  risk-return  structure  in  an  international  scene  can 
be  modelled  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  Sharpe  (1963)  market  model. 
If  one  incorporates  the  interdependence  of  changes  in  the  prices  of 
securities  in  the  international  context,  an  international  market 
model  can  be  formulated  as  follows  (Agmon  and  Lessard,  1977):! 
Raj  =  a.  +  Bl  jk  Rk+B  2j 
N  Rw  +e.  Rjk 
ý 
where,  Rik  =  Return  on  security  j  for  country  k; 
N 
Rk  =  Return  on  country  k  market  factor; 
N 
Rw  =  Return  on  the  world  market  excluding  country  k; 
(ie,  the  rest  of  the  world). 
If  the  international  firm  is  viewed  as  a  collection  of  activities 
in  different  countries,  then  the  return  on  its  traded  shares  can  be 
viewed  as:  - 
Rj  =  aj  +  wi  j 
B1  ij  Ri  +  BZj  lW  +  eJ 
i=1 
where,  Ri  =  market  factors  for  each  of  the  N  countries  in  which  firm 
j  generates  proportion  of  Wij  of  its  revenues  or  profits 
(ziWi  =  1) 
This  equation  implies  a  direct  relationship  between  the  international 
composition  of  the  firm's  activities  and  the  pattern  of  price  changes 
of  its  shares. 185 
If  the  above  relationship  holds,  then  the  return  on  the  shares  of  a 
UK  based  multinational  may  be  thought  of  as  arising  from  the  following 
relationship:  - 
R0%. 
0  O%j 
.S=aiJJ.  +  BI 
is 
RUK  +  B2  SRW 
+e 
J.  J 
where,  Rjs  =  Return  on  the  share  of  the  j  th  firm  with  a  proportion 
's'  of  non-UK  sales  or  profits 
..  r 
RUK  =  Return  on  the  FT  all  shares  index,  and 
N 
Rw  =  Return  on  the  rest  of  the  world  index,  defined  to  be 
orthogonal  (ie,  independent)  to  the  RUK. 
The  testable  hypothesis  in  the  above  formulation  could  be  that  B,  is 
is  a  decreasing  function  of  's',  and  B2  is*  is  an  increasing  function 
of  's'. 
Agmon  and  Lessard  (1977)  tested  such  a  hypothesis  on  217  US  based 
multinationals  for  168  months  from  January  1959  to  October  1972. 
They  obtained  Rw,  the  rest  of  the  world  index  orthogonal  to  the 
country  index  by  regressing  the  Capital  International  world  index 
on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  (NYSE)  index,  and  defined  the 
residuals  as  the  'rest  of  the  world  index  orthogonal  to  the  NYSE  index'. 
Their  results  showed  that  firms  with  high  proportions  of  non-US  sales 
were  highly  correlated  with  Rw,  the  rest  of  the  world  index,  and 
less  with  the  NYSE  index. 186 
5.6  Summary 
Chapter  V  has  been  concerned  with  risk  assessment  in  capital  markets 
with  special  reference  to  the  segmental  geographical  disclosure  issue, 
First,  the  notion  of  risk  has  been  explained  in  the  context  of  choice 
theory,  and  the  two  parameter  mean  variance  model  has  been  chosen 
in  preference  to  models  incorporating  higher  moments.  Following  this, 
the  mean-variance  efficient  theory  of  portfolio  selection  has  been 
analysed,  and  its  relevance  in  market  model,  and  the  equilibrium 
model  of  asset  pricing  has  been  shown, 
The  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM)  has  then  been  described,  its 
implications  explored,  its  relationship  with  market  efficiency  has 
been  explained,  and  problems  in  empirically  testing  the  model  have 
been  mentioned.  Shortcomings  of  the  CAPM  have  been  commented  upon, 
and  its  general  robustness  in  spite  of  methodological  objections 
raised  by  Roll  (1977)  hasbeen  shown. 
Attention  has  then  been  focused  on  the  question  of  the  application  of 
the  CAPM  to  the  segmental  geographical  issue  under  two  headings: 
beta  stability,  and  beta  determinants.  The  relevance  of  estimation 
risk  in  predicting  beta  has  been  shown,  and  problems  in  choosing  an 
appropriate  horizon,  and  in  deciding  upon  an  appropriate  level  of 
temporal  disaggregation  in  beta  measurement  have  been  discussed. 
Ha/ing  explained  the  stability  problem  in  beta  measurement,  attention 
has  been  switched  to  the  question  of  beta  determinants.  Instrumental 
variables  approach  following  Beaver,  Kettler  and  Scholes  (1970)  have 
been  explained,  various  multi-factor  models,  and  the  concept  of 
arbitrage  pricing  explained,  following  which  the  aptness  of  the 
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disclosure  has  been  shown. 
This,  then  concludes  the  theoretical  discussions  around  the 
question  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure,  Chapter  VI  will 
be  concerned  with  prior  research  in  the  area  of  segmental  disclosure, 
following  which  hypotheses  will  be  developed,  data  base  and 
methodology  explained,  various  analyses  performed  and  appropriate 
conclusions  drawn  in  subsequent  chapters, 188 
APPENDIX  V(A) 
The  Irrelevance  of'Unsystematic  Risk 
To  show  that  unsystematic  risk  does  not  matter,  all  that  matters  is  the 
systematic  risk: 
I  If  a  portfolio  is  comprised  on  N  securities,  then  the  portfolio  variance 
consists  of  N  individual  variances,  and  N(N  -  1)/2  covariances. 
2  For  a  portfolio  consisting  of  two  securities,  1  and  2,  of  equal  weight, 
the  portfolio  variance  can  be  stated  as: 
02P  =  021(j)2  +  022(f)2  +2  Cov12(l)(1) 
3  If  a  portfolio  is  composed  of  three  equal  weighted  securities,  1,2  and 
3,  then  the  portfolio  variance  can  be  stated  as: 
_2122212121 
2+ 
3) 
+2  Cov13(1)2  G2  P=Q  l(3)  +Q  2(. 
1)2 
3+  Q  2(3)  +2  Cov12(1)2  -) 
2  Cov23(1)2 
3 
4  Similarly  if  the  portfolio  consists  of  N  securities,  1,2,3,  .... 
(N  -  1),  N.  of  equal  weight,  then  the  portfolio  variance  can  be  stated 
as: 
Q2  =  a2(.  )2  +  Q2  (1)2  +....  Q2N(1)2  +2  Covi2(1)2  +2  Cov13(N)2 
P1  2N  N 
+..  2CovNN 
1 
(1)2 
(N 
5  For  convenience  we  can  decompose  the  expression  in  (4)  into  two  sections: 
the  first  consisting  of  the  individual  variances,  and  the  second  of  the 
covari  ances. 
6  The  variances  of  the  individual  securities  in  a  portfolio,  following 
the  expression  in  (4)  above  is: 
Q21(ß)2  +  022(1)2  +....  Q2  N(1)2  NNN 
_  (1)2-  {cx2I  +  422  +....  Q2N) 
N 
N 
N2  i=1  a2i 
As  the  number  of  securities  become  large,  N  becomes  large,  and  1/N2 
tends  to  zero;  this  makes  the  whole  expression 
12  N2 
also  zero. 
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7  Now,  the  covariances  from  our  expression  in  (4): 
2  Cov12(1)2  +2  Cov13  (l)2  +2  Cov23(1)2  +....  2  Cov 
_  1(N)2  NNN  (N  )N 
=  2(1)2  {Cov12  +  CoV13  +  Cov23  +....  CoV 
N  (N  ^  1)N} 
_  "{Q12  +  v13  +  Q23  +....  }  Q(N 
_  1)N  2N  N 
Let  Qj  be  the  average  of  covariances;  and  there  are'{N(N  -  1)/2}  such 
covariances,  as  stated  in  (1). 
Therefore, 
2  NN-1 
2  2NN-1- 
2N2 
QiJ 
N-1 
N  i3 
As  N  tends  to  be  larger  and  larger,  the  ratio  of  (N  ^  1)  and  N  tends  to 
one.  Hence  the  whole  expression-of  covariances  tends  to  aid. 
8  If  Qij  is  represented  by  any  index  model,  where  beta  replaces  the  aver- 
age  covariance,  then  all  that  matters  is  the  beta  or  the  systematic 
risk,  and  the  unsystematic  risk,  ie  the  variances  of  the  individual 
securities  do  not  matter  any  more. 
(For  notational  convenience  a12  is 
used  instead  of  Cov12) 190 
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Earlier  chapters  have  introduced  the  topic  of  segmental 
disclosure,  analysed  the  theory  of  information  disclosure  and 
explored  capital  market  impacts  of  such  information  disclosure 
in  general.  In  this  chapter  prior'research  in  the  area  of 
segmental  disclosure  will  be  examined  with  a  view  to  developing 
hypotheses  of  possible  benefits  of  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  to  be  tested  in  the  following  chapter.  Figure  6.1 
is  a  schematic  presentation  of  prior  research. 
First,  descriptive  studies  which  examine  possible  benefits  of 
segmental  disclosure  from  a  user  consensus  viewpoint,  will  be 
cited.  Cerf's  (1961)  consensus  study  will  be  examined  in  detail, 
and  an  evaluation  of  user  behaviour  studies  will  be  made. 
Next,  predictive  ability  studies  will  be  examined  under  two 
headings  :  judgmental  response  of  the  decision  maker,  and 
accuracy  of  forecasting  models.  Pioneering  research  of  Kinney 
(1971)  will  be  examined  in  detail  under  predictive  accuracy  of 
models. 
Content  analysis  studies,  which  examine  the  extent  of  disclosure 
across  companies  and  across  countries  will  then  be  examined. 
Analytical  aggregate  market  level  impact  studies,  which  explore 
the  risk  implications  of  segmental  disclosure,  will  be  examined 
in  detail  after  that.  Finally,  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
will  be  examined  primarily  with  the  aid  of  studies  in  the  area  of 
international  capital  markets. 200 
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6.1  User  Behaviour  6.2 6.1  User  Behaviour  Studies  201 
User  behaviour  studies  in  segmental  disclosure  are  concerned  with 
the  way  the  users  (consumers)  respond  to  the  disclosure  of  segmental 
information  in  corporate  reports.  This  approach  is  very  much  like 
the  marketing  approach  in  trying  to  find  out  what  the  customers  want, 
or  think  they  want.  Such  studies  are  usually  positive/descriptive 
type,  conducted  through  opinion  surveys  such  as  questionnaires  or 
interviews. 
Prior  research  concerning  user  behaviour  in  segmental  disclosure  can 
be  categorised  into  two  broad  groups  :  (i)  disclosure  benefit  studies 
and  (ii)  consensus  studies. 
Disclosure  benefit  studies  are  attempts  to  establish  whether  users 
(decision  makers)  find  segmental  disclosure  related  information 
useful  in  decision  making  in  general.  Consensus  studies  are  about 
the  relative  importance  of  individual  disclosable  items  to  the  user. 
Assuming  segmental  disclosure  is  useful  to  the  decision  maker  in 
principle,  consensus  studies  are  attempts  to  establish  a  consensus 
among  users  as  to  which  items  are  important.  From  such  consensus, 
an  index  of  disclosure  can  be  constructed  against  which  'good'  or 
'poor'  reporters  can  be  identified. 202 
6.11  Disclosure  Benefit  Studies 
Empirical  research  on  segmental  disclosure  benefits  started  in  the 
sixties,  and  were  in  response  to  the  phenomenon  of  conglomerate  mergers 
in  western  industrialsed  countries.  Since  conglomerate  mergers  were 
not  based  on  product  market  logic  like  horizontal  or  vertical  mergers, 
analysts  found  it  difficult  to  unravel  the  efficiency  of  the 
organization  without  segmental  information.  Various  professional 
bodies,  notably  the  National  Association  of  Accountants  (NAA)  and 
the  Financial  Executives'  Institute  sponsored  studies  on  segmental 
disclosure  benefits  to  be  able  to  recommend  disclosure  policies. 
Bradish  (1965)  was  the  earliest  example  of  opinion  survey  on 
disclosure  benefit  in  which  he  interviewed  financial  analysts 
representing  security  brokers,  trust  and  loan  departments  of  commercial 
banks,  and  insurance  companies  to  determine  the  types  of  information 
they  deemed  inadequately  disclosed.  He  also  sought  proposed 
solutions  from  the  analysts  which  could  correct  these  inadequacies. 
His  analysis  showed  that  there  was  a  lack  of  communication  between 
the  users  (the  analysts)  and  the  preparers  (the  accountants)  of 
financial  information. 
Bradish,  however,  did  not  address  his  enquiry  to  the  segmental  disclosure 
issue  in  particular.  This  was  done  by  Kautz  (1968)  in  a  research  study 
sponsored  by  the  Financial  Executives'  Institute.  The  objective  of 
Mautz's  study  was  to  define  and  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of 
segment  reporting.  He  conducted  an  extensive  study  directly  concerned 
with  the  adequacy,  for  investment  decision  purposes,  of  financial 
reports  of  diversified  companies,  to  examine  if  segment  data  would 
be  useful.  Mautz  sent  out  questionnaires  to,  and  conducted  interviews 
with  financial  controllers  and  *financial  analysts. 203 
Among  the  various  recommendations  that  resulted  from  this  research, 
the  two  important  ones  are  : 
(i)  companies  that  operate  in  more  than  one  broadly  defined  industry 
should  meet  extended  disclosure  requirements;  and 
(ii)  management  should  use  its  discretion  in  determining  the  segments 
for  reporting  purposes. 
Among  the  results  that  Mautz  obtained,  it  was  found  that  90.8°0  of 
the  responding  financial  analysts  attempt  to  determine  operating 
results  by  segments  of  diversified  firms.  However,  87.6%  of  the 
analysts  felt  that  the  annual  financial  reports  did  not  provide 
satisfactory  clues  to  appropriate  segmentation  (p  113).  It  can  be 
concluded  from  Mautz's  study  that  although  segmental  financial  data 
was  considered  desirable  from  an  investor's  point  of  view,  many 
conglomerates  chose  not  to  reveal  such  information  in  a  meaningful 
way. 
Mautz's  study  was  pathbreaking  in  that  it  established  in  a  formal  way 
the  benefits  of  segmental  disclosure.  It  has  also  been  controversial 
in  that  it  left  the  definition  of  segments  to  management  discretion. 
Accountants  were  equally  concerned  with  the  segmental  issue  like  the 
financial  analysts.  Backer  and  McFarland  (1968)  produced  a  study 
sponsored  by  the  National  Association  of  Accountants  (NAA)  in  which 
questionnaires  were  used  to  survey  the  opinion  of  financial  analysts, 
bankers  and  corporate  executives.  Analysis  showed  that  participants 
were  almost  unanimously  in  favour  of  segmental  disclosure.  Segment 
identification  problems,  however,  remained  unresolved  by  being  left 
to  the  discretion  of  management.  They  however  have  recommended  that 
such  segment  information  should  be  audited  since  audited  segment 
information  will  increase  the  users'  confidence  in  such  information. 204 
Rappaport  and  Lerner  (1969)  was  a  follow  up  research  study  also 
sponsored  by  NAA  in  which  the  concepts  e>plored  by  Backer  and 
McFarland  (1968)  was  further  developed.  The  objective  of  this  study 
was  to  develop  a  framework  for  financial  reporting  by  diversified 
companies  that  would  be  useful  to  the  shareholders  and  investors. 
The  authors  presented  alternative  investor  valuation  models,  and  based 
on  these  models  presented  a  case  for  segment  reporting.  Since  this 
study  has  wider  implications  for  model  building,  it  will  be  formally 
discussed  in  section  6.2,  on  'Predictive  Ability  Studies'. 205 
6.12  Consensus  Studies 
If  there  are  benefits  from  additional  disclosure,  then  to  be  able 
to  reap  these  benefits  any  haphazard  method  of  disclosure  is  clearly 
undesirable  because  the  cost  of  disclosure  may  be  larger  than  the 
benefits.  Items  to  be  disclosed  have  to  be  carefully  chosen  in  such 
a  way  that  the  benefits  exceed  the  costs.  Consensus  studies  of 
disclosure,  sometimes  called  research  measure  of  disclosure,  aim  to 
establish  this  by  assessing  the  information  content  of  individual 
items  disclosed. 
The  first  comprehensive  effort  to  measure  the  information  content  of 
individual  items  disclosed  was  made  by  Cerf  (1961).  Cerf  believed 
that  the  differences  in  disclosure  between  firms  could  be  shown  to 
be  related  to  certain  firm  characteristics  (variables).  Knowing 
what  variables  were  associated  with  disclosure  would  point  to  the 
areas  where  educational  or  other  methods  to  improve  disclosure  should 
be  concentrated. 
Cerf  considered  the  possible  influence  on  disclosure  of  the  following 
variables 
1  Method  of  trading  shares  of  stock. 
2  Size. 
3  Profitability. 
4  Frequency  of  external  financing. 
5  Stability  of  growth  in  earnings  and  dividends. 
6  Product  of  firm. 
7  Degree  of  competition. 
8  Industry. 
9  Stage  of  development. 
10  Associated  outside  auditor. 
11  Characteristics  of  management. 206 
Cerf  chose  to  test  the  association  between  disclosure  and  three  of 
these  variables,  ie  Nos  1,2  and  3;  method  of  trading;  size, 
measured  both  by  asset  size  and  by  ownership  distribution;  and 
profitability.  His  criterion  for  choosing  these  three  were  primarily 
quanti  fiabili  ty. 
In  order  to  test  the  association  between  disclosure  and  the  three 
variables,  Cerf  had  to  develop  a  measure  or  index  of  disclosure  (IOD). 
The  development  of  the  IOD  involved  three  major  steps  : 
1  Items  of  information  which  were  thought  to  be  important  in 
making  investment  decisions  were  chosen.  Selection  of  these 
items  were  based  on  : 
(a)  a  review  of  literature  on  how  investment  decisions  are  made 
or  should  be  made; 
(b)  interviews  with  financial  analysts; 
(c)  an  examination  of  analysts  reports;  and 
(d)  a  list  of  items  most  frequently  used  by  financial  services 
(eg  Moody's,  Standard  and  Poors). 
2  Members  of  the  National  Federation  of  Financial  Analysts'  Societies 
(NFFAS)  were  interviewed  and  a  questionnaire  was  sent  to  other 
members  at  random.  In  this  step  the  analysts  were  asked  to 
weight  the  information  items  to  their  relative  importance. 
3  Cerf  examined  527  annual  reports.  When  an  item  appeared,  the 
annual  report  received  the  number  of  points  indicated.  The  sum 
of  the  points  received,  divided  by  the  total  points  possible 
became  the  firm's  index  of  disclosure. 
Cerf  concluded  that,  on  the  basis  of  differences  in  means  (arithmetic 
averages)  high  disclosure  firms  - 
(i)  had  more  stockholders; 207 
(ii)  were  larger  in  total  assets; 
(iii)  were  more  profitable,  ie  the  ratio  of  net  profit  to  net  worth 
were  greater;  and 
(iv)  were  more  likely  to  be  registered  on  the  NYSE  than  on  a 
regional  exchange  or  over  the  counter. 
Cerf's  pioneering  work  on  consensus  of  disclosure  improvement  has 
been  replicated  by  Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971),  Buzby  (1974b  and  1975), 
Chandra  (1974),  Barrett  (1976),  and  Firth  (1978)  in  various  contexts. 
Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971)  developed  an  index  of  disclosure.  The 
index  consisted  of  34  items  of  information  which  were  used  as  the 
basis  for  a  composite  measure  of  the  extent  of  disclosure  of  these 
items  in  annual  reports.  Weights  were  assigned  to  these  items  in 
order  to  note  distinctions  in  their  relative  importance  as  indicated 
by  the  security  analysts  who  were  interviewed.  The  extent  of  a 
company's  disclosure  was  measured  by  adding  weights  assigned  to  items 
included  in  its  annual  report.  Using  this  approach  they  identified 
companies  which  had  inadequate  disclosure.  They  concluded 
corporations  which  disclose  inadequate  information  are  likely  to  be  : 
(a)  small  in  size  as  measured  by  total  assets 
(b)  small  in  size  as  measured  by  number  of  stockholders 
(c)  free  from  listing  requirements 
(d)  audited  by  small  CPA  firms,  and 
(e)  less  profitable  as  measured  by  earnings  margin. 
Buzby  (1974b)  surveyed  professional  financial  analysts  to  construct 
a  detailed  set  of  weighted  disclosure  criteria  for  each  of  38  items 
or  types  of  financial  and  non-financial  information  which  might 
appear  in  an  annual  report.  The  set  of  disclosure  criteria  was 208 
then  applied  to  a  sample  of  annual  reports  to  determine,  among  other 
things,  the  relationship  between  the  importance  of  an  item  and  its 
extent  of  disclosure.  He  concluded  that  there  is  room  for 
improvement  by  disclosing  those  items  for  which  this  relationship  is 
low. 
Buzby  (1975)  studied  the  relationship  between  the  extent  to  which 
selected  items  of  information  are  presented  in  corporate  annual 
reports  and  two  company  characteristics  -  the  size  of  the  company 
and  its  listing  status.  The  extent  of  disclosure  of  these  items  in 
the  annual  reports  was  measured  by  a  disclosure  index  similar  to  that 
used  by  Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971).  The  results  of  Buzby's  study 
indicate  that  'the  extent  of  disclosure  in  annual  reports  is 
positively  associated  with  the  size  of  a  company's  assets  and  not 
affected  by  listing  status'  (p  30).  The  implication  of  this  result 
is  that  disclosure  improvement  efforts  should  be  focused  on  smaller 
firms. 
Chandra  (1974)  conducted  questionnaire  studies  to  test  the  consensus  on 
disclosure  in  published  reports  among  public  accountants  and  security 
analysts.  58  items  from  balance  sheets,  income  statements,  and 
other  published  financial  information  were  given  to  accountants  and 
financial  analysts.  The  relativeimportance  given  by  each  group  were 
compared.  Results  showed  a  marked  difference  between  the  preferences 
of  accountants  and  financial  analysts  so  far  as  information  required 
for  share  valuation  was  concerned. 
Barrett  (1976)  measured  the  extent  of  disclosure  in  published  reports 
by  an  index  constructed  of  seventeen  categories  of  information  for  a 
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of  multinational  firms  across  seven  industrialised  countries.  He 
found  that  in  spite  of  the  regulatory  environment,  US  companies  were 
not  the  best  performers  so  far  as  segmental  disclosure  was  concerned. 
In  some  cases,  the  Swedish  and  UK  firms  performed  better  as  measured 
by  his  disclosure  index. 
Firth  (1978)  studied  the  consensus  of  perceived  importance  of 
disclosure  of  individual  items  in  corporate  annual  reports. 
Questionnaires  containing  seventy-five  items  that  are  or  could  be 
disclosed  in  a  firm's  annual  report  were  -sent  to  750  individuals  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  These  individuals  consisted  of  250  directors 
of  companies  in  the  Times  1000  largest  firms  in  UK;  250  qualified 
accountants  employed  by  auditing  firms;  120  financial  analysts 
working  for  stockbrokers  and  investment  institutions,  and  130  loan 
officers  of  major  banks  and  finance  houses  in  the  city  of  London. 
These  individuals  were  asked  to  state  their  views  as  to  how  important 
they  perceived  each  individual  item  in  the  list  so  far  as  including 
such  items  in  the  annual  reports  were  concerned.  Results  showed 
similarities  and  differences.  Similarities  were  found  in  that 
company  directors  agreed  with  auditors  as  to  relative  rankings  of 
individual  items;  and  financial  analysts  agreed  with  bank  loan 
officers;  but  the  rankings  given  by  loan  officers  and  analysts 
differed  from  those  perceived  by  directors  and  auditors. 
The  importance  of  Firth's  study  is  twofold;  first,  it  emphasises  the 
multiperson  approach  to  user  behaviour;  second  it  gives  substance 
to  the  view  that  there  is  need  for  better  communication  between 
preparers  and  users  of  financial  statements. 6.13  '  Evaluation 
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All  the  research  using  an  index  of  disclosure  (IOD)  are  based  upon 
the  argument  that  improved  disclosure  is  useful  if  it  adds  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  users'  needs.  Consumer  sovereignty  rules 
(Peasnell,  1981).  It  is  held  that  management  of  a  corporation  can 
benefit  from  responding  to  the  needs  of  the  user  through  improved 
disclosure.  Once  the  information  needs  of  the  user  have  been 
established,  one  can  measure  the  quality  of  existing  financial 
disclosure  by  investigating  the  extent  to  which  users'  needs  are 
being  satisfied. 
Implicit  in  the  reasoning  employed  above  are  the  following  assumptions: 
(i)  Users  are  assumed  to  possess  a  high  degree  of  insight  concerning 
their  own  use  of  information. 
(ii)  The  relative  importance  of  an  item  of  information  to  the 
user  is  the  same  regardless  of  what  other  items  of  information 
are  available  to  him. 
and 
(iii)  The  relative  importance  of  a  disclosure  item  does  not  change 
over  time  (Dhaliwal,  1980,  by  p.  386) 
Each  of  the  three  above  assumptions  are  questionable. 
1  Research  had  indicated  that  individuals  (even  e>perts)  have  poor 
insights  into  their  own  judgment  process  as  described  by 
mathematical  models.  Decision  makers,  in  general,  lack  insight 
concerning  their  own  use  of  information  (Ashton  1976).  Further, 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  variation  in  the  relative  importance 
assigned  to  different  items  of  information  by  different  sets  of 
analysts  in  designing  an  index  of  disclosure. 
2  The  second  assumption  implies  that  the  relative  importance  of  a 211 
disclosure  item  to  the  user  is  the  same  regardless  of  what  other 
items  of  information  are  available  to  him.  This  relates  to  the 
concept  of  substitute  signals  of  information.  Two  items  of 
information  are  substitute  items  if  elimination  (or  absence)  of 
one  of  them  does  not  result  in  loss  of  information  to  the  user. 
Which  means  that  as  long  as  one  of  the  two  items  is  available, 
the  disclosure  of  the  second  item  does  not  provide  any  more 
information.  This  concept  of  substitute  items  of  information 
has  been  ignored  in  the  construction  of  disclosure  indices,  and 
redundant  data  seem  to  have  been  included. 
Moreover,  there  is  the  consideration  of  information  overload. 
It  is  conceivable  that  the  inclusion  of  numerous  items  of  data 
might  reduce  the  validity  of  the  resulting  prediction,  even  though 
each  one  of  them  might  be  relevant  in  isolation. 
3  The  third  assumption  is  about  the  stability  of  importance  of  the 
items  over  time.  Relative  importance  of  an  information  item  is 
dependent  upon  economic  conditions  and  the  objective  of  the  user, 
and  thus  not  stable  over  time. 
A  new  methodology  of  disclosure  improvement  is  therefore  needed  which 
will  provide  a  programme  for  obtaining  maximum  improvement  in 
financial  disclosure  through  a  minimum  number  of  additional 
disclosure  items.  Perhaps  the  use  of  multivariate  factor  analysis 
will  be  an  appropriate  technique  to  apply  here  (Hair,  Anderson  et  al, 
1979). 
The  information  content  of  a  new  disclosure  item  can  be  viewed  as 
having  two  components.  The  first  component  is  that  information 
which  is  already  being  provided  by  one  or  more  items;  the  second 
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provide.  A  new  disclosure  item  may  have  no  second  component. 
However,  disclosure  of  this  item  will  be  desirable  if  the  cost  of 
providing  this  item  is  less  than  the  cost  of  providing  the  items 
that  will  no  longer  be  needed  (Dhaliwal,  1980b,  p  388). 6.2  Predictive  Ability  Studies 
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User  oriented  studies  described  in  section  6.1  assume  consumer 
sovereignty.  In  such  studies  it  is  the  behaviour  or  opinion  of 
decision  makers  which  has  been  the  object  of  enquiry. 
There  is  another  approach  to  the  empirical  investigation  of  decision- 
usefulness  of  published  financial  statements.  This  places  emphasis 
on  determing  what  are  better  methods  of  financial  reporting. 
Attention  is  shifted  from  the  accounting  data  to  determining  which 
accounting  data  and  methods  give  the  best  predictions  of  the  events 
in  the  future  of  relevance  to  particular  type  decision.  (Peasnell  1981). 
This  is  the  predictive  ability  criterion  and  has  been  discussed  in 
the  literature  extensively  (Beaver,  Kennely  and  Voss,  1968;  Ashton, 
1976).  Predictive  ability  studies  in  the  context  of  segmental 
disclosure  is  about  the  extent  to  which  consolidated  sales  and  profits 
can  be  better  forecast  with  the  aid  of  segmental  information  than 
without  such  segmental  information. 
Based  on  the  conceptual  framework  of  Rappaport  and  Lerner  (1969), 
Kinney  (1971)  was  the  pioneer  in  testing  forecasting  ability  of 
segmental  information  in  the  financial  reporting  context.  But  such 
predictive  ability  tests  of  segmental  information  of  a  model  testing 
variety  is  only  a  partial  test  of  predictive  ability  because  the  so 
called  "predictive  ability  model  does  not  explicitly  consider  the 
decision  maker"  (Libby,  1975,  p  476).  Strictly  speaking,  most  forms 
of  accounting  data  do  not  give  predictions;  predictions  are  obtained 
by  putting  data  into  a  model.  Therefore  'predictive  ability'  tests 
of  accounting  data  are  tests  of  a  joint  hypothesis,  that  the  data  and 
the  model  combined  have  predictive  value.  It  is  necessary,  therefore, 
to  consider  (i)  studies  relating  to  judgmental  response  of  the  fore- 
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model  testing  variety  separately  to  obtain  a  fuller  understanding  of 
predictive  ability  studies  in  segmental  disclosure  context. 
6.21  Judgmental  Response 
Predictive  ability  models  have  two  components  :  (i)  the  judge,  or  the 
decision  maker  with  his  perceptional  strengths  and  limitations  and 
his  response  to  environmental  changes  in  the  face  of  new  information; 
and  (ii)  the  model  used  by  the  decision  maker  to  make  the  prediction. 
Judgmental  response  studies  recognize  that  "information  is  not  useful 
if  it  cannot  be  utilized  effectively  by  the  decision  maker  because  of 
his  limitations  as  an  information  processor"(Libby,  1975,  p  477). 
Judgmental  response  studies  in  the  context  of  segmental  information 
disclosure  have  been  of  two  types  :  (i)  simulation  studies  -  studies 
of  judgmental  response  in  controlled  environment  and  (ii)  real  life 
studies  of  decision  makers  in  real  life'open'environment. 
6.211  Simulation  Studies 
Simulation  studies  are  studies  of  judgmental  response  of  simulated 
decision  makers  in  the  context  of  segmental  disclosure  of  information 
against  nondisclosure  of  such  segmental  information.  Judgmental 
response  studies  using  simulated  decision  makers  in  the  context  of 
segmental  disclosure  were  conducted  by  Barefield  (1972)  and  Porcano 
(1976). 
Barefield  (1972)  conducted  a  simulation  study  with  a  student  group  at 
Purdue  University.  Students  played  the  role  of  managers  responsible 
for  controlling  labour  costs,  and  were  provided  with  simulated  data. 
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costs,  while  the  other  group  was  given  data  on  labour  costs  only. 
Data  analysis  showed  that  the  subjects  receiving  detailed  disaggregated 
material  and  labour  costs  were  slightly  better  performers.  The 
importance  of  this  study  is  rather  limited  however,  since  the 
participants  were  students,  role  playing,  and  in  an  obviously 
experimental  setting. 
Porcano  (1976)  conducted  an  experiment  similar  to  that  of  Barefield  on 
a  student  sample  of  forty,  to  examine  users'  predictive  ability  changes 
under  segmental  disclosure  against  nondisclosure  of  segmental 
information.  The  emphasis  here  was  on  unsophisticated  users  and  on 
the  interaction  effects  of  segmental  disclosure  and  other  moderator 
variables.  Results  indicated  that  disclosure  of  segmental  data,  by 
itself,  did  not  affect  (i)  subject's  predictions  of  corporate  earnings, 
(ii)  prediction  consensus  among  subjects,  and  (iii)  the  confidence 
subjects  placed  in  their  predictions  of  corporate  earnings.  However, 
the  disclosure  of  segmental  data  (when  interacting  with  similarity  in 
segments)  does  affect  subjects'  average  predictions  and  prediction 
consensus  among  subjects. 
Simulation  studies  such  as  those  conducted  by  Barefield  and  Porcano 
have  limitations  in  that  they  are  concerned  with  simulated  (hence 
unreal)  decision  makers  role  playing.  There  is  no  way  of  saying 
how  the  real  decision  makers  will  behave  in  real  life  situations. 
Hence  external  validity  (ie  generalization)  is  a  real  problem  with 
simulation  studies.  However,  since  simulation  studies  are  conducted 
in  a  controlled  environment,  its  internal  validity  (ie,  ability  to 
control  for  confounding  factors)  is  enhanced.  "Properly  done,  this 
method  has  potential  value  in  throwing  light  on  users'  reactions  to 
accounting  alternatives.  "  (Peasnell,  1981,  pp  110-111). 6.212  Real  Life  Studies  216 
Predictive  ability  of  any  forecasting  model  has  two  components  :  the 
forecaster  and  the  model  that  the  forecaster  is  using.  At  the 
individual  forecaster  level  there  are  perceptual  or  judgmental  factors 
involved.  The  judgmental  ability  of  the  forecaster  can  be  evaluated 
in  a  controlled  environment  via  simulation  studies  which  give  good 
internal  validity  at  the  expense  of  external  validity  of  the  model. 
If  real  life  decision  makers,  users  or  forecasters  are  used  then 
external  validity  is  likely  to  improve  at  the  expense  of  internal 
validity. 
Real  life  studies  with  actual  forecaster  or  users  of  financial 
information  were  made  by  Stallman  (1969),  Buzby  (1974a),  Ortman  (1975) 
and  Benjamin  and  Stanga  (1977),  to  test  whether  additional  disclosure 
represented  an  improvement  in  judgmental  ability  in  the  sense  of 
satisfying  users'  information  needs. 
Stallman  (1969)  used  questionnaire  method  to  study  the  effects  of 
additional  disclosure  of  segmental  income  data  on  financial  analysts' 
confidence  in  their  own  judgment.  The  data  used  in  the  experiment 
were  obtained  by  combining  the  actual  reported  financial  data  of  real 
single  industry  companies  to  construct  financial  statements  of  two 
hypothetical  multi-industry  companies.  Questionnaire  packets 
containing  condensed  annual  reports  and  price  data  for  each  of  the  two 
companies  were  mailed  to  a  representative  sample  of  1068  members  of 
Financial  Analysts'  Federation,  and  the  Institute  of  Chartered 
Financial  Analysts.  The  analysts  were  asked  to  judge  the  'intrinsic' 
or  long  term  investment  value  of  a  share  of  stock  for  each  of  the  two 
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The  analysis  of  stock  valuation  estimates  made  by  responding  analysts 
showed  that  the  valuations  differed  between  the  two  companies. 
The  valuations  differed  because  of  the  level  of  past  stock  price 
performance  data  whichwere  supplied  to  the  analysts.  These 
differences  in  valuations  due  to  the  price  performance  factor  were 
affected  by  the  additional  disclosure.  "Those  analysts  receiving  the 
additional  disclosure  of  divisional  income  data  were  influenced  less 
by  the  difference  between  the  high  and  low  price-performance  data 
than  those  who  did  not  receive  it"  (p  41). 
Disclosure  of  segmental  information  had  apparently  put  historical 
price  performance  data  in  perspective;  hence  segmental  information 
proved  useful  to  investors. 
Buzby  (1974a)  used  questionnaire  study  on  financial  analysts  and 
concluded  that  financial  analysts  found  segment  reporting  of  income 
and  sales  relatively  important  items  of  information  in  investment 
decision  making. 
Ortman  (1975)  tested  the  impact  of  segmental  financial  information  on 
judgemental  improvement  of  sophisticated  users  (chartered  financial 
analysts).  A  stratified  sample  of  just  over  three  hundred  was  drawn 
from  the  complete  membership  list  of  about  two  thousand  six  hundred 
chartered  financial  analysts.  Two  sets  of  financial  statements  were 
generated  for  ten  years.  One  set  presented  segmented  information 
and  ratios,  while  the  second  set  generated  aggregated  information 
alone.  Subjects  in  each  of  the  groups  were  asked  to  assign  a  per 
share  offering  price  to  each  of  the  two  diversified  firms,  both  of 
which  were  expected  to  go  public  in  the  near  future.  Without  knowledge 
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the  subjects  were  forced  to  rely  on  the  financial  information  given 
for  their  estimates  of  the  stock  value  of  each  company.  With 
segmental  data,  the  value  of  each  firm's  stock  was  in  accordance  with 
the  present  value  of  its  expected  returns  as  reflected  by  industry 
average  price  earnings  ratios.  Without  segmental  data  the  reverse 
was  experienced.  The  decrease  in  the  variance  with  regard  to  the 
distributions  of  per  share  values  of  the  diversified  firm's  stocks  in 
this  study  may  mean  that  segmental  disclosure  by  all  such  firms  could 
result  in  greater  stability  in  the  movement  of  prices  of  these  stocks. 
The  results  of  this  study  strongly  suggest  that  diversified  firms 
should  include  segmental  data  in  their  financial  reports. 
Benjamin  and  Stanga  (1977)  surveyed  the  opinion  of  commercial  bank 
loan  officers  and  professional  financial  analysts  to  compare  the 
informational  needs  of  the  two  groups  who  are  primary  users  of  external 
accounting  information.  The  questionnaire  encompassed  79  items  of 
information.  The  sample  consisted  of  600  commercial  bank  loan 
officers  and  600  chartered  financial  analysts.  It  was  hypothesised 
that  there  was  no  difference  between  the  perceived  importance  of 
information  to  commercial  bank  loan  officers  making  a  term  loan 
decision  and  the  perceived  importance  of  information  to  CFAs  making  a 
common  stock  investment  decision.  A  series  of  null  hypotheses  for 
each  of  the  79  information  items  included  in  the  questionnaire  was 
formulated,  and  each  hypothesis  was  tested  at  the  5  per  cent  significance 
level  using  a  chi-square  test. 
Results  showed  that  the  perceived  informational  needs  of  the  two 
groups  were  different.  For  instance  bankers  perceived  comparative 
statement  of  retained  earnings  for  the  past  two  years  as  of  primary 
importance,  and  ranked  this  as  number  one,  while  analysts  ranked 
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6.22  Model  Testing 
Predictive  ability  tests  of  segmental  disclosure  has  two  components: 
the  information  processing  ability  of  the  decision-maker,  and  the 
inherent  accuracy  of  the  model  to  forecast  consolidated  numbers  with 
the  disaggregated  numbers  assuming  no  information  processing  constraint 
exists.  Tests  of  predictive  accuracy  of  segmental  information  have 
been  made  by  Kinney  (1971),  Collins  (  1976a,  and  1976b), 
and  Emmanuel  and  Pick  (1980). 
Kinney  (1971)  used  a  framework  that  was  developed  by  Rappaport  and 
Lerner  (1969).  Rappaport  and  Lerner  study  developed  a  framework  for 
financial  reporting  designed  to  be  useful  to  the  shareholders  and 
investors.  This  study  presented  alternative  investor  valuation  models, 
and  based  on  these  models  presented  a  case  for  segment  reporting.  They 
identified  two'ways  investors  might  try  to  estimate  earnings: 
(i)  forecast  returns  through  industry  analysis,  and  (ii)  forecast 
returns  from  company  data. 
The  first  method  involves  estimating  future  industry  conditions  and 
determining  the  company's  relationship  to  the  industry.  If  the  company 
being  evaluated  operates  in  several  industries  then  it  follows  that 
knowledge  of  the  different  products  and/or  markets  in  which  the  company 
operates  is  essential.  To  use  the  industry  analysis  model  the  investor 
must  receive  sales  and  income  data  from  each  segment. 
The  second  method  is  to  use  the  past  consolidated  data  and  extrapolate. 
A  linear  extrapolation  based  on  consolidated  data  may  be  in  error  if 
the  segments  are  growing  at  different  rates  or  experiencing  different 
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The  Rappaport  and  Lerner  study  presents  the  first  ever  theoretical 
evidence  in  favour  of  segment  reporting.  They  also  implicitly  define 
the  two  variables  which  might  influence  the  need  for  segment  data: 
(i)  the  nature  of  the  segments  (ie  are  they  in  similar  industries 
or  dissimilar  industries?  ),  and 
(ii)  the  earnings  history  (variability)  of  the  segments. 
If  the  segments  are  in  similar  industries  then  apparently  segment  data 
will  contain  less  information  than  would  be  the  case  if  the  segments 
were  in  dissimilar  industries. 
Kinney  (1971)  used  Rappaport  and  Lerner  framework  to  test  the  improved 
forecasting  ability  of  segment  data  when  compared  with  consolidated 
data  alone. 
Kinney  was  motivated  by  SEC  segmental  disclosure  requirements  by  Line 
of  Business  (LOB)  in  1969.  He  wanted  to  test  the  usefulness  of  this 
new  requirement  by  the  SEC,  and  designed  a  test  as  to  the  predictive 
ability  improvement  following  LOB  disclosure  rule.  Predictive  ability 
was  defined  as  the  ability  to  determine  next  period's  consolidated 
earnings.  Kinney  used  four  prediction  models  and  compared  earnings 
forecasts  based  on  consolidated  earnings  only,  with  those  based  on 
segment  data,  for  a  sample  of  24  US  companies  which  had  voluntarily 
reported  sales  and  earnings  data  by  subentity  for  the  years  1968  and 
1969.  He  employed  only  relatively  simple  prediction  models  in  order 
to  assess  whether  the  reporting  of  this  data  adds  to  the  investor's 
capability  to  predict  earnings  of  the  diversified  company. 
Kinney  used  four  prediction  models,  two  based  on  consolidated  earning, 
and  two  based  on  segment  earnings.  Kinney's  models  are  described  below, 
first  the  two  consolidated  earnings  based  models,  then  the  segment 
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1  For  a  company  which  is  a  single  product  company,  or  which  is 
diversified  in  the  same  manner  as  the  gross  national  product  is 
composed  of,  the  consolidated  earnings  forecast  for  this  year 
will  be  equal  to  consolidated  earnings  of  last  year  multiplied 
by  change  in  GNP  forecast  for  this  year  over  last  year. 
In  symbols, 
Ei  =  (1  +AGNPi)  Ei 
_1 
Predicted  Predicted  Consolidated 
consolidated  change  in  earnings  in 
earnings  for  GNP  from  X  year  i-1 
year  i  year  i-1 
to  year  i 
2  For  a  company  that  is  less  diversified  than  in  situation  1  above, 
but  the  fluctuations  among  divisions  are  offset  by  each  other, 
implying  that  covariances  among  divisions  are  large  and  negative, 
consolidated  earnings  forecasts  can  be  made  from  an  analysis  of 
trend  in  consolidated  earnings. 
Ei  =  f(Ei 
-  19  Ei 
-  2, 
..... 
Ei 
.  t) 
Predicted 
consolidated  =A  function  of  past  consolidated  earnings 
earnings 
Kinney  used  an  extension  of  this  linear  trend  of  consolidated 
earnings  by  applying  double  exponential  smoothing  of  the  following 
type  : 
Ei  =  aEi-1  +  (1-a)  Ei 
-2+ 
(Ei 
-1- 
Ei 
-  1) 
which  is  essentially  a  weighted  moving  average  forecasting  process, 
where  a  is  a  smoothing  constant,  0<a<1; 
E  is  the  first  order  smoothed  average  earnings  through  1  period  i-1; 
and  Ei  I  is  the  second  order  smoothed  averages  obtained  by 
smoothing  the  first  order  averages. 222 
3  If  the  firms  provide  information  on  segments,  using  segment  revenues 
the  investor  could  predict  future  revenues  by  segment  by  using 
predictions  of  industry  revenues  and  applying  the  rates  of  change 
in  industry  revenues  (and  possibly  an  expected  change  or  trend 
in  market  share)  to  the  past  revenues  of  the  segment.  The  sum 
of  subentity  sales  could  be  multiplied  by  consolidated  earnings 
rate  to  predict  consolidated  earnings. 
01 
l% 
Ei  =E  (1  +  QISi 
,  j)  Si 
-  1.  j  E 
jS 
Predicted  Predicted  Actual  Average 
consolidated  =%  change  in  x  segment  x  consolidated 
earnings  segment  sales  of  profit  rates 
sales  past  year 
4  If  subentity  earnings  data  are  also  reported,  then  the  procedure 
in  3  above  can  be  amended  by  replacing  average  consolidated  profit 
rates  by  respective  segment  profit  rates. 
Eý  =E  (1  +G1ISi 
sJ) 
Si 
-  1,  J  eJ 
Si 
Predicted  Predicted  Actual  Average 
consolidated  =%  change  in  x  segment  x  rate  of 
earnings  segment  sales  of  profit  of 
sales  past  year  segment  sales 
Where  the  symbols  are  as  follows:  - 223 
Consolidated  Segment 
Sales  Actual  S  s 
Average  5  s 
Predicted  S 
Earnings  Actual  E  e 
Average  E  e 
Predicted  E 
Year  i 
Industry  j 
In  more  simple  terms  the  four  models  are: 
1  Last  year's  actual  consolidated  profit  x  forecast  change  in  GNP. 
2  Last  year's  actual  consolidated  profit  x  simple  extrapolation. 
3  Forecast  segment  sales  x  Average  consolidated  profit  rates. 
4  Forecast  segment  sales  x  Average  segment  profit  rates. 
Ab. 
For  24  companies  which  disclosed  segmental  data  consolidated  earnings 
forecasts  were  made  using  each  of  the  four  above  prediction  models  to 
see  if  segmental  data  were  better  predictors.  Despite  the  size  of  his 
sample,  the  short  study  period,  and  the  limited  number  of  models 
employed,  Kinney  still  reached  the  conclusion  that  `predictions  based  on 
segment  sales  and  earnings  data  and  industry  predictions  are  on  average 
more  accurate  than  predictions  based  on  models  using  consolidated 
performance  data  alone'  (p  136). 
Kinney  investigated  the  predictive  ability  of  segmental  line  of  business 
information  for  companies  that  disclosed  such  information  voluntarily. 224 
However,  there  may  be  something  peculiar  to  the  reporting  firms  which 
might  explain  their  willingness  to  disclose  voluntarily  their  segment 
sales  and  profits.  Collins  (1976a,  and  1976b)  wanted  "to  extend  and 
update  the  preliminary  work  of  Kinney  using  data  disclosed  under  the 
line  of  business  reporting  requirements  ... 
initiated  by  the  SEC" 
(1976b,  p  164). 
Beginning  with  fiscal  years  ending  on  or  after  December  31,1970,  the 
SEC  required  all  registrants  engaged  in  more  than  one  "line  of  business" 
to  report  sales  and  profits  before  taxes  and  extraordinary  items  by 
product  lines  in  their  annual  10-K  report.  In  addition  for  each  line 
of  business  the  registrant  is  required  to  disclose  sales  and  profits 
for  each  of  the  last  five  years.  (Securities  Act  Release  No  34-9000, 
October,  1970). 
Collins  used  96  firms  that  did  not  disclose  segmental  earnings 
voluntarily  prior  to  1970  10-K  requirement,  but  did  so  subsequent  to 
1970  when  such  disclosures  became  mandatory.  He  extended  Kinney's 
work  by  using  a  larger  number  of  models:  seven  consolidated  based 
and  two  segment  based.  In  the  consolidated  based  models  he  included 
five  models  which  were  specifically  appropriate  for  testing  time  series 
properties  of  numbers.  Moreover  he  included  three  years,  1968,1969 
and  1970  in  his  investigation. 
The  consolidated  sales  and  earnings  figures  were  obtained  from  the 
Standard  and  Poors'  COMPUSTAT  tapes.  The  choice  of  accounting  variables 
that  were  predicted  was  dictated  by  the  availability  of  segment 
information  on  the  10-K  reports. 225 
The  extensions  to  Kinney's  models  that  Collins  made  can  be  summarised 
as  follows: 
Kinney  Collins 
Sample  size  24  companies  96  companies 
Nature  of  disclosure  voluntary  mandatory 
No  of  years  tested  two  three 
No  of  models: 
consolidated  based  two  seven 
segment-based  two  two 
Nature  of  models  simple  includes  those  which 
test  time-series 
properties  of 
accounting  numbers 
Collins  argued  that  Kinney's  models  were  chosen  without  any  explicit 
reference  to  empirical  research  concerning  the  time  series  properties 
of  accounting  numbers  such  as  those  conducted  by  Beaver  (1970)  and 
Ball  and  Watts  (1972). 
Collins  argued  that  it  is  entirely  possible  that  observed  superior 
predictive  ability  of  segment  vis-a-vis  consolidated  data  could  be 
explained  by  the  inappropriateness  or  misspecification  of  the 
consolidated-based  forecasting  procedures  that  were  tested. 
Appropriateness  of  the  earnings  prediction  model  is  greatly  dependent 
on  the  form  of  earnings  variable  used  in  the  model.  Level  of  earnings 
have  been  found  to  exhibit  high  serial  correlation  and  to  be  well 
specified  by  a  strict  martingale  or  submartingale  prediction  model. 
First  differences  in  the  earnings  series,  however,  possess  very  little 
serial  correlation  and  are  well  specified  by  a  simple  linear  regression 
model.  First  differences  in  earnings  also  have  been  found  to  be  well 
approximated  by  simple  mean  reversion  or  mean  reversion  with  drift 
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Market  association  studies  (Ball  &  Brown,  1968,  Beaver  &  Dukes,  1972) 
have  shown  that  several  time-series  models  are  consistent  with  the 
earnings  expectations  of  securities  market  participants.  Thus  the 
models  should  be  tested  in  conjunction  with  consolidated  data  when 
evaluating  the  relative  predictive  usefulness  of  segment  versus 
consolidated  data. 
Further  that  the  observed  superiority  of  segment-based  models  in 
predicting  future  income  could  be  explained  by  the  weakness  of  the 
consolidated-based  models  due  to  their  inappropriateness  or  mis- 
specification. 
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To  improve  the  reliability  of  the  consolidated-based  models  Collins 
tested  seven  models  for  predictive  ability  of  consolidated  data. 
Consolidated-based  prediction  models  which  Collins  used  included 
the  two  that  Kinney  used,  but  in  addition  he  included  the  following 
five: 
Linear  regression 
Strict  martingale 
Submartingale 
Pure  mean  reversion  -  no  drift 
Moving  average  of  a  pure  mean  reverting  process 
C.  1  Linear  Regression  Model 
E  (Xit)  =  ai  +  bi  Xmt 
It  is  assumed  in  this  model  that  there  is  a  strong  association 
between  the  earnings  of  the  firm  and  the  general  trend  of  earnings 
throughout  the  economy;  (Ball  and  Brown,  1967).  Here  E  (xit) 227 
represents  the  expected  value  of  earnings  in  period  t  from  firm 
i;  the  intercept  and  slope  of  a  linear  regression  are  represented 
by  ai  and  bi  respectively,  and  the  general  market  wide  index  of 
earnings  is  represented  by  Xmt' 
C.  2  Strict  Martingale 
E  (Xit)  =  Xit 
-1 
This  model  assumes  that  the  earnings  for  the  coming  year  will  be 
the  same  as  the  previous  year. 
C.  3  Submartingale 
N 
E  (X  it)  =  Xit 
_+IE  N  j=1 
(Xit 
- 
Xit 
--  1) 
Earnings  were  assumed  to  be  the  same  as  for  the  previous  year 
plus  a  drift  factor  which  was  estimated  to  be  the  average  yearly 
change  in  earnings  since  1951. 
C.  4  Pure  mean  reversion  -  no  drift 
E  (X 
N 
it)  _E  Xit 
N  j=1 
Average  earnings  for  the  firm  from  1951  to  the  year  prior  to  the 
year  of  prediction  was  used  as  an  estimate  of  future  earnings  in 
this  model. 
C.  5  Moving  average  of  a  pure  mean  reverting  process 
N 
E  (Xit)  =  Xit 
-1  .1E  (Xit  Xit 
__  1}  N  j=1 
In  this  model  earnings  were  estimated  to  be  the  same  as  for  the 
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Model  C.  6  and  C.  7  of  the  consolidated-based  prediction,  and  the 
two  segment-based  models  were  identical  to  that  of  Kinney's. 
Collins  carried  out  two  different  tests  of  predictability: 
(i)  prediction  of  consolidated  sales  and  earnings,  and 
(ii)  prediction  of  first  differences  of  consolidated  sales  and 
earnings. 
With  regard  to  the  prediction  of  consolidated  sales  and  earnings 
Collins  found  the  following: 
1  Forecasts  of  consolidated  sales  based  on  previous  years'  segment 
sales  models  were  more  useful  (being  better  predictors)  than  models 
basedon  consolidated  sales  only. 
2  Forecasts  of  consolidated  profits  based  on  segment  sales  x 
consolidated  earnings  rate  were  better  than  consolidated  sales  x 
consolidated  earnings. 
3  When  segment  earnings  rates  were  introduced  in  addition  to  segment 
sales,  consolidated  profits  forecasts  did  not  improve  significantly. 
This  may  be  due  to  the  amount  of  discretion  available  to  management 
in  cost  allocations  in  determining  segment  earnings  rate. 
The  above  findings  were  confirmed  when  prediction  of  first  differences 
were  carried  out,  and  confirmed  Kinney's  (1971)  findings. 
In  the  United,  Kingdom,  Emmanuel  and  Pick  (1980)  replicated  the  research 
of  Collins  (1976b)  with  UK  data  in  an  environment  of  voluntary  disclosure. 
A  sample  of  50  UK  firms  was  randomly  selected  from  the  top  100  of 
'The  Time  1,000'  for  the  year  1977-78.  Predictions  of  consolidated 
profits  and  sales  were  made  for  the  years  1973-77  using  the  data  for 
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strict  martingales,  (where  this  year's  forecast  is  the  same  as  last 
year's  actual).  Seven  segment-based  models  were  used:  three  for 
forecasting  sales  and  four  for  forecasting  profits.  These  segment- 
based  models  are  as  follows: 
A  For  forecasting  consolidated  sales: 
(1)  (a)  x  (b) 
(ii)  (a)  x  (b)  x  (c) 
(iii)  (a)  x  (d) 
where:  a=  Last  year's  segment  sales. 
b=  National  Institute  Economic  Review  (NIER)  growth  forecast 
of  industrial  output. 
c=  Consumer  price  index  change  forecast  made  by  NIER. 
d=A  trend  factor  derived  from  NIER  forecasts. 
B  For  forecasting  consolidated  profits: 
(iv)  (e)  x  (f) 
(v)  (e)  x  (f)  x  (g) 
(vi)  (e)  x  (h) 
(vii)  (e)  x  (h)  x  (g) 
where:  e=  Estimated  segment  sales. 
f=  Previous  year  consolidated  profit  margin. 
g=A  trend  factor  in  segment  sales. 
h=  Previous  year's  segment  profit  margin. 230 
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Emmanuel  and  Pick  tested  the  accuracy  of  each  of  the  seven  models  by 
computing  the  mean  absolute  error  (MAE)  in  predicting  sales  or  profits 
for  the  years  1973-77  as  follows: 
MAE  = 
77 
ei  t 
t=73 
where  eit  =  (predicted  -  actual)/actual  , 
ignoring  signs. 
For  consolidated-based  strict  martingale  model  for  sales  prediction, 
Emmanuel  and  Pick  had  an  average  error  of  17.27%  compared  with  only 
11.43%  of  Collins.  Similarly  for  sales  prediction  using  segment-based 
models  Emmanuel  and  Pick  found  greater  error  than  Collins.  These 
differences  according  to  the  authors  could  have  been  caused  by 
differences  in  the  quality  of  published  statistics  in  UK  compared  with 
USA,  and  the  differential  levels  of  price  changes  in  the  years  studied. 
For  predicting  consolidated  earnings,  the  conclusions  of  Emmanuel-  and 
Pick  are  similar  to  that  of  Collins.  They  found  that  segment  sales  had 
additional  information  content  for  predicting  consolidated  profits. 
But  further  sophistication  in  forecasting  using  segment  profits  rate 
did  not  improve  consolidated  profits  forecasts  significantly. 6.3  Content  Analysis  231 
Research  on  content  analysis  of  disclosure  has  been  concerned  with 
(i)  the  extent  to  which  disclosure  practices  between  companies  are 
different,  and  (ii)  possible  reasons  for  the  existence  of  such 
differences. 
The  extent  of  the  differences  in  disclosure  practices  between  companies 
have  been  examined  by  Choi  and  Bavishi  (1982),  Gray  and  Radebaugh  (1981) 
and  Arnold,  Holder  and  Mann  (1980). 
Choi  and  Bavishi  (1982)  have  conducted  a  comprehensive  empirical 
analysis  of  disclosure  practices  for  one  thousand  companies  of 
international  standing,  across  twenty  four  countries,  for  thirty  two 
reporting  categories.  Not  surprisingly,  they  found  wide  differences 
in  disclosure  practices  regarding  pensions  accounting,  tax,  goodwill, 
inventory  valuation,  lease  capitalization  methods  and  others. 
While  the  Choi  and  Bavishi  study  was  comprehensive,  it  was  not  specifically 
related  to  segmental  disclosure.  A  specific  segmental  disclosure 
related  UK-US  comparative  study  was  conducted  by  Gray  and  Radebaugh 
(1981)  who  found  significant  differences  in  segmental  disclosure 
practice  in  companies  between  these  two  countries. 
The  Gray  and  Radebaugh  study  consisted  of  an  examination  of  the  1979 
annual  reports  of  103  multinational  companies  (44  UK  based  and  59  US 
based)  for  segmental  disclosure  practices.  Companies  were  selected 
in  the  sample  only  if  at  least  30  per  cent  of  revenues,  profits, 
assets  or  number  of  employees  of  the  consolidated  report  arose  from 
foreign  operations.  Results  showed  that  although  the  qualitative 
narrative  for  UK  companies  were  more  meaningful,  US  companies  in 
I  S" 
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A  geographical  segmental  disclosure  study  was  conducted  by  Arnold, 
Holder  and  Mann  (1980)  who  analysed  10-K  reports  for  the  year  1978 
filed  by  US  companies  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 
(SEC)  and  concluded  that  a  great  deal  of  divergency  exists  in  practice 
in  regard  to  disclosure  of  foreign  activities.  SFAS  No  14  has  not 
resulted  in  an  adequate  narrow  definition  of  geographical  area. 
The  existence  of  such  diversity  makes  it  difficult  for  investors 
to  assess  at  least  two  different  kinds  of  risk  :  political  risk  of 
expropriation,  and  economic  risk  arising  from  foreign  currency 
translation  and  exchange. 
Disclosure  studies  conducted  earlier  in  the  seventies  were  not  as 
comprehensive  as  that  of  Choi  and  Bavishi,  but  were  nonetheless 
significant  because  of  their  implications.  Barrett  (1976  and  1977) 
examined  financial  disclosure  practices  across  seven  industrialized 
countries  for  103  large  companies  selected  by  market  capitalization 
rankings. 
Barrett  measured  the  extent  of  financial  disclosure  by  an  index 
constructed  of  seventeen  categories  of  information,  on  principles 
similar  to  that  pioneered  by  Cerf  (1961),  and  subsequently  used  by 
Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971)  and  Buzby  (1974).  He  examined  annual  accounts 
for  a  ten  year  period  (1963-1972),  and  found  that  US  companies  were 
not  necessarily  the  best  disclosing  companies  so  far  as  segmental 
disclosure  was  concerned.  For  the  year  1972,  Swedish  and  UK  firms 
disclosed  better  information  measured  by  his  index  of  disclosure. 
But  what  is  more  significant  is  that  he  found  discernible  groupings 
in  disclosure  practices.  The  United  Kingdom  and  the  USA  belonged  to 
one  group;  West  Germany  and  France  belonged  to  another  group;  Japan 233 
belonged  to  yet  another  group.  Barrett  hypothesized  that  "there  is 
a  link  between  the  quality  of  financial  reporting  practice  and  the 
degree  of  efficiency  of  national  equity  market"  (Barrett,  1976,  p  24). 
Solnik  (1973)  and  MacDonald  (1973)  had  also  come  to  conclusions  similar 
to  that  of  Barrett.  They  observed  that  equity  markets  in  the 
continental  Europe  were  less  efficient  than  those  of  the  UK  and  the 
USA;  that  financial  reporting  practice  and  loose  requirements  for  the 
disclosure  of  information  were  among  the  possible  explanations  for 
apparent  inefficiencies  of  the  continental  European  markets.  A 
similar  view  of  the  relative  inefficiencies  of  the  continental  European 
stock  markets  has  been  expressed  by  Gray(1978a)  in  a  comparative 
analysis  of  disclosure  of  statistical  information  by  companies. 
Gray  observed  that  the  UK  disclosure  was  more  detailed  than  on 
the  continent  of  Europe,  and  that  this  difference  in  the  extent  of 
disclosure  was  related  to  the  development  of  the  national  capital 
markets. 
A  further  implication  of  Barrett's  findings  lie  in  the  possible 
influence  of  cultural  factors  in  explaining  differences  in  disclosure 
practices  across  countries  and  continents.  Jaggi  (1975),  McComb 
(1979)  and  Choi  (1980)  also  have  examined  the  impact  of  cultural 
difference  on  disclosure  practice.  Nair  and  Prank  (1980)  and 
Nobes  (1983)  have  attempted  to  classify  financial  disclosure 
differences  across  countries,  and  such  differences  could  also  have 
been  influenced  by  cultural  differences,  and  by  the  differences  in  the 
history  of  economic  developments  of  those  countries. 234 
6.4  Aggregate  Market  Level  Impact 
Studies  on  aggregate  market  level  impact  of  segmental  disclosures 
bring  together  the  impact  of  user  behaviour,  predictive  ability, 
and  content  analysis  studies  described  earlier,  but  focus  on  one 
specific  kind  of  user  -  investors.  Although  aggregate  market 
behaviour  can  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the  individual  action, 
there  are  significant  differences.  These  are  influences  of 
factors  that  are  difficult  to  simulate  in  individual  level 
research,  such  as  competing  sources  of  information,  incentives, 
and  user  reactions,  which  are  important  in  the  study  of  groups 
(AAA,  1977,  p  19).  For  these  reasons,  it  is  important  to  study 
the  behaviour  of  the  market  in  response  to  segmental  information 
disclosure  separate  from  the  reaction  of  the  individual  user. 
Prior  studies  of  aggregate  market  level  impact  of  segmental 
information  disclosure  have  been  made  primarily  in  the  context  of  the 
information  efficiency  of  capital  markets.  These  studies  test 
the  impact  of  new  information  in  the  framework  of  Sharpe's  (1963) 
market  model,  and  apply  the  results  to  the  evaluation  of 
disclosure  policy. 
Kinney  (1972)  was  the  first  to  produce  evidence  which  indicated 
that  segmental  earnings  data  contained  information  relevant  to 
the  estimation  of  systematic  risk.  He  attempted  an  integration 
of  portfolio  theory  and  the  reporting  of  segmental  financial  data 
by  large  multisegment  corporations  by  examining  the  relationship 
between  : 
(i)  the  covariability  of  segment  -earnings  of  a  sample  of  multi- 
segment  firms,  and  (ii)  the  covariability  of  the  returns  of  these 
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Kinney's  sample  consisted  of  51  firms  from  Accounting  Trends  and 
Techniques  published  annually  by  the  American  Institute  of 
Certified  Public  Accountants.  These  firms  had  voluntarily 
disclosed  some  type  of  segment  earnings  continuously  for  the 
years  1965-1969.  Twenty-five  of  the  firms  reported  on  a 
geographic  basis,  while  the  remaining  twenty-six  reported  on  a 
line  of  business  basis. 
Kinney  argued  that  a  multisegment  firm  can  be  considered  as  a 
portfolio  of  investments.  One  possible  motive  for  establishing 
a  multisegment  firm  could  thus  be  to  obtain  the  advantages  of 
diversification.  Following  Markowitz  (1952),  a  measure  of 
success  of  a  firm  in  diversifying  would  be  the  ratio  of  the 
variance  of  the  returns  of  the  firm  as  a  whole  to  the  sum  of  the 
variances  of  the  individual  segment  returns.  For  a  firm  with  N 
segments,  this  ratio  can  be  expressed  as  : 
z 
ýNZ 
Ev 
j=1 
Kinney  called  this  ratio,  the  covariance  ratio  (CR). 
Following  a  Markowitz  approach  to  diversification,  a  firm  would 
select  investment  which,  other  things  being  equal,  have  negative 
covariances  of  returns  with  existing  investments  in  order  to 
obtain  an  efficient  portfolio,  which  can  diversify  away  the  un- 
systematic  risk.  For  positively  correlated  segment  returns,  on 
the  average,  the  variance  of  the  returns  of  the  firm  is  increased 
over  the  sum  of  the  variances  of  the  individual  segments,  since 
the  segment  returns  tend  to  vary  together.  Conversely,  if  the 
firm  had  selected  segments  which  have  negatively  correlated 
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than  the  sum  of  the  parts,  since  the  segment  returns  would  not 
be  varying  together. 
Kinney  applied  the  covariance  ratio  of  earnings  instead  of  returns 
since  the  capital  employed  figures  for  the  segments  were  not 
available.  Kinney's  covariance  of  earnings  ratio  is  as  follows  : 
2N2 
Cr  Ea  Ej 
E 
j-1 
2 
where,  Cr 
E 
is  the  variance  of  consolidated  earnings,  and 
Q2  is  the  variance  of  the  segment  earnings. 
Ej 
The  smaller  this  covariance  of  earnings  ratio  is  the  more 
successful  the  firm  is  seen  to  be  so  far  as  its  efforts  in 
diversifying  is  concerned. 
To  relate  this  expost  measure  of  diversification  to  the  market 
determined  risk  measure,  B,  Kinney  regressed  the  monthly  stock 
price  data  for  the  five  year  period,  December  1964  to  December 
1969  for  each  of  these  51  stocks  with  the  Standard  and  Poor's 
Composite  Index  (500  stocks)  using  ordinary  least  squares. 
Correlation  measures  were  then  computed  between  the  betas  and 
the  covariance  ratios.  Results  showed  that  for  line  of  business 
reporters,  the  association  between  betas  and  covariance  ratios 
were  significant  at  5%  level.  For  geographic  reporters  this 
association  was  not  significant.  Kinney  concluded  that  segment 
earnings  on  a  line  of  business  (LOB)  basis  had  information  content 
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Barefield  and  Comiskey  (1973)  examined  the  degree  of  association 
between  market  beta,  earnings  variability,  and  errors  in  fore- 
casting  firm's  earnings  as  reflected  in  analysts'  forecasts. 
A  one-hundred  company  sample  was  drawn  from  the  Standard  and  Poor's 
Earnings  Forecaster  service.  These  companies  satisfied  the 
following  constraints  simultaneously  :  (i)  a  December  31  year 
end,  (ii)  continuous  listing  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  for 
the  years  1967  to  1972,  and  (iii)  continuous  inclusion  in  the 
Earnings  Forecaster  as  published  by  Standard  and  Poor  during  1967- 
1972.  Forecast  error  and  earnings  variability  were  computed 
from  the  sample  data  while  the  market  beta  was  drawn  from  the 
Value  Line  Investment  Survey.  Forecast  error  was  defined  as  the 
mean  of  the  absolute  value  of  the  percentage  difference  between 
the  actual  and  forecasted  earnings  for  the  six  years,  1967-1972. 
A  positive  association  was  observed  between  the  three  risk 
measures  :  market  beta,  earnings  variability,  as  well  as  fore- 
casting  error  of  the  analysts  in  predicting  firms'  earnings, 
although  the  degree  of  association  was  strongest  between  forecast 
errors  and  earnings  variability.  This  positive  association 
between  market  beta  and  forecast  earnings  error  suggest  that  the 
observed  decline  in  market  beta,  on  average,  may  be  a  consequence 
of  improvements  in  earnings  forecastability  which  can  result 
from  segmental  disclosures. 
Choi  (1973b)  examined  the  problem  of  financial  disclosure  and  its 
impact  on  the  firm's  cost  of  capital  in  the  eurobond  market. 
He  examined  18  multinational  companies  which  entered  the  eurobond 
market  prior  to  1971,  and  compared  their  disclosure  index 
(following  Cerf  1961)  with  that  of  similar  companies  matched  by 
asset  size,  period  studied,  and  approximate  industry  category. 
He  conducted  a  Wilcoxon  matched  pairs  test,  and  found  that  new 238 
entrants'  disclosure  practices  were  significantly  better  at  the  5% 
level  of  significance.  Since  the  new  entrants'  ability  to  raise 
capital  is  dependent  upon  the  investing  community's  perception  of 
the  uncertainties  about  new  entrants,  Choi  concluded  that 
increased  corporate  disclosure  (including  segmental  disclosure) 
reduces  investor  perceived  uncertainties,  and  consequently 
reduces  equity  cost  of  capital. 
Kochanek  (1974)  investigated  the  impact  of  segmental  disclosure 
on  stock  prices  for  37  multisegment  firms  for  the  four  year 
period  1966-1969.  His  a  priori  hypotheses  were  (i)  investors 
with  segmental  data  are  better  able  to  predict  future  earnings 
changes  of  the  firm,  than  without;  and  (ii)  security  price 
fluctuations  of  the  firm  are  dampened  where  such  segmental  data 
are  available.  Using  a  disclosure  index  (following  the  methodology 
of  Cerf,  1961;  and  Singhvi  and  Desai,  1971)  he  categorized  firms 
into  'good'  and  'poor'  reporters,  and  used  Spearman's  Rank 
Correlation  method  to  compute  the  association  between  'good' 
reporting  practice.,  earnings  predictability  and  weekly  stock 
price  changes. 
Tests  confirmed  his  a  priori  hypotheses.  Good  reporters  exhibited 
higher  positive  correlations  between  current  period  stock  price 
changes  and  subsequent  period  earnings  changes  than  poor 
reporters,  indicating  that  segmental  disclosures  help  in  the 
prediction  of  future  earnings  changes.  Testing  the  association 
between  stock  price  volatility  and  reporting  practice,  he  also 
the 
found  that/  weekly  stock  price  volatility  ratio  was  smaller  for 
good  reporters  than  for  poor  reporters. 
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The  results  of  Kochanek's  empirical  tests  suggest  that  not  only 
future  earnings  predictions  are  facilitated  by  segmental  reports, 
but  that  voluntary  disclosure  of  subentity  data  reduces  stock 
price  volatility  over  time  as  well. 
Horowitz  and  Kolodny  (1977)  study  of  market  level  impact  of 
segmental  disclosure  is  in  marked  contrast  from  all  other  market 
level  impact  studies  conducted  previously.  They  included  post 
10-K  requirement  data  and  reported  the  first  evidence  against  the 
information  content  of  segmental  data  in  their  study  of  two  sets 
of  50  firms  covering  the  period  1965-1973.  They  divided  their 
investigation  period  into  three  subperiods  :  predisclosure, 
1965-1970;  disclosure,  1971;  and  post  disclosure,  1972-1973. 
Their  treatment  group  consisted  of  50  firms  which  were  required 
to  disclose  segmental  earnings  in  the  10-K  reports  filed  with 
the  SEC  for  the  first  time  in  1971,  while  the  control  group  of 
50  firms  were  not  required  to  make  any  disclosure  of  segmental 
earnings.  Using  ordinary  leastsquares  method,  beta  values  were 
computed  for  each  firm  in  the  sample,  for  predisclosure  and  post 
disclosure  periods;  and  averaged  for  each  of  the  two  groups. 
A  difference  of  means  test  was  conducted  assuming  normal 
distribution  properties.  The  Z-statistic  obtained  showed  that  the 
two  means  were  not  different  at  .  05  significance  level. 
The  significance  of  Horowitz  and  Kolodny's  findings  are,  however, 
limited  since  they  tested  only  two  year  data  for  the  post 
disclosure  period  which  is  in  marked  contrast.  to  the  six  year  period 
studied  for  the  pre  disclosure  period.  To  construct  a  time 
series  with  some  reliable  parameters,  a  larger  number  of 240 
observations  is  warranted. 
Initiated  by  the  negative  findings  of  Horowitz  and  Kolodny  cited 
above,  Collins  and  Simonds  (1979)  carried  out  one  of  the  most 
substantive  piece  of  research  in  the  area  of  aggregate  market 
level  impact  of  segmental  disclosure. 
Collins  and  Simonds  formalised  the  arguments  supporting  the  use 
of  segment  data  for  evaluating  the  riskiness  of  a  firm  by  linking 
segment  operating  characteristics  to  some  measure  of  firm 
riskiness.  They  argued  that  since  the  operating  characteristics 
of  the  firm  are  determinants  of  risk,  it  would  be  reasonable  to 
assume  that  segment  reporting  of  contribution  margin,  asset,  and 
revenue  would  contribute  to  the  accuracy  of  risk  assessment. 
Borrowing  from  Rubinstein  (1973),  the  authors  showed  that  beta  for 
the  pure  equity  firm  is  a  function  of  operating  variables  that 
define  operating  risk.  Rubinstein's  formulation  of  the 
determinants  of  risk  for  the  multiproduct  firm  provided  the 
theoretical  support  for  the  assumed  importance  of  information  on 
a  firm's  segments.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  Rubinstein 
model  includes  segment  variable  cost  as  an  operating  risk  factor 
which  is  related  to  the  concept  of  operating  leverage  which 
Lev  (1974b)  has  shown  to  be  an  important  factor  in  explaining 
differences  in  betas  in  cross-sectional  studies. 
They  analysed  215  firms  :  137  identified  as  the  control  group  of 
companies  which  did  not  change  their  disclosure  practice  throughout 
the  period  of  investigation,  1963-1974;  and  78  identified  as 
treatment  group  -  companies  which  disclosed  very  little  or  none 
at  all  so  far  as  segmental  data  was  concerned  before  the 
initiation  of  line  of  business  reporting  by  the  SEC  in  1970  in  10-K 241 
reports,  but  did  disclose  both  segment  revenue  and  profits  data 
after  1970. 
They  used  the  familiar  market  model  of  Sharpe  (1963)  variety, 
but  defined  the  systematic  risk,  B,  in  terms  of  the  operating 
characteristics  of  the  firm  as  follows  : 
Cov(R  Rm)  Q(q  /ö  "vi 
Bim  =-Z  di  E(p  -  Vcj)  P(gij.  Rm)  iJ  iJ  1 
Var(R.  ) 
J  _ý 
JJý 
where, 
aýý  =  Proportion  of  the  i  th  firm's  wealth  at  period  1, 
invested  in  segment  j,  where  Zi  6ii  =1 
E(PJ  '  vcj)  =  Expected  unit  contribution  margin  from  segment 
i's  output 
P(q"j,  Rm)  =  The  coefficient  of  correlation  between  the 
quantity  of  segment  j's  output  produced  by 
firm  i  and  the  rate  of  return  on  market 
... 
portfolio  Rm 
o(qij/öijVij)  A  measure  of  uncertainty  of  the  output  level  of 
segment  j  per  unit  of  wealth  invested  in 
segment  j 
The  constancy  of  beta  coefficients  was  tested  by  employing  the 
analysis  of  variance  procedure  as  described  by  Johnston  (1972), 
which  involved  splitting  the  overall  time  series  of  monthly 
observations  into  two  non-overlapping  subperiods  differentiated 
by  the  critical  event  (the  time  period  associated  with  the 
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Sums  of  squared  residuals  obtained  by  applying  separate 
regressions  to  subperiod  1  (pre-disclosure)  and  subperiod  2 
(post-disclosure)  data  were  compared  against  the  sum  of  squared 
residuals  from  a  pooled  regression  (subperiod  1  and  subperiod  2 
combined)  to  test  whether  a  statistically  significant  shift  in 
beta  parameter  had  occurred. 
Analysis  of  covariance  test  was  applied  to  monthly  portfolio  level 
return  data  for  each  of  the  sample  groups.  Separate  regression 
estimates  were  computed  over  the  forty  observations  on  either 
side  of  the  period  July  1969  to  March  1971  during  which  changes 
in  beta  values  may  have  occurred. 
Results  showed  a  significant  negative  change  in  beta  over  the 
critical  period  (July  1969  to  March  1971)  for  the  treatment  group. 
There  was  no  significant  change  in  the  beta  for  the  control  group. 
Collins  and  Simonds  concluded  that  the  'observed 
change  in  beta  was  caused  by  the  new  requirement  of.  segmental 
disclosure. 
Location  of  beta  shift  was  examined  by  two  methods  :  (i)  moving 
beta  estimates  over  forty  month  regression  periods  calculated 
monthly  from  January  1967  to  December  1974,  and  (ii)  calculation 
of  Quandt  log-likelihood  ratios  over  the  period  May  1966  to 
August  1975.  Both  these  techniques  indicated  that  beta  shift 
occurred  during  March/April  1970. 
Negative  change  in  beta  for  the  treatment  group  following 
segmental  disclosure  showed  that  segmental  data  had  information 
content,  and  that  the  disclosure  of  such  information  has  altered 
the  market's  perception  of  the  riskiness  of  the  disclosing  firms 24  3 
which  were  previously  not  disclosing  such  finer  information. 
So  far  as  the  timing  of  the  beta  change  around  April  1970  is 
concerned  Collins  and  Simonds  observed  that  : 
"the  market  was  anticipating  the  effects  which  expanded  segmental 
disclosure  would  have  on  management's  tendency  to  take  on  less 
risky  projects  in  an  attempt  to  minimize  the  agency  cost  to  them 
(management)  of  disclosing  marginal  or  unprofitable  operations 
or  that  LOB  disclosure  reflected  reduced  investor  uncertainty 
about  operations  of  multi-segment  firms  brought  about  by  early 
dissemination  of  LOB  data  prior  to  disclosure  in  1970  10-K 
reports.  "  (p  380) 
There  are  two  minor  shortcomings  of  Collins  and  Simmonds'  most 
elegant  theoretical  exposition  of  segmental  disclosure  and  risk. 
(i)  They  disregarded  the  effects  of  changes  in  leverage  in  the 
estimation  of  betas;  and  (ii)  Control  groups  are,  in  theory,  to 
differ  from  the  treatment  group  only  in  terms  of  the  variable 
under  investigation.  The  authors  do  not  make  clear  if  any 
matching  as  to  the  characteristics  other  than  the  one  under 
investigation  have  taken  place. 
Nevertheless,  in  a  most  exhaustive  analysis  Collins  and  Simonds 
have  provided  fairly  convincing  evidence  that  the  observed  decline 
in  beta  for  the  treatment  group,  on  average,  is  a  consequence  of 
improvements  in  earnings  forecastability,  which  results  from 
segmental  disclosure  and  a  reflection  of  reduced  investor 
uncertainty  about  the  future  prospects  of  multisegment  firms. 
Using  a  modified  version  of  Collins  and  Simonds'  sample 
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relatively  longer  period  of  ecerience  on  the  part  of  both 
preparers  and  users  of  such  data.  In  order  to  do  this,  he  tested 
changes  in  consensus  at  the  aggregate  market  level  as  an  effect 
of  mandatory  disclosure  policies. 
Ajinkya  examined  172  companies;  108  in  the  treatment  group 
category  and  64  in  the  control  group,  for  a  ten  year  period, 
1966-1975.  Treatment  group  companies  were  multiproduct  firms 
which  had  changed  segmental  disclosure  practice  from  non  or  partial 
disclosure  to  'full'  disclosure  of  segmental  earnings  following 
the  SEC  10-K  requirements  in  1970.  Control  group  companies  were 
either  multiproduct  firms  which  had  voluntarily  disclosed 
segmental  earnings  prior  to  10-K  requirements  or  single  product 
firms  for  whom  the  10-K  requirements  were  not  applicable. 
'Market  risk  equalized'  mean  returns  for  portfolios  based  on 
varying  disclosure  requirements  for  the  pre,  and  post  10-K 
requirement  periods  were  computed.  For  the  period  before  the 
10-K  requirements  were  initiated  Ajinkya  found  no  significant 
difference  (at 
.  05  level,  using  F  test)  in  the  mean  returns 
between  the  portfolios.  However,  when  covariance  of  returns 
structure  among  groups  in  the  pre  Vs  post  10-K  requirement  period 
was  examined  using  Box's  x2  test,  results  suggest  a  consensus  of 
risk-return  assessment  following  disclosure. 
Ajinkya  concluded  that  risk  equalized  mean  portfolio  returns  were 
not  significantly  different  because  the  direction  of  beta  change 
at  the  individual  firm  level  were  not  predictable  following  the 
disclosure  of  finer  information.  Hence  at  the  portfolio  level, 
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the  aggregate  consensus  was  examined  the  usefulness  of  finer 
information  was  substantiated. 
"The  results  suggest  that  the  uniformity  and  greater  fineness  of 
disclosure  for  multiproduct  firms  (as  mandated  by  the  SEC) 
appear  to  have  increased  the  consensus  in  the  risk-return  assess- 
ments  of  securities  of  multiproduct  firms  at  the  aggregate  level". 
(p  360) 
All  the  aggregate  market  level  impact  studies  mentioned  above, 
Kinney  (1972),  Barefield  and  Comiskey  (1973),  Choi  (1973b), 
Kochanek  (1974),  Collins  and  Simonds  (1979),  and  Ajinkya  (1980) 
found  evidence  in  favour  of  increased  information  content  in 
segmental  disclosure.  There  has  been  only  one  exception  to  this 
consensus  :  Horowitz  and  Kolodny  (1977),  whose  post  disclosure 
observations  were  rather  limited. 
There  have  been  many  other  studies  exploring  aggregate  market 
level  impacts  :  Benston  (1973),  Collins  (1975),  Tanju  (1977), 
Dhaliwal  (1978),  Foster  and  Vickrey  (1978),  Dhaliwal,  Spicer  and 
Vickrey  (1979),  and  Garsombke  (1979)  to  name  but  a  few. 
Results  of  all  these  studies  also  are  not  too  dissimilar  to  those 
that  have  been  mentioned  in  detail  in  this  section.  With  the 
exception  of  Benston  (1973),  and  Garsombke  (1979),  all  these 
studies  found  increased  information  content  in  segmental  disclosure. 
Apart  from  consensus  on  information  content  of  segmental  data, 
these  studies  have  something  else  in  common.  With  the  exception 
of  Kinney  (1972)  none  of  the  above  mentioned  studies  have  even 
considered  segmental  geographical  disclosure,,  being  entirely 
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only  a  halfhearted  attempt  at  e>loring  geographical  disclosure 
and  concentrated  primarily  on  line  of  business. 
6.5  Geographical  Disclosure 
In  the  previous  sections  in  this  chapter  an  appraisal  has  been 
made  of  prior  research  in  segmental  disclosure.  Evidence 
gathered  from  prior  studies  seem  to  favour  the  notion  that 
segmental  disclosure  has  information  content.  However,  this 
information  content  of  segmental  disclosure  is  based  on  line  of 
business  data.  Research  on  geographical  disclosure  is  scarce  to 
the  point  of  being  almost  non-existent  compared  with  the  plethora  of 
studies  on  LOB.  Yet,  there  is  wide  support  in  the  literature 
for  segmental  disclosure  research  although  actual  studies  are 
rather  scarce.  For  instance  : 
"With  the  increased  consistency  in  reporting  segmental  operations 
across  firms  afforded  by  FASB  Statement  No  14,  the  opportunity 
exists  to  test  whether  different  bases  of  segmentation  (eg. 
)product- 
line,  customer,  or  geographical  breakdown)  .... 
have  differential 
market  consequences.  Such  research  could  suggest  the  specific 
form  of  segmental  disclosure  that  investors  find  most  useful  in 
assessing  the  risk  and  return  prospects  of  multisegment  firms.  " 
(Collins  and  Simonds,  1979,  p  381) 
and 
"Segmentation  on  a  geographical  basis  is  not  an  alternative  to 
segmentation  on  the  basis  of  business  activity.  It  is  distinctly 
and  significantly  different,  as  foreign  countries  often  exhibit 
different  risk  and  return  profiles  as  a  consequence  of  foreign 
exchange,  inflation,  and  interest  rate  differentials  -  quite  apart 
from  the  differing  impact  of  environmental  factors,  including 
political  risk  and  the  possibility  of  expropriation. 247 
Whilst  geographical  segmentation  is  a  widely  used  basis,  it  is 
not  well  developed.  "  (Gray,  1981,  pp  39-40) 
Kinney  (1972)  conducted  an  analysis  of  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  as  a  byproduct  of  his  line  of  business  investigation 
cited  earlier.  Twenty  five  of  his  sample  of  fifty  one  companies 
had  reported  geographical  earnings  for  two  or  three  segments  for 
the  years  1965-1969  voluntarily.  Geographic  segment  categories 
were  domestic  or  foreign,  and  eastern  and  western  hemisphere. 
Although  these  categorizations  were  very  general,  Kinney  proceeded 
to  analyse  the  segment  earnings  with  the  aid  of  the  ratio  of 
covariance  defined  as  : 
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where  Ej  is  the  earnings  of  segment  j,  and 
E  is  the  consolidated  earnings  of  the  firm. 
The  measure  of  consolidated  earnings  used  paralleled  the  ones 
reported  for  the  segments.  Thus  consolidated  earnings  measure 
varied  from  consolidated  net  income  after  taxes  to  consolidated 
net  income  before  common  cost  allocations. 
Kinney  found  that  three  of  the  25  geographic  data  firms  had 
covariance  ratios  of  less  than  one,  meaning  that  only  in  three 
cases  out  of  25  were  there  benefits  of  geographical  diversification 
so  far  as  diversifying  away  the  unsystematic  risk  was  concerned. 
To  examine  the  information  content  of  geographical  segmental 
disclosure  Kinney  used  least  square  regression  between  the  Standard 
I 
and  Poor's  Composite  Index  (500  stocks)  and  the  monthly  stock 24  8 
price  data  for  six  years,  1964-1969.  Product  moment  and  rank 
correlation  tests  were  conducted  between  the  covariance  ratios 
and  betas.  Kinney  found  no  evidence  of  information  content  in 
geographical  segmental  disclosure.  Kinney's  results  for 
geographic  firms  were  as  follows  : 
Sample  size  25  firms 
Beta  : 
average  1.01 
standard  deviation  0.35 
Covariance  Ratio  : 
average  1.32 
standard  deviation  0.38 
Correlation  Coefficient 
(Covariance  ratio  and  B) 
Product  Moment  -  . 
054 
Rank  (Spearman)  -.  047 
Having  thus  found  no  evidence  of  information  content  in  geographic 
segmental  disclosure,  Kinney  observed  : 
"The  geographic  data  firms  cannot  be  considered  as  multisegment 
firms  in  the  same  sense  as  those  reporting  on  a  product  line  or 
divisional  basis.  Firms  reporting  on  a  geographic  basis  are 
likely  to  be  in  the  same  industries  in  both  the  foreign  and 
domestic  markets  and  thus  have  a  smaller  incidence  of  covariance 
ratio  less  than  one  due  to  worldwide  industry  effects.  "  (p  342) 
Kinney's  conclusions  may  have  been  premature.  Firstly,  his 
segments  were  not  identified  in  detail,  being  simply  'domestic 
or  foreign,  and  eastern  and  western  hemisphere'.  Such 
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grouping  segments  into  suitable  risk  categories.  Secondly,  as 
he  himself  stated  subsequently,  his  sample  size  of  25  companies 
was  hardly  exhaustive.  Finally,  given  that  the  western  world 
has  seen  a  large  number  of  conglomerate  mergers  during  the  nineteen 
sixties  and  seventies,  it  is  no  longer  true  that  "firms  reporting 
on  a  geographical  basis  are  likely  to  be  in  the  same  industries 
in  both  foreign  and  domestic  markets". 
Regrettably  however,  Kinney's  is  the  only  study  ever  conducted  as 
yet  on  information  content  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
at  the  aggregate  market  level.  There  have  been  other  studies 
such  as  Gray  (1978b),  Arnold,  Holder  and  Mann  (1980),  and  Gray 
and  Radebaugh  (1981),  but  none  of  these  have  been  in  the  area  of 
aggregate  market  level  impact  of  geographical  segmental  disclosure. 
Regulatory  and  other  authorities  such  as  the  FASB  in  the  USA,  the 
UK  Companies  Act  1981,  and  the  London  Stock  Exchange  have  left 
the  segment  identification  problem  entirely  to  the  discretion  of 
reporting  companies.  Yet,  without  some  tightening  up  of  the 
segment  identification,  any  empirical  analysis  of  benefits  of 
geographical  disclosure  is  going  to  be  difficult  (Gray,  1978b; 
Gray,  Shaw  and  McSweeney,  1981;  Emmanuel  and  Gray  1977,  and 
1978). 
An  adequately  narrow  operational  definition  of  geographical 
segments  is  necessary.  Such  data  is  important  due  to  political 
(for  example  expropriation)  and  economic  (for  example,  currency 
exchange  and  translation)  implications.  (Arnold,  Holder  and 
Mann,  1980,  p  135). 250 
Because  of  varying  economic,  political  and  other  risks  in  overseas 
countries,  arguments  about  geographical  segmental  disclosure 
benefits  overflow  into  the  area  of  studies  in  international  capital 
markets  where  a  continuing  debate  is  whether  the  international 
capital  market  is  segmented  or  unified  . 
(Grubel 
,  1968). 
A  segmented  market  hypothesis  will  support  international 
diversification  for  risk  reduction  purposes  at  the  corporate 
level  while  an  unified  market  may  make  international 
diversification  superfluous  since  there  may  be  no  additional 
benefit  from  diversifying  into  overseas  territories  over  and 
above  those  to  be  derived  from  product  diversification. 
Grubel  (1968)  demonstrated  that  international  diversification  can 
lead  to  new  gains  in  world  welfare  apart  from  the  traditional 
gains  from  trade  and  migrational  factors  of  production,  thus 
supporting  the  segmented  market  hypothesis.  Agmon  (1972)  on  the 
other  hand  in  a  study  of  share  price  comovement  supported  the  one 
market  hypothesis. 
To  demonstrate  possible  gains  from  geographical  diversification, 
Grubel  (1968)  collected  monthly  information  on  common  stock  market 
averages  for  11  industrialized  countries  (10  NATO  countries  and 
South  Africa)  for  January  1959  to  December  1966,  calculated 
expost  returns,  variances  of  returns,  and  regressed  each  country 
index  with  the  US  index  (Moody's  Industrial  Average  of  US  common 
stocks), 
His  results  indicated  that  diversification  among  11  countries  had 
allowed  investors  a  superior  risk-return  trade  off  compared  to  the 
portfolio  consisting  of  Moody's  Industrial  Average  of  US  common 
stocks. 251 
Levy  and  Sarnat  (1970)  extended  Grubel's  study  by  including  Less 
Developed  Countries  (LDCs)  and  found  additional  risk  adjusted 
gains  in  diversifying  businesses  to  LDCs.  They  concluded  that 
such  advantage  in  diversification  to  LDCs  is  possible  because  of 
inefficiencies  in  international  capital  markets  due  to  barriers 
in  international  capital  flows.  Therefore,  the  lifting  of  restrictions 
on  international  capital  movements  would  produce  greater  benefits 
from  geographical  diversification. 
Agmon  (1972)  disputed  Grubel  and  Levy  and  Sarnat's  findings,  in 
a  study  of  benefits  in  diversifying  between  US,  UK,  Germany  and 
Japan.  He  observed  no  benefit  in  diversifying  between  these 
countries,  and  concluded  that  the  international  capital  market  is 
unified  and  not  segmented.  Hence  geographical  diversification 
is  superfluous.  However,  his  was  a  very 
, 
small  sample  of  only 
four  countries.  It  is  not  surprising  that  four  industrially 
developed  countries  of  the  west  with  similar  economies  would 
present  little  advantage  in  geographical  diversification  among 
them.  These  four  countries  may  have  characteristics  of  a  unified 
market,  but  there  are  many  more  countries  in  the  developed  and 
underdeveloped  world  where  opportunities  for  geographical 
diversification  would  exist.  Agmon  (1973)  in  a  further  study 
admitted  this  and  found  "the  existence  of  some  unique  country 
factors". 
Solnik  (1974)  developed  an  equilibrium  model  of  the  international 
capital  market  that  integrates  exchange  risks  and  different 
interest  rates  across  the  world,  and  called  this  the  International 
Asset  Pricing  Model  (IAPM).  The  IAPM  states  that  the  risk 
premium  of  any  security  over  the  international  risk  free  rate  is 
proportional  to  its  international  systematic  risk,  where  the 252 
proportionality  is  the  return  on  the  world  market  less  a  world 
interest  rate. 
He  also  developed  a  Multinational  Index  Model  where  security 
returns  are  influenced  by  both  world  factor  and  purely  national 
factor,  which  can  be  seen  as  a  resolution  of  the  Grubel-Agmon 
debate. 
Solnik's  IAPM  is  a  novel  idea  though  it  has  two  drawbacks. 
First,  his  'world'  consisted  of  Europe  and  USA.  He  used  234 
stocks  of  eight  European  stock  exchanges,  and  65  US  stocks  for  the 
period  of  March  1966  to  April  1971.  Second,  his  risk  parameter 
consisted  entirely  of  exchange  risk  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other 
risks. 
Lessard  (1974)  extended  Solnik's  research  by  testing  the 
relationship  between  16  national  stock  price  indices  (including 
4  from  Latin  America)  for  15  years,  January  1959  -  October  1973. 
He  used  multivariate  analysis  (principal  component  )j  and 
analysed  world,  national  and  industry  factors  in  equity  returns. 
He  found  that  the  influence  of  a  common  world  factor  was  very 
small  in  explaining  stock  price  variances,  and  that  national 
factor  was  the  most  dominant  over  the  other  two;  world  factor 
and  industry  factor.  There  was 
"less  to  be  gained  by  diversifying  across  industries 
given  diversification  across  countries  than  by 
diversifying  across  countries  given  industrial 
diversification  within  a  single  country"  (p  382). 
This  shows  that  where  cultural,  political  and  other  factors  are 
predominantly  different,  (as  is  the  case  between  Latin  America 253 
and  Western  Europe),  geographical  diversifications  has  greater 
benefits  than  line  of  business  diversification,  and  is  in  marked 
contrast  to  Kinney's  observation  : 
"...  firms  reporting  on  a  geographic  basis  are  likely  to  be 
in  the  same  industries  in  both  foreign  and  domestic  markets 
and  thus  have  a  smaller  incidence  of  the  covariance  ratio 
less  than  one  due  to  world-wide  industry  effects"  (Kinney, 
1972,  p  342) 
Rugman  (1978)  extended  the  frontier  of  international  capital 
market  studies  further  by  linking  accounting  beta  (Beaver,  Kettler 
and  Scholes,  1970)  studies  with  geographical  diversification. 
He  concluded  that  accounting  beta  for  multinational  firms  can 
explain  the  risk  characteristics  better  than  purely  market  betas 
following  Sharpe-Lintner  capital  asset  pricing  model. 
To  conclude,  unlike  LOB  disclosure  benefit  studies,  studies  of 
benefits  from  geographical  segmental  disclosure  are  scarce. 
Evidence  from  international  capital  markets  literature  cited  above 
suggest  that  in  the  absence  of  barriers  to  international  capital 
flows,  and  imperfections  in  factor  markets  and  goods  markets, 
there  might  not  be  advantages  in  diversifying  geographically. 
But  the  real  world  is  different. 
The  notion  of  a  perfect  economy  and  perfect  competition  requires 
the  assumption  that  prices  everywhere  are  adjusted  to  bring  supply 
and  demand  into  equilibrium.  It  may  well  be  that  because  of 
segmentation  in  world  markets,  rates  of  return  are  not  equalized 
internationally.  Such  segmentation  can  be  due  to  currency 
overvaluation,  inefficiencies  in  security  markets  such  as  thin 254 
trading  or  lack  of  disclosure,  and  disequilibrium  in  technology 
markets.  (Calvet,  1981,  pp  317-318). 
It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  there  are  benefits  to  geographical 
diversification.  If  such  benefits  exist  , 
it  may  well  be  that 
disclosure  of  geographical  segmental  data  will  result  in  a  better 
appreciation  of  risk  characteristics  of  disclosing  entities. 
6.6  Summary 
In  this  chapter  prior  research  in  segmental  disclosure  and  related 
studies  have  been  cited  and  analysed.  User  behaviour  studies 
have  examined  ways  in  which  the  consumers  of  segmental  reports 
respond  to  segmental  disclosure.  Cerf's  (1961)  consensus  study 
is  a  landmark  in  user  behaviour  studies  where  he  established  a 
disclosure  index.  Cerf's  methodology  has  been  used  by  many  in 
different  contexts.  Predictive  ability  studies  have  been 
discussed  after  user  behaviour  studies.  There  are  two  components 
in  predictive  ability  tests  :  the  judgmental  response  or  the 
perceptual  aspects,  and  the  models  with  which  predictions  are 
made.  Kinney's  (1971)  model  testing  study  based  on  voluntary 
disclosure  is  the  pathbreaking  one,  although  Collins  (1976b)  is 
an  enlargement  of  Kinney's.  Content  analysis  studies  have  been 
described  next  following  which  are  the  aggregate  market  level 
impact  studies  which  integrate  all  other  prior  studies  in 
segmental  disclosure  area.  Again,  as  in  model  testing  studies, 
Kinney  (1972)  produced  the  pathbreaking  study  while  Collins  along 
with  Simonds  produced  a  bigger  and  more  sophisticated  study. 
All  these  studies  have  been  concerned  primarily  with  line  of 
business  disclosure.  Studies  of  benefits  of  geographical 
segmental  disclosure  have  been  scarce,  and  Kinney  (1972)  is  the 
only  exception. 255 
Studies  in  the  international  capital  markets  have  been 
examined  next.  Some  evidence  exist  that  the  international 
capital  market  is  segmented  due  to  various  market 
imperfections.  Thus  there  will  be  benefits  from  corporate 
geographical  diversification. 
In  the  following  chapter,  hypotheses  will  be  developed  for 
the  testing  of  the  possible  effects  of  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  on  stock  market  risk  assessments,  and  the  data 
base  will  be  described  upon  which  such  hypotheses  will  be 
tested. 256 
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CHAPTER  VII 
Hypotheses,  Database  and  Experimental  Design 
7.0  Introduction 
In  earlier  chapters,  segmental  geographical  disclosure  issues, 
information  theory  perspectives,  capital  market  theories,  and  prior 
research  have  been  discussed.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to 
set  the  scene  for  empirically  testing  the  concepts  and  issues  explored 
in  earlier  chapters. 
First,  hypotheses  will  be  formulated  drawing  upon  the  theoretical 
framework  earlier  cited.  There  are  two  specific  hypotheses  in  this 
thesis:  one  concerns  the  information  content  of  segmental  geographical 
data,  and  the  other  is  related  to  the  benefits  accruing  to  one  specific 
user  group,  the  investors. 
Second,  the  database,  upon  which  the  hypotheses  can  be  tested 
empirically,  will  be  explained.  The  rationale  behind  the  choice  of 
companies  and  the  time  period  studied  will  be  discussed  and  the 
categorization  of  companies  between  the  control  group  and  the  treatment 
group  will  be  explained. 
Finally,  the  design  of  the  experiment  will  be  examined.  In  this 
connection,  various  alternative  methods  of  experimental  design  will 
be  cited,  and  the  rationale  for  choosing  the  moving  regression  method  in 
preference  to  others  will  be  explained. 269 
7.1  Hypotheses 
A  system  of  financial  disclosure  should  take  into  account  user  needs  and 
the  user  environment  (sections  2.11  and  2.12).  User  needs  and 
environment  have  changed  in  the  sixties  and  seventies  in  the  wake  of 
conglomerate  diversification  across  national  boundaries  (section  3.1). 
Conglomerate  merger  and  diversification  have  resulted  in  a  loss  of 
finer  information  to  investors. 
Finer  disaggregated  information  can  help  in  uncertainty  reduction 
(section  2.211).  Segmental  geographical  disclosure  results  in  finer 
information  on  segment  trading  profits,  sales  and  other  relevant 
information  being  available  to  users  (section  3.2).  Since  such 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  has  costs  as  well  as  benefits, 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  desirable  if  benefits  exceed 
costs  (section  3.3). 
One  of  the  possible  benefits  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is 
reduction  in  the  uncertainty  of  the  rates  of  return  from  investments. 
It  is  possible  to  examine  the  risk  reduction  benefits  in  the  context 
of  the  capital  market.  If  segmental  geographical  data  have'  information 
content,  then  in  an  efficient  market  finer  information  about  the 
entity  should  be  reflected  in  the  stock  prices  of  the  entity  (section 
4.14). 
For  a  well  diversified  investor  company  specific  volatility  does  not 
matter,  all  that  matters  is  systematic  risk  (section  5.4).  Therefore 
if  segmental  disclosure  benefits  exceed  costs,  then  over  time,  there 
will  be  a  reduction  in  systematic  risk  of  such  disclosing  companies 
when  compared  with  nondisclosing  companies  as  a  group  although  this 
may  not  be  true  for  each  individual  company. 270 
Benefits  of  segmental  disclosure  of  a  line  of  business  variety  in 
the  stock  market  context  have  been  examined  by  researchers,  and  evidence 
has  been  found  to  substantiate  the  notion  that  an  average  segmental 
line  of  business  disclosure  results  in  a  reduction  of  systematic  risk 
for  disclosing  entities  as  a  group.  (Section  6.4) 
Tests  of  risk  reduction  benefits  resulting  from  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  have  been  scarce  in  general,  and  none  in  the  UK  context 
(section  6.5)  in  particular. 
Current  research  is  based  on  segmental  geographical  data  disclosed 
by  UK  based  multinationals.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  other  things 
being  unchanged,  segmental  geographical  disclosure  and  systematic 
risk  are  associated  then  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  segmental 
geographical  data  have  information  content.  If  it  can  be  further 
shown  that  the  direction  of  beta  change  favours  disclosure  behaviour, 
ie  segmental  geographical  disclosure  has  resulted  in  a  lower  beta 
then  it  can  be  concluded  that  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
reduces  systematic  risk  for  disclosing  companies. 
Thus,  the  two  hypotheses  of  this  thesis  are  : 
(1)  Regarding  information  content  : 
Segmental  geographical  disclosure  affects  systematic  risk. 
(2)  Regarding  disclosure  benefits  : 
Segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  associated  with  a  lower 
systematic  risk  for  the  disclosing  companies  as  a  group. 
The  next  section  will  describe  the  data  base  upon  which  the  above 
hypotheses  can  be  tested. 271 
7.2  The  Database 
Earlier  studies  on  segmental  disclosure  cited  in  chapter  VI  were 
mostly  based  on  US  data,  and  primarily  on  the  effectiveness  of  line 
of  business  (LOB)  disclosure.  The  objective  of  this  study  is  to 
investigate  UK  based  companies  and  the  effectiveness  of  geographical 
segmental  disclosure.  For  this  reason  companies  selected  will  be 
required  to  have  substantial  overseas  sales  disclosed  in  their  financial 
reports.  Moreover,  since  our  purpose  is  to  examine  the  risk 
characteristics  of  these  companies  there  has  to  be  a  reasonable  length 
of  time  over  which  the  geographical  segmental  data,  and  the  listings 
for  ordinary  shares  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  are  available 
continuously  throughout  the  period  under  investigation. 
To  be  more  specific,  the  following  were  seen  as  required  criteria  for 
an  adequate  database  for  current  investigation  : 
(i)  Substantial  overseas  sales 
(ii)  A  common  year  end  to  avoid  seasonality 
(iii)  Continuous  stock  price  listing  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange 
(iv)  An  adequate  horizon  and  an  appropriate  interval  over  which 
stock  prices  are  to  be  measured 
(v)  An  examinable  point  of  impact;  and  adequate  differentiation 
between  the  control  group  and  the  treatment  group  of  companies 
(vi)  A  justifiable  proxy  for  the  'market' 
(vii)  Avoidance  of  'estimation  risk' 
To  ensure  that  each  of  the  above  criterion  is  met,  the  following 
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(i)  The  starting  point  of  this  data  base  is  "The  Times  1000 
Largest  UK  Industrial  Companies  (1981/82)  by  Turnover". 
Since  size  is  an  important  criterion  in  investigating 
multinational  conglomerates,  only  the  first  500  of  this  1000 
companies  was  investigated. 
To  ensure  substantial  overseas  sales,  it  was  decided  that  at 
least  10%  of  total  third  party  sales  must  be  in  overseas 
territories  since  any  smaller  percentage  is  unlikely  to  induce 
companies  to  disclose  segmental  geographical  sales.  The  figure 
which  is  required  to  be  disclosed  for  exports  was  taken  as  a 
reliable  indicator  in  this  regard.  This  choice  of  10%  cut  off 
was  also  influenced  by  FAS  14,  and  the  London  Stock  Exchange 
Listing  Agreement  discussed  earlier  (section  3.2). 
An  exception  was  made  in  the  case  of  British  Petroleum,  the 
number  one  company  in  the  Times  Listing,  because  of  its  over- 
whelming  size.  For  the  year  1981/82,  British  Petroleum's 
export  sales  from  UK  was  just  over  9%  of  its  turnover. 
(ii)  The  companies  must  have  a  common  year  end.  This  common  year 
end  is  important  because  the  violation  of  this  condition  can 
cause  distortions  due  to  seasonality. 
December  31  was  the  choice,  since  52a  of  all  companies  listed 
in  the  Times  Top  1000  companies  have  their  financial  year  end 
on  December  31. 
The  application  of  criteria  (i)  and  (ii)  simultaneously  resulted 
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(iii)  To  be  able  to  investigate  the  risk  characteristics'  of  these 
companies  disclosing  geographical  segmental  data,  stock  prices 
are  required.  Of  the  101  surviving  companies  only  55  were 
listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  in  June  1982,  the  rest 
were  either  unquoted  companies,  or  quoted  in  overseas 
exchanges. 
(iv)  Next,  stock  prices  at  the  beginning  of  each  month  were 
obtained  from  Data  Stream  for  109  months  :  June  1973  to 
June  1982. 
The  choice  of  Data  Stream  for  stock  prices  is  justified  as 
follows  :  unlike  . 
the  USA,  stock  price  data  base  for  UK 
companies  are  scarce;  there  are  two  major  sources  for  stock 
pricey  data  in  existence  at  this  time  point  :  the  London 
Business  School  (LBS)  and  Data  Stream  International.  The 
data  base  available  from  LBS  could  not  ensure  an  adequate 
horizon  as  it  did  not  go  as  far  back  as  1973.  This  was 
possible  with  Data  Stream. 
Justification  for  monthly  stock  prices  being  used  instead  of 
weekly  or  daily  prices  has  been  given  earlier  (section  5.513). 
Eight  of  the  fifty-five  companies  mentioned  in  (iii)  above 
dropped  out,  either  because  there  were  newer  companies  which 
have  come  to  the  market  since  June  1973,  or  because  their 
listings  were  discontinuous.  This  resulted  in  47  companies 
with  a  continuous  listing  for  the  109  months  which  disclosed 
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(v)  Having  established  continuous  stock  price  listings  on  the 
London  Exchange  for  109  months,  a  common  financial  year  end 
on  31  December,  and  substantial  overseas  sales,  the  disclosure 
practice  of  these  companies  was  examined  with  the  aid  of  their 
annual  reports,  company  records  from  The  Exchange  Telegraph 
Company  (EXTEL)  such  as  the  EXTEL  cards  and  EXTEL  Handbook 
of  Market  Leaders  for  appropriate  years.  Since  the  objective 
of  this  research  is  to  investigate  the  risk  impact  of  differential 
disclosure  practices,  a  point  of  impact  was  decided  as  being 
December  1977  for  two  reasons:  (i)  this  is  approximately  in 
the  middle  of  the  period  under  investigation,  hence  will  result 
in  a  reasonable  sample  size  for  the  period  after  as  well  as 
before  the  point  of  intervention;  and  (ii)  secondly,  because 
these  multinational  conglomerates  are  likely  to  be  influenced 
by  changes  in  disclosure  requirements  by  the  FASB,  the  IAS, 
and  the  UN  around  this  time  (see  figure  3.1).  Of  the  forty- 
seven  companies  disclosing  geographical  segmental  data 
mentioned  in  (iv)  above,  (a)  15  had  continuously  disclosed 
segmental  geographical  data  throughout  the  nine  year  period, 
(b)  21  had  changed  from  nondisclosure  to  geographical 
segmental  disclosure  in  December  1971,  and  (c)  11  had  changed 
from  nondisclosure  to  disclosure  at  a  time  point  other  than 
end  of  December  1977. 
To  ensure  a  point  of  impact,  companies  in  category  (c)  were 
withdrawn  from  further  investigation,  leaving  a  final  sample 
of  36  surviving  companies.  Category  (a),  the  15  continuously 
disclosing  companies  were  designated  as  the  Control  Group, 275 
and  category  (b),  the  21  companies  which  changed  their 
disclosure  practice  on  31  December  1977  were  considered  as 
the  Treatment  Group. 
Appendix  VII(B)  is  a  list  of  treatment  group  companies,  and 
Appendix  VII(C)  is  a  list  of  control  group  companies. 
(vi)  To  be  able  to  analyse  the  systematic  risk  characteristic  of 
the  companies  surviving  the  selection  process  in  (v)  above,  a 
proxy  for  the  market  portfolio  is  required.  For  this  purpose, 
the  Financial  Times  Actuaries  Index  (FTA  500)  was  chosen. 
According  to  Financial  Times  (1982,  p  12),  the  FT  Actuaries 
share  indices  are  joint  compilation  of  the  Financial  Times, 
London,  the  Institute  of  Actuaries,  London,  and  the  Faculty 
of  Actuaries,  Edinburgh.  These  indices  are  based  on  the 
London  Stock  Exchanges'  share  prices  for  quoted  companies, 
and  are  adjusted  for  capitalization  issues  retrospectively. 
The  FTA  500  share  index  consists  of  487  industrial  group 
companies  and  13  companies  in  the  oil  sector,  but  excludes  the 
financial  group  companies  such  as  banks  and  discount  houses. 
As  none  of  the  companies  in  the  final  sample  of  36  mentioned 
in  (v)  above  were  in  the  financial  group,  the  FTA  500  index  was 
chosen  as  an  appropriate  proxy  for  the  market. 
To  generate  the  market  return,  Rmt,  price  relatives  were 
computed  as  follows  : 
R- 
Pt  -  Pt 
-1 
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Price  indices  for  the  beginning  of  the  month  were  used  to 
conform  with  the  individual  stock  prices  data  mentioned  in 
(iv)  above.  Using  109  months'  price  indices,  (109-1)  -  108. 
market  returns  wererobtained. 
(vii)  For  each  of  the  36  companies  mentioned  in  (v)  above,  Data 
Stream  beginning  of  the  month  stock  prices  (which  are  already 
adjusted  retrospectively  for  capitalisation  issues)  were  used. 
Interim  and  final  dividend  information  were  obtained  from 
annual  reports  and  EXTEL  cards,  to  adjust  the  market  prices, 
prior  to  computing  monthly  returns  in  a  fashion  similar  to 
that  in  (vi)  above. 
(viii)  The  selection  process  outlined  in  (i)  to  (vii)  above  results 
in  approximately  four  thousand  price  relatives  as  follows  : 
for  the  market  :  1(108)  =  108 
for  treatment  group  :  21(108)  =  2268 
for  control  group  :  15(108)  =  1620 
total  3996 
Systematic  risk  indicators,  betas,  can  now  be  computed  by 
regressing  the  market  returns  with  company  returns  for 
companies  in  the  treatment  and  control  group  categories. 
The  sample  selected  above  ensures  an  adequate  sample  size  of  companies, 
is  consistent  to  be  able  to  minimise  seasonality  due  to  the  choice  of 
financial  year  end,  provides  an  adequate  number  of  observations, 
being  109  months  long,  ensuring  a  long  enough  time  span  to  be  able  to 
examine  the  changes  in  systematic  risk,  if  any,  and  is  manageable  for 277 
computational  purposes. 
Furthermore,  'estimation  risk'  is  avoided  as  the  number  of  observations 
per  security  is  larger  than  the  number  of  securities  investigated 
(section  5.511)  . 
7.3  Experimental  Design 
In  the  choice  of  an  experimental  design  the  researcher  has  to  consider 
(i)  internal  validity  and  (ii)  external  validity.  Internal  validity 
refers  to  the  consistency  of  the  model  and  its  applicability  to  the 
research  question  in  hand  in  a  particular  instance,  and  external 
validity  refers  to  the  generalisability  of  the  research.  While 
internal  validity  is  essential  for  model  validation,  external  validity 
can  never  be  proved  unquestionably.  It  is  desirable  to  have  both. 
"Internal  validity  is  the  basic  minimum  without  which  any  experiment 
is  uninterpretable:  Did  in  fact  the  experimental  treatments  make  a 
difference  in  this  specific  experimental  instance?  External  validity 
asks  the  question  of  generalisability:  To  what  populations,  settings, 
treatment  variables,  and  measurement  variables  can  this  effect-be 
generalised?  Both  types  of  criteria  are  obviously  important,  even 
though  they  are  frequently  at  odds  in  that  features  increasing  one 
may  jeopardize  the  other.  While  internal  validity  is  the  sine  qua  non, 
and  while  the  question  of  external  validity,  like  the  question  of 
inductive  inference,  is  never  completely  answerable,  the  selection  of 
designs  strong  in  both  types  of  validity  is  obviously  our  ideal". 
Campbell  and  Stanley,  1963,  p5 278 
The  research  question  in  hand  is  the  testing  of  changes  in  systematic 
risk,  B,  in  response  to  changes  in  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
practice  over  time.  Such  questions  are  answered  via  the  time  series 
models,  and  the  testing  here  is  essentially  one  of  stationarity  over 
time.  In  such  a  setting  it  is  worthwhile  considering  that  : 
"A  weak  model  reduces  the  power  of  the  test,  while  a  model  correlated 
with  extraneous  signals  can  lead  to  false  rejection  of  the  null 
hypothesis  of  no  information  content". 
Patell,  1979,  p  546 
Bearing  in  mind  the  question  of  trade-off  between  internal  validity 
and  external  validity  discussed  above,  in  the  following  sections  the 
cumulative  average  residuals,  the  most  popular  research  method  in  the 
finance  literature,  will  be  described;  other  possible  designs  will 
be  mentioned;  and  a  simple  technique,  a  moving  beta  estimate  which 
is  being  used  will  be  explained. 
7.31  Cumulative  Average  Residual  (CAR)  Method 
One  of  the  most  commonly  used  methodology  in  capital  market  literature 
is  the  cumulative  average  residual  (CAR),  pioneered  by  Ball  and  Brown 
(1968),  and  Fama,  Fisher,  Jensen  and  Roll  (1969).  This  CAR 
methodology  consists  of  :  (i)  estimating  the  parameter  of  the  market 
model  based  in  a  time  period  prior  (and  sometimes  subsequent)  to  an 
announcement,  and  (ii)  analysing  the  residuals  derived  from  applying 
this  model  to  a  time  period  which  includes  the  announcement  date. 
A  step  by  step  approach  to  cumulative  average  residual  methodology  can 
be  stated  as  follows  : 279 
(1)  A  sample  is  chosen  from  the  population  of  companies  engaged  in 
the  event  of  interest. 
(2)  For  each  company  the  date  when  the  event  of  interest  occurs  is 
called  to 
(3)  An  estimation  period  is  decided  upon  which  does  not  include  the 
announcement  date,  or  any  date  immediately  before  or  after  the 
announcement  date  to  avoid  any  contamination. 
(4)  For  each  security  the  parameters  of  the  ordinary  least  squares  are 
estimated  using  the  one  factor  market  model,  as  follows  : 
Rjt  aj+Bj 
mt+ejt 
where  tildes  denote  random  variables,  and  ejt  denotes  the  error 
term  satisfying  the  assumptions  of  a  linear  regression  model 
regarding  means,  variances  and  covariances. 
(5)  For  each  security,  and  for  each  period,  forecast  returns  are  now 
computed  using  the  intercept,  aj,  the  slope  Bj,  and  the 
corresponding  market  return  Rmt' 
(6)  Actual  returns  for  each  security  for  each  period  are  subtracted 
from  the  forecast  return  to  obtain  'Abnormal  Returns'  or 
residuals. 
ti  ýc 
ARjt  =  Kjt  -  (aj  +  Bj'mt) 
(7)  These  abnormal  returns  around  the  time  of  the  event  of  interest 
are  then  : 
(a)  calculated  for  each  security  in  the  sample 
(b)  cumulated  over  time,  and 
(c)  averaged  across  securities 
to  test  for  the  information  content  in  the  event  of  interest 
around  to.  The  assumption  here  is  that  any  drift  in  the  cumulative 
average  residuals  (CARs)  is  caused  by  excess  risk-adjusted  returns 280 
in  anticipation  or  as  a  result  of  the  announcement.  The  behaviour 
of  the  cumulative  average  residual  is  examined  by  visual 
inspection  or  statistical  testing. 
0 
While  the  CAR  methodology  described  above  is  by  far  the  most  popular 
method  used  in  the  capital  market  literature,  there  are  many  problems 
with  using  this  method.  Firstly,  it  does  not  allow  for  changes  in 
beta  over  time.  In  many  cases  there  are  a  priori  reasons  to  expect 
systematic  risk  to  change  during  an  announcement  test.  Such  changes 
in  systematic  risk  have  been  cited  in  the  literature  extensively. 
(Boness,  Chen  and  Jatusipitak,  1974;  Sunder,  1973;  and  Brenner  and 
Smidt,  1977).  Further,,  in  CAR  methodology  it  is  assumed  that  beta 
for  each  company  is  independent  across  securities.  This  may  not 
always  be  so  when  the  securities  being  investigated  are  influenced  by 
the  same  external  factor  such  as  changes  in  segmental  disclosure 
practice. 
Discussing  the  pitfalls  of  this  CAR  methodology,  Sunder  (1973,  p  36) 
states  that  : 
"(1)  ..  such  analysis  may  indicate  abnormal  price  changes  when  in 
fact  none  exist; 
(2)  even  when  abnormal  price  changes  are  present,  this  analysis  may 
not  be  able  to  detect  them  due  to  the  presence  of  changes  in  the 
relative  risk;  and 
(3)  in  the  presence  of  risk  changes,  estimated  abnormal  returns  on 
stocks  are  dependent  on  the  time  series  data  used  for  estimation 
of  the  relative  risk;  and  to  the  extent  that  this  choice  is 
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Similar  reservations  on  CAR  methodology  have  been  ecressed  by 
Marshall  (1975),  Deakin  (1976),  AAA  (1977),  Larcker,  Gordon  and 
Pinches  (1980),  and  Peasnell  (1981).  For  instance,  Larcker,  Gordon 
and  Pinches  (1980,  p  270)  state  : 
"The  average  residual  (ARt+1)  is  unbiased  if  changes  in  Bit  are 
independent  across  securities.  However,  in  an  announcement  test  it 
is  likely  that  changes  in  Bit  will  be  associated  with  that  event. 
Hence  averaging  across  the  securities  is  of  no  benefit  and  the 
estimated  average  (ARt+1)  and  cumulative  average  residuals  (CARL)  are 
biased;  accordingly,  any  statement  about  market  efficiency  or  the 
information  content  of  the  announcement  may  be  incorrect.  In  effect 
the  traditional  methodology  confounds  the  results  so  that  patterns  in 
the  CAR's  caused  by  shifting  B's  cannot  be  disentangled  from  shifts 
which  appear  to  be  associated  with  new  information.  " 
It  is  concluded  that  in  spite  of  its  popularity,  the  ubiquitous 
cumulative  average  residual  method  is  not  appropriate  for  investigating 
the  relationship  between  segmental  geographical  disclosure  and 
systematic  risk  because  of  its  stationarity  and  independence 
assumptions.  In  the  following  section  other  possible  methods  for 
testing  the  relationship  between  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
and  systematic  risk  will  be  explored. 
7.32  Other  Possible  Methods 
Other  possible  methods  for  testing  changes  in  beta  over  time  include 
(i)  Dummy  Variables  and  (ii)  Box-Jenkins  Method.  While  dummy 282 
variables  have  rarely  been  used  in  capital  market  studies*,  the  use 
of  Box-Jenkins  method  is  fairly  common,  though  used  in  a  different 
context  (improved  forecasting  ability). 
7.321  Dummy  Variables 
"Dummy  variables  may  be  used  as  proxies  for  qualitative  factors  when 
no  observations  on  these  factors  are  available,  or  when  it  is 
inconvenient  to  do  so".  (Koutsoyiannis,  1977,  p  281.  ) 
A  typical  relationship  using  dummy  variable  may  be  described  as 
follows  : 
C=  a1  x1  +a2  x2+BY+e 
where  C  refers  to  the  amount  consumed  by  the  community  of  a  product, 
and  the  X's  are  dummy  variables  such  that  : 
X1  -1  in  each  wartime  years,  and  0  in  each  peace-time  years; 
X2  =1  in  each  peace-time  years,  and  0  in  each  wartime  years. 
However,  in  using  this  method  one  has  to  be  aware  of  'The  Dummy 
Variable  Trap' 
.  If  explanatory  variables  such  as  those  mentioned 
above  in  the  equation  are  used  in  conjunction  with  a  regression 
programme  that  automatically  produces  an  intercept  term,  then  the 
estimating  procedure  breaks  down.  (Johnston,  1972,  p  179.  ) 
A  more  popular  method,  though  usually  in  a  different  context  is  the 
Box-Jenkins  Auto  Regressive  Integrated  Moving  Average  (ARIMA)  method. 
Exceptions  being  Wippern  (1966)  and  Collins  and  Simonds  (1979). 
**  Albrecht,  Lookabill  and  McKeown  (1977),  Ang  (1979),  Foster  (1977), 
Lorek,  McDonald  and  Patz  (1976),  Mabert  and  Radcliffe  (1974),  and 
Umstead  and  Bergstrom  (1979). 283 
7.322  The  Box-Jenkins  Method 
Data  describing  real  life  phenomena  are  more  complicated  than  one 
which  can  be  described  by  a  straight  line  relationship.  Therefore, 
in  all  forecasting  we  make  an  initial  assumption  as  to  the  pattern 
that  best  fits  the  data  (linear,  logarithmic,  exponential,  multi- 
nomial  etc)  based  upon  which  we  produce  a  model  that  best  fits  the 
data.  Box  and  Jenkins(1970,  p.  19)  describe  forecasting  as  a  four 
stage  process  as  in  figure  7.1. 
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The  Box-Jenkins  method  postulates  three  general  classes  of  models 
which  can  describe  any  type  or  pattern  of  data:  (1)  Auto-Regressive 
(AR),  (2)  Moving  Average  (MA),  and  (3)  mixed  Auto-Regressive  Moving 
Average  (ARMA),  which  is  also  known  as  Auto-Regressive  Integrated 
Moving  Average  (ARIMA),  Identification  of  the  correct  model  type 
is  made  by  examining  the  auto-correlation  coefficients.  If  the 
correct  model  is  fitted  into  the  data  the  residuals  must  be  randomly 
distributed  around  the  model,  there- 
fore  their  auto-correlation  should  be  small  with  no  pattern  in  them. 
This  has  to  be  achieved  in  stage  2,  before  one  can  proceed  to  stage 
3,  in  figure  7.1. 
An  ARIMA  model  has  three  structural  parameters,  p,  d  and  q.  The 
structural  parameter  p  indicates  an  auto-regressive  relationship, 
that  is  the  number  of  past  observations  used  to  predict  the  current 
observation.  The  structural  parameter  q  denotes  the  number  of  moving 
average  structures  in  the  model;  and  finally,  the  structural  parameter 
d  indicates  that  the  time  series  was  differenced,  ie,  the  first 
observation  is  subtracted  from  the  second,  the  second  observation  is 
subtracted  from  the  third,  and  so  on.  Model  identification  referred 
to  in  stage  one  of  figure  7.1  refers  to  the  empirical  procedures 
by  which  the  most  appropriate  set  of  structural  parameters  (p,  d  and  q) 
are  selected  from  a  given  time  series.  This  means  that  the  researcher 
will  have  to  know  how  many  times  to  difference  the  data  (d),  how  many 
auto-regressive  (p)  and/or  moving  average  parameters  (q)  to  estimate 
for  a  set  of  data.  This  model  identification  is  a  cumbersome  task. 
However,  once  a  correct  model  has  been  developed  it  can  be  quite 
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7.33  Quasi-Experimentation 
In  earlier  sections  it  has  been  suggested  that  Dummy  Variables  are 
appropriate  for  qualitative  factors  when  no  observations  on  these 
factors  are  available 
IheBox-Jenkins  ARIMA  method  though  powerful  is 
cumbersome,  and  is  appropriate  for  forecasting  purposes.  Cumulative 
Average  Residuals  (CAR)  is  inappropriate  when  there  is  the  likelihood 
of  changes  in  relative  risk.  The  nature  of  our  sample  is  such  that 
perfect  matching  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  The  purpose  of 
our  research  is  to  investigate  changes  in  systematic  risk  in  the 
event  of  an  interruption.  For  these  two  reasons  quasi-experimentation 
of  a  regression  discontinuity  type  is  appropriate. 
A  genuine  comparative  experiment  requires  that  the  experimentor 
manipulate  two  or  more  experimental  conditions  by  assigning  them 
at  random  -  either  simply  or  restrictedly  -  to  the  experimental  units 
(or,  what  is  the  same,  he  assigns  the  experimental  units  at  random 
to  the  experimental  conditions).  Randomization  guarantees  that  before 
the  experiment  begins,  the  means  of  the  various  conditions  for  any 
variable  will  differ  only  randomly.  Such  randomization  forms  the 
basis  for  tests  of  statistical  significance. 
If  the'  expe  rimentor  cannot  or  does  not  assign  his  experimental  units 
at  random  to  his  experimental  treatments,  he  performs  something  other 
than  a  "true"  experiment. 
Using  the  analysis  of  variance  or  't'  test  does  not  change  a  status 
study  into  an  experiment;  the  design  of  an  investigation,  rather  than 
the  analysis,  distinguishes  experiments  from  non-experiments. 
Campbell  and  Stanley(1963),  p  34  describe  quasi-experimental  designs 
as  follows:  - 286 
"There  are  many  natural  social  settings  in  which  the  research  person 
can  introduce  something  like  experimental  design  into  his  scheduling 
of  data  collection  procedures  (eg,  the  when  and  to  whom  of  measurement), 
even  though  he  lacks  full  control  over  the  scheduling  of  experimental 
stimuli  (the  when  and  to  whom  of  exposure  and  the  ability  to  randomize 
exposures)  which  makes  a  true  experiment  possible.  Collectively, 
such  situations  can  be  regarded  as  quasi-experimental  designs". 
7.331  Regression  Discontinuity  Analysis 
In  a  quasi-experimental  setting,  regression  discontinuity  analysis 
is  an  appropriate  method  where  perfect  matching  of  the  treatment 
and  control  group  samples  is  difficult,.  if  not  impossible. 
Thistlethwaite  and  Campbell  (1960),  p309  -  310,  explain  regression 
discontinuity  analysis  as  follows:  - 
"While  the  term  "ex-post  facto  experiment"  could  refer  to  any  analysis 
of  records  which  provides  a  quasi-experimental  test  of  a  causal 
hypothesis, 
..... 
it  has  come  to  indicate  more  specifically  the  mode 
of  analysis  in  which  two  groups  -  an  experimental  and  a  control 
group  -  are  selected  through  matching  to  yield  a  quasi-experimental 
comparison.  In  such  studies  the  groups  are  presumed,  as  a  result 
of  matching,  to  have  been  equivalent  prior  to  the  exposure  of  the 
experimental  group  to  some  potentially  change  inducing  event  (the 
"experimental  treatment").  If  the  groups  differ  on  subsequent 
measures  and  if  there  are  no  plausible  rival  hypothesis  which  might 
account  for  the  differences,  it  is  inferred  that  the  experimental 
treatment  has  caused  the  observed  differences.  ..... 287 
In  situations  ....  where  exposure  to  an  experimental  treatment 
.. 
is  determined  by  the  subject's  standing  on  a  single,  measured  variable, 
and  where  the  expected  effects  of  the  treatment  are  of  much  the  same 
nature  as  would  be  produced  by  increasing  magnitudes  of  that  variable, 
examinations  of  the  details  of  the  regression  may  be  used  to  assess 
experimental  effects.  The  experimental  treatment  should  provide  an 
additional  elevation  to  the  regression  of  dependent  variables  on  the 
exposure  determiner,  providing  a  steplike  discontinuity  at  the  cutting 
score". 
Regression  discontinuity  analysis  does  not  rely  upon  matching  to 
equate  experimental  and  control  groups,  hence  it  avoids  the  difficulties 
of  (a)  differential  regression-toward-the-mean  effects,  and  (b) 
incomplete  matching  due  to  failure  to  identify  and  include  all  relevant 
antecedent  characteristics  in  the  matching  process. 
The  value  of  the  regression-discontinuity  analysis  is  that  it  provides 
a  more  stringent  test  of  causal  hypotheses  than  is  provided  by  the 
ex-post  facto  design. 
7.332  Time  Series  Experimental  Design 
"The  'pretest  -  post-test'  experimental  design  has  never  been  highly 
regarded  as  an  experimental  technique  in  the  behavioural  and  social 
sciences,  and  for  good  reasons.  The  simple  pattern  of  'observation- 
treatment-observation  of  change'  which  worked  so  well  in  the  physical 
sciences  is  seldom  equal  to  the  difficult  task  of  demonstration  of 
causal  relationships  in  the  system  of  human  behaviour.  In  such 
systems  observations  must  be  made  repeatedly  both  before  and  after 
the  intervention,  ie,  introduction  of  the  'treatment'  or  assumed 
cause.  The  change  from  immediately  before  to  immediately  after 
intervention  can  then  be  judged  as  either  the  effect  of  the  intervention 288 
or  merely  the  progression  of  an  evolving  and  dynamic  process  un- 
affected  by  the  intervention.  The  assessment  of  a  causal  claim 
can  be  made  more  reliably  by  an  extension  of  the  pretest-posttest 
design  known  as  the  time  series  experimental  design"'. 
Glass,  Willson  and  Gottman(1975)  p1 
The  essence  of  the  time-series  design  is  the  presence  of  a  periodic 
measurement  process  on  some  group  or  individual  and  the  introduction 
of  an  experimental  change  into  this  time  series  of  measurements,  the 
results  of  which  are  indicated  by  a  discontinuity  in  the  measurements 
recorded  in  the  time  series.  It  can  be  diagramed  thus: 
01  02  03  04  X  05  06  07  08 
Figure  7.2  shows  some  possible  patterns  from  the  introduction  of  an 
experimental  variable  into  a  time  series  of  measurements. 
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Some  Possible  Outcome  Patterns  from  the  introduction  of  an 
Experimental  Variable  at  Point  X  into  a  Time  Series  of  Measurements, 
01  -  08.  Except  for  D,  the  04  -  05  gain  is  the  same  for  all  time 
series,  while  the  legitimacy  of  inferring  an  effect  varies  widely.., 290 
7.333  Interrupted  Time  Series  Analysis 
Analysis  of  the  time  series  quasi  -experiment  is  a  statistical 
comparison  of  the  pre  and  post  intervention  time  series  segments. 
This  analysis  requires  a  statistical  model  which  might  be 
Yi-  =  Bpre  +  Bpost  +  ei 
where  , 
Yi.  =  the  ith  observation  of  a  time  series 
Bpre  =  the  pre-intervention  series  level 
Bpost  =  the  post-intervention  series  level 
e1  =  an  error  term  associated  with  Yi 
The  null  hypothesis  for  this  model, 
H0  :  Bpre  -  Bpost  -0 
states  that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  difference  between 
the  pre-intervention  and  post-intervention  series  levels,  that  the 
intervention  had  no  statistically  significant  impact  on  the  series 
levels. 291 
7.334  The  Moving  Regression  Method 
Having  established  a  hypothesis  to  be  tested  in  an  interrupted  time 
series  framework  in  a  quasi-experimental  setting,  to  be  able  to  test 
this  possible  discontinuity  of  systematic  risk,  a  plausible  time  series 
will  have  to  be  generated.  A  simple  pre-test,  post-test  series  of 
betas  would  be  inappropriate.  Instead  a  moving  regression  will  be 
used  following  Brown,  Durbin  and  Evans  (1975),  and  Collins  and 
Simonds  (1979).  Brown,  Durbin  and  Evans  have  described  a  moving 
regression  as  follows  : 
if...  Another  useful  way  of  investigating  the  time  variation 
of  Bt  is  to  fit  the  regression  on  a  short  segment  of  n 
successive  observations  and  to  move  this  segment  along  the 
series.  The  graphs  of  the  resulting  coefficients  against 
time  provide  further  evidence  of  departures  from  constancy  ...  " 
p  155 
The  quantities  required  for  each  new  segment  are  computed  by  first 
adding  a  new  segment  to  the  observation  and  dropping  one  from  the 
beginning  of  the  series  similar  to  the  moving  average  process. 
A  30  item  moving  regression  programme  has  been  developed  following 
Brown,  Durbin  and  Evans  (1975)  which  will  be  used  in  analysing  the 
data.  This  moving  regression  programme  appears  in  Appendix  VII(D). 
A  'thirty  item'  series  has  been  chosen  because  (i)  a  series  of  much 
smaller  number  of  items  will  not  produce  a  reliable  beta;  it  will  be 
a  very  volatile  beta  likely  to  be  influenced  by  random  items;  and 
(ii)  to  be  able  to  measure  the  change  in  the  regression  slope  over 
time,  and  to  be  able  to  judge  the  intervention  (change  in  disclosure 
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of  the  intervention  point;  a  thirty  item  regression  results  in 
approximately  40  items  on  either  side  of  the  intervention  time  point. 
Assuming  normal  distribution,  statistical  tests  of  significance  will 
be  performed  using  Z  tests.  Pre-intervention  and  post-intervention 
betas  will  be  examined  to  test  for  significant  differences  in  average 
betas  between  the  two  segments  for  both  the  control  group  and  the 
treatment  group. 
If  geographical  segmental  disclosure  is  a  significant  influence  on 
betas,  it  is  envisaged  that  pre-intervention  betas  for  the  treatment 
group  will  be  significantly  different  from  the  control  group  betas 
for  the  pre-intervention  period;  but  post-intervention  betas  for 
the  treatment  and  control  groups  will  have  no  significant  differences. 
This  will  be  a  test  of  the  first  hypothesis  :  "segmental  geographical 
disclosure  affects  systematic  risk". 
Further,  if  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  beneficial  to  the 
investors,  post  intervention  betas  for  the  treatment  group  will  be 
significantly  smaller  than  pre-intervention  betas  for  the  treatment 
group.  This  will  be  a  test  of  the  second  hypothesis  :  "segmental 
geographical  disclosure  results  in  a  lower  systematic  risk". 
Having  examined  the  change,  if  any,  in  the  direction  and  magnitude  of 
the  treatment  group  moving  beta  in  response  to  intervention  (change 
in  disclosure  practice),  against  the  norm  of  the  control  group,  the 
duration  and  onset  of  such  changes  will  be  further  explored  to  see  if 
the  duration  of  the  change  in  beta  is  temporary  or  permanent,  and  if 293 
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the  onset  is  abrupt  or  gradual.  Figure  7.3  illustrates  the 
duration-onset  analysis  of  regression  slope  following  McDowall, 
McCleary,  Meidinger  and  Hay  (1980). 
Finally,  to  ensure  that  such  changes,  if  any,  in  moving  beta  are  not 
unduly  influenced  by  confounding  variables  such  as  leverage  or  return 
on  equity,  the  relationships  between  these  possible  confounding 
variables  and  betas  will  be  analysed. 
7.335  Location  of  structural  change 
Structural  change  in  a  linear  equation  can  be  located  with  the  method 
of  maximum  likelihood  tests  (Mood  and  Graybill  1963).  A  more  specific 
measure  of  structural  change  in  the  context  of  regression  analysis  is 
the  Quandt's  Log-Likelihood  Ratio  Technique  (Quandt,  1958,1960). 
This  ratio  is  appropriate  when  it  is  believed  that  the  regression 
relationship  may  have  changed  abruptly  at  an  unknown  time  point 
t=r  from  one  constant  relationship  specified  by  B(1)  Q2  to 
another  constant  relationship  specified  by  B(2',  a2 
2 
If  B(1)  is  the  regression  slope  corresponding  to  Ho,  and  B(2)  is  the 
regression  corresponding  to  H1,  then  this  likelihood  ratio  is  computed 
as  follows  : 
Ar  =  lo  maximum  likelihood  of  the  observation  given  H0 
g10 
(maximum  likelihood  of  the  observation  given  H  1 
Such  a  ratio  has  been  used  by  Collins  and  Simonds  (1979)  and  Brown, 
Durbin  and  Evans  (1975).  The  point  at  which  this  ratio  achieves  its 
minimum  is  the  most  likely  location  of  a  structural  shift  in  the 295 
linear  time  series  relation.  However,  although  maximum  likelihood 
estimates  have  the  desired  properties  of  consistency  and  efficiency 
they  are  biased  for  small  samples  (Koutsoyiannis,  1977;  Fogler  and 
Ganapathy,  1982).  Since  the  final  sample  size  in  this  research  is 
15  in  the  control  group,  and  21  in  the  treatment  group,  the  use  of  the 
maximum  likelihood  test  may  result  in  biased  results.  Maximum 
likelihood  ratios  will  therefore  not  be  used  to  locate  the  structural 
shift  in  beta.  Visual  observation  will  be  used  instead. 
7.4  Summary 
Chapter  VII  has  been  concerned  with  hypotheses,  data  base  and 
experimental  design.  First  hypotheses  have  been  formulated  and  stated. 
The  two  hypotheses 
of  this  thesis  are  (i)  segmental  geographical  disclosure  affects 
systematic  risk;  and  (ii)  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is 
associated  with  a  lower  systematic  risk  for  the  disclosing  group  as  a 
whole. 
The  database  upon  which  the  hypotheses  can  be  tested  have  then  been 
described.  In  describing  the  database  selection  criteria  have  been 
explained  prior  to  describing  the  companies,  the  treatment  and  control 
groups,  the  choice  of  index,  and  the  interval  over  which  observations 
have  been  taken. 
The  design  of  the  experiment  has  been  explained  next,  where  the 
cumulative  average  residuals,  dummy  variables,  and  Box-Jenkins  methods 
have  been  explained,  and  the  reasons  for  their  not  being  selected 
have  been  stated.  The  nature  of  quasi  -experimentation,  regression 
discontinuity  analysis  and  interrupted  time  series  analysis  have  been 
explained  and  their  relevance  in  the  measurement  of  changes  in 296 
systematic  risk  in  the  context  of  geographical  segmental  disclosure 
have  been  explained.  A  moving  regression  method  has  been  explained, 
a  fortran  programme  for  moving  regression  has  been  developed,  and 
methods  for  location  of  structural  change  in  beta  have  been  explained. 
Having  thus  set  the  scene  for  hypotheses  testing,  such  tests  will  be 
performed  in  the  next  chapter  from  which  results  will  be  obtained  and 
commented  upon. 
Appendix  VII  (E)  is  a  summary  of  data  base  and  experimental  design. 297 
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APPENDIX  "VII(A) 
Possible  List  of  Companies 
From  The  Times  1000  largest  industrial  companies  (1981/82)  by  turnover 
included  are  the  first  500  companies  with  the  year  end  December,  and 
export  .  at  least  10%  of  total  sales  (except  for  BP  where  9%  is 
accepted  because  of  its  overwhelming  size).  December  year  end  is  the 
most  common,  52%  of  the  first  500  had  December  year  end.  (Origins  are 
mentioned  for  non-UK  parentage). 
Origin  JRank 
if  not  1  81/2  Company  Name 
Hollan 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
Holt 
Activity  I  Total  jEx  i 
I  British  Petroleum  Oil  25,347  2,289 
4  ICI  Chemicals  5,715  1,173 
5  Unilever  Food  4,345  455 
7  Shell  (UK)  Oil  3,263  666 
8  Esso  Petroleum  Oil  3,219  650 
10  Ford  Motor  Co  Vehicle  2,924  852 
20  Guest  Keen  &  Nettlefold  Engineering  1,923  193 
35  CT  Bowring  Ins  Brokers  1,458  688 
37  British  Aerospace  Aircraft  1,423  789 
39  Dunlop  Holdings  Rubber  1,386  149 
45  BICC  Holdings  Cable  1,281  244 
48  Hawker  Siddeley  Engineering  1,205  289 
49  Mobil  Oil  Oil  1,201  163 
53  Tube  Investments  Engineering  1,158  235 
56  Conoco  Oil  1,102  343 
66  IBM  (UK)  Holdings  Computers  954  452 
71  Babcock  International  Engineering  873  146 
75  Vauxhall  Motors  Vehicles  819  209 
76  Phillips  Electronics  Electronics  800  177 
88  Coats  Paton  Yarn  689  71 
97  Blue  Circle  Industries  Cement  637  65 
98  Turner  &  Newall  Asbestos  635  112 
102  IMI  Metals  629  139 
104  Northern  Engineering  Electricals  610  127 
110  S  Pearson  &  Son  Newspaper  591  124 
9 
21 
10 
20 
20 
29 
10 
47 
55 
11 
19 
24 
14 
20 
31 
47 
17 
26 
22 
10 
10 
18 
22 
21 
21 302 
Origin  ýRank  Sales  f  million 
if  not  UK  81/2  Company  Name  Activity  Total  xpor 
France  112  Talbot  Motor  Co  Vehicle  588  189  32 
115  Standard  Telephones  Telecom  538  95  18 
USA  125  Gulf  Oil  Oil  496  89  18 
126  Vickers  Engineering  493  142  29 
USA  127  Food  Manufacturers  (GB)  Food  493  48  10 
France  129  Michelin  Tyre  Tyre  474  148  31 
Belgium  133  Petrofina  (UK)  Oil  454  83  18 
USA  141  Albright  Wilson  Chemicals  412  103  25 
Switz  143  Ciba-Geigy  (UK)  Chemicals  401  148  37 
144  Fisons  Chemicals  399  47  12 
USA  150  Amoco  (UK)  Oil  374  105  28 
Canada  164  Alcan  (UK)  Aluminium  336  92  27 
170  Phillips  Imperial  Petroleum  Oil  329  63  19 
Canada  173  INCO  Europe  Nickel  Refin  325  191  59 
175  Simon  Engineering  Engineering  324  :  1)3  35 
186  Guthrie  Corporation  Plantation  301  34  11 
188  Carrington  Viyella  Textiles  297  40  13 
194  APV  Holdings  Engineering  282  43  15 
198  Tricentrol  Exploration  276  66  24 
199  Croda  International  Chemicals  276  44  16 
206  Hepworth  Ceramic  Holding  Clay  Pipes  263  36  13 
USA  210  Monsanto  Chemicals  256  80  31 
USA  220  Foster  Wheeler  Engineering  236  `73  31 
USA  226  General  Motors  Automobiles  229  45  20 
USA  229  Dupont  (UK)  Chemicals  227  78  34 
239  Cape  Industries  Bldg  Matl  219  26  12 
USA  250  Hoover  Appliances  207  29  14 
USA  251  Goodyear  Tyres  Tyres  206  41  20 
252  Automotive  Products  Components  206  55  27 
USA  254  Teneco  Int  Holdings  Agr  Equip  204  86  42 
255  Arthur  Bell  Whiskey  203  23  11 
263  Laird  Group  Metal  Ind  194  40  21 
264  Stone  Platt  Machinery  193  75  39 
268  London  and  Northern  Contracting  191  28  15 
286  Bunzl  Paper  Group  Paper  170  19  11 
Canada  287  Tioxide  Group  Chemical  168  44  26 
295  Bridon  Wire  Ropes  159  33  21 303 
Origin 
if  not  UK 
Rank81/2 
Company  Name  Activity 
Sales  f  million 
Tote  xpo  % 
299  Hunting  Assoc  Ind  Aviation  Supp  155  29  19 
301  Davies  &  Newman  Shipbrokers  154  29  19 
USA  303  Engelhard  Industries  Precision  Met  153  35  23 
308  Charterhouse  Group  Merchant  Bank  151  22  15 
France  323  May  &  Baker  Chemicals  141  45  32 
USA  328  Dow  Chemicals  Chemicals  159  29  18 
Sweden  329  Electrolux  Appliances  139  24  17 
USA  330  USMC  International  Machinery  138  43  31 
331  Aurora  Holdings  Engineers  136  22  16 
335  BBA  Group  Insulation  135  16  12 
USA  337  Cummings  Engineering  Diesel  Eng  134  101  75 
342  La  Porte  Industries  Chemicals  128  40  31 
346  Coutinho,  Card  &  Co  Steel,  Chemic  127  16  13 
349  Portals  Holdings  Papermaking  127  47  37 
USA  350  Honeywell  Computers  126  23  18 
351  Twil  Wire  Manuf  124  17  14 
Italy  352  Pirrelli  General  Cable  Wire  &  Cable  124  33  27 
354  Morgan  Crucible  Misc,  Matl  124  35  28. 
356  Molins  Machinery  123  71  58 
USA  368  Borg-Warner  Eng/Chemicals  119  66  55 
USA  387  Texas  Instruments  Electronic  11  45  41 
394  London  &  Scottish  Marine  Exploration  10  36  33 
398  Andrew  Weir  Shipping  10  11  10 
405  Coates  Bros  &  Co  Print/Ink  10  18  17 
Switz  415  European  Grain  &  Shipping  Brokers  100  25  25 
USA  427  Merck,  Sharpe  &  Dohme  Chemists  9  35  36 
Italy  428  Pirelli  Tyres  9  21  22 
432  Central  &  Sheerwood  Fin  Service  9  26  28 
USA  441  Ingersoll-Rand  Holdings  Engineers  9  48  52 
454  Brown  Boveri  Kent  Instruments  8  28  31 
463  International  Synthetic  Rubber  Rubber  8  24  27 
464  M  Golodetz  Brokers  8  26  30 
465  Tenants  Consolidated  Chemical  8  9  10 
USA  471  Lummus  &  Co  Refinery  Eng  8  14  16 
Sweden  475  Sandvik  Steel  Product  8  12  14 
USA  479  Alcoa  (GB)  Aluminium  8  16 
, 
19 
491  Frank  Fehr  &  Co  Merchants  8  32  39 304 
Origin  Rank  Sales  f  mil  ion 
if  not  UK  81/2  Company  Name  Activity  Total  Exp  % 
USA  494  Rohm  &  Haas  (UK)  Chemical  Manuf  81  53  65 
498  Amalgamated  Power  Eng  Turbines  81  32  40 
Total,  101  companies  with  December  year  end  in  the  first  500  of  The  Times 
1,000  largest  UK  industrial  companies  (1981/2)  by  turnover  and  export  sales 
at  least  10%  of  total. APPENDIX  VII(Bj- 
Treatment'Gröup  (21  companies) 
Company  Number  Name 
Ti  APV  Holdings 
T2  Aurora  Holdings 
T3  Automotive  Products 
T4  Babcock  International 
T5  BBA  Group 
T6  British  Petroleum 
T7  Bunzl 
T8  Cape  Industries 
T9  Carrington  Viyella 
T10  Croda  International 
T11  Dunlop 
T12  Fisons 
T13  Hepworth  Ceramic 
T14  Imperial  Chemical  Industries 
T15  Laird  Group 
T16  La  Porte  Industries 
T17  S  Pearson 
T18  TI  Group 
T19  Tricentrol 
T20  Unilever 
T21  Vickers 
305 
(All  these  companies  changed  their  disclosure  practice  starting 
December  1977;  from  non'  disclosure  of  geographical  sales  and 
trading  profit  to  disclosure  of  geographical  sales  and  trading 
profit). APPENDIX  VII  (C)'  ý"t,,, 
Control  Group  (15  companies) 
Company  Number  Name 
Cl  Arthur  Bell 
C2  BICC 
C3  Blue  Circle 
C4  Bridon 
C5  Central  and  Sheerwood 
C6  Coates  Brothers 
C7  Coats  Paton 
C8  Davies  and  Newman 
C9  Guthrie  Corporation 
Cl0  Hawker  Siddley 
C11  Hunting  Associates 
Cl2  London  and  Northern 
C13  Morgan 
. 
Crucible 
C14  Portals  Holdings 
C15  Simon  Engineering 
(All  these  companies  made  no  change  in  their  disclosure  practice 
during  the  whole  of  the  period  under  investigation,  ie  1  June  1973 
to  1  June  1982). -307 
Appendix  VII  (D) 
Fortran  Programme  for  Moving  Regression 
COMM'etnd:  l_IST  BP#OLD 
CI.  1ARACTER*80  BUF,  BLI-( 
DIMENSION  A(108),  ß(108) 
DOUBLE  PRECISION:  RES(20),  X(30),  Y(30),  BEES  (79),  TIME(?  9) 
DATA  SLF:  /8ßr'  `/ 
(.  0 
C  SET  UP  TIME  AS  AN  INDEX 
GO  21  I=1,  '9 
21  TIME(I)=DDLE(I) 
Cr 
Cl  OPEN  UI'  SEGONE  AND  READ  THE  INDEX 
OF'EN(UNIT=1,  FILE='SEGONE') 
DO  1  I=1 
,1 
83 
ý  READ(19101)A(I) 
r1  1 
tý  FOR  EACH  COMPANY  INS  THE  FIRST  FILE 
t.  '  READ  INTO  B 
C 
DO  10  IC=1  ,  21 
110  2  I=1  ,  108 
02 
READ(1,101)B(I) 
C  EXTRACT  30  LONG  SEGMENTS  AND  FASS  TO  NAG 
DO  3  IS=1,79 
IOFF=IS-1 
DO  4  I=1,30 
X(I)=A(IOFF+I) 
4  Y(I)=B(IOFFF"+fI)  " 
tý  DO  THE  REGRESSION  (FIRST  ORDER) 
CALL  G02CAF(30,  X,  Y,  RES,  IF) 
BEES(IS)=RES(6) 
BUF=BLK 
IX=l+INT(((RES(6)+3)/7)  *80) 
BUF(IX:  IX)='*' 
URITE(6,102)  IC,  BUF 
CONTINUE 
CALL  G02CA1=  (79,  TIMI:,  RIEES,  RES,  IF) 
WRITE(6,103)  IC,  RES(6)'RES(3),  RES(10),  RES(  13),  RES(2),  RI:  S(4) 
10  CONTINUE 
CLOSE(1) 
OPEN(UNIT=1,  FILE="'SEGTUO'  ) 
C%  FOR  EACH  COMPANY  IN  THE  SECOND  FILE 
C=  READ  INTO  A 
t: 
DO  50  IC=1,15 
DO  42  I=1  ,  108 
42  READ(1,101)B(I) 308 
42  REAO(1,101)B(I) 
C 
C  EXTRACT  30  LONG  SEGMENTS  AND  PASS  TO  NAG 
r.  $  DO  43  IS=1  ,:  9 
I0FF=IS-1 
DO  44  I=1,3© 
X(I)=A(IOFF+I) 
44  Y(I)=B(IOFI-+I) 
DO  THE  REGRESSION  (FIRST  ORDER) 
" 
CALL  G02CAF  (30,  X,  Y,  RE  S,  IF  ) 
BUF=BL1< 
IX=I+INT(((RES(6)"}3)/7)ßr80) 
BUF(IX:  IX)='*' 
BEES(IS)=RES(6) 
WRITE(6,1g2)  IC,  BUI= 
43  CONTINUE 
CALL  G02CAI=  (79,71  MI_,  KIEES,  RES.  I1=  ) 
WRITE(6,103)  IC,  FES(b),  RI:  s(S),  I:  E:  3t1dý,  I;  ESii3),  I:  CS(  ).  ý1=Stay 
$a  CONTINUE 
1  01  FORMAT  (1  0X.  r  700  ) 
gý  FORMAT(*'  CQMF".  IS,  ý'  B  F'LOT  :  ''  a10ß  ) 
103  FORMTAT(`  COMF'`,  IS,  '  ST  sERR',  F10.5,  '  T=  ,  6F10.  x) 
STOP 
ENIi 309 
APPENDIX 
_VII 
(E) 
DATA  BASE  AND  EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN  -A  SUMMARY 
Times  1000  top  UK  Industrial  Companies 
1000  companies 
ranked  by  turnover  for  the  year  1981/82 
Select  first  500  only  500  " 
Financial  Year  End  31  December,  and  101 
exports  greater  than  10%  of  turnover 
Continuous  listing  on  the  London  Stock  47 
Exchange  for  109  months  :  6/73  -  6/82 
No  change  in  segmental  (geographical)  disclosure 
practice  during  109  months  :  6/73  -  6/82;  OR  36 
changed  disclosure  practice  on  31  December  1977 
Collect  FTA  500  monthly  Collect  Company  Stock  Prices  at  the 
stock  price  index  at  the  beginning  of  each  month  (source:  DATA 
beginning  of  the  month  STREAM).  Adjust  for  Dividends  and 
(Source  :  DATA  STREAM)  capitalization  issues  (source:  Company 
1  -7 
Reports  &  EXTEL) 
Lonpute  rrlce  Kelatives  Lompute  trice  tteiatlvee  Tor 
for  Index  individual  companies 
1 
Regress  company  price  relatives  with  FTA 
L 
500  Index  price  relatives. 
(30  item  moving  regression  to  be  able  to  derive 
.  `.  a  time  series  of  slope) 
Check  Disclosure  Practice, 
Data  for  err  ories 
(Corm  anv  Reports.  and  EXTEL  cards) 
No  change  in  Disclosure  Change  in  Disclosure  practice,  12/17, 
practice  for  the  nine  from  non  disclosure  to  disclosure 
year  period  : 
CONTROL  GROUP  TREATMENT  GROUP 
(15  co  anies)  (21  co  anies) 
A  ONT  NUOUS  TIME  SERIES] 
INTERRUPTED  M  SERIE 
TEST  FOR  SIGNIFICANCE 
NN 
IN  SLOPE,  AND  LOCATE  THE  APPROXIMATE 
TIME  OF  CHANGE  TO  TEST  THE  INFLUENCE 
OF  CHANGES  IN  DISCLOSURE  PRACTICE 310 
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8.0  Introduction 
Chapter  VII  has  been  concerned  with  hypotheses,  database, 
and  experimental  design.  In  chapter  VIII  analyses  will 
be  performed  using  the  database  and  experimental  design 
explained  in  chapter  VII  to  test  the  two  hypotheses  of 
this  thesis:  (i)  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
affects  systematic  risk;  and  (ii)  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  results  in  a  lower  systematic  risk  than  would 
have  been  the  case  without  such  segmental  geographical 
disclosure.  This  chapter  proceeds  as  follows: 
1.  First,  individual  company  moving  betas  will  be  computed 
using  the  fortran  programme  earlier  cited  (section  7.334, 
and  appendix  VII(D)).  These  moving  betas  will  be  used 
to  perform  cross  sectional  as  well  as  time  series  analyses. 
2.  Moving  betas  will  be  examined  using  nonparametric  as  well 
as  parametric  tests.  First  nonparametric  tests  will  be 
performed  to  see  if  the  treatment  group  and  the  control 
group  belong  to  the  same  population,  assuming  no  under- 
lying  distribution  of  the  moving  betas. 
3.  Parametric  tests  will  then  be  formed  to  examine 
(i) 
independence  (ii)  stability  and  (iii)  the  impact  of  inter- 
vention  on  the  treatment  and  control  group  betas. 
4.  The  time  series  will  be  redefined  for  intervention  analysis 
purposes,  and  the  two  hypotheses  of  this  thesis  will  be 
examined  in  the  light  of  intervention  analysis. 
5.  Having  tested  the  hypotheses,  a  duration-onset  analysis 
will  be  performed  on  the  beta  changes  in  response  to 
intervention  to 
_see 
if  the  duration  is  permanent  or 314 
or  temporary,  and  whether  the  onset  is  abrupt  or  gradual. 
6.  Finally,  impact  of  possible  confounding  variables  will  be 
tested  in  an  attempt  to  improve  the  external  validity  of 
our  results. 
First,  the  moving  betas. 
8.1  Moving  Betas 
One  of  the  objectives  of  this  research  is  to  examine  the 
degree  of  association,  if  any,  between  changes  in  dis- 
closure  practices  and  the  systematic  risk  profiles  of  UK 
based  multinationals.  To  be  able  to  examine  systematic 
risk,  over  time,  a  time  series  of  betas  needs  to  be 
generated.  Using  the  database  described  in  section  7.2, 
and  methods  described  in  section  7.334,  moving  betas 
were  first  generated  for  treatment  group  companies 
listed  in  appendix  VII(B),  and  control  group  companies 
listed  in  appendix  VII(C).  These  moving  beta  pro- 
cedure  resulted  in  seventy-nine  data  points  for  each  of 
the  companies  in  the  treatment  group  and  the  control 
group.  Table  8.1  shows  the  moving  betas  for  the 
treatment  group  companies,  and  table  8.2  shows  the 
moving  betas  for  control  group  companies.  In  the 
generation  of  these  moving  betas,  the  fortran  programme 
listed  in  appendix  VII(D)  has  been  used. 315 
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8.2  Testing  for  Differences  in  Moving  Betas 
There  are  two  ways  in  which  differences  in  betas  can  be 
tested:  (i)  assuming  the  underlying  distributions  of 
betas  are  known,  and  is  normal;  and  (ii)  assuming  that 
the  underlying  distribution  is  not  known.  In  the  first 
case  normal  distribution  tests  will  be  appropriate.  If 
the  underlying  distribution  is  not  known  and  no  under- 
lying  distribution  is  assumed  then  'distribution  free', 
non-parametric  tests  will  be  appropriate  (Siegel,  1956). 
For  non-parametric  testing,  we  shall  use  Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov  two  sample  test,  and  for  parametric  tests  'tI, 
tests  will  be  used.. 
8.21  Nonparametric  Test 
According  to  Siegel  (1956)  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  two- 
sample  test  is  a  test  of  whether  two  independent  samples 
have  been  drawn  from  the  same  population.  The  two- 
tailed  test  is  sensitive  to  any  kind  of  difference  in 
the  distributions  from  which  the  two  samples  were 
drawn  -  differences  in  location  (central  tendency),  in 
dispersion,  in  skewness,  in  kurtosis,  etc. 
The  two  sample  test  is  concerned  with  the  agreement 
between  two  cumulative  distributions.  If  the  two 
samples  have  in  fact  been  drawn  from  the  same  population 
distribution,  then  the  cumulative  distributions  of  both 
samples  may  be  expected  to  be  fairly  close  to  each 
other,  in  as  much  as  they  both  should  show  only  random 
deviations  from  the  population  distribution.  If  the 319 
two  sample  cumulative  distributions  are  too  far  apart  at 
any  point,  this  suggests  that  the  samples  come  from 
different  populations.  Thus,  a  large  enough  deviation 
between  the  two  sample  cumulative  distributions  is 
evidence  for  rejecting  Ho. 
Moving  betas  for  treatment  group  companies  have  been 
averaged  across  companies  over  time,  and  are  shown  in 
table  8.1.  Similarly,  moving  betas  for  control  group 
companies  have  been  averaged  across  companies  and  have 
been  shown  in  table  8.2. 
Cumulative  frequency  percentages  of  these  average  betas 
across  companies  over  time  have  been  compared  between 
treatment  and  control  groups  in  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test 
as  shown  in  table  8.3. 
Results  show  that  the  differences  between  treatment  and 
control  group  betas  are  significant  at  the  5,  %  level. 
Figure  8.1  shows  the  cumulative  frequencies  for  treatment 
and  control  group  moving  betas  used  in  Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
two  sample  test. 320 
Table  8.3 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Two  Sample  Test 
Beta  values'  Treatment  group  Control  group  Treatment-Control 
class  intervals 
cumulative 
% 
cumulative 
f  %  BT  -  BC  frequency  requency 
(F0  (X))  (SN  (X))  (D) 
.  80  -  . 
84  10  15  -5 
.  85  -  .  89  35  58  -23 
.  90  -  .  94  61  81  -20 
.  95  -  .  99  84  89  -5 
1.00  -  1.04  89  99  -10 
1.05  -  1.09  90  100  -10 
1.10  -  1.14  91  100  -9 
1.15  -  1.19  95  100  -5 
1.20  -  1.24  100  100  0 
D=  maximum  [F0(X) 
-  SN(X)]  =  35-58  =  23%  or  . 
23 
Critical  value  of  0  at  5%  level  of  significance  for  large  samples 
is  given  by:  - 
1.36 
[(rul 
+  n2)/nl  n2 
For  nl  =  n2  =  79,  we  get:  - 
1.36  (158/6241)1  =  .  216; 
Our  observed  value  of  D  is  .  23;  this  is  in  excess  of  the  critical 
value  of  .  216;  hence  H0  is  rejected,  at  5%  level  of  significance. 
The  differences  between  the  control  and  treatment  group  betas 
are  significant  at  5%  level.  That  is  there  is  95%  chance  that  the 
differences  are  real  and  not  random. 321 
Figure  8.1 
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Since  the  maximum  number  of  observations  in  the  moving 
beta  is  seventynine,  the  maximum  value  in  less  than 
cumulative  frequencies  is  also  seventynine. 
D=  maximum  F0(X)  -  SN(X)  =  18/79  a  .  23,  appears  at 
beta  value  . 
87,  the  mid  point  of  the  class  interval 
.  85  -  . 
89,  corresponding  to  table  8.3. 322 
8.22  Parametric  Tests 
Parametric  tests  are  tests  which  assume  that  the  under- 
lying  distribution  of  the  data  being  examined  are 
known.  The  assumed  distributions  are  usually,  though 
not  always,  normal. 
In  the  following  sections  three  different  parametric 
tests  will  be  performed:  (i)  autocorrelation  test, 
to  test  the  independence  of  successive  moving  betas; 
(ii)  student's  It'  test  for  testing  the  stability  of 
moving  betas  over  time;  and  (iii)  tests  to  ascertain 
the  influence  of  the  intervention  variable 
(change  in 
disclosure  practice),  on  systematic  risk  by  comparing 
the  pre-intervention  betas  and  the  post-intervention 
betas  between  the  treatment  and  control  groups. 
The  purpose  of  the  first  two  tests:  the  serial 
correlation  test  and  testing  for  the  stability  of  beta 
over  time  is  to  justify  the  use  of  intervention  analysis 
mentioned  in  section  7.333"  It  has  earlier  been  stated 
in  section  7.31  that  the  cumulative  average  residual 
method  assumes  (a)  independence  of  successive  betas, 
and  (ii)  stability  of  betas  over  time.  If  our  first 
two  tests  show  that  successive  betas  are  not  in- 
dependent,  and  that  such  betas  are  not  stable,  then  it 
will  be  appropriate  for  us  not  to  use  cumulative 
average  residual  method.  The  use  of  interrupted  time 
series,  and  intervention  analysis  will  be  justified. 323 
8.221  Testing  for  Independence 
Intervention  analysis  of  the  type  described  in  section 
7.333  is  justified  in  preference  to  the  cumulative 
average  residual  analysis,  if,  among  others,  successive 
observations  in  the  time  series  are  random;  i.  e.,  their 
serial  correlation,  or  autocorrelation  function  (ACF)  is 
not  significantly  different  from  zero.  (Sunder,  1973, 
P-36). 
A  stationary  stochastic  process  is  fully  determined  by 
the  mean,  the  variance,  and  the  autocorrelation  function 
(ACF).  If  two  processes  have  the  same  mean,  variance 
and  ACF,  then  they  are  the  same  process.  The  auto- 
correlation  function  displays  the  autocorrelation 
structure  of  a  series  Z  up  to  a  specified  lag,  k.  The 
k  th  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  measures  the 
extent  to  which  Zt  and  Zt+k  observations  move  together. 
The  k  th  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  is  estimated 
as: 
Ek 
(Zt 
-  Z)  (Zt+k  Z) 
Rk  =  t=1 
z  (1/T) 
Q 
z 
where  Z  is  the  mean  of  the  stationary  series 
2 
Cl  is  the  variance  of  the  stationary  series,  and 
z 
T  is  the  number  of  observations  after  allowing 
for  lag,  i.  e.  (n-k) 
The  range  for  Rk  for  k=1  to  T-k  is  +1 324 
In  more  precise  terms,  for  Zt  time  series  process,  the 
ACF  of  k  th  order  (lag)  is  defined  as 
ACF(k)  =  Covariance  (Zt'  Zt+k)  /  Variance  Zt  ( 
n-k 
The  ACF(k)  is  thus  a  measure  of  correlation  between 
Zt  and  Zt+k. 
As  the  value  of  k  increases,  the  confidence  in  the 
estimate  of  ACF(k)  diminishes. 
Significance  tests  are  often  useful  in  deciding  if  the 
estimated  autocorrelations  are  statistically  significant 
from  zero. 
The  standard  error  (SE)  of  each  Rk  indicates  the  standard 
deviation  of  distribution  with  Rk=O  for  the  sample  size 
(T)  used  to  estimate  Rk 
I 
SE(Rk)  =  ('1/T)f  at  95%  confidence  level  (Foster,  1978, 
p.  85) 
To  test  the  independence  of  successive  moving  betas  in 
the  treatment  group  and  in  the  control  group,  auto- 
correlation  tests  were  performed  for  fifteen  observations 
on  either  side  of  the  intervention  point,  too.  Results 
of  the  autocorrelation  tests  are  shown  in  table  8.4, 
and  the  detailed  computations  are  shown  in  appendix 
VIII(A)  and  VIII(B). 
Results  show  highly  significant  autocorrelation  for 
lags  1,2,  and  3  for  treatment  group,  and  for  lags  1, 
and  2  for  the  control  group.  While  it  is  not  surprising 325 
that  there  will  be  significant  autocorrelation  in  the 
time  series  of  betas  since  (i)  betas  in  successive 
months  are  influenced  by  similar  causal  variables 
(section  5.521),  and  (ii)  there  is  a  built  in  auto- 
correlation  in  the  moving  betas  since  moving  betas 
are  in  effect  a  moving  average  process,  what  is 
revealing  that  the  autocorrelation  coefficients 
were  much  higher  for  the  treatment  groups  than  for 
control  groups.  It  is  possible  that  because  of 
intervention,  i.  e.  change  in  disclosure  practice, 
betas  of  the  treatment  group  companies  were 
significantly  influenced  by  the  common  factor  of 
intervention. 326 
Table  8.4 
Autocorrelation  Testat  Summary 
Maximum 
Treatment  Group  Control  Group  value  at 
Moving  Betas  Moving  Betas  95%  con- 
fidence 
level 
z  .  926  .  826 
2 
v  .  00443  .  00083 
z 
Cov0, 
l  .  1165 
,  o144 
Covo 
0,2  .  1102  ,  oo84 
Cov093  .  0981  -  ,  oo14 
ACF  T=  29  1  .  1165  1  .  0144 
29  .  00443  29  .  00083 
_  .  907  =  .  599  .  1856 
ACF(2)"  T=  28  1  .  1102  1 
.  0084 
28  ,  00443  z8  ,  00083 
,  888  .  361  .  1890 
ACF(3),  T-  27  1  ,  0981  1  -90014 
27  .  00443 
(27). 
00083 
. 
819  -  -.  062  .  1925 
Autocorrelations  are  significant  at  95%  confidence  level 
for  treatment  group  betas  for  lags  1,2,  and  3;  and  for 
control  group  betas  for  lag  1,  and  lag  2. 327 
8.222  Testing  for  Stability 
To  test  the  stability  of  moving  betas  for  individual 
companies  in  the  treatment  group  and  in  the  control 
group,  over  the  nine  year  period,  as  listed  in  tables 
8.1  and  8.2,  a  slope  or  beta  of  moving  regression  betas 
was  computed  for  each  company,  the  hypothesis  being  that 
if  the  slope  remains  constant  over  time,  then  the  beta 
of  betas  will  be  zero.  Any  significant  deviation  from 
zero  will  be  a  sign  of  instability  of  betas  at  the 
company  level. 
Appendix  VIII(C)  shows  the  beta  of  betas,  their  standards 
errors,  and  It'  values  for  regression  for  each  company. 
Applying  a  95%  confidence  level  test,  with  degrees  of 
freedom,  (n-2)  =  77,  column  (D)  in  appendix  VIII(C)  shows 
the  accept-reject  results  of  the  analyses.  These 
accept-reject  results  are  further  analysed  in  table  8.5 
in  summary  form. 
From  table  8.5  it  can  be  seen  that  betas  at  company 
level  were  highly  unstable,  supporting  Meyers  (1973a), 
and  Sharpe  and  Cooper  (1972)  assertions  that  betas  at 
company  level  are  likely  to  be  unstable.  Of  the 
thirty-six  companies  tested  only  eleven  (i.  e.  31%) 
showed,  at  the  95%  confidence  level,  that  betas  were 
stable,  while  twenty-five  companies  (i.  e.  69%)  showed 
that  betas  were  unstable  at  the  95%  confidence  level. 328 
A  further  characteristic  of  these  moving  betas  which 
can  be  observed  from  table  8.5  is  that  treatment 
group  betas  were  relatively  more  unstable  than  control 
group  betas  at  the  company  level.  Control  group 
companies  are  those  which  have  not  changed  their 
disclosure  practice,  while  treatment  group  companies 
are  those  which  have  changed  their  segmental  dis- 
closure  practice  during  the  period  of  investigation. 
It  is  possible  to  surmise  therefore  that  there  might 
be  associations  between  disclosure  practice  and 
systematic  risk  profiles  of  companies,  betas  being 
measures  of  systematic  risk. 329 
Table  8.5 
Stability  of  Betas  at  Company  Levels  Summary 
H:  B=0 
0 
D.  F.  :  79-2  =  77;  't'  test  at  95%  confidence  level, 
Reject  Ho  Accept  H0  Total 
No.  of  No.  of  No.  of 
Companies  %  Companies  %  Companies  % 
Treatment  Group  16  76  5  24  21  100 
Control  Group  9  60  6  40  15  100 
Total  25  69  11  31  36  100 
Of  the  total  sample  of  36  companies,  only  in  the  case 
of  11  companies,  beta  was  seen  to  be  stable  at  95% 
confidence  level.  However,  the  proportion  companies 
with  stable  betas  were  larger  in  control  group 
companies  than  in  the  treatment  group  companies. 
Detailed  analysis  of  company  level  betas  and  't' 
values  for  regression  appears  in  appendix  VIII(C). 
Reject  H  Accept  H  Total 
o  0 
No.  of  No.  of  No.  of 
Companies  %  Companies  %  Companies  % 
Treatment  Group  16  76  5  24  21  100 
Control  Group  9  60  6  40  15  100 
Total  25  69  11  31  36  100 330 
8.223  Testing  for  Impact  of  Intervention 
Parametric  tests  in  sections  8.221  and  8.222  have 
shown  that  moving  betas  in  section  8.1  are  serially 
correlated  and  are  unstable.  Since  cumulative 
average  residual  method  assumes  that  observations 
in  the  series  are  independent  and  stable,  it  will  be 
inappropriate  to  use  cumulative  average  residual 
method  to  test-the  impact  of  change  in  disclosure 
practice  on  systematic  risk.  Intervention  analysis 
of  the  type  described  in  section  7.333  is  a  possible 
alternative. 
Intervention  analysis  will  be  used  to  test  the  two 
hypotheses  of  this  thesis  mentioned  earlier 
(section  7.1). 
The  first  hypothesis  is  that  "segmental  geographical 
disclosure  affects  systematic  risk".  If  this 
hypothesis  is  true,  then  the  following  will  also  be 
true: 
(i)  For  the  treatment  group  companies,  at  the 
aggregate  level,  pre-intervention  period 
average  betas  will  be  significantly  different 
from  post-intervention  period  average  betas. 
(ii)  For  the  control  group  companies,  at  the 
aggregate  level,  pre-intervention  period 
average  betas  will  not  be  significantly 
different  from  post-intervention  period 
average  betas. .  ýI 
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The  second  hypothesis  of  this  thesis  is  that 
"segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  associated  with 
a  lower  systematic  risk".  If  this  second 
hypothesis  is  true  then  the  following  will 
also  be  true: 
(iii)  For  the  pre-intervention  period,  (when 
disclosure  practices  for  the  treatment 
group  are  different  from  the  control  group), 
at  the  aggregate  level,  average  betas  for 
the  treatment  group  will  be  significantly 
larger  than  the  average  betas  for  the 
control  group. 
(iv)  For  the  post-intervention  period,  (when 
disclosure  practices  for  the  treatment 
group  are  not  different  from  the  control 
group),  at  the  aggregate  level,  average 
betas  for  the  treatment  group  will  not  be 
significantly  different  from  the  average 
betas  for  the  control  group. 
8.2231  Redefining  the  Timeseries 
To  be  able  to  test  the  impact  of  intervention 
(change  in  disclosure  practice)  on  systematic 
risk,  the  time  series  of  betas  listed  in  tables 
8.1  and  8.2  were  sub-divided  into  five  different 
groups  on  either  side  of  the  intervention  point,  t40 
s 
(December  1977),  for  both  treatment  and  control 
groups  as  followss 332 
A.  t1  -  t39,  pre-intervention  matched  by  t41-t79, 
post-intervention,  with  39  moving  average  betas 
to  encompass  the  whole  series. 
B.  Allowing  for  the  possibility  that  the  impact  of 
intervention  may  be  diluted  over  time,  to  test 
the  more  immediate  impact  on  systematic  risk, 
pre-intervention  period  was  defined  as  t21-t4  , 
and  post-intervention  period  as  t41-t60, 
resulting  in  20  observations  on  either  side  of 
the  intervention  point. 
C.  Further,  assuming  that  there  might  be  over- 
reaction  by  the-market  participants  in  the 
immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  intervention 
point,  the  series  (B)  above  was  modified. 
Five  months  on  either  side  of  the  intervention 
point  were  omitted  to  take  into  account  possible 
contamination,  and  the  pre-intervention  period 
was  defined  as  t21-t35,  whilst  post-intervention 
period  was  defined  as  t46-t6o.  This  resulted  in 
15  observations  on  either  side  of  the  intervention 
point. 
D.  To  examine  the  longer  term  impact  of  intervention, 
15  observations  immediately  before  the  inter- 
vention,  and  14  observations  immediately  after  the 
intervention  were  omitted,  and  the  series  was 
redefined.  This  resulted  in  tl-t25  as  the  pre- 
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intervention  period  and  t 
55-t  79  as  the  post- 
intervention  period  with  20  observations  in  each. 
E.  Finally,  assuming  no  prior  knowledge  of  imminent 
change  in  disclosure  practice  was  available  to 
market  participants,  and  allowing  for  the  almost 
certain  possibility  that  annual  results  are  likely 
to  be  made  public  a  few  months  after  the  end  of  the 
financial  year,  a  five  months'  lag  was  assumed 
after  the  intervention  point.  Pre-intervention 
period  was  defined  as  t 
21  -t  40,  the  same  as 
series  (B)  above,  but  post-intervention  period  was 
defined  as  t46-t65,  allowing  for  the  lag,  resulting 
in  20  observations  in  both  the  pre  and  the  post- 
intervention  periods. 
Figure  8.2  is  a  schematic  presentation  of  the 
various  pre  and  post-intervention  series  mentioned, 
above. 334 
Figure  8.2 
Redefining  the  Pre  and  Post-intervention  Series 
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(A)  The  whole  series:  t1-t391  t41  t79 
(B)  Immediate  impacts  t21-t40;  t41-t6o 
(C)  Immediate  impact  and  no  contaminations 
t21-t35;  t46-t6o 
(D)  Longer  term  impacts  t1-t25;  t55-t  79 
(E)  Lag  in  publication  of  results$  t21-t401  t46-t6S 335 
Having  defined  the  pre  and  post-intervention  series 
for  testing  purposes,  means  and  standard  deviations  of 
each  of  these  five  series  were  calculated  for  the 
treatment  group  and  control  group  observations.  Table 
8.6  shows  these  means  and  standard  deviations  which  will 
be  used  for  hypotheses  testing  purposes.  . 
Table  8.6 
Treatment  and  Control  Group  Betass  Pre  and  Post-Intervention 
Treatment  Control 
Mean  S.  D.  Mean  S.  D.  N 
A.  t1-39 
.  9421  .  o465  .  8938  .  0377  39 
t41-79 
.  9470  .  1370  .  9030  .  0720 
B.  t21-40 
.  9740  .  0317  .  8770  .  0334  20 
t41-6o 
.  8645  .  0347  .  8585  .  0359 
C.  t21_35 
.  9746  .  0366  .  8600  .  0173  15 
t46-6o 
.  8507  .  0212  .  856o  .  0292 
D.  t1-25 
.  9176  .  0402  .  9120  .  0352  25 
t55-79 
.  9932  01515  .  9244  .  0783 
E.  t21-4o 
.  9740  .  0317  .  8770  .  0334  20 
t46-65 
.  8490  .  0192  .  8566  .  0280 
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8.2232  Hypotheses  Tested 
The  two  hypotheses  of  this  thesis  were  tested  using 
the  means  and  standard  deviations  listed  in  table  8.6 
for  each  of  the  five  series  shown  in  figure  8.2  for 
both  control  group  betas  and  for  treatment  group  betas. 
Results  for  testing  the  first  hypothesis  that  "segmental 
geographical  disclosure  affects  systematic  risk"  are 
shown  in  table  8.7.  An  examination  of  table  8.7, 
"Differences  Between  Average  Betas,  Pre-Post"  reveals 
that: 
(i)  For  the  treatment  group  companies,  at  the  aggregate 
level,  average  betas  were  significantly  different, 
at  95%  confidence  level,  in  the  pre-intervention 
period  when  compared  with  post-intervention  period, 
in  series  B,  C,  D  and  E,  but  not  in  series  A. 
(ii)  For  the  control  group  companies,  at  the  aggregate 
level,  average  betas  were  not  significantly 
different,  at  95%  confidence  level,  in  the  pre- 
intervention  period  when  compared  with  post- 
intervention  period  for  series  As  B,  C,  and  D,  and 
at  98%  confidence  level  for  series  E. 
It  is  possible  to  conclude  that  in  the  study  conducted 
here,  changes  in  geographical  segmental  disclosure 
practices  were  associated  with  changes  in  betas.  The 
lack  of  significance  found  in  series  A  in  treatment  group 
betas  could  be  explained  by  the  possibility  that 
distant  beta  values  are  not  as  affected  by  disclosure 
practice  changes  as  more  immediate  beta  values. 337 
Our  first  hypothesis  appears  to  be  true  in  all  cases 
except  in  series  A  for  the  treatment  group;  i.  e., 
in  9  out  of  10  possible  situations.  Results  for 
testing  the  second  h  othesis  that  "segmental 
geographical  disclosure  results  in  lower  systematic 
risk"  are  shown  in  table  8.8:  "Differences  Between 
Average  Betas,  Treatment-Control.  " 
An  examination  of  table  8.8  reveals  thats 
(i)  For  the  pre-intervention  period,  at  the  aggregate 
level,  average  betas  for  the  treatment  group  were 
significantly  larger  than  control  group  average 
betas  at  95%  confidence  level  in  series  A,  B,  C, 
and  E,  but  not  in  series  D. 
(ii)  For  the  post-intervention  period,  at  the  aggregate 
level,  average  betas  for  the  treatment  group  were 
not  significantly  different  from  the  average  betas 
for  the  control  group;  at  95%  confidence  level,  in 
series  A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E. 
It  appears  therefore  that  in  9  out  of  10  possible  cases, 
our  second  hypothesis  is  true  in  the  investigation 
carried  out  here.  Possible  explanation  for  series  D 
being  out  of  line  lies  in  the  fact  that  series  D 
includes  only  distant  betas;  and  as  is  the  case  with 
the  first  hypothesis,  distant  betas  are  likely  to  be 
less  affected  by  changes  in  disclosure  practice  than 
more  immediate  betas. 338 
Table  8.7 
Differences  Between  Average  Betas,  Pre-Post 
Degrees  of  It'  Values  from 
Series  Calculated*'t'  Values  Freedom  table 
Treatment  Control 
Group  Group  (nl+n2-2)  5iö  2% 
A  .  2115  .  7072  76  1.99  2.36 
B  7.8646  1.6849  38  2.02  2.42 
C  11.3462  .  4566  28  2.04  2.46 
D  2.4115  .  7281  48  2.01  2.40 
E  8.1539  2.0400  38  2.02  2.42 
Detailed  calculations  for  't'  values,  'pre-post' 
appear  in  Appendi  x  VIII(D) 
(i)  For  the  treatment  group,  calculated  It'  values 
are  significant  at  5%  level  for  series  B,  C,  D, 
and  E,  but  not  for  series  A. 
(ii)  For  the  control  group,  calculated  't'  values  ar  e 
not  significant  at  5%  level  for  series  A,  B,  C, 
and  D.  Calcul  ated  't'  values  for  series  E  is 
not  significant  at  2%  level. 339 
Table  8.8 
Differences  Between  Average  Betas,  Treatment-Control 
Series  Calculated*It'  Values  Degrees  of  It'  values 
Freedom  from  table 
Pre-  Post- 
intervention  interven- 
tion 
(n  +n  -2)  12 
5%  2% 
A  5.0418  1.7756  76  1.99  2.36 
B  9.4175  "5376  38  2.02  2.42 
C  10.9560  -.  5693  28  2.04  2.46 
D  .  5234  2.0170  48  2.01  2.40 
E  9.4175  -1.0026  38  2.02  2.42 
Detailed  calculations  for  It'  values,  'treatment- 
controls  appears  in  Appendix  VIII(E). 
(i)  For  the  pre-intervention  period,  calculated 
t'  values  are  significant  at  5%  level  for 
series  A.  B,  C,  and  E,  but  not  for  series  D. 
(ii)  For  the  post-intervention  period,  calculated 
It'  values  are  not  significant  at  5%  level 
for  series  A,  B,  C,  D.  and  E. 340 
8.3  Duration-Onset  Analysis 
In  section  8.21,  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  has  shown 
that  there  are  likely  to  be  real  differences  between 
treatment  and  control  group  betas. 
Non  parametric  test  (section  8.21)  has  shown  that 
differences  in  betas  between  the  treatment  and  control 
group  are  unlikely  to  be  due  to  chance.  Parametric 
tests  have  been  used  to  test  the  two  hypotheses  of  the 
thesis:  (i)  that  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
affects  systematic  risk;  and  (ii)  that  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  results  in  lower  systematic 
risk. 
Analysis  of  results  from  It'  tests(section  8.223)  show 
that  our  two  hypotheses  are  supported.  Having 
concluded  that  it  is  likely  that  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  affects  systematic  risk,  and  that  such 
systematic  risk  is  likely  to  be  lower  as  a  consequence 
of  improved  segmental  geographical  disclosure,  our  next 
step  is  to  establish  (i)  whether  this  apparent  systematic 
risk  reduction  benefit  from  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  is  of  a  temporary  or  of  a  permanent  nature; 
and  (ii)  whether  the  onset  of  this  apparent  systematic 
risk  reduction  benefit  is  an  abrupt  or  a  gradual  one. 
A  framework  for  this  duration-onset  analysis  has  been 
mapped  earlier  in  chapter  VII  (figure  7.3).  To  be 
able  to  test  the  duration  and  onset  of  changes  in 
systematic  risk  profiles  of  treatment  group  companies 
as  compared  with  the  control  group  companies,  beta 341 
differences  between  the  treatment  and  control  group 
averages  were  computed  (Appendix  VIII(F))9  and 
examined  (figure  8.3). 
An  examination  of  figure  8.3  in  the  light  of  figure 
7.3  shows  (i)  that  the  onset  of  the  change  in  beta  is 
somewhat  abrupt  rather  than  gradual;  that  market 
participants  are  likely  to  have  been  taken  by  surprise, 
or  that  there  is  new  information  content  in  segmental 
geographical  data,  as  shown  in  change  in  beta 
differences  at  around  t45  in  figure  8.3; 
(ii)  further  that  this  information  is  not  anticipated, 
and  that  there  is  a  lag  of  around  5  months  after  the 
end  of  the  financial  year,  resulting  in  a  shift  of  the 
intervention  point  from  t40  to  t45.; 
(iii)  that  the  duration  of  this  apparent  benefit  in  the 
form  of  reduction  in  systematic  risk  is  of  a  semi- 
permanent  nature,  lasting  for  about  25  months  after 
the  intervention.  After  about  t70  betas  seem  to 
drift  away.  Earlier  results  from  It'  test 
(section  8.223)  have  also  confirmed  this  trend  in 
series  A  and  in  series  D  (figure  8.2).  A  possible 
explanation  of  this  behaviour  of  betas  in  response 
to  intervention  could  be  that  once  the  continuity  of 
finer  information  disclosure  has  been  established, 
there  is  no  more  new  information  content  in  such 
disclosure.  As  time  passes,  other  factors  tend  to  dominate. 
Further  research  is,  however,  necessary  to  explain  fully  the 
subsequent  drift  in  betas  observed. 342 
Fip_,  ure  8.3 
Differences  Between  Treatment  and  Control  Group  Betas 
Over  Time 
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(i)  The  impact  of  intervention  appears  to  have  a  lag  of 
approximately  five  months; 
(ii)  The  impact  of  intervention  appears  to  last  about 
25  months; 
(iii)  The  treatment  group  average  betas  are  noticeably 
greater  than  control  group  betas  in  the  pre- 
intervention  period,  but  not  in  the  post- 
intervention  period. 343 
8.4  Testing  for  Confounding  Variables 
Analyses  in  earlier  sections  in  this  chapter  have  shown 
that  beta  changes  and  geographical  segmental  disclosure 
practices  are  associated.  To  minimize  the  possibility 
that  such  associations  are  influenced  by  extraneous 
factors,  further  tests  were  carried  out  to  examine 
associations  between  systematic  risk  and  possible 
confounding  variables. 
Although  it  is  never  possible  to  test  for  all  possible 
confounding  variables,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  test 
the  association  between  beta  and  some  commonly  cited 
instrumental  variables  in  our  samples.  If  it  can  be 
shown  that  such  instrumental  variables  were  not 
associated  with  beta  changes  for  the  sample  companies 
during  the  period  of  current  investigation,  the 
reliability  of  a  claim  that  beta  changes  are  associated 
with  changes  in  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
practices  is  likely  to  be  improved. 
Evidence  exists  in  the  literature  that  some  accounting 
variables  are  good  proxies  for  instrumental  variables 
influencing  beta  changes  (Beaver,  Kettler  and  Scholes, 
1970;  Hamada,  1972;  Foster,  1975;  and  others).  A 
summary  of  some  of  the  major  investigations  testing  the 
association  between  systematic  risk  and  various  account. 
ing  variables  cited  in  the  literature  appears  in 
Appendix  VIII(G).  A  closer  examination  of  these 
variables  show  that  there  are  two  important  groups  of 
accounting  variables  which  are  seen  to  be  associated 344 
with  systematic  risk.  These  are  (i)  rates  of  return  on 
equity  and  (ii)  financial  leverage. 
Accordingly,  associations  between  these  two  accounting 
variables  and  systematic  risk  were  tested  for  each  of 
the  companies  in  the  treatment  group  and  in  the  control 
group  for  pre-intervention  and  post-intervention  periods. 
Following  steps  were  taken  to  perform  this  analysis  of 
association  between  systematic  risk  and  the  two 
accounting  variables: 
(a)  For  each  company  in  the  control  group  and  in 
treatment  group,  financial  leverage  and  rates 
of  return  on  equity  were  computed  from  the 
annual  accounts  and  EXTEL  cards  (section  7.2). 
(b)  Equity  was  defined  as  share  capital  plus  reserves 
plus  deferred  tax  liability. 
(c)  Return  to  equity  holders  was  defined  as  pretax 
profits  available  to  ordinary  shareholders. 
(d)  Rates  of  return  on  equity  was  defined  as  the  ratio 
of  (c)/(b). 
(e)  Debt  was  defined  as  long  term  loans  plus  bank 
borrowing. 
(f)  Financial  leverage  was  defined  as  the  ratio  of 
(e)/(b+e). 
(g)  To  allow  for  two  equal  segments  in  the  pre  and  post. 
intervention  regime,  to  minimize  the  impact  of 
possible  contamination,  and  to  give  recognition  to 
the  possibility  that  annual  accounts  are  not  likely 345 
to  be  published  immediately  after  the  financial  year 
end,  data  for  the  year  end  1977  (the  intervention 
point)  were  left  out.  Pre-intervention  period  was 
defined  as  1973-1976  inclusive,  and  post-intervention 
period  was  defined  as  1978-1981  inclusive,  giving  us 
four  years  in  each  segment. 
Table  8.9  shows  the  financial  leverage,  beta,  and  return 
on  equity  for  each  of  the  companies  in  the  treatment 
group  and  in  the  control  group  for  pre-intervention 
period  average  and  post-intervention  period  average. 
Linear  regression  analysis  was  then  performed  between:  r 
(i)  average  beta  and  average  financial  leverage  for 
pre-post  values; 
(ii)  average  beta  and  average  rates  of  return  on  equity 
for  pre-post  values. 
Table  8.10  shows  the  regression  results,  It'  values  and 
tests  of  significance.  It  can  be  seen  from  table  8.10 
that  associations  between  beta  and  rates  of  return  on 
equity  were  not  significant  at  95%  confidence  level 
either  for  the  treatment  group  or  for'  the  control  group; 
associations  between  beta  and  financial  leverage  for  the 
control  group  was  not  significant  at  95%  confidence 
level,  but  was  significant  at  95%  for  the  treatment 
group.  At  99%  confidence  level  association  between 
financial  leverage  and  beta  for  the  treatment  group  was 
not  significant. 346 
For  the  control  group,  the  It'  values  from  statistical 
tables,  for  degrees  of  freedom,  n-2=13,  at  95%  con- 
fidence  level  is  2.17.  Our  calculated  't'  values  are 
.  70  for  financial  leverage  and  1.36  for  rates  :  of  return 
on  equity,  both  of  which  are  smaller  than  the  value 
indicated  by  the  statistical  table  value.  Hence  it  is 
concluded  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  beta  changes  at 
the  company  level  were  influenced  significantly  by 
changes  in  the  financial  leverage  or  by  changes  in  the 
rates  of  return  on  equity  during  the  period  of  invest- 
igation. 
For  the  treatment  group,  the  It'  values  from  statistical 
tables,  for  degrees  of  freedom,  n-2=19,  at  95%  confidence 
level  is  2.10;  and  at  99%  confidence  level  is  2.87. 
Calculated  It'  values  are  2.79  for  financial  leverage, 
and  .  58  for  rates  of  return  on  equity.  Hence  for 
financial  leverage,  the  calculated  Its  value  is 
significant  at  95%  confidence  level,  but  not  at  99% 
confidence  level.  For  rates  of  return  on  equity,  the 
calculated  Its  value  is  not  significant  at  95%  con- 
fidence  level.  Hence  it  is  concluded  that  for  the 
treatment  group  beta  changes  and  changes  in  rates  of 
return  are  unlikely  to  be  associated;  but  there  is  a 
small  chance  that  there  may  be  some  association  between 
beta  changes  and  changes  in  financial  leverage,  but  this 
possible  association  is  not  strong. 347 
It  is  concluded,  therefore,  that  at  the  company  level, 
the  confounding  variables  which  we  have  identified 
were  unlikely  to  have  been  responsible  for  changes  in 
betas.  Hence,  our  earlier  findings  (section  8.223) 
relating  changes  in  segmental  disclosure  practice  with 
changes  in  systematic  risk  stands.  We  can  reasonably 
conclude  that  changes  in  geographical  segmental  dis- 
closure  practice  were  associated  with  changes  in 
systematic  risk  of  companies  in  the  treatment  group. 
Changes  in  geographical  segmental  disclosure  are 
likely  to  have  been  associated  with  changes  in  the 
systematic  risk  perceived  by  investors  in  the 
disclosing  companies. 348 
Table  8.9 
Financial  Leveraje.  Beta.  and  %  Return  on  Equity 
Financial  Beta  Return  on 
Companies  e  age  Eu  ty 
Pre  Post 
Pre- 
Post  Pre  Post 
Post 
Pre  Post 
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Table  8.10 
Regression  Analysis  and  Tests  of  Significance  for 
Confounding  Variables 
(Financial  Leverage,  Beta,  and  %  Return  on  Equity 
at  the  Company  Level 
Treatment  Control 
(Pre-Post 
Groust 
(Pre-Pp 
Degrees  of  Freedom:  n-2  19  13 
Financial  Leverage  (x): 
.  0633  .  0870 
ax  .  1122  .  0828 
Beta  (y): 
.  0000  -.  0110 
ay  .  2850  .  2318 
%  Return  on  Equity  (z):  z 
.  0850  .  0700 
vz  .  1130  .  o846 
Cov  .  0172  .  0036 
xy 
Cov  .  0035  .  0069 
yz 
=  Coy  /  ax.  ay  r1=  rx  "5392  .  1899 
y 
/  cty.  Qz  r2=  r 
z= 
Cov  .  1087  .  3534 
yz  y 
t1=rl(n-2)k  /  (1-ri)k  Z.  79**  .  70* 
t2=r2(n-2)1  /  (1-r2 
.  58*  1.36* 
It'  Values  from  tables  at  5%  2.10  2.17 
2%  2.54  2.66 
1%  2.87  3.03 
Not  significant  at  5%  level 
**  Not  significant  at  1%  level 350 
8.5  Summary 
Chapter  VIII  has  been  concerned  with  the  analysis  of 
data  using  the  database  and  research  design  explained, 
and  hypotheses  stated  in  chapter  VII.  The  objective 
of  this  chapter  has  been  to  test  the  two  hypotheses  in 
the  context  of  intervention.  These  two  hypotheses  are 
(i)  segmental  geographical  disclosure  affects  systematic 
risk;  and  (ii)  segmental  geographical  disclosure  ie 
associated  with  a  lower  systematic  risk  on  average. 
To  test  these  two  hypotheses,  two  series  of  moving  betas 
have  been  generated  using  moving  regression  method 
explained  in  chapter  VII.  Nonparametric  Kolnnogorov- 
Smirnov  two  sample  test  has  first  been  applied  which  has 
shown  that  there  are  real  differences  between  the  average 
means  of  the  control  and  the  treatment  groups.  Para- 
metric  tests  have  been  applied:  first  tests  of  in- 
dependence  of  successive  betas,  then  stability  tests. 
Results  showed  significant  autocorrelation  up  to  three 
lags,  and  that  betas  at  the  company  level  were  highly 
unstable.  Since  cumulative  average  residual  method 
assumes  independence  and  stability  of  individual  betas, 
cumulative  average  residual  method  was  not  pursued, 
intervention  analysis  was  used  instead,  to  test  the 
hypotheses.  Applying  intervention  analysis  it  was 
shown  that  both  the  hypotheses  of  our  thesis  are  likely 
to  be  true  at  95%  significance  level. 
Duration-onset  analysis  was  then  applied  to  the  beta 351 
changes  to  examine  if  the  duration  of  the  supposed 
benefit  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure  was 
permanent  or  temporary,  and  whether  the  onset  was 
abrupt  or  gradual.  It  was  concluded  that  the 
duration  was  semi-permanent,  and  the  onset  was  abrupt. 
Finally,  influences  of  possible  confounding  factors 
were  tested.  Financial  leverage  and  rates  of  return 
on  equity  were  identified  as  the  two  likely  confounding 
factors,  and  their  influences  on  beta  changes  were 
tested  using  correlation  tests.  Results  showed  no 
significant  correlation  between  beta  changes  and 
changes  in  the  values  of  these  two  possible  confounding 
variables. 
It  is  concluded  therefore  that  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  and  beta  are  significantly  associated. 
Internal  validity  of  our  tests  have  been  maintained  by 
using  both  non-parametric  and  parametric  tests. 
Possible  confounding  variables  have  been  tested  to 
improve  external  validity.  In  chapter  1X  implications 
of  our  results  will  be  explored. 352 
Appendix  VIII(A) 
Aitocorrelation  Test  :  Treatment  Group  Moving  Betts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
cov  01 
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cov  02 
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.  99  6.4  5.4  7.4  6.4  34.56  47.36  40.96 
5 
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9  .  98  5.4  4.4  3.4  5.4  23.76  18.36  29.16 
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.  82  -  10.6  -  6.6  -  6.6  -  6.6  69.96  69.96  69.96 
50  .  81  -  11.6  -  10.6  -  6.6  -  6.6  122.96  76.56  76.56 
1 
.  82  -  10.6  -  11.6  -  10.6  -  6.6  122.96  112.36  69.96 
2 
.  83  -  9.6  -  10.6  -  11.6  -  10.6  101.76  111.36  101.76 
3 
.  86  -  6.6  -  9.6  -  10.6  -  11.6  63.36  69.96  76.56 
4  .  87  -  5.6  -  6.6  -  9.6  -  10.6  36.96  53.76  59.36 
5  .  88  -  4.6  -  5.6  -  6.6  -  9.6  25.76  30.36  44.16 
.  1165  .  1102  .  0981 
=  .  926 
Q2  =  .  00443 353 
Appendix  VIII(B) 
Aitocarrelation  Test  Control  Group  Moving  Betas 
coy  01  coy  02  coy  03 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (3  x  4)  (3  x  5)  (3  x  6) 
t  t  t  -Z  tz+1  t2+2Z  tZ+3-Z  lag  I  lag  2  lag  3 
Z  2 
10-2  10-2  10-2  x10-2  X10-4  x10-4  x10-4  X  x  x 
26  .  87  0.8 
7  .  85  -  1.2  0.8  -  .  96 
8  .  86  -  0.2  -  1.2  0.8  .  24  -  .  16 
9  .  86  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  0.8  .  04  .  24  -  .  16 
30  .  85  -  1.2  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  .  24  .  24  1.44 
1  .  85  -  1.2  -  1.2  -  0.2  -  0.2  1.44  .  24  .  24 
2  .  85  -  1.2  -  1.2  -  1.2  -  0.2  1.44  1.44  .  24 
3  86  -  0.2  -  1.2  -  1.2  -  1.2  .  24  .  24  .  24 
4  .  86  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  -  1.2  .  04  .  24  .  24 
5  .  86  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  .  04  .  04  .  24 
6  .  87  0.8  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  0.2  -  .  16  -  . 
16  -  . 
16 
7  .  87  0.8  0.8  -  0.2  -  0.2  .  64  -  .  16  -  .  16 
8  .  88  1.8  0.8  0.8  -  0.2  1.44  1.44  -  .  36 
9  .  87  0.8  1.8  0.8  0.8  1.44  .  64  .  64 
40  .  85  -  1.2  0.8  1.8  0.8  -  .  96  -  2.16  -  .  96 
1  .  81  -  5.2  -  1.2  0.8  1.8  6.24  -  4.16  -  9.36 
2  .  84  -  2.2  -  5.2  -  1.2  0.8  11.44  2.64  -  1.76 
3  .  83  -  3.2  -  2.2  -  5.2  -  1.2  7.04  16.64  3.84 
4  .  93  6.8  -  3.2  -  2.2  -  5.2  -  21.76  -  14.96  -  35.36 
5  .  92  5.8  6.8  -  3.2  -  2.2  39.44  -  18.56  -  12.76 
6  .  92  5.8  5.8  6.8  -  3.2  33.64  39.44  -  18.56 
7  .  91  4.8  5.8  5.8  6.8  27.84  27.84  32.64 
8  .  89  2.8  4.8  5.8  5.8  13.44  16.24  16.24 
9  .  86  -  0.2  2.8  4.8  5.8  -  .  56  -  .  96  -  2.90 
50  .  85  -  1.2  -  0.2  2.8  4.8  . 
24  -  3.36  -  5.76 
1  .  86  -  0.2  -  1.2  -  0.2  2.8  .  24  .  04  -  .  56 
2  .  82  -  4.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  -  0.2  .  84  5.04  .  84 
3  .  83  -  3.2  -  4.2  -  0.2  -  1.2  13.44  .  64  3.84 
4  .  85  -  1.2  -  3.2  -  4.2  -  0.2  3.84  5.04  .  24 
5  .  83  -  3.2  -  1.2  -  3.2  -  4.2  3.84  10.24  13.44 
Z=  .  862  .  0144  .  0084  -  .  0014 
Q2  =  .  0083 354 
APPENDIX  VIII(C) 
Company  Analyses  of  Stability  of  Betas  (H  iB=  0) 
0 
Company  Beta  of  30 
item  moving 
regression; 
tl-t? 
9 
Standard 
error 
of  (A) 
1t'  values 
for 
regression 
(A)  /  (B) 
Accept/Reject  H 
at  95%  confi-  ° 
dence  level; 
D.  F  77 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Treatment 
Group 
T1  -  .  01597 
.  00118  13.538  reject 
T2  -  .  01271 
.  00101  12.533  reject 
T3  -  .  00107 
.  00151  0.707  accept 
T4 
.  00133 
.  00131  1.013  accept 
T5 
.  00636 
.  00087  7.282  reject 
T6 
.  00575  .  00122  4.702  reject 
T7  -  .  00003 
.  00095  0.035  accept 
T8  -  .  00776 
.  00063  12.311  reject 
T9 
.  00392 
.  00064  6.138  reject 
T  10 
.  00140 
.  00094  1.487  accept 
T  11 
.  00354  .  00059  5.999  reject 
T  12 
.  00365 
.  00125  2.928  reject 
T  13 
.  00358  ,  00118  3.031  reject 
T  14 
.  00122 
.  00046  2.662  reject 
T  15 
.  00026 
.  00100  0.265  accept 
T  16 
.  00201 
.  00097  2.063  reject 
T  17  -  .  00534 
.  00092  5.820  reject 
T  18 
.  00912 
.  00075  12.162  reject 
T  19 
.  00394 
.  00098  4.003  reject 
T  20  -  .  00124 
.  00055  2.248  reject 
T  21 
.  01425 
.  00151  9.454  reject 
Control 
Group 
C1 
.  00043 
.  00072  .  594  accept 
C2 
.  00454  .  00085  5.345  reject 
C3 
.  00447 
.  00070  6.365  reject 
C4 
-  .  00191 
.  00113  1.693  accept 
C 
5 
.  00008 
.  00070  0.121  accept 
C5  -  .  00091 
.  00144  . 
634  accept 
C7  -  .  00446  .  00058  7.664  reject 
C8  -  .  00053 
.  00067  . 
804  ccept 
C9  -  .  00918 
.  00084  10.890  reject 
C  10 
.  00858 
.  00078  11.035  reject 
C  11 
.  01014 
.  00062  16.320  reject 
C  12  -  ,  00381 
.  00081  4.686  reject 
C  13  -  .  00399 
.  00095  4.186  reject  C  14 
.  00322 
.  00036  9.028  reject 
C  15 
.  00053 
.  00035  1.519  ccept 
a  "-'  signs  are  ignored  in  It'  values  for  regression  since  we 
are  only  interested  in  the  absolute  values  here. 
ax  It'  values  from  statistical  tables  at  95%  confidence  level 
for  77  degrees  of  freedom  is  2.00. 355 
Appendix  VIII(D) 
Differences  Between  Average  Betas:  'Pre-Post' 
Series  A  B  C  D  E 
N=  n1  =  n2  39  20  15  25  20 
x1  .  9421  .  9470 
.  9746  .  9176  .  9740 
x2  .  9470  .  8645 
.  8507  .  9932  .  8490 
Treatment  s1  .  0465  .  0317  .  0366  .  0402  .  0317 
Group 
s2  .  1370  .  0347  .  0212  .  1515  .  0192 
x1  -  x2  -.  0049  .  0825  .  1239  -  .  0756  .  1250 
s2  1  .  00216  .  00100  .  00134  .  00162  .  00100 
s2  2  .  01877  .  00120  .  00045  .  02295  .  00037 
(s2  +8 
2)/N 
.  0054  .  00011  .  00012  .  00098  .  00024 
[(s2  +  s2)/N]k  .  02317  .  01049  .  01092  .  03135  .  01533 
t*  _  (x1+x2)/[s?  +s2)/N]/  .  2115  7.8646  11.3462  2.4115  8.1539 
x1  .  8938  .  8770  .  8600  .  9120  .  8770 
x2  .  9030  .  8585  .  8560  .  9244  .  8566 
Control  s1  .  0377  .  0344  .  0173  .  0352  .  0334 
Crop 
s2  .  0720  .  0359  .  0292  .  0783  .  0280 
x1  -  x2  -.  0092  .  0185  .  0040  -  .  0124  .  0204 
1 
.  00142  .  00112 
. 
00030  .  00124  .  00112 
s2  2  .  00518  . 
00129 
.  00085  .  00613  . 
00078 
s2  +  s2  /N 
.  00017  .  00012  .  00008  .  00029  .  00010 
[(s2  +  s2  )/N]/ 
.  01301  .  01098  .  00876  .  01703  .  01000 
t_  (x1+x  )/[(s  +s2)/N]ý  .  7072  1.6849  .  4566  .  7281  2.0400  2  l 
x1  =  Preintervention  average  betas 
x2  =  Postintervention  average  betas 
as  in  table  8.6 
s1  =  Standard  deviation  of  x1 
s2  =  Standard  deviation  of  x2 
*  these  't'  values  have  been  used  in  table  8.7  for  significance  tests. 356 
Appendix  VII1(E) 
Differences  Between  Average  Betas:  'Treatment  -  Control' 
Series  A  B  C  E 
N=  n1  =  n2  39  20  15  5  20 
x1  . 
9421 
. 
9470 
.  9476 
.  9176 
. 
9740 
x2  .  8938  .  8770  .  8600  .  9120  .  8770 
Pre- 
s1  .  0465  .  0317 
.  0366  .  0402  .  0317 
Intervention 
s2  .  0377  . 
0344 
.  0173  .  0352  .  0344 
x1  -  x2  .  0463  .  0970  .  1146  .  0056  .  0970 
s2  1  .  00216  .  00100 
.  00134  .  00162  .  00100 
s2  .  00142  .  00112  .  00030  .  00124  .  00112 
(s2  +  s22  )/N 
.  000092  .  000106  .  00010  .  000114  .  000106 
[(s2  +  s2)/N]k  . 
00958 
. 
01030 
.  01046  .  01070 
. 
01030 
t*  =  (x1+x2)/[(s2+s2)/N]/  5.0418  9.4175  10.9560  .  5234  9.4175 
x1  .  9470  .  8645  .  8507  .  9932  .  8490 
x2  .  9030 
. 
8585 
.  8560  .  9244 
. 
8566 
s1  .  1370  .  0347  .  0212  .  1515  .  0192 
Post- 
s2  .  0720  .  0359  .  0292  .  0783  .  0280 
Intervention 
x1  x2  . 
0440 
.  0060  -  . 
0053  .  0688  -  . 
0076 
s2  1  .  01876  .  00120  .  00045  .  02295  .  00037 
s2  2  .  00518  .  00129  .  00085  .  00613  .  00078 
(s2  +  S2  )/N 
.  00614  .  000125  .  00006  .  001163  .  000058 
[(s2  +  s2)/N]k  .  02478  .  01116  .  00931  .  03411  .  00758 
t*  =  (x1+x2)/[s?  +s2)/Nl/  1.7756  .  5376  -  .  5693  .  0170  -1.0026 
x1  =  Treatment  group  average  betas 
x2  _  Control  group  average  betas  As  in  table  8.6 
s1  =  Standard  deviation  of  x1 
82=  Standard  deviation  of  x2 
*  these  't'  values  have  been  used  in  table  8.8  for  significance  tests. 357 
APPENDIX  VIII(F) 
Differences  Between  Crosasectional  Average  Betas 
(BTt  Treatment  Group  Average;  BC  e  Control  Group  Average 
t  BT  Bc  BT  BC  t  BT  Bc  BT  BC 
1  . 
85 
. 
89  -.  04  41  90  . 
81 
.  09 
2  . 
86 
. 
89  -.  03  42  .  96  .  84  .  12 
3  .  86  .  89  -..  03  43  .  91  .  83  .  08 
4  .  86  .  89  -.  03  44  .  90  .  93  -.  03 
5  .  86 
.  89  -.  03  45  .  86  .  92  -.  06 
6  .  86  .  89  -.  03  46  .  86  .  92  -.  06 
7  .  94  .  97  -.  03  47  .  86  .  91  -.  05 
8  .  93  .  95  -.  02  48  .  86  .  89  -.  03 
9  .  92  .  95  -.  03  49  .  82  .  86  -.  04 
10  .  93  .  95  -.  02  50  .  81  .  85  -.  04 
11  .  94  .  95  -.  01  51  .  82  .  86  -.  04 
12  .  93  .  93  .  00  52  .  83  .  82  .  01 
13  .  94  .  95  -.  01  53  .  86  .  83  .  03 
14  .  94  .  93  .  01  54  .  87  .  85  .  02 
15  .  94  .  94  .  00  55  .  88  .  83  .  05 
16  .  93  .  92  .  01  56  .  86  .  84  .  02 
17  .  94  .  93  .  01  57  .  86  .  85  .  01 
18  .  93  .  93  .  00  58  .  87  . 
85  .  02 
19  .  94  .  92  .  02  59  .  86  .  85  .  01 
20  .  93  .  91  .  02  60  .  84  .  83  .  01 
21  1.02  .  91  .  11  61 
. 
84 
. 
83  .  01 
22  .  89  .  84  .  05  62  .  85  .  87  -.  02 
23  .  91  .  84  .  07  63  .  83  .  83  .  00 
24  .  93  .  86  .  07  64  .  84  .  87  -"03 
25  .  96  .  88  .  08  65  .  86  .  89  -.  03 
26  .  99  .  87  .  11  66  .  94  .  91  "03 
27  .  98  .  85  .  13  67  .  97  .  92  .  05 
28  1.00  .  86  .  14  68  .  97  .  92  .  05 
29  .  99  .  86  .  13  69  .  97  .  93  "04 
30  1.00  .  85  .  15  70  .  98  .  93  .  05 
31 
.  99  . 
85 
.  14  71  1.12  1.02  .  10 
32  1.00  . 
85 
.  15  72  1.09  1.02  .  07 
33 
.  98  . 
86 
.  12  73  1.16  1.02  . 
14 
34  .  99  .  86  .  13  74  1.17  1.00  .  17 
35 
.  99  . 
86 
.  13  75  1.21  1.00  . 
21 
36  .  98  .  87  .  11  76  1.19  1.01  .  18 
37  .  96  .  87  .  09  77  1.20  1.01  .  19 
38  .  97  .  88  .  09  78  1.23  1.03  .  20 
39  .  98  . 
87 
.  11  79  1.24  1.05  . 
21 
40 
.  97  .  85  .  12 358 
APPENDIX-V773(G) 
Some  Possible  Instrumental  Variables  of  Beta 
Income  v.  Lev  er  Cash  Asset 
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A  ..  1  .  .a  U  1)  In 
Ball  and  Brown  (1967)  x  x 
Beaver,  Kettler  and  Scholes  (1970)  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
petit  and  Westerfield  (1972)  x  x  x 
Ramada  (1972)  x 
Beaver  and  Dukes  (1972)  x 
Rosenberg  and  Mclibbin  1973  x 
Breen  and  Lerner  (1973)  X1 
Gonedes  (1973a) 
x 
Lev  (1974b)  x 
Lev  and  Kunitzky  (1974)  I  x 
Bildersee  (1975)  x  x  x 
Foster  (1975)  x 
Beaver  and  Manegold  (1975)  x 
Gonedes  (1975)  x  X  1  I 
Myers  (1976)  x  x 
Griffin  (1976)  x  x 
Thompson  (1976)  x  x  x  x  x 
Dotan  (1977 
x 
Rufiman  (1978) 
x 
Bowman  (19799  1980)  x  x 359 
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9.0  Introduction 
In  Chapter  VIII  the  hypotheses  of  this  thesis  related  to 
information  content  and  risk  assessment  aspects  of 
geographical  segment  disclosure  have  been  tested  and 
results  obtained.  These  results  have  been  further 
analysed  to  test  the  duration-onset  aspects.  In  this 
chapter  the  results  will  be  restated  and  implications 
for  financial  reporting  will  be  explored. 
Implications  of  the  results  will  be  analysed  as  follows: 
First  the  direct  implications  will  be  analysed.  Direct 
implications  of  the  results  are  related  to  (i)  inform- 
ation  content  of  segmental  geographical  data  and  its 
implications  for  market  efficiency;  and  (ii)  im- 
plications  for  risk  assessment  in  geographically 
diversified  multinational  companies. 
Implications  of  an  indirect  nature  will  be  explored  next. 
Indirect  implications  of  this  research  are  in  the  area  of 
policy  formulation  in  financial  reporting.  Under  the 
heading  of  implications  for  disclosure  policy  voluntary 
and  mandatory  disclosures  will  be  discussed.  Voluntary 
disclosure  will  be  analysed  in  the  context  of  agency 
theory,  agency  costs,  incentive  signalling  and  moral 
hazard  problems. 
Mandatory  disclosure  will  be  discussed  next.  In  this 
context  arguments  for  and  against  regulation  will  be 
explored  in  the  light  of  market  failure  theory  and 
capture  theory.  The  nature  of  nonmarket  failure  will  be 
analysed,  the  problems  in  setting  adequate  disclosure 
standards  in  the  area  of  geographical  segment  dis- 
closure  will  be  analysed,  and  the  possible  contribution  of 
this  research  to  the  issue  of  geographical  segment 
disclosure  will  be  stated. 
First  the  implications  for  market  efficiency. 366 
9.1  Implications  for  Market  Efficiency 
It  has  been  shown  earlier  (section  8.2232)  that  for  the 
treatment  group  of  companies,  companies  which  changed 
their  disclosure  practice  from  nondisclosure  to  dis- 
closure  of  geographical  segment.  information,  at  the 
aggregate  level,  average  pre-intervention  betas  were 
significantly  different  from  post-intervention  betas; 
no  such  differences  were  found  for  the  control  group  of 
companies  which  have  disclosed  geographical  segmetit 
information  before  and  after  the  intervention  point. 
It  has  also  been  shown  that  such  differences  in  betas 
were  not  significantly  influenced  by  confounding  factors 
such  as  changes  in  rates  of  return  on  equity  or  changes 
in  financial  leverage  (section  8.  Z).  The  implication 
of  this  association  between  -geographical  segment  data 
and  changes  in  systematic  risk  is  that  geographical 
segment  data  are  likely  to  have  been  reflected  in 
the  stock  prices  resulting  in  beta  changes  for  the  treat- 
ment  group  of  companies. 
Earlier  in  this  research,.  information  has  been  distinguished 
from  data  and  knowledge  (section  2.2).  Data  are  simply 
facts,  which  are  obtained  through  empirical  observations. 
Knowledge  is  a  group  of  law-like  generalizations  which 
relate  data  to  their  environment;  information  is  the 
resultant  co-ordination  of  data  with  knowledge  when  data 
are  screened,  edited  and  evaluated  for  use  by  a  specific 
user  in  a  given  situation  (Caspari,  1968). 
The  possible  existence  of  information  content  in  geographical 
segment  data,  as  has  been  found  in  the  results  in 
chapter  VIII  implies  that  geographical  segment  data, 
(transmitted  by  companies),  which  are  simply  facts,  are 
likely  to  have  been  related  to  the  geographically  diverse 
environments  of  the  conglomerate  multinationals  by  the 
users  (investors)  for  use  in  a  given  situation  (buy,  sell 
or  hold  decisions),  resulting  in  the  transformation  of 
geographical  segment  data  into  geographical  segment 
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Having  established  that  geographical  segment  data  are 
likely  to  have  information  content,  to  establish  its 
implications  for  market  efficiency  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  the  speed  with  which  such  information  may  have 
been,  impounded  in  the  stock  prices. 
"In  order  to  demonstrate  that  it  serves  shareholders' 
interest  better  that  companies  publish  all  information 
which  contributes  to  the  efficiency  of  the  market  rather 
than  to  withhold  data  which  might  be  beyond  the  under- 
standing  even  of  the  reasonably  informed  investor,  it  is 
necessary  to  take  account  of  the  evidence  in  support  of 
what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  efficient  market  hypo- 
thesis"  (Keane,  1975,  pp"231-232). 
Market  efficiency  is  about  information  processing 
efficiency.  In  a  world  of  perfect  information,  market 
efficiency  is  a  tautology,  and  disclosure  is  redundant. 
In  a  world  of  imperfect  information  where  insiders  can 
use  private  information  for  private  gain  at  the  expense 
of  others,  disclosure  can  be  beneficial  to  the  society  if 
the  costs  of  producing  and  disseminating  additional  in- 
formation  do  not  exceed  the  gross  gain  to  the  society. 
In  the  classical  economic  world  disclosure  is  irrelevant. 
In  the  neoclassical  world  it  is  assumed  that  there  are 
advantages  of  possessing  information.  Disclosure  con- 
sequences  in  the  classical  economic  world  of  perfect 
information,  assuming  managers  as  insiders,  and  all  other 
interested  parties  as  outsiders  can  be  mapped  in  the 
following  manner: 368 
Environment:  Classical  economic  world  of  perfect 
information 
Participants:  (i)  insiders:  managers; 
(ii)  outsiders:  all  other  interest 
groups 
Scenarios  Disclosure  Consequences 
Sl:  No  valuable  inform-  Nothing  to  disclose 
ation 
S2:  All  information  is  Disclosure  is  redundant 
known  to  everyone 
S3:  Market  is  efficient  Disclosure  has  no  impact 
in  the  strong  form; 
(it  can  predict  as 
well  as  it  could  if 
it  possessed  inside 
information) 
In  general  such  arguments  are  false.  "At  its  heart 
is  a  misunderstanding  of  the  efficient  markets  arguments. 
Past  observations  on  prices  and  dividends,  as  well  as  the 
general  financial  and  technical  information  available 
on  a  firm,  do  provide  information  about  the  future; 
they  do  not  provide  all  the  available  information 
but  only  a  portion  of  it.  There  is  nothing  at  all 
"inefficient"  about  a  market  where  more  information  is 
more  informative  about  future  possibilities" 
(Ross,  1979,  p.  179.  ). 
The  duration-onset  analysis 
(section  8.3)  has  shown  that 
the  onset  of  the  beta  changes  in  the  treatment  group  as 
compared  with  the  control  group  was  more  likely  to  have 
been  abrupt  than  gradual.  Information  disclosure 
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have  shown  that  the  notion  of  market  efficiency  is  about 
information  processing  efficiency.  In  an  efficient 
market  the  market  should  reflect  all  new  information 
'without  undue  delay'.  Our  results  show  that  this 
notion  of  market  efficiency  is  likely  to  have  been  true 
for  multinational  companies  in  the  London  Stock  Exchange 
in  the  semi-strong  sense.  The  abruptness  of  the  onset 
of  beta  changes  show  that  there  was  a  quick  response  in 
stock  prices.  Public  information  regarding  segmental 
geographical  prospects  were  likely  to  have  been  taken 
into  account  in  the  stock  price  changes.  This  result 
is  somewhat  in  contrast  to  earlier  study  conducted  by 
Collins  (1975)  who  investigated  market  efficiency  with 
regard  to  product  line  reporting  in  the  USA.  Using 
cumulative  average  residual  method  to  formulate  trading 
strategy,  Collins  reported  that  "the  market  was  not 
efficient  with  respect  to  the  non-public  segment  revenue 
and  profit  data  of  nondisclosure  firms  for  1968-1969.11 
The  contribution  to  knowledge  which  can  be  derived  from 
this  current  study  is  that  (i)  intervention  analysis  has 
been  used  instead  of  cumulative  average  residual  method 
for  reasons  stated  earlier  (section  7.31);  (ii)  unlike 
previous  studies  which  have  tested  the  information  con- 
tent  of  line  of  business  activity,  this  study  has 
investigated  the  information  content  of  segmental 
geographical  data;  and  (iii)  the  database  is  exclusively 
of  UK  origin  while  most  of  the  earlier  studies.  have  examined 
US  database. 
9.2  Implications  for  Risk  Assessment 
Relevance  of  current  research  in  the  area  of  risk  assess. 
ment  fall  under  two  headings: 
(i)  at  the  general  level;  and  (ii)  at  the  technical  level. 
At  the  general  level,  it  has  been  seen  in  chapter  VIII 
that  when  comparing  control  and  treatment  group  betas, 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  likely  to  result 
in  lower  systematic  risk  for  disclosing  companies 
(table  8.8).  More  specifically,  it  was  shown  that  in 370 
the  pre-intervention  period,  nondisclosing  treatment 
group  average  betas  were  significantly  larger  than  the 
disclosing  control  group  average  betas;  in  the  post- 
intervention  period,  when  the  disclosure  practices  of 
the.  treatment  group  and  the  control  group  were  similar, 
there  were  no  significant  differences  in  the  average 
betas  of  the  two  groups. 
It  has  been  stated  earlier  in  this  research  (chapter  V, 
appendix  V(A)),  that  for  a  well  diversified  investor, 
unsystematic  risk  does  not  matter,  all  that  matters  is 
systematic  risk,  B.  If  beta  is  the  relevant  factor 
in  measuring  risk,  and  consequently  in  establishing 
risk  premium  for  equity  cost  of  capital,  then  geographical 
segment  disclosure  practice,  which  has  been  shown 
to  be  associated  with  beta  changes,  could  also  be  a 
relevant  factor  in  the  assessment  of  risk  as  perceived 
by  investors  in,  geographically  diversified  multinational 
companies. 
Comparing  our  findings  with  earlier  studies  cited  in 
this  research  (section  6.5),  the  following  observations 
seem  pertinent: 
Mautz  (1968),  and  Backer  and  McFarland  (1968)  have  stated 
that  there  are  likely  to  be  benefits  from  segmental  dis- 
closure.  Our  findings  support  their  views.  Choi  (1973b) 
investigated  the  relationship  between  financial  information 
disclosure  in  an  international  setting  and  the  firm's  cost 
of  equity  capital,  and  found  that  improved  disclosure  is 
likely  to  result  in  lower  equity  cost  of  capital.  Our 
research  findings  showing  that  systematic  risk  for  dis- 
closing  companies  overall  are  likely  to  be  lower  than  non- 
disclosing  companies  supports  Choi's  findings. 
Similarly,  Dhaliwal  (1978),  and  Dhaliwal,  Spicer  and 
Vickrey  (1979)  have  empirically  tested,  and  have  found 
evidence  in  support  of,  the  hypothesis  that  segmental 371 
disclosure  had  a  favourable  effect  on  the  cost  of 
equity  capital.  The  contribution  to  knowledge  of  this 
present  research  is  that  it  extends  this  reduction  in 
cost  of  equity  capital  notion  to  (i)  segmental  geograph- 
ical  disclosure,  and  (ii)  to  the  UK  database. 
Kochanek  (1974)  tested  the  association  between  stock 
price  volatility  and  reporting  practice  and  found  that 
weekly  stock  price  volatility  ratio  was  smaller  for  good 
reporters  than  for  poor  reporters.  If  control  group 
companies  in  our  research  are  seen  as  good  reporters  in 
preintervention  period,  and  treatment  group  companies  in 
the  preintervention  period  are  categorized  as  poor  re- 
porters,  then  our  finding  that  preintervention  period 
betas  for  control  group  companies  were  lower  than 
treatment  group  companies,  supports  Kochanek's  findings 
that  good  reporters  are  likely  to  have  lower  risk. 
Our  findings  are,  however,  in  sharp  contrast  to  Kinney's 
(1972).  Kinney  investigated  the  voluntary  disclosure 
of  geographical  segmental  data  for  25  multinationals  for 
the  period  196+-69  and  found  that  only  in  3  cases  out  of 
25  were  there  any  benefit  from  geographical 
diversification.  The  important  point  of  difference 
between  Kinney's  study  and  current  research  is  that 
Kinney  investigated  the  total  variance  of  earnings, 
including  unsystematic  risk,  while  in  our  present  study, 
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In  the  international  capital  markets  context,  Grubel  (1968) 
has  demonstrated  the  benefits  of  international  portfolio 
diversification  supporting  a  segmented  international  capital 
market  hypothesis,  meaning  that  there  exist-  imperfections 
in  international  capital  markets.  Levy  and  Sarnat  (1970) 
have  conducted  a  study  similiar  to  that  of  Grubel,  but  included 
less  developed  countries  in  their  sample,  and  concluded  in 
similiar  fashion  to  that  of  Grubel,  thus  arguing  for  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  international  capital  movements.  Agmon  (1972) 
has  argued  against  the  Grubel-Sarnat-Levy  hypothesis  of  segmented 
international  capital  markets.  According  to  Agmon,  the 
international  capital  market  is  unlikely  to  be  segmented.  His 
conclusion  was  based  on  a  limited  sample  of  four  industrially 
advanced  countries  while  Grubel,  and  Levy  and  Sarnat  had  a 
much  larger  number  of  countries  in  their  samples. 
While  our  observations  about  segmented  international 
capital  markets  can  only  be  of  an  indirect  nature,  it  is 
possible  to  make  direct  observations  about  another  aspect 
of  international  capital  market  studies:  country  influence. 
Following  King  (1966)  who  demonstrated  industry  influence 
in  the  determination  of  systematic  risk,  Lessard  (1974) 
demonstrated  the  relevance  of  decomposing  the  betas 
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country,  and  industry  factors.  If  segmental  geograph- 
ical  disclosure  affects  systematic  risk,  as  has  been 
found  in  current  research,  and  geographical  disclosure 
implies  that  information  about  country  factors  are 
inherent  in  geographical  information,  then  it  is  possible 
to  conclude  that  our  research  result  supports  Lessard's 
conclusion  that  the  country  factor  is  an  important  influence 
in  the  determination  of  beta. 
If  country  influence  is  an  important  influence  in  the 
determination  of  beta,  then  the  implication  of  this 
research  can  be  seen  to  lie  also  in  the  theory  of 
Arbitrage  Pricing  (section  5.523)  and  multifactor  models 
of  capital  asset  pricing  (section  5.522)  in  general. 
The  arbitrage  pricing  theory  states  that  rates  of  return 
on  any  security  is  a  linear  function  of  'k'  factors, 
but  it  does  not  tell  us  what  these  factors  are.  If 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  practice  is  a  relevant 
factor  in  beta  determination,  and  beta  is  a  relevant 
factor  in  establishing  required  rates  of  return,  then  it 
is  possible  to  conclude  that  geographical  segment 
disclosure  practice  is  one  of  these  'k'  factors. 
Apart  from  its  relevance  in  beta  determinants  as  men- 
tioned  above,  there  are  technical  implications  of  this 
research  in  risk  assessment.  One  of  the  major  issues 
in  the  measurement  of  systematic  risk  is  the  horizon 
problem  (section  5.512).  The  horizon  problem  in  the  contoxt 
of  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  the  problem  of 
deciding  how  long  the  period  of  observations  should  be 
over  which  the  prices  information  should  be  collected  and 
analysed  to  be  able  to  establish  a  realistic  risk  profile 
for  multinational  companies. 
The  duration-onset  analysis  (section  8.3)  has  shown  that 
the  duration  of  changed  beta  for  treatment  group  com- 
panies  in  response  to  changes  in  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  practice  was  semipermanent;  i.  e.,  the 374 
duration  of  the  impact  of  intervention  lasted  for  about 
25  months,  after  which  the  impact  seemed  to  be  diluted 
by  more  immediate  factors  (figure  8.3).  Our  findings 
seem  to  support  the  stance  taken  by  Brenner  and  Smidt 
(1978)  who  have  stated  that  betas  would  not  be 
stationary  over  indefinite  length  of  time. 
9.3  Implications  for  Disclosure  Policy 
It  has  been  shown  that  geographical  segment  disclosure 
is  associated  with  a  reduction  of  systematic  risk  for 
disclosing  companies  when  compared  with  similar  non- 
disclosing  companies.  If  .  geographical  segment  dis- 
closure  is  associated  with  benefits  to  user  groups  such 
as  investors,  and  if  an  important  attribute  of  an 
adequate  financial  reporting  system  is  the  satisfaction 
of  user  needs  (section  2.11),  then  should  such  dis- 
closure  of  segmental  geographical  data  be  left  to 
voluntary  efforts  of  information  producers,  or  should 
such  disclosure  of  . -geographical 
segment  data  be 
mandatory?  This  is  one  of  the  general  questions  in 
disclosure  policy.  The  answer  to  such  a  question  lies 
in  an  understanding  of  the  arguments  for  and  against 
voluntary  and  mandatory  disclosure  systems. 
9.31  Voluntary  Disclosure 
In  chapter  VIII  it  has  been  shown  that  for  the  treatment 
group,  average  betas  in  the  post-intervention  period  were 
significantly  different  from  average  betas  in  the  pre- 
intervention  period,  pointing  to  the  possibility  of 
information  content  of  segmental  geographical  data  in 
response  to  the  intervention  variable,  segmental 
geographical  disclosure  practice.  It  has  also  been 
shown  that  results  of  duration-onset  analysis  point  to 
the  abruptness  of  the  beta  change  after  the  intervention 
point  when  treatment  group  average  betas  are  compared 
with  the  control  group  average  betas.  This  has  been 
construed  to  mean  that  the  stock  market  reacted  in  an 
efficient  manner  to  impound  the  new  information  about 375 
segmental  geographical  prospects  in  the  stock  prices 
of  the  disclosing  companies. 
Further,  it  has  been  shown  that  in  the  pre  -iiterventign 
period  treatment  group  average  betas  were  significantly 
larger  than  control  group  average  betas,  but  in  the 
post-intervention  period  there  were.  no  significant 
differences  between  the  treatment  and  control  group 
average  betas,  pointing  to  the  possibility  that  inter- 
vention  (segmental  geographical  disclosure  practice)  is 
associated  with  a  reduction  of  systematic  risk  for  dis- 
closing  companies. 
It  can  be  argued  therefore  that  all  is  well;  in  an 
efficient  market  the  information  content  of  geographical 
segment  data  which  might  result  in  a  reduction  of 
systematic  risk  for  disclosing  companies  overall  will  auto- 
matically  be  taken  care  of  by  the  market  mechanism, 
and  there  is  no  need  for  any  regulation  of  disclosure 
practices  of  companies  in  the  economy.  Bird  and  Locke 
(1981)  support  this  view  of  efficiency  of  the  market 
mechanism.  Additional  support  for  the  efficiency  of  the 
market  mechanism,  suggesting  that  voluntary  disclosure  is 
a  desirable  mode  of  operation  is  posited  in  Agency  Theory. 
9.311  Agency  Theory 
Agency  Theory  posits  that  there  are  incentives  to  vol- 
untary  disclosure.  In  modern  corporations,  such  as 
geographically  diversified  multinationals  which  have  been 
investigated  in  this  research,  ownership  is  separated 
from  control.  While  shareholders  may  not  be  tied  to  the 
fortunes  of  the  firm  because  they  can  diversify  their 
portfolio  of  investments,  the  management  of  a  firm  has  a 
long  horizon  tied  to  the  firm.  The  economic  fortunes  of 
the  management  depend  on  those  of  the  corporation.  In  a 
competitive  market  with  no  mandated  disclosure,  the 
managers  of  firms  will  find  their  compensation  linked 
directly  to  the  fortunes  of  the  firm  on  an  ongoing  basis 
and  will  be  precluded  from  profiting  directly  from  inside 376 
information.  In  such  a  situation,  they  will  have  a 
strong  self  interest  in  disclosing  relevant  information 
to  the  outside  market  (Ross,  1979;  Fama,  1980),  as  long 
as  it  is  necessary  to  disclose  such  information  to  compete 
for  capital  and  credit  in  the  market  place  (Mautz  and  May, 
1978).  Segmental  geographical  disclosure  may  necessitate 
some  costs  in  information  production  and  competitive  dis- 
advantage  but  so  long  as  the  advantages  in  the  form  of 
obtaining  credit  and  capital  outweigh  the  costs, 
managers  will  be  in  favour  of  disclosure  (section  3.32). 
Managers  of  treatment  group  companies  may  have  decided  to 
disclose  segmental  geographical  data  because  the  advantages 
of  disclosure  might  have  been  perceived  to  be  greater  than 
costs  of  such  disclosure.  This  is  in  support  of  agency 
cost  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976),  which  states  that 
if  investors  find  it  worthwhile  to  obtain  detailed 
information  about  the  firm  then  the  price  they  are  willing 
to  pay  for  the  firm's  stocks  will  be  inversely  related  to 
the  cost  of  obtaining  that  information.  In  other  words, 
the  cost  of  obtaining  financial  information  will  be  borne 
by  the  firm  directly,  or  it  will  be  imposed  upon  the  firm 
via  the  stock  price  setting  mechanism.  Recent  invest- 
igation  by  Chow  (1983)  into  the  impact  of  the  SEC  1933 
Act  also  supports  this  view. 
9.312  Agency  Costs 
Agency  costs  arise  because  the  manager's  (the  agent's) 
interests  do  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  interests 
of  shareholders  or  the  bondholders  (the  principals).  For 
example,  the  manager,  if  he  owns  shares,  has  incentives 
to  convert  the  assets  of  the  :  corporation  into  dividends. 
Similarly  the  manager  has  incentives  to  transfer  wealth 
to  himself  in  the  form  of  perquisites  at  the  expense  of 
the  principal.  (Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1979). 
Bondholders  and  shareholders  anticipate  the  manager's 
behaviour  and  appropriately  discount  the  price  of  shares 
or  bonds  at  the  time  of  the  issue.  Hence  the  promoter 377 
(or  manager)  of  a  new  corporation  receives  less  for  the 
new  issue.  This  difference  in  the  market  value  of  the 
securities  is  part  of  the  cost  of  an  agency  relationship 
and  is  called  the  residual  loss  being  borne  by  the 
manager.  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976). 
Because  of  the  residual  loss  which  the  manager  has  to 
bear,  he  has  incentives  to  make  expenditures  to  guarantee 
that  he  will  not  take  certain  actions  which  harm  the 
principal's  interest  or  that  he  will  compensate  the 
principal  if  he  does.  These  are  "bonding"  and 
monitoring  expenditures  and  are  additional  elements  of 
agency  costs.  Contracting  to  restrict  dividend  payments 
and  expenditures  to  monitor  such  dividend  covenants  are 
examples  of  monitoring  costs.  "' 
The  third  element  of  agency  costs  results  in  a  reduction 
of  the  total  agency  cost.  This  is  related  to  the 
marginal  utility  of  the  perquisites  and  wealth  transfers 
that  the  managers  can  make  for  themselves.  While  the 
providers  of  monetary  capital  have  no  direct  interest  in 
the  survival  of  any  particular  firm,  the  managers  of  the 
firm,  however,  have  a  much  more  permanent  interest  in  the 
survival  of  the  firm  as  they  rent  a  substantial  lump  of 
their  wealth  -  their  human  capital  -  to  the  firm,  and  the 
rental  rates  for  their  human  capital  as  conveyed  to  the 
managerial  labour  market  are  likely  to  be  dependent  on  the 
degree  of  success  of  the  particular  firm.  (Fama,  1980). 
An  equilibrium  occurs  when  the  net  cost  of  an  agency 
relationship,  the  agency  costs  are  minimised  by  trading 
off  the  decrease  in  the  manager's  utility  due  to  the 
residual  loss,  the  monitoring  and  bonding  expenditures, 
and  the  increased  utility  due  to  increased  perquisites. 
Accounting  procedures  such  as  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  are  devices  used  to  reduce  the  agency  costs 
of  contracts.  Since  these  costs  vary  across  firms, 
accounting  procedures  and  reporting  practices  will  also 378 
vary  giving  rise  to  variety  of  techniques  and  formats. 
(Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1979,  p.  278). 
9.313  Moral  Hazard 
One  of  the  consequences  of  information  on  aggregate 
production  and  resource  allocation  is  its  effect  on  the 
relationship  between  management  and  investors.  In 
earlier  accounting  literature  this  relationship  has  been 
described  in  terms  of  stewardship  theory.  In  the  economics 
literature,  particularly  in  insurance  (Arrow,  1971, 
p.  142)  this  is  treated  as  a  problem  of  moral  hazard  and 
is  of  prime  concern  to  agency  theory  (Beaver,  1981). 
Although  the  agency  cost  reduction  role.  of  accounting  is 
merely  the  modern  counterpart  of  what  is  traditionally 
known  as  the  stewardship  function,  unlike  the  stewardship 
function,  the  agency  cost  approach  is  more  concerned  with 
economic  incentives  than  with  such  concepts  such  as 
'fairness'  or  right  to  know.  (Rouen,  1979,  p.  431)9 
In  an  agency  setting  a  moral  hazard  problem  arises  because 
of  an  information  asymmetry.  There  is  general  concern 
that  the  agent  will  use  his  superior  information  to 
maximize  the  agent's  self  interest  at  the  expense  of  the 
principal.  This  is  the  moral  hazard  problem.  Moral 
hazard  not  only  includes  such  acts  as  fraud  and  shirking, 
but  it  also  includes  other  actions  that  are  not  in  the  best 
interests  of  the  principal  such  as  risk-reward  trade  offs 
made  in  project  selection. 
There  is  a  moral  hazard  problem  associated  with  markets 
in  information.  How  is  the  buyer,  the  investor,  who  by 
assumption  is  ignorant,  to  verify  the  validity  of  the 
information  (geographical  segment  data),  he  is  buying? 
Disclosure  regulation  can  induce  individuals  to  be 
truthful  by  exacting  penalties  for  transmission  of  false 379 
information,  but  it  would  be  simplistic  to  think  it  is  a 
cure  for  all  moral  hazard  problems.  Several  responses 
to  the  moral  hazard  problems  are  possible. 
One  response  is  to  "provide  for  public  disclosure  of 
firm's  information  so  as  to  remove  the  superior  inform- 
ation  position  of  management.  Hence,  the  information 
asymmetry  that  leads  to  the  concern  over  moral  hazard  is 
removed"  Beaver,  1981,  p.  49).  Another  option  is  to 
provide  an  incentive  contract  for  management  so  as  to 
provide  goal  congruence  between  the  manager  and  the 
owner. 
9.314  Incentive  Signalling 
Determining  the  costs  and  benefits  of  any  particular 
disclosure  regulation  hinges  on  whether  one  supports  the 
classical  view  or  the  incentive  signalling  view.  "Aside 
from  stewardship  function,  whether  it  is  in  the  old 
vintage  form  or  under  the  modern  label  of  agency  costs, 
....  e  accounting  clearly  plays  an  additional  role: 
providing  information  for  resources  allocation  - 
internally  within  the  firm  and  externally  for  con- 
sumption  -  investment  decisions.  From  this  perspective 
of  the  role  of  accounting,  the  issue  is:  do  companies 
have  incentives  within  the  free  market  mechanism  to 
provide  correct  signals  for  decision-making?  Should 
signalling  be  regulated  because  the  market  does  not  offer 
sufficient  incentives  for  correct  signalling?  "  (Ronen, 
1979,  p.  415)" 
The  traditional  view  that  insiders  will  never  reveal  their 
information,  preferring  to  exploit  them  directly  is  too 
simplistic. 
The  neoclassical  view  that  management,  as  agents  of 
stockholders,  will  release  all  information  up  to  the 
point  where  the  marginal  benefit  to  stockholders  just 
equals  the  marginal  cost  is  also  inadequate. 380 
A  more  complete  explanation  of  the  forces  in  the  free 
market  that  lead  to  disclosure  is  provided  by  incentive- 
signalling  analysis,  which  elucidates  the  competitive 
incentives  for  the  revelation  of  inside  information. 
The  marginal  analysis,  in  effect,  defines  the  information 
that  will  be  disclosed,  while  the  incentive  signalling 
analysis  explains  the  mechanism  of  disclosure  (Ross,  1979). 
The  incentive  signalling  theory  is  really  an  extension 
of  the  traditional  theory,  but  it  arrives  at  different 
implications  for  policy  because  it  makes  some  assumptions 
that  are  different  from  those  implicit  in  the  traditional 
theory.  The  traditional  view  argues  that  there  are  no 
constraints  that  prevent  the  manager  from  suppressing  and 
exploiting  inside  information.  The  incentive  signalling 
approach  argues  that  the  absence  of  such  constraints  is 
incompatible  with  competitive  financial  markets  in 
managerial  services  (Fama,  1980). 
Historical  analysis  of  voluntary  disclosures  have  been 
made  by  Edey  (1968,  p.  137)  for  UK  companies  for  the 
period  1862-1900,  and  by  Benston  (1969)  for  US  companies 
for  the  pre  1933  SEC  Act.  Edey  reported  that  in  the 
period  1862-1900  many  UK  companies  voluntarily  adopted 
the  optional  articles  included  in  Table  A  of  1862  UK 
Companies  Act.  Benston  reported  that  as  of  1926,  of 
the  firms  listed  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  100% 
published  balance  sheets,  and  disclosed  net  income;  71% 
disclosed  depreciation  and  4+5%  disclosed  cost  of  sales. 
More  recently,  in  a  survey  of  UK  published  accounts, 
the  ICAEW  (1982)  reported  that  of  300  large  companies 
selected  from  the  Times  Top  1000  companies,  for  the  year 381 
ending  30th  June  1982,225  companies  (i.  e.,  75% 
disclosed  some  form  of  segmental  geographical 
information.  Such  findings  confirm  the  view  that  there 
are  incentives  to  voluntary  disclosure  in  an  unregulated 
market. 
That  management  will  have  an  incentive  to  disclose  good 
information  (unless  doing  so  will  jeopardize  its  value 
to  the  firm)  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  (section  3.33)" 
Such  disclosure  will  raise  the  value  of  the  firm,  and 
therefore  the  managers'  compensation.  But  with  bad 
news,  the  analysis  is  not  symmetric.  Those  with  no 
news  will  suffer  by  being  lumped  in  with  those 
suppressing  bad  news. 
"In  a  voluntary  system  of  financial  reporting,  it  is  to 
be  expected  that  some  companies  will  not  disclose. 
However,  if  market  participants  deem  segment  reporting 
important  for  a  particular  firm,  they  will  interpret  the 
lack  of  disclosure  by  that  firm  as  bad  news  and  will 
reduce  their  willingness  to  buy  that  company's  shares; 
therefore  lack  of  disclosure  will  lead  to  a  higher  cost 
of  equity  capital  for  the  nondisclosing  firm  than  for  a 
similar  disclosing  firm"  (Horowitz  and  Kolodny,  1980, 
p.  23)- 
This  incentive  signalling  analysis  in  a  free  market  can 
be  criticised  on  the  following  grounds: 
a.  Even  if  it  were  true  that  over  the  long  run  the 
market  would  penalize  companies  which  withheld 
segmental  geographical  information,  in  the  interim 
inefficiencies  may  persist. 
b.  Moreover,  confidence  in  the  securities  market  rests 
upon  the  publicts  notion  of  fairness,  and  fairness 
is  related  to  the  equal  access  doctrine.  Under 
this  doctrine,  the  public  may  deem  it  unfair  when 
only  some  firms  voluntarily  disclose  segmental  data, 
and  for  those  firms  not  disclosing,  only  insiders, 382 
large  investors  and  institutions  with  sizeable  resources 
have  access  to  such  information. 
c.  "At  best,  nondisclosure  would  be  a  noisy  signal  which 
cannot  be  unambiguously  interpreted.  It  would  be  con- 
sistent  with  both  the  following  possibilities:  (1)  effect 
of  segment  information  on  the  stock  price  would  have  been 
negative,  and  (2)  effect  of  segment  information  on  the 
stock  price  would  have  been  positive  but  the  cost  of 
disclosure  (including  adverse  effects  on  competitive 
advantage)  outweighs  the  benefit  (increase-in  stock- 
holders'  wealth);  that  is,  the  net  positive  value'is 
negative"  (Ronen  and  Livnat,  1981,  p.  475). 
If  the  market  mechanism  cannot  be  relied  on  to  guarantee 
either  comprehensive  disclosure  of  segmental  geographical 
information,  or  a  setting  in  which  nondisclosure  can  be 
interpreted  unambiguously,  then  one  needs  to  consider  the 
circumstances  under  which  regulation  of  segmental  reporting 
can  be  justified. 
9.32  Mandatory  Disclosure 
It  has  been  stated  in  the  previous  section  that  the  argument 
in  favour  of  voluntary  disclosure  rests  on  the  assumption  of 
market  efficiency  and  incentives  to  voluntary  disclosure. 
But  market  efficiency  does  not  necessarily  imply  economic 
efficiency  (section  L.  23),  nor  does  the'existence  of 
incentives  to  voluntary  disclosure  exclude  the  possibility 
of  information  asymmetry  and  moral  hazard  (section  9.31+). 
If  voluntary  disclosure  is  inadequate  to  satisfy  user  needs, 
mandatory  disclosure  could  be  a  possibility.  Yet,  economic 
efficiencies  in  allocation  and  distribution  are  not  necessarily 
best  served  by  mandatory  disclosure  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  costs  of  nonmarket  failure  are  necessarily  smaller  than 
costs  of  market  failure.  The  public  goods  characteristics 
of  accounting  information,  and  multiperson  nature  of  social 
choice  implies  that  accounting  policy  choice  such  as 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  is  a  political  choice  in 
an  institutional  setting. 383 
9.321  Market  Failure 
It  has  been  shown  that  the  treatment  group  betas  were 
affected  abruptly  as  a  consequence  of  intervention 
(section  8.3),  pointing  to  the  possibility  that  the 
London  stock  market  was  likely  to  have  been  efficient  in 
response  to  segmental  geographical  information  for  multi- 
nationals.  However,  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis 
says  that  all  information  is  impounded  in  the  stock 
prices,  it  does  not  necessarily  say  that  such  impounding 
is  done  correctly.  If  the  information  set  is  incomplete, 
immaterial,  or  meaningless,  then  efficient  markets  notion 
can  do  very  little  to  ensure  a  socially  desirable 
allocation  of  resources. 
It  has  earlier  been  shown  that  the  usefulness  of 
segmental  geographical  information  is  circumscribed  by 
the  problems  of  segment  identification,  materiality  and 
meaningfulness  (section  3.3).  Information  asymmetry  is 
likely  to  exist  between  managers  (who  are  insiders)  and 
users  (who  are  outsiders.  )  Therefore  managers  have 
incentives  to  suppress  bad  news  and  disclose  good  news. 
Ball  and  Brown  (1967),  and  Niederhoffer  (1971)  have 
shown  that  stock  prices  tend  to  rise  with  good  news  and 
fall  with  bad  news.  Patell  and  Wolfson  (1982)  have  shown 
that  good  news  is  more  likely  to  be  released  when  the 
security  markets  are  open  while  bad  news  appears  more 
frequently  after  the  close  of  trading. 
The  efficient  security  market  hypothesis  relates  to  individual 
values,  not  to  the  relationship  between  individual  value 
and  the  social  value,  while  accounting  information  dis- 
closing  segmental  geographical  information  may  have 
public  value  apart  from  private  value.  (Beaver  and 
Demski,  1974;  Demski,  1974). 
Since  accounting  information  may  have  public  value,  it 
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It,,  *  management  has  a  responsibility  to  disclose  any 
information  (other  than  commercial  secrets)  which  is 
material  and  relevant  to  shareholders'  portfolio  needs, 
that  is  provide  the  market  with  all  data,  however 
technical  or  incomprehensible  to  the  'ordinary  investor', 
which  affect  the  market  value  of  the  shares  and  the 
allocation  of  capital  to  the  company,  and  to  provide  the 
individual  investor  or  his  advisor  with  ...  information 
which  will  enable  the  investor  to  place  the  shares  in  a 
'covariancet  category.  This  might  include  a  breakdown 
of  sales  into  product  lines,  analysis  of  the  firmts 
activities  into  geographic  or  economic  regions,  and 
possibly  a  probabilistic  analysis  of  future  returns  ...  " 
(Keane,  1975,  p.  239)" 
Public  disclosure  of  segmental  geographical  information 
would  therefore  seem  to  be  in  the  societal  interest.  In 
the  absence  of  such  public  disclosure  of  segmental  geo- 
graphical  information: 
"there  are  clear  incentives  to  information  search  ... 
for  those  with  unusual  detective  abilities,  large 
resources  and  influences.  The  resulting  private  search 
for  information  not  only  has  redistributive  effects  but 
may  also  lead  to  economic  inefficiencies  in  the  form  of 
reduced  aggregate  output"  (Hakansson,  1977,  p.  413). 
The  impact  of  accounting  information  such  as  segmental 
geographical  data  on  aggregate  output  can  be  seen  through 
its  influence  on  cost  of  capital.  It  has  been  shown 
(section  8.3)  that  segmental  geographical  information  and 
beta  changes  were  associated.  If  beta  changes  and  equity 
cost  of  capital  are  associated  then  the  distribution  of 
cost  of  capital  among  firms  is  likely  to  be  influenced, 
and  consequently  the  allocation  of  capital  to  various 
users  in  the  economy.  Choi  (1973b)9  and  Makin  (1978) 
also  supports  this  view. 
One  view  of  accounting  information  is  that  no  one  should 
be  excluded  from  information  published  by  enterprises. 385 
But  the  problem  is  that  without  the  exclusion  of  those 
who  do  not  pay  for  the  information,  no  rational  person 
will  be  prepared  to  pay  for  any  of  it.  This  is  the 
'free  rider'  problem  (Bromwich,  1981).  The  existence 
of  free  riders  constitutes  the  evidence  that  accounting 
can  sometimes  be  called  a  public  good  since  its  supply 
is  not  reduced  by  the  consumption  of  any  individual 
(Samuelson,  1954).  The  existence  of  public  good 
characteristics  makes  the  operation  of  market  mechanism 
difficult.  Gonedes  and  Dopuch  (1974)  have  argued  that 
the  prohibition  of  insider  trading  gives  accounting  in- 
formation  some  public  good  characteristics.  Such  public 
good  characteristics  requires  an  analysis  of  externalities. 
9.3211  Externality 
Though  there  is  far  from  unanimity  about  the  meaning  of 
the  term  externality  in  the  economics  literature,  the 
interdependence  notion  is  one  of  the  more  accepted  versions 
of  the  definition  of  the  term  'externality$  (Foster,  1980, 
a).  Yet,  the  existence  of  interdependencies  is  only  a 
necessary,  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  the  existence 
of  externalities.  An  interdependence  between  two  firms 
exists  when  action  taken  by  one  firm  affects  the  other. 
Indeed  in  some  sense  the  action  of  any  firm  affects  all 
other  firms  in  the  economy  indirectly.  An  externality 
arises  when  the  interdependence  gives  rise  to  a  mis- 
allocation  of  resources  -  in  particular  the  inter- 
dependence  between  the  two  firms  is  such  that  the 
results  of  decentralised  decision-making  by  each  firm 
is  pareto  inferior  to  a  centralised  solution. 
Externalities  in  financial  reporting  can  arise  from  either: 
(i)  timing  of  information  releases  or 
(ii)  the  content  of  these  releases. 
If  two  firms  have  the  same  reporting  period,  and  are  in 
the  same  risk  class  but  release  their  earnings  and 
investment  plans  at  different  times,  there  is  'timing' 
externality.  Content  externality  can  arise  when 386 
information  disclosed  by  one  firm  can  affect  the  pro- 
duction  or  investment  decisions  by  other  firms. 
The  possibility  of  externalities  in  information 
generation  (financial  reporting)  imply  that  regulation 
of  accounting  information  production  may  lead  to  an 
allocation  of  resources  that  is  pareto  superior  to  that 
achieved  by  a  free  market  equilibrium  allocation.  More- 
over,  changes  in  information  production  induced  by 
regulation  may  alter  the  values  of  securities  portfolios 
and  through  those  values,  the  distribution  of  wealth 
among  individuals.  Either  one  or  both  of  these 
potential  influences  adds  a  social  value  dimension  to 
the  regulation  of  financial  accounting  information. 
(May  and  Sundem,  1976). 
It  has  been  shown  that  accounting  has  public  goods 
characteristics.  Such  public  goods  characteristics 
result  in  the  possibilities  of  the  existence  of 
externalities.  Although  there  are  incentives  to 
voluntary  disclosure  under  incentive  signalling  theory, 
corporate  management  also  has  incentives  not  to  disclose 
unfavourable  information.  Therefore,  left  to  market 
forces,  there  would  result  an  asymmetrical  or  uneven 
possession  of  information  among  market  participants. 
This  is  the  market  failure  argument. 
The  most  celebrated  attempt  to  allow  for  non-unanimity 
while  retaining  the  concept  of  pareto  optimality  was  the 
'compensation  principle'  formulated  by  Kaldor  and  Hicks 
(Prest  and  Purvey,  1965).  Under  this  compensation 
principle,  when  externalities  exist,  the  gainers  would 
compensate  the  losers  such  that  in  the  end  everyone  is 
better  off. 
While  in  principle  it  is  possible  to  devise  such  an 
elaborate  compensation  system  through  the  price  mechanism, 
such  a  system  may  be  too  costly,  or  simply  infeasible 
because  of  the  burden  of  bureaucracy.  Yet,  without  some 387 
form  of  collective  action,  the  parties  benefiting  in  the 
presence  of  externalities  have  no  incentive  to  internal- 
ise  the  effect  on  third  parties. 
"A  necessary  (but  not  sufficient)  condition  for  regulation 
to  create  a  socially  better  allocation  of  resources  and/or 
distribution  of  wealth  is  that  it  at  least  be  capable  of 
producing  a  different  allocation  and/or  distribution  than 
would  be  attained  in  a  free  market.  There  are  several 
reasons  that  this  condition  may  be  met. 
First,  regulation  can  impose  production  of  information  on 
entities  with  comparative  advantages  in  producing  the 
information.  However,  these  entities  do  not  necessarily 
have  a  private  incentive  to  do  so.  In  this  way,  it  may 
be  possible  to  alter  the  information  set  employed  privately 
by  investors  in  forming  their  preferences  for  various 
securities  by  altering  the  distribution  of  costs  of 
information.  Such  alteration  may  affect  resources 
allocation  and  wealth  distribution  directly  by  changing 
production  opportunities  of  other 
(external)  information 
suppliers  ..... 
Second,  since  optimal  investment  strategies  imply  inter- 
firm  comparisons,  some  external  economies  in  information 
processing  may  be  achievable  through  imposition  of  certain 
uniformities  in  financial  accounting  information  produced. 
This  may  mean  lower  costs  of  acquiring  information  for 
investors  and  other  decision  makers. 
Third,  to  the  extent  that  a  policy  apparatus  lessens  the 
probability  of  major  scandals,  it  may  contribute  to  the 
general  perception  of  risk  over  a  vast  number  of  risky 
investments  and,  therefore,  the  level  of  savings  and 
investment  in  the  economy  as  a  whole".  (May  and  Sundem, 
1976,  p.  7119-750). 
However,  the  sufficient  condition  for  mandatory  disclosure 
policy  formulation  "requires  that  the  realized  inadequacies 
of  market  outcomes  be  compared  with  the  potential 
inadequacies  of  non  market  efforts  to  ameliorate  them"9 388 
(Wolf,  1979,  p.  107),  and  market  outcomes  be  found 
inferior  to  the  alternative  solution. 
"Existing  institutional  arrangements,  such  as  markets, 
should  not  be  condemned  until  it  can  be  shown  that  there 
is  an  alternative  regime  which  can  produce  socially 
superior  output",  (Leftwich,  1980,  p.  193). 
9.322  Nonmarket  Failure 
Although  it  has  been  shown  that  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  is  likely  to  enhance  market  efficiency 
(section  9.1),  and  benefit  shareholders 
(section  9.2), 
the  idea  that  the  association  between  segmental 
geographical  data  and  efficiently  determined  market 
prices  can  be  used  as  a  basis  for  information  production 
has  been  disputed  by  Gonedes  and  Dopuch  (1974),  May  and 
Sundem  (1976)  and  Demski  (1974),  when  costs  and  benefits 
of  disclosure  in  a  societal  context  are  taken  into  account. 
Since  information  production  has  a  cost,  "there  is  clearly 
a  limit  to  which  the  principles  of  full  disclosure  can  be 
implemented"  (Keane,  1983,  p.  149). 
Further,  the  magnitude  of  benefits,  net  of  costs  is  also 
of  an  uncertain  nature  due  to  information  overload 
phenomenon  (section  2.221,  and  the  reasons  underlying  the 
self  interest  theory  of  regulation 
(Posner,  1974).  On 
the  issue  of  information  overload,  it  is  possible  that  as 
more  and  more  detailed  segmental  geographical  information 
becomes  available,  investors  may  find  that  in  most  cases 
their  information  processing  ability  is  able  to  extract 
increasingly  less  meaningful  information  to  aid  the 
decisionmaking  process.  Thus,  "as  financial  statements 
come  to  include  more  and  more  information,  they  become 
meaningful  to  an  increasingly  small  number  of  sophisticated 
users"  (Anderson  and  Myers,  19759  P"30).  The  possibility 
of  being  increasingly  useful  to  a  minority  of  sophisticated 
users  gives  rise  to  the  arguments  supporting  the  "capture 
theory"  or  "self  interest  theory"  of  regulation.  Capture 
theory  states  that  regulation  is  likely  to  be  supplied  in 389 
response  to  the  demands  of  interest  groups  struggling 
among  themselves  to  maximize  the  incomes  of  their 
members  (Posner,  1974,  PP"335-336). 
Apart  from  costs  of  information  production,  there  are 
costs  of  monitoring  and  enforcement  as  well  as  the 
hidden  costs  of  implementation  of  the  legislation 
itself. 
Disclosure  regulation  may  also  result  in  production  of 
too  much  information  -  information  that  would  not  be 
produced  by  companies  operating  on  their  own  account. 
Further,  due  to  problems  of  meaning":  'ulness,  segment 
identification  and  segment  materiality  (section  3.3), 
they  may  not  lead  to  production  by  the  most  efficient 
producer. 
Externalities  and  public  goods  characteristics  in 
accounting  information  give  rise  to  the  suspicion  of 
market  failures,  and  creates  demand  for  regulation. 
Sufficient  condition  for  regulatory  policy  is  to  show 
that  the  impact  of  non-market  failures  on  society  is 
less  harmful  than  any  possible  market  failure.  This 
is  almost  impossible  to-prove  either  way. 
Disclosure  regulation  may  be  able  to  induce  individuals 
to  be  more  truthful  by  exacting  penalties  for  trans- 
mission  of  false  information,  but  it  would  be  simplistic 
to  think  it  is  a  cure.  for  all  moral  hazard  problems. 
The  real  effect  of  disclosure  regulation  may  be  "simply 
to  shift  the  burden  of  monitoring  and  verifying  from 
the  private  sector  to  the  public  sector,  with  no  evident 
gain  in  economic  efficiency.  "  Ross,  1979,  p.  183). 
9.33  Social  Choice 
Competition  in  the  product  market  and/or  competition  in 
the  capital  market  are  the  usual  bases  upon  which  a 
priori  standing  for  the  profit  maximization  hypothesis  is 
established.  Incentive  signalling  and  voluntary  dis- 
closure  discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter  are  based  on 
this  profit  maximization  notion. 390 
Among  the  administrative  or  regulatory  alternatives  to 
product  and  capital  market  competition  that  have  been 
considered  from  time  to  time  as  a  means  of  controlling 
the  exercise  of  managerial  discretion  are  more  extensive 
accounting  disclosure  and  vigorous  anti-trust  enforcement. 
Enforcement  agencies  are  complex  systems.  Complex  systems 
are  constrained  because  of  'bounded  rationality.  '  By 
'bounded  rationality'  is  meant  bounds  on  the  rate  at  which 
information  can  be  absorbed  per  unit  of  time,  limits  to 
information  storage  capacity  (in  an  effective  retrieval 
sense),  and  bounds  on  the  information  processing  ability 
of  the  decision  maker.  Given  bounded  rationality,  only 
finite  spans  of  control  are  feasible.  One  way  of 
alleviating  the  constraint  of  limited  span  is  to  engage  in 
a  capacity  augmenting  strategy  via  delegation,  and  redesign 
of  the  organisation.  This  is  called  the  process  of 
"decoupling".  (Williamson,  1970). 
Such  decoupling  in  financial  reporting  systems  in  a 
societal  context  can  be  achieved  by  a  system  of  semi- 
official  regulatory  authorities,  such  as  the  Stock  Exchange, 
or  Accounting  Standards  Committees. 
Given  the  existence  of  possible  market  failures, 
heterogeneous  interest  groups  and  user  preferences,  non- 
market  failures,  and  bounded  rationality,  theories  of 
disclosure  regulation  can  be  categorised  into  three  types: 
1.  "Market  Failure"  or  "Public  Interest"  theory, 
firmly  rooted  in  welfare  economics,  provides  an 
economic  rationale  for  what  regulation  ought  to 
do  -  improve  economic  efficiency  by  correcting 
market  failure.  Though  rich  in  analysis,  this 
theory  fails  to  capture  adequately  the  way  in 
which  regulation  actually  works  in  the  real  world. 
(Phillips  and  Zecher,  1981). 
2,  "Public  Choice"  or  "Capture"  theory,  rooted  in 
history,  political  science  and  law,  in  addition  to 391 
economics,  provides  a  rationale  for  understanding  why 
regulatory  agencies  and  programmes  often  do  not  deal 
effectively  with  the  economic  problem  of  inefficient 
allocation  of  resources.  According  to  capture  theory, 
the  prime  beneficiaries  of  regulation  are  not  the  public, 
but  those  being  regulated  (Posner,  1974). 
3.  Yet  another  theory  of  regulation  is  that  regulators  them- 
selves  receive  net  benefits  at  the  expense  of  both  con- 
sumers  and  regulated  firms  (Eckert,  1974;  Schwert,  1981). 
Once  a  regulatory  body  is  set  up,  it  tends  to  justify  its 
existence  long  after  the  original  reason  for  the  setting 
up  of  the  agency  has  disappeared.  Information  becomes  a 
symbol  of  power  and  authority  (section  2.24).  In  an 
ongoing  regulatory  environment,  the  predominant  function  r' 
of  providing  segmental  geographical  data  can  embrace  the 
danger  of  supplying  excuses  which  satisfy  the  demand 
created  by  the  political  process  in  an  institutional 
setting  (Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1979).  Support  for  such 
hypothesis  of  institutional  behaviour  can  be  found  in 
Weber  (1947). 
Which  theory  is  correct?  No  theory  is  ever  perfect,  and 
theories  are  never  right  or  wrong.  Theories  can  only  be 
evaluated  in  given  institutional  settings  and  user  object- 
ives.  (Demsetz,  1969;  Beaver  and  Demski,  1974;  Cushing, 
1977).  Further,  social  choice  being  a  political  process 
(Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1979),  all  three  theories  have  partial 
truths. 
In  a  multiperson  setting  decisions  concerning  the  use  of 
accounting  systems  require  some  value  judgments  as  to  which 
user  groups'  preferences  are  paramount.  In  the  absence  of 
such  value  judgments,  given  that  a  multiperson  user  setting 
implies  heterogeneous  requirements  and  expectations,  one 
has  to  cope  with  the  Arrow  (1951)  impossibility  theorem, 
and  the  problem  of  nontransitivity  in  social  choice. 
Cushing  (1977)  has  argued  that  social  choice  based  on  pareto 
optimality  is  impractical. 392 
Arrow's  choice  theory  transplanted  into  accounting  and 
public  policy  economics  implicitly  presents  the  relevant 
choice  as  between  an.  ideal  norm  and  an  existing  "imperfect" 
institutional  arrangement.  This  'ideal  norm'  or  "nirvana 
approach  differs  considerably  from  a  comparative  instit- 
ution  approach  in  which  the  relevant  choice  is  between 
alternative  real  institutional  arrangements.  " 
(Demsetz,  1969,  p.  l). 
9.331  Economic  Consequences 
No  matter  which  disclosure  policy  is  adopted,  there  are 
economic  consequences.  By  economic  consequences  of 
financial  reporting  is  meant  "the  impact  of  accounting 
reports  on  the  decision-making  behaviour  of  business, 
government,  unions,  investors  and  creditors.  "  (Zeff, 
1978,  p.  56).  In  a  setting  of  multiperson  user  groups 
and  heterogeneous  expectations  one  could  conceivably 
include  many  more  decision-makers.  But,  in  general, 
how  financial  reporting  alternatives  affect  the  economic 
fortunes  of  various  user  groups  is  the  domain  of  economic 
consequences. 
Economic  consequences  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
embrace  costs  and  benefits  of  disclosure.  If  there  are 
benefits  from  segmental  geographical  disclosure  in  the  form 
of  more  accurate'  risk  assessments  by  the  market  makers, 
then  ignoring  cost  considerations  it  can  be  stated  that 
shareholders'  wealth  maximization  criterion  is  satisfied. 
When  cost  considerations  (section  3.32)  are  included, 
disclosure  benefits,  net  of  costs  become  uncertain.  This 
is  not  to  say  that  market  efficiency  is  not  a  desirable 
objective,  but  that  market  efficiency  is  not,  by  itself, 
a  sound  criterion  for  making  policy  decisions.  "Market 
efficiency  is  a  desirable  attribute  of  a  market,  as  long  as 
other  criteria  for  evaluating  a  market  are  not  ignored" 
(Anderson 
and  Myers,  1975,  PP"31-32).  Such  other  criteria 
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Economic  consequences  of  segmental  geographical  dis- 
closure  have  been  discussed  in  detail  elsewhere  in  this 
research  (chapter  III).  Summarizing  earlier  discussions, 
possible  economic  consequences  of  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  can  be  stated  as  follows: 
A.  At  the  individual  level: 
(i)  Distribution  of  wealth  among  individuals 
(ii)  Allocation  of  risk  among  individuals 
(iii)  Use  of  resources  in  the  private  search  for 
information. 
B.  At  the  firm  level: 
(iv)  Allocation  of  resources  among  firms 
C.  At  the  aggregate  level  (economy  as  a  whole): 
(v)  Use  of  resources  devoted  to  the  production, 
certification,  dissemination,  processing, 
analysis,  and  interpretation  of  financial 
information 
(vi)  Use  of  resources  in  the  development,  com- 
pliance,  and  enforcement  and  litigation  of 
regulations 
(vii)  The  aggregate  consumption  and  production 
(e.  g.  the  effects  on  the  rate  of  capital 
formation). 
Because  these  consequences  may  affect  various  constit- 
uencies  differently,  the  selection  of  an  appropriate  re- 
porting  system  for  segmental  geographical  disclosure  is 
a  social  choice.  As  in  any  social  choice  situation, 
there  is  considerable  controversy  over  which  economic 
consequences  and  constituencies  should  be  considered  in 
a  policy  setting  (Beaver,  1981;  Zeff,  1978).  The 
resolution  of  such  issues  requires  a  framework  that 
recognizes  the  role  of  information  in  a  multiperson 
setting,  and  the  rationale  for  regulation  as  an 
institutional  solution. 
There  is  no  general  agreement  among  researchers  as  to 
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Benston  (1976)  made  comparisons  between  the  mandatory 
US  system  and  the  UK  system:  of  private  regulation,  and  on 
balance  concluded  in  favour  of  the  UK  system.  The  Wilson 
Committee  Report  (1980)  discussing  the  balance  between 
statutory  and  voluntary  regulation  commented: 
"There  is,  in  effect,  something  of  a 
continuum  ...  the  issue  therefore  is 
not  whether  statutory  or  non-statutory 
methods  ...  are  preferable  in  some 
absolute  sense,  but  whether  the  existing 
balance  is  appropriate  ...  "  (para.  l099) 
Ronen  (1979)  argued  in  favour  of  mandatory  disclosure 
because  of  the  possible  existence  of  moral  hazards. 
Empirical  research  can  only  provide  evidence.  Policy 
makers  in  the  light  of  the  evidence  have  to  find  the 
right  balance  in  the  context  of  institutional  arrange- 
ments. 
9.332  Disclosure  Policy 
"In  a  'general'  theory  the  specification  of  users  should 
be  able  to  cope  with  a  variety  of  users  and  multiperson 
configurations"  (AAA,  1977,  p.  3).  Such  multiperson 
configurations  could  include  companies  large  and  small, 
uninational  and  multinational,  and  operating  in  different 
cultural  environments. 
Jaggi  (1975)  has  explored  the  impact  of  the  cultural 
environment  on  financial  disclosure.  Choi  (1980)  has 
explored  the  cross  cultural  aspect  of  financial  reporting. 
McComb  (1979),  Nair  and  Frank  (1980),  Gray  (1980),  and 
Nobes  (1983)  have  analysed  the  cultural  aspects  of  inter. 
national  reporting  and  classification.  All  these 
studies  provide  additional  dimensions  to  the  multiperson 
configuration,  and  choice  of  objectives.  A  positive 
theory  of  accounting  is  a  prerequisite  to  understanding 
how  firms  react  to  changes  in  disclosure  requirements. 
In  a  multiperson  setting,  where  choices  are  not 
transitive,  Arrow  (1951),  has  shown  the  impossibility 395 
of  a  consistent  social  choice  based  on  pareto  optimality 
criterion.  Cushing  (1977)  has  shown  the  absurdity  of  a 
pareto  optimality  criterion  in  a  policy  context.  Bator 
(1958,  P"378)  stated:  "Pareto  optimality  as  such  may 
not  be  necessary  for  bliss.  " 
"Agency  theory  asserts  that  in  the  absence  of  compulsory 
disclosure  regulations,  company  managers  would  still  have 
an  incentive  to  supply  ...  financial  statements  to  share- 
holders  and  creditors  and  would  enter  into  bonding 
arrangements  for  this  purpose.  The  voluntary  acts  may 
be  undertaken  to  reduce  agency  costs,  that  is  costs 
arising  from  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control 
and  the  conflict  between  ownership  and  management 
interests"  (Ma,  1982,  p.  129).  Based  on  agency  theory 
Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1979)  suggest  that  accounting  theories 
are  supplied  in  response  to  demand  for  theories. 
Theory  construction  is  a  continuing  process.  A  dynamic 
theory  must  evolve  in  the  light  of  changing  circumstances, 
and  is  a  cumulative  activity  in  the  manner  suggested  by 
Kuhn  (1970).  In  this  accumulation  of  knowledge,  through 
which  theory  is  likely  to  evolve,  empirical  analysis  has 
an  important  role  to  play  through  the  process  of  theory 
verification. 
"It  is  probably  correct  that  if  a  theory  becomes  too 
precise  too  early  it  can  have  tendencies  to  become  too 
sterile.  It  is  also  probably  correct  that  if  a  theory 
stays  too  vague  and  ambitious  too  long  it  can  be  harmful 
in  that  nothing  can  be  done  to  disprove  it  or  change  it, 
This  probably  means  that  theories,  when  vague,  should  at 
least  be  stated  in  a  form  which  makes  the  adding  of 
precision  possible  as  knowledge  increases.  It  also 
probably  means  that  theory  should  run  ahead,  but  not  too 
far  ahead,  of  the  data  so  that  the  trap  of  premature  pre- 
cision  can  be  avoided.  It  certainly  means  that  theories, 
whether  vague  or  precise,  must  be  in  such  a  form  that 
empirical  data  can  influence  them".  (Festinger,  1950,  p.  271). 396 
This  research  has  thrown  some  light  in  this  process  of 
theory  construction,  giving  empirical  evidence  on  the 
influence  of  segmental  geographical  disclosure 
practices  on  risk  profiles  of  UK  based  multinationals. 
But,  a  theory  is  a  prescriptive  or  descriptive  model 
whose  validity  is  independent  of  any  goal  structure, 
while  a  policy  requires  a  commitment  to  goals,  and 
therefore,  requires  a  policy  maker  to  make  value  judg- 
ments.  Policy  decisions  presumably  are  based  on  both 
an  understanding  of  theories  and  acceptance  of  a  set  of 
goals. 
"Since  the  selection  of  a  set  of  goals  is  inherently  a 
value  judgment,  most  debate  about  sets  of  goals  is  a 
debate  about  whose  value  judgments  are  best.  The 
resolution  of  the  problem  of  goals  must  be  resolved  by 
general  agreement,  not  by  proof  of  correctness.  " 
(May  and  Sundem,  1976,  p.  748). 
So  it  is  with  disclosure  policy. 
9.4  Summary 
Chapter  IX  has  been  concerned  with  the  implications  of 
the  results  of  the  tests  of  hypotheses  in  this  research. 
First  implications  for  market  efficiency  have  been 
explored.  It  has  been  shown  that  since  treatment  group 
average  betas  in  the  postintervention  period  were 
significantly  different  from  preintervention  period, 
there  was  likely  to  have  been  association  between 
segmental  geographical  disclosure  practice  and  systematic 
risk,  suggesting  that  segmental  geographical  data  had 
information  content.  It  has  been  further  shown  that  the 
impact  of  this  change  in  systematic  risk  profile  has  been 
abrupt  in  response  to  the  intervention  variable, 
suggesting  that  the  London  stock  market  was  likely  to 
have  been  efficient  in  a  semi-strong  sense  in  response 
to  segmental  geographical  information  about  multinationals. 397 
Implications  for  risk'assessment  have  been  discussed 
next.  It  has  been  shown  that  geographical  segment 
disclosure  is  associated  with  risk  assessment  benefits 
for  the  disclosing  companies  since  post-intervention 
period  betas  for  treatment  group  were  lower  in  response 
to  intervention. 
- 
Geographical  segment  disclosure  can 
result  in  lower  equity  cost  of  capital.  The  con- 
tribution  to  knowledge  of  this  research  lies  in  the 
following:  First,  market  efficiency,  and  risk  assessment 
have  been  explored  in  the  context  of  geographical 
segment  disclosure,  while  earlier  research  in  this 
area  have  been  almost  exclusively  in  the  the  context 
of  line  of  business  disclosure.  Second,  the  methodology 
applied  in  this  research  is  intervention  analysis  while 
cumulative  average  residual  methodology  has  been  the 
vogue  in  earlier  research.  Third,  while  most  of  the 
earlier  research  have  been  conducted  on  US  data,  this 
research  has  used  a  UK  database. 
Having  explored  the  implications  for  market  efficiency 
and  risk  assessment,  the  implications  for  disclosure 
policy  have  been  discussed  next.  The  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of'mandatory  and  voluntary  disclosures 
have  been  examined  in  the  context  of  agency  theory, 
incentive  signalling,  market  failure  and  nonmarket 
failure  theories.  It  was  concluded  that  due  to  the 
multiperson  nature  of  accounting  information,  and  its 
public  goods  characteristics,  any  recommendation  on 
disclosure  policy  will  have  to  be  settled  as  a  political 
choice  in  an  institutional  setting. 
Chapter  X  following  will  summarize  the  main  strands  of 
this  research,  and  point  to  areas  of  possible  further 
research. 398 
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CHAPTER  X 
CONCLUSION 
10.0  Introduction 
In  earlier  chapters  of  this  thesis  the  research 
problem  has  been  introduced  and  its  theoretical 
background  has  been  explored.  Prior  research  has 
been  cited  and  discussed,  the  database  and  research 
design  have  been  explained,  results  obtained  and 
implications  analysed. 
In  this  chapter  the  following  is  envisaged: 
First,  the  major  threads  of  this  research  will  be 
brought  together  in  summary  form  by  restating  the 
research  problem,  the  research  approach  used,  and 
results  obtained  from  this  research.  Implications 
of  this  research  and  its  contribution  to  knowledge 
will  be  discussed  next.  Following  this  the 
limitations  of  this  research  will  be  stated  and 
areas  for  future  research  will  be  discussed. 408 
10.1  Summary 
In  chapter  I.  the  problem  of  geographical  segment 
disclosure  has  been  introduced.  First,  the 
historical  development  of  financial  reporting  has 
been  traced,  and  the  importance  of  geographical 
segment  disclosure  in  the  context  of  conglomerate 
mergers  has  been  shown.  The  objective  of  this 
research  has  then  been  explained,  and  the  limited 
nature  of  the  objective  has  been  pointed  out. 
Following  this  the  possible  contribution  to  knowledge 
from  this  research  has  been  discussed. 
In  chapter  II9  the  relevance  of  user  needs  and  user 
environments  in  a  disclosure  framework  has  been 
explained,  following  which  the  concepts  of  inform- 
ation  in  a  quantitative  as  well  as  a  qualitative 
sense  has  been  explored.  Since  financial  inform- 
ation  can  affect  various  user  groups,  information 
problems  in  a  multi-person  setting  have  also  been 
discussed. 
Having  explained  the  information  concepts  in  chapter 
II9  the  issues  of  segmental  information  disclosure 
have  been  analysed  in  chapter  III.  Disclosure 
criteria  -  predictive  ability,  decision  usefulness, 
and  social  welfare  maximization  have  been  explained 
and  their  interdependence  have  been  emphasised. 
Geographical  segment  disclosure  being  the  special 409 
area  of  investigation  in  this  research,  the  need  for 
geographical  disclosure,  and  special  problems  related 
to  geographical  segment  disclosure  have  been  analysed 
separately. 
Capital  markets'  reaction  to  segmental  geographical 
disclosure  has  been  the  concern  of  the  next  two 
chapters.  Chapter  IV  has  explored  the  problems  of 
information  disclosure  in  the  capital  market  emphasising 
market  efficiency  concepts  and  tests,  and  shown  the 
relationship  between  the  efficient  markets  concept 
and  the  concept  of  economic  efficiency.  Chapter  V 
has  been  concerned  with  risk  assessment  in  capital 
markets.  The  concept  of  risk  has  been  explained, 
developments  in  portfolio  theory,  market  model,  and 
capital  asset  pricing  have  been  explained,  and  the 
special  problems  of  risk  measurement  in  a  geographical 
segment  disclosure  context  in  a  capital  asset  pricing 
framework  have  been  dealt  with.  The  relationships 
between  geographical  segment  disclosure  and  inter- 
national  capital  markets  have  also  been  explored. 
Prior  research  in  geographical  segment  disclosure  have 
been  discussed  in  chapter  VI  in  a  background  of  dis- 
closure  problem  in  general,  and  segmental  disclosure 
in  particular.  It  has  been  shown  that  prior  research 
in  the  area  of  geographical  segment  disclosure  have 
been  extremely  scarce,  and  support  for  the  benefits  of 
geographical  segment  disclosure  has  been  found  in  the 410 
international  capital  markets  literature. 
The  empirical  element  of  this  research  has  been 
introduced  in  chapter  VII  where  hypotheses,  database, 
and  experimental  design  have  been  explained.  It 
has  been  stated  that  the  two  hypotheses  of  this 
research  are  related  to  (i)  market  efficiency  and 
(ii)  improved  risk  assessment  benefits  stemming  from 
geographical  segment  information.  Reasons  for  the 
choice  of  the  database  have  then  been  discussed  and 
the  rationale  for  choosing  intervention  analysis  in 
preference  to  cumulative  residuals  analysis  have  been 
explained. 
Chapter  VIII  has  been  concerned  with  analyses  of  the 
data  to  test  the  hypotheses  using  the  experimental 
design  argued  for  and  explained  in  chapter  VII. 
Results  obtained  have  substantiated  both  the  hypo- 
theses  of  this  research;  support  has  been  found  for 
market  efficiency  in  a  semistrong  sense,  as  well  as 
for  risk  assessment  benefits  stemming  from  geographical 
segment  disclosure. 
In  chapter  IX  the  implications  of  the  findings  in 
chapter  VIII  have  been  analysed.  Implications  of 
the  findings  from  this  research  have  been  categorized 
under  three  headings:  implications  for  market 
efficiency;  implications  for  risk  assessment  in 
general  and  in  the  context  of  international  capital 411 
markets  in  particular;  and  the  implications  for 
disclosure  policy  formulation. 
This  then  is  an  outline  of  what  has  been  done  in 
this  research.  The  contribution  to  knowledge 
stemming  from  this  research  will  be  explained  in  the 
next  section. 
10.2  Contribution  to  Knowledge 
In  chapter  I,  (section  1.6).  expectations  about  con- 
tribution  to  knowledge  stemming  from  this  research 
were  stated.  In  this  section  the  realization  will 
be  matched  with  earlier  expectations  to  establish 
what  has  been  achieved. 
(i)  It  was  stated  that  segmental  disclosure  studies 
in  general  have  been  scarce  in  the  UK  context. 
Almost  all  prior  studies  of  an  analytical  nature  in 
this  area  have  used  US  databases.  One  of  the 
objectives  of  this  research  was  to  extend  disclosure 
studies  of  an  analytical  nature  to  a  UK  database. 
This  has  been  accomplished. 
(ii)  There  has  been  only  one  earlier  study  of  an 
analytical  nature  using  a  UK  database,  i.  e., 
Emmanuel  and  Pick  (1980),  which  was  concerned  with 
examining  the  forecasting  ability  of  segmental  data. 
There  has  been  no  study  in  the  UK  context  exploring 
the  risk  assessment  aspects  of  geographical  segment 
information.  Even  in  the  USA,  where  most  of  the 412 
disclosure  related  studies  in  the  capital  markets 
context  have  been  carried  out,  apart  from  Kinney 
(1972),  there  has  been  no  published  research  in  the 
area  of  geographical  segment  disclosure.  Even 
Kinney  was  not  exclusively  concerned  with  geographical 
segment  disclosure;  his  main  concern  was  disclosure 
of  a  line  of  business  variety. 
By  concentrating  on  segmental  geographical  disclosure, 
this  research  has  filled  a  gap  in  the  spectrum  of 
knowledge. 
(iii)  Similarly,  market  efficiency  studies  on  seg- 
mental  information  in  the  UK  has  not  been  undertaken 
in  the  past.  Earlier  studies  on  stock  market 
efficiency  in  the  UK  context  have  examined  weak  form 
efficiency  (Dryden,  1970a),  and  aemistrong  form 
efficiency  in  response  to  rights  issue  announcement 
(Marsh,  1979),  but  none  of  the  earlier  studios  have 
tested  the  efficiency  of  the  London  stock  market  in 
response  to  segmental  information.  By  examining  the 
London  stock  market's  reaction  to  geographical  segment 
information  this  research  has  contributed  to  market 
efficiency  tests  in  the  UK  context. 413 
(iy)  This  research  has  contributed  to  the  fund  of 
knowledge  by  substantiating  the  claim  that  the 
country  factor  is  an  important  influence  in  inter- 
national  capital  asset  pricing  (Lessard,  1974). 
(v)  The  establishment  of  the  country  influence  as  an 
important  variable  in  the  international  capital  market 
setting  provides  evidence  in  support  of  multifactor 
capital  asset  pricing  models,  such  as  Arbitrage 
Pricing  Theory  (Ross,  1976).  The  country  factor 
could  be  identified  as  one  of  the  'k'  factors  in  the 
linear  regression  in  arbitrage  pricing  (section  5.523). 
(vi:  )  On  methodology,  this  research  has  used  inter- 
vention  analysis  rather  than  cumulative  average 
residuals.  The  contribution  to  knowledge  from  this 
lies  in  providing  support  for  intervention  analysis 
as  a  plausible  method  of  research  in  testing  market 
efficiency,  alongside,  if  not  supplanting,  the 
popular  cumulative  average  residuals. 414 
Similarly,  it  has  used  moving  betas  to  generate  a 
time  series  of  betas,  and  beta  of  betas  to  test  the 
stability  of  the  beta  series.  Intervention  analysis, 
though  rare,  is  not  entirely  new  in  security  markets 
research.  Deakin  (1976)  for  instance,  has  used 
intervention  analysis  in  studying  the  behaviour  of 
security  returns.  Similarly,  moving  regression 
analysis,  though  rare,  is  not  entirely  new. 
Following  Brown,  Durbin  and  Evans  (1975),  Collins  and 
Simonds  (1979)  have  used  the  moving  regression  method. 
What  is  entirely  new,  however,  is  a  simple  techniques 
beta  of  betas  (section  8.222)  in  testing  the  stability 
of  beta  over  time.  Since  this  is  novel,  and  has  not 
been  used  previously  in  security  markets  research,  the  use 
of  beta  of  betas  can  be  construed  as  a  contribution 
to  knowledge. 
(vii  )  Finally,  on  policy  issues,  this  research  will 
have  contributed  to  the  fund  of  knowledge  having  re- 
examined  the  arguments  for  and  against  regulation, 
the  weaknesses  of  incentive  signalling,  and  the  costs 415 
of  market  and  non-market  failures.  This  will  add 
substance  to  the  issue  of  segmental  disclosure  in 
the  United  Kingdom. 
10.3  Limitations 
Limitations  of  this  research  are  of  two  typest 
A.  Limitations  stemming  from  the  limited  nature  of 
the  research  objective  outlined  in  chapter  I 
(section  1.4);  and 
B.  Limitations  inherent  in  the  methodology  used  in 
this  research. 
A.  Limitations  stemming  from  the  objectives  aret 
(i)  Restriction  in  the  scope  of  this  investigation  due 
to  being  solely  concerned  with  geographical  seg- 
ment  disclosure,  to  the  exclusion  of  line  of 
business  or  other  forms  of  disclosure.  While 
this  is  a  strength  of  this  research  in  that  it 
has  explored  a  comparatively  new  territory,  it 
is  also  a  weakness  in  that  it  has  searched  only  a 
small  part  of  the  problem. 
(ii)  Similarly,  this  research  has  been  concerned  with 
only  a  UK  database,  which  means  that  it  has 
external  validity  of  a  limited  nature,  especially 
when  the  inferences  are  extended  to  other  countries. 
(iii)  The  user  group  investigated  are  investors  only, 
to  the  exclusion'of  many  other  user  groups,  such 
as  employees,  trade  unions,  consumers,  regulatory 
authorities  and  many  others. 
(iv)  It  has  excluded  the  direct  consideration  of  the 
costs  of  segmental  disclosure  from  its  scope, 416 
concentrating  almost  exclusively  on  disclosure 
benefits.  A  complete  policy  analysis  demands 
that  costs  as  well  as  benefits  should  be  included 
in  the  scope  of  the  investigation. 
(v)  Even  while  investigating  disclosure  benefits,  this 
research  has  been  concerned  with  risk  assessment 
aspects  only,  to  the  exclusion  of  other  possible 
benefits,  such  as  the  improved  forecasting  ability 
of  segmental  data. 
(vi)  Even  within  the  realm  of  risk  measurement  aspects, 
this  research  has  only  used  the  two  parameter 
mean-variance  model  on  which  the  capital  asset 
pricing  model  is  based,  thus  excluding  the  higher 
moments  such  as  skewness  or  kurtosis  from  the  scope 
of  the  investigation. 
(vii  Finally,  to  avoid  'estimation  risk'  (section  5.511) 
which  demands  that  the  number  of  companies  in- 
vestigated  should  be  smaller  than  the  number  of 
data  points  in  the  time  series,  this  research  has 
investigated  only  thirty-six  companies,  tw©ntyon© 
in  the  treatment  group,  and  fifteen  in  the  control 
group.  A  larger  number  of  companies  could  make 
the  investigation  more  complete. 
All  these  limitations  have  been  necessary  to  keep  this 
research  within  a  manageable  size  and  in  recognition  of 
constraints  as  to  the  availability  of  data. 417 
B.  Limitations  stemming  from  the  research  methodology  are: 
(i)  Firstly,  market  related  risk,  beta  has  been 
analysed  to  derive  the  results  of  intervention 
effect.  Limitations  related  to  the  use  of  beta 
in  intervention  analysis  remain  the  limitations  of 
this  research.  Breen  and  Lerner  (1972).  have  in- 
vestigated  the  use  of  beta  in  regulatory  pro- 
ceedings  and  found  it  lacking  because  empirical 
measures  of  beta  are  known  to  depend  upon 
(a)  the  estimation  equation  that  is  usod; 
(b)  the  choice  of  market  index,  and  (c)  the 
specific  period  that  is  selected  for  beta  measure- 
ment.  There  are  other  problems  related  to  the 
use  of  beta  in  capital  markets  research  such  as 
the  stability  of  betas,  the  intervalling  effect, 
the  effect  of  nontrading,  and  others.  Those 
inherent  limitations  have  been  mentioned  earlier 
in  this  research  in  chapter  V  (section  5.5)" 
(ii)  Risk  assessment  of  multinationals  in  this  research 
have  been  accomplished  in  the  context  of  capital 
markets  theory.  It  is  possible  that  the  Capital 
Asset  Pricing  Model  may  not  be  whole  story  about 
risk  and  return  on  either  a  theoretical  or  an 
empirical  basis.  It  may  be  possible  to  evaluate 
disclosure  effort  outside  the  capital  market 
framework.  A  wider  social  or  organizational 
viewpoint  may  be  desirable  (Fi©ldman  and  March, 
1981). 418 
(iii)  Companies  chosen  in  the  sample  have  been  made 
mainly  on  the  grounds  of  practicality.  Since 
geographical  disclosure  was  being  investigated, 
the  companies  had  to  have  substantial  overseas 
business.  Companies  had  to  be  listed  con- 
tinuously  on  the  stock  market  during  the  nine 
year  period  of  investigation  to  be  able  to 
measure  the  disclosure  impact  on  their  stock 
prices.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  there 
are  biases  inherent  in  the  sample.  Such  biases 
could  include  survival  bias  and  large  company 
bias.  To  the  extent  that  such  biases  do  exist, 
they  constitute-further  limitations  of  'this 
research. 
(iv)  Finally,  there  is  a  limitation  due  to  the  choice 
between  a  type  I  and  a  type  II  error.  "In 
performing  statistical  tests,  there  exist 
chances  of  making  mistakes  due  to  the  fact  that 
purely  by  chance  a  sample  may  not  be  represent- 
ative  of  its  population  or  that  the  underlying 
distributions  of  the  dependent  variable  measure 
do  not  confirm  to  those  assumed  in  the 
statistical  tests  employed"  (Collins  and  Dont, 
1979,  p.  17).  The  possibility  of  making  errors 
due  to  inappropriability  of  the  method  used  in 
this  research  has  been  reduced  by  applying 
stability  tests  and  tests  of  autocorrolation  to 
the  beta  series  (section  8.22).  But  the 419 
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possibility  that  the  sample  of  thirty-six  com- 
panies  chosen  may  not  be  representative  of  the 
population  remains. 
Errors  resulting  from  statistical  testing  in 
this  research  can  be  of  type  I  or  type  II  variety. 
Type  I  error  would  occur  when  it  is  decided  that 
geographical  segment  disclosure  affects  risk 
profile,  when  it  really  does  not.  Type  II 
error  would  occur  in  failing  to  find  an  effect 
when  one  exists.  If  there  are  errors  in  this 
research,  it  would  be  of  type  I  variety. 
To  the  extent  that  type  I  error  might  remain, 
this  is  a  limitation  of,  this  research.  However, 
it  is  not  possible  by  applying  statistical  tests 
to  eliminate  both  type  I  and  type  II  errors  at 
the  same  time.  "In  any  statistical  inference 
a  danger  exists  of  committing  one  of  two  alter- 
native  types  of  errors"  (Siegel,  1956,  p.  9). 
Control  should  be  applied  to  that  error  which 
would  have  the  greatest  cost  wore  the  error 
realized. 
If  it  is  determined  incorrectly  that  there  is  a 
market  effect  j  when  in  fact  there  is  nonol  then 
financial  statement  users  will  have  to  boar  the 
costs  of  additional  information  production,  and 
diseconomies  will  result  from  typo  I  error.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  typo  II  error  is  committed 420 
i.  e.,  one  fails  to  find  significant  change  in  risk 
profiles  as  a  consequence  of  geographical  segment 
disclosure,  when  there-existed-such  a  change,  then 
the  potential  consequences  are  likely  to  be  more 
costly  than  would  be  the  case  with  a  type  I  error. 
Thus  type  II  error  is  likely  to  be  more  costly  from 
societal  viewpoint  than  type  I  error.  This  is  so 
in  the  case  of  geographical  segment  disclosure  issue 
because  in  most  instances  the  information  is  likely 
to  be  available  in  companies,  and  the  additional  cost 
of  disclosing  existing  information  may  not  be  all 
that  great  in  spite  of  potential  competitive  dis- 
advantages.  This,  however,  is  subjective,  and  not 
necessarily  conclusive. 
Control  of  type  II  error  is  difficult,  but  not  im- 
possible.  One  of  the  ways  the  control  of  type  II 
error  can  be  achieved  is  by  exercising  due  care  in 
selecting  appropriate  'treatment'  and  'control'  group 
firms.  This,  hopefully,  has  boon  achieved  by  dis- 
tinguishing  companies  as  to  their  geographical  segment 
disclosure  practices  (section  7.2).  A  second  way  of 
minimizing  a  type  II  error  is  to  use  test  procedures 
which  are  appropriate.  Moving  regression  analysis, 
stability  tests,  and  tests  for  serial  correlation 
(section  8.22)  have  been  performed  to  achieve  this. 421 
The  influence  of  extraneous  variables  have  also  been 
tested  by  examining  the  influences  of  changes  of  rates 
of  return  on  equity,  and  changes  in  financial  lev©rag© 
on  moving  betas  (section  8.4). 
The  possibility  of  type  II  error  remaining  has  boon 
minimized.  The  possibility  of  type  I  error  remains. 
But  the  limitations  of  this  research  due  to  the 
existence  of  type  I  error  remaining  has  been  con- 
sidered  to  be  less  costly  than  the  possibility  of 
type  II  error  remaining.  Support  for  this  view  of 
costs  of  type  I  and  type  II  errors  can  be  found  in 
Collins  and  Dent  (1979). 
10.4  Areas  for  Future  Research 
Areas  for  future  research  as  a  sequel  to  this  research 
study  can  be  grouped  into  four  categorical 
A.  Within  the  framework  of  financial  reporting. 
B..  Extensions  in  the  context  of  international 
capital  markets. 
C.  Within  the  capital  markets  framework,  but  outside 
the  framework  of  the  Capital  Asset  Pricint  Model. 
D.  Beyond  the  framework  of  capital  markots  research. 
A.  Within  the  framework  of  financial  reporting 
extensions  to  current  research  can  be  a3 
follows$ 
(i)  By  eliminating  some  of  the  restrictive 
assumptions  of  this  research  such  as 422 
increasing  the  number  of  companies  in  the 
sample,  by  including  companies  from  many 
different  countries  in  the  sample,  by 
selecting  a  different  intervention  point, 
by  examining  line  of  business  disclosure  in 
a  framework  of  intervention  analysis,  and  by 
investigating  a  further  control  group, 
additional  evidences  could  be  obtained 
which  would  extend  the  external  validity 
of  this  research. 
(ii)  By  investigating  disclosure  costs,  such  as 
costs  of  competitive  disadvantages,  costs  of 
information  production  and  dissemination, 
possible  agency  costs,  and  costs  of  non  dis. 
closure  by  comparing  costs  of  equity 
capital  and  costs  of  obtaining  credit 
between  disclosing  and  nondisclosing  com- 
panies  over  time,  this  research  could  be 
extended  and  be  helpful  in  policy  formulation 
in  the  area  of  financial  reporting. 
(iii)  In  the  context  of  disclosure  in  general, 
Cerf  (1961),  used  a  consensus  study  (6.12) 
which  has  been  used  by  Singhvi  and  D©sai 
(1971)  and  others  to  establish  a  disclosure 
index.  In  the  context  of  segmental  dis. 
closure  it  would  be  possible  to  establish  a 
similar  disclosure  index.  This  would  help 
in  reducing  many  of  the  problems  of  segment 423 
identification,  segment  materiality,  and 
meaningfulness;  it  would  also  help  in 
deciding  which  items  are  worth  disclosing 
and  which  are  not.  A  questionnaire  could  be 
designed  listing  a  large  number  of  possible 
items  that  could  be  disclosed  in  the  context 
of  segmental  disclosure.  A  voting  mechanism 
could  be  used  to  identify  which  items  are 
important.  Perhaps  some  kind  of  factor 
analysis  or  similar  multivariate  analysis 
could  be  used  to  establish  discriminating 
power  of  each  of  these  possible  disclosable 
items. 
B.  Extensions  to  this  research  in  the  context  of 
international  capital  markets  are  envisaged  as 
follows: 
(i)  A  comparative  analysis  could  be  conducted  by 
comparing  line  of  business  disclosure  with 
geographical  disclosure.  Information  about 
geographical  segments  can,  in  many  cases, 
include  line  of  business  information  when  a 
particular  subsidiary  is  engaged  in  a  single 
product  activity;  similarly  line  of  business 
disclosure  can  in  some  cases  include  goo- 
graphical  information.  In  the  international 
capital  markets  literature  the  Grubol  (1968) 
and  Agmon  (1973).  debate  has  been  about  whether 
there  exists  benefits  from  geographical 424 
diversification.  It  has  earlier  been 
stated  in  this  research  (section  9.2)  that 
to  be  able  to  demonstrate  conclusively  that 
international  capital  markets  are  s©gmontod, 
it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  benefit 
from  international  diversification  is  Creator 
than  uninational  line  of  business  diversif- 
ication  for  matched  pairs. 
This  could  be  achieved  as  followss  First 
companies  of  similar  size  and  similar  pro- 
duct  groups  (according  to  standard  industrial 
classification)  could  be  selected,  but  there 
would  be  one  characteristic  which  would  be 
different  between  the  control  group  and  the 
treatment  group.  One  group  would  be 
entirely  uninational,  while  the  other  group 
would  have  to  be  transnational.  If  it 
could  be  shown  that  the  risk  characteristics 
of  the  uninational  companies  are  significantly 
different  from  that  of  transnational  companies, 
then  some  conclusive  evidence  regarding 
segmentation  of  international  capital 
markets  would  emerge. 
(ii)  A  further  extension  in  the  area  of  inter- 
national  capital  market3  would  bo  invostigating 
industry  and  country  influences  on  UK  based 
multinational's  systematic  risk  profiles, 425 
C.  Within  capital  markets  research,  but  outside 
the  framework  of  the  Capital  Asset  Pricing 
Model  this  research  could  be  extended  by 
examining  the  higher  moments  such  as  skewness 
or  kurtosis  differences  between  disclosing 
and  nondisclosing  companies  over  time, 
Similarly  it  would  be  possible  to  investigate 
the  total  variance  and  not  just  systematic 
risk  differences  between  disclosing  and  non- 
disclosing  companies,  in  the  same  manner  as 
Kinney  (1972). 
D.  Beyond  the  framework  of  capital  markets  but 
within  the  framework  of  financial  reporting, 
this  research  could  be  extended  by  investigating 
actual  or  potential  costs  and  benefits  to  user 
groups  other  than  investors. 
Such  extension  could  be  in  the  area  of  employee 
reporting  for  instance,  and  could  be  conducted 
in  an  organization  theory  context. 1  426 
10.5  Concluding  Remarks 
This  research  has  examined  geographical  segment 
disclosure  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  context 
of  diversification  and  mergers.  Theoretical 
analyses  of  this  research  have  explored  information 
theory  and  the  theory  of  capital  markets.  Additional 
support  in  terms  of  theoretical  development  has  been 
found  in  the  international  capital  markets  literature. 
The  limited  objective  of  this  research  has  been  to 
investigate  risk  assessment  aspects  of  UK  based 
multinationals  disclosing  geographical  segment 
information.  Empirical  investigation  in  this 
research  has  shown  that  geographical  segment  data 
are  likely  to  have  information  content;  that  the 
London  stock  market  is  likely  to  have  been  efficient 
in  a  semi-strong  sense  in  response  to  geographical 
segment  information;  and  that  geographical  segmental 
information  disclosure  is  likely  to  be  associated 
with  .  overall  risk  reduction'  for  disclosing  companies. 
The  contribution  to  knowledge  stemming  from  this 
research  lies  in  its  conduct  of  market  efficiency 
tests  in  the  UK  context  of  which  there  have  been  so 
few;  in  being  the  first  ever  study  to  test  the  dis- 
closure  benefits  hypothesis  for  geographical 
information  in  the  context  of  the  United  Kingdom; 
in  the  use  of  relatively  novel  methodology  in  the 
form  of  intervention  analysis  and  beta  of  betas; 427 
and  in  providing  evidence  bearing  on  the  segmentation 
of  international  capital  markets  using  UK  based 
multinationals. 
Areas  of  future  research  can  be  seen 
field  of  financial  reporting,  in  the 
national  capital  markets  and  beyond. 
implications  of  this  research  can  be 
the  potential  contribution  to  the  del 
disclosure  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
to  exist  in  the 
field  of  inter- 
The  policy 
seen  to  lie  in 
bate  on  segmental 428 
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